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6
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
  ryan-haynesandRyan Haynes
|
d316cbbed4 |
fix!: support opt-in PKCE for device-code login (#4747)
## Problem and change
Some Keycloak client policies require S256 PKCE during device-code
login. Sending those parameters unconditionally breaks interoperability
with providers that expect standard RFC 8628 requests.
Configure device login with `OAuthFlow::DeviceCode(DeviceCodeOptions)`,
following the existing authorization-code options pattern.
`DeviceCodeOptions::new()` keeps PKCE disabled; `.use_pkce(true)` sends
an S256 challenge during device authorization and its matching verifier
during token polling. There is no automatic downgrade, and enabling PKCE
preserves the existing token-cache identity. Python, Node, and CLI
conversions retain ordinary device login without PKCE.
OIDC discovery and token requests now include a versioned User-Agent.
`env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION")` is expanded at compile time and embeds the
version in the binary; no Cargo environment variable is needed when
running an installed binary or native binding.
The supported-flows guide documents the Rust-only device PKCE option and
its default.
## Rust API migration
BREAKING CHANGE: `OAuthFlow::DeviceCode` now carries
`DeviceCodeOptions`. Replace construction with
`OAuthFlow::DeviceCode(DeviceCodeOptions::new())` or
`OAuthFlow::DeviceCode(Default::default())`, and match with
`OAuthFlow::DeviceCode(_)`. Import `DeviceCodeOptions` from
`lancedb::remote` to opt into PKCE. Python and TypeScript public APIs
are unchanged.
## Validation
- `cargo +1.97.1 test --locked -p lancedb --features remote --lib
remote::`: 679 passed, including PKCE-on/off polling, option defaults,
User-Agent headers, and cache identity.
- `cargo +1.97.1 test --locked -p lancedb-python -p lancedb-nodejs --lib
test_device_code_conversion`: both native-binding conversion tests
passed.
- `cargo +1.97.1 test --locked -p lancedb --features remote --doc
remote::`: 6 passed, including the new options example and updated
session examples.
- `cargo +1.97.1 test --locked -p lancedb-cli --lib auth::tests::`: 11
passed.
- `cargo +1.97.1 fmt --all -- --check` and `git diff --check`: passed.
- A compiled version-string check ran successfully with
`CARGO_PKG_VERSION` unset at runtime.
---------
Co-authored-by: Ryan Haynes <ryan.haynes@lancedb.com>
|
||
  Jack YeandXuanwo
|
f3ef21b8ca |
feat: use oauth2 crate for OAuth with configurable client auth (#4181)
Stacked on #4173 (`jack/restore-oidc-flows`, base branch mirrored to this repo so the diff shows only this change); context from review: https://github.com/lancedb/lancedb/pull/4173#issuecomment-5674048100. Rebase to `main` once #4173 and #4179 merge. ## What moved to the `oauth2` crate (5.0, no default features) - Authorization URL generation and CSRF state (`authorize_url`, `CsrfToken`) - PKCE S256 challenge/verifier generation and code exchange - Client-credentials, authorization-code, refresh-token, and device-code grant request construction - Device authorization request and the device token polling loop (`authorization_pending`, `slow_down` +5s, expiry deadline, denial, network backoff capped at 10s) - Standard success/error response parsing (`RequestTokenError`) - Token-endpoint client authentication and standards-compliant parameter encoding (RFC 6749 2.3.1 Basic encoding) LanceDB keeps ownership of OIDC discovery (compared `openidconnect`: no measurable win for our 3-field metadata + strict validation, at real dependency cost), HTTPS-or-loopback endpoint enforcement, the loopback callback server, browser/stderr prompts, token caching and refresh orchestration, and the dedicated hardened Azure IMDS source, which is unchanged. ## Client authentication methods New `ClientAuthMethod` enum (`none` | `client_secret_basic` | `client_secret_post`), exposed in Rust, Python, and Node. Unset resolves to `client_secret_basic` when a secret is present (RFC 6749 2.3.1 recommendation and the normal Okta confidential-app default, so a default Okta app works without weakening its configuration) and to `none` for public clients (PKCE/device). Explicit `none` with a secret, or basic/post without one, is rejected. The method applies to client credentials, code exchange, refresh, and device requests. Deliberate behavior change: confidential clients previously always sent the secret in the POST body; they now default to Basic (Keycloak accepts both). No `audience`/`resource` parameters were added: the supported target is an Okta custom authorization server with the API audience configured server-side, so client-provided audience parameters are unnecessary; `add_extra_param` support exists if a concrete provider contract ever needs them. ## Device polling behavior changes (deliberate, tested) - The first token poll now happens immediately rather than after one interval (RFC 8628 allows both). - Transient failures (HTTP 429, 5xx, `temporarily_unavailable`, network errors) now retry with exponential backoff capped at 10s instead of retrying at the fixed interval; polling never spins faster than once per second even if a server reports a zero interval. ## Security and compatibility - Issuer and discovered endpoints (and device verification URIs) still require HTTPS except explicit loopback HTTP, enforced before any crate URL type is built - Token HTTP client keeps the hardened redirect policy that refuses insecure redirect targets; regression test added - Errors never embed raw response bodies (avoids leaking tokens through parse failures); all credential types stay redacted in Debug - Transient conditions (429/5xx/`temporarily_unavailable`) remain retryable in device polling and hard errors elsewhere; refresh keeps rotation and reauthentication semantics - Existing public APIs stay source-compatible except the added `OAuthConfig.client_auth_method` field ## Tests Rust: client-auth methods across code exchange/refresh/client-credentials/device (none/basic/post), auth-method resolution and validation, transient device retries, denial/expiry, redirect rejection, malformed-response leak check, PKCE URL assertions, redaction. Python and Node: enum values, conversion, unknown-method errors, config defaults. Manual Okta validation recipe (no automated Okta credentials): create a custom authorization server with an API audience, one confidential web app (Basic) for authorization-code, one native app (PKCE, no secret), one native device app; point `issuer_url` at the custom server, set `client_auth_method` only for the POST-required case; verify token acquisition, refresh after expiry, and `x-lancedb-credential-type: oidc` against a LanceDB deployment. Never commit tenant URLs or secrets. Co-authored-by: Xuanwo <github@xuanwo.io> |
||
|
Xuanwo
|
161f81276d |
chore: update lance dependency to v13.0.0-beta.3 (#4197)
Update the Rust workspace and Java Lance dependencies to [v13.0.0-beta.3](https://github.com/lance-format/lance/releases/tag/v13.0.0-beta.3), which includes the nullable-list encoding fix in lance-format/lance#9268. Also resolve existing strict Clippy diagnostics in crate-private OAuth modules and the Python token-cache conversion, without changing effective visibility. Validated the rebuilt Python SDK with nullable and nested lists: Match/Phrase searches preserve document coordinates before and after appending data and optimizing the table. |
||
 Colin Patrick McCabe
|
3a1d3be256 |
feat(oidc): support resource and audience (#4193)
Support configuring resource and audience for OAuth authorization, token exchange, and refresh requests. |
||
|
Jack YeandXuanwo
|
2f88b71c21 |
feat: add persistent OAuth token cache and session APIs (#4182)
Stacked on #4173 (diff includes it until that merges; will rebase after). Addresses the token-cache part of [Colin's review](https://github.com/lancedb/lancedb/pull/4173#issuecomment-5674048100). Adds an explicit, opt-in persistent OAuth token cache shared by Rust, Python, and Node clients, plus `login` / `status` / `logout` session APIs, so short-lived processes (CLIs, scripts, notebooks) reuse one session instead of restarting a browser or device flow on every start. - **Opt-in and minimal**: existing callers stay memory-only and lazy. Only refresh tokens are persisted (never access tokens, never client secrets), so there are no local token-expiry decisions to get wrong when clocks move. Each process start performs one silent refresh grant. - **Hardened file backend**: private directory (`0700`), per-record files (`0600`), owner validation, symlink rejection, and atomic `rename` replacement. Corrupt, truncated, unknown-version, or permission-invalid records fail with actionable errors naming the file. Native keyring backends were evaluated (keyring crate routes Linux through D-Bus/zbus: heavy deps, headless/CI flakiness) and are deferred; the file store is the explicit opt-in, not a downgrade from a keyring. - **Cache key**: SHA-256 of the canonical identity (issuer, client ID, sorted/de-duplicated scopes, flow, public/confidential), so no secret appears in a filename and distinct identities never collide. Versioned record schema (`version: 1`). One record per identity: last login wins, documented. - **Cross-process rotation locking**: per-key `fs4` file lock (`flock` / `LockFileEx`) around the refresh critical section — acquire, reread the durable record, refresh exactly once, atomically store the rotated refresh token, release. The OS releases locks on process death, so crashes cannot strand stale locks. Only confirmed `invalid_grant`/`invalid_token` deletes a record and reauthenticates; transport, 5xx, 429, and parse failures retain it. - **Session APIs**: `OAuthSession::login/status/logout` in Rust, `lancedb.remote.OAuthSession` (async) in Python, `OAuthSession` class in Node. `status` returns non-secret metadata only. `logout` removes only the local credential — provider revocation (RFC 7009) is a deliberate follow-up, and local logout never terminates browser SSO. Azure managed identity is rejected for persistence (machine identity stays in memory); client credentials have nothing refreshable to persist and stay memory-only. - No CLI binary exists in this repo, so this ships library APIs plus doc examples in all three languages. Tests: Rust unit + mock-IdP integration (cache-key canonicalization/separation, record versioning/corruption/truncation/symlink/owner/perms, lock serialization + release, two concurrent providers proving no `invalid_grant` and correct rotation, transient-failure retention, `invalid_grant` delete + reauthenticate, login/status/logout lifecycle, client-credentials no-op, IMDS rejection, secret redaction); Python lifecycle + a true two-subprocess cross-process reuse test (second process refreshes once, never hits the device endpoint); Node lifecycle + device-flow login test. Local builds were skipped in development; CI validates all bindings. --------- Co-authored-by: Xuanwo <github@xuanwo.io> |
||
|
Jack Ye
|
39e819b6a7 |
feat(python): expose OAuth connection config (#3586)
Expose the merged Rust OAuth header provider through the Python async connection path. Includes: - Python OAuthConfig and OAuthFlowType public config objects - PyO3 conversion into the Rust OAuthConfig - connect_async(oauth_config=...) plumbing - repr redaction coverage for client_secret Local validation: cargo fmt --all; ruff format/check on touched Python files. |