If you have a lot of RAM, using only default percentages could
potentially leave some RAM unused. These lua functions
allow more precise control over the limits.
This was always present, it just wasn't something we provided a syntax
to specify.
max_burst allows you to control how quickly your throttle budget will
be consumed over the throttle time period.
The default max_burst is equal to the limit you specify, allowing
the full budget to be instantaneously consumed.
refs: https://github.com/KumoCorp/kumomta/issues/326
This controls what we do in an smtp session when we experience a
disconnect during message sending; do we give up on the session,
continue with the connection plan, or try to connect to the same
host again and continue sending any additional messages there?
The timer object can track latencies in lua code and is helpful for
ad-hoc, explicit "profiling" in your policy script: the latencies are
exported via a prometheus histogram.
When used together with an Opportunistic TLS mode, if the handshake
or subsequent EHLO fails, we will re-connect to the current host
and disable TLS.
This is implemented as a recursive solution, which I'm not totally
keen on, but the recursion is limited to a single level so it's
not so bad.
This option should be used with caution, and ideally only
for trusted networks.
The purpose is to absorb the latency of post-DATA processing
and hide it from the trust injector.
It defers processing that would normally happen in smtp_server_message_received
and instead will, at some (ideally) near-future time trigger an
smtp_server_message_deferred_inject event instead.
This will marginally increase your average injection latency but should
clamp your worst case injection latency much lower because the outliers
will not happen inline with the injecting client.
I was halfway through adding special purpose options for this,
but I realized that skip_hosts already exists for this function
and is much more flexible.
Add an example to the docs to show how it can be done.
The same technique can be used to skip using IPv4 if that is
desired (despite being impractical with the current state
of SMTP on ipv6), but using `0.0.0.0/0` as an entry in the
skip_hosts list.
closes: https://github.com/KumoCorp/kumomta/issues/317
This provides a simpler and easier to use option for dealing with broken
TLS.
The back story here is that sites with broken TLS ideally should result
in a TLS failure and return us to a clear text SMTP session that we
could use for the remainder if we are in opportunistic mode.
In practice, it's not that simple:
* The rustls implementation provides into_fallible() to enable this mode
of operation, but certain handshake errors result in the session being
unusable once the failed handshake has been communicated
* Openssl is perfectly capable of operating this way, but the Rust
ecosystem bindings do not expose the handshake failure in a way that
allows the clear text session to continue
If we wanted to allow the session to communicate with the failed host in
clear text we will need to make a new separate connection for this case.
There is a concern that this will bump a connection counter in a
reputation system implemented on the destination host, but it is
reasonable to wonder if a site that has broken TLS would be sufficiently
sophisticated to employ such a system.
If we did want to allow making a new connection to the same host, it is
a bit awkward to fit into our current mx host connection plan system.
So, with all that in mind, this commit tries a slightly different
approach:
* A new `remember_broken_tls = "3 days"` field in the egress path config
will enable an in-process cache to keep track of the site_names that
advertise STARTTLS and for which we failed to handshake, or failed to
re-EHLO after a handshake.
* That will cause the connection plan to move on to subsequent hosts, if
any. It won't cause us to re-attempt the current host.
* Subsequent connection attempts (which may be immediate if there are
additional hosts in the current session plan) will consult the
broken tls cache for the site, and use that to decide on the
availability of TLS
* If we previously encountered broken TLS, we will effectively treat
the site as not advertising TLS in EHLO, but will generate an
appropriate error message if TLS is Required.
Since we track the breakage in a cache with per-item TTLs, you
can set the duration as appropriate to your situation.
The cache will be cleared when the process is restarted.
There is no sharing of the cache between nodes.
This is a much lower complexity solution than the existing workaround
using TSA automation rules to override the site with Disabled TLS, and
will help to minimize the number of rules for that purpose in the TSA
daemon.
Note that this commit doesn't change any behavior; we can do a followup
commit to replace those TSA rules with this mechanism.
There's big explanation about this in the included docs change.
The TL;DR is: we can now optionally queue the request and generate it
asynchronously wrt. the incoming injection request.
There's also a throttle that can be used to constrain this, because
the asynchronous submission disconnects the injection request from
any kind of back pressure that we'd otherwise have to indicate to
the injector that there might be load related issues.
This enables shaping based on MX hostname and domain name matching
rules.
At a lower level, this is supported via two new options:
additional_connection_limits and additional_message_rate_throttles that
allow specifying arbitrarily scoped named limits and throttles, which
in addition to allowing provider-based rules in the shaping helper,
allow things like global or other more esoteric scoping of constraints.
closes: https://github.com/KumoCorp/kumomta/pull/260
This commit adds disk space monitors for the configured spool
and local log file locations.
Incoming messages will be rejected when the available space is below
the configured amount.
The default minimum is 10%.
Wez Furlong
Ryan Bonnell
Mike Hillyer
Laurent Marchaud