- Wired up filtering on VPC endpoints
- Wired up block access from public internet / VPC depending on per
project flag
- Added cache invalidation for VPC endpoints (partially based on PR from
Raphael)
- Removed BackendIpAllowlist trait
---------
Co-authored-by: Ivan Efremov <ivan@neon.tech>
Now that we construct the TLS client config for cancellation as well as
connect, it feels appropriate to construct the same config once and
re-use it elsewhere. It might also help should #7500 require any extra
setup, so we can easily add it to all the appropriate call sites.
## Problem
To debug issues with TLS connections there's no easy way to decrypt
packets unless a client has special support for logging the keys.
## Summary of changes
Add TLS session keys logging to proxy via `SSLKEYLOGFILE` env var gated
by flag.
As the title says, I updated the lint rules to no longer allow unwrap or
unimplemented.
Three special cases:
* Tests are allowed to use them
* std::sync::Mutex lock().unwrap() is common because it's usually
correct to continue panicking on poison
* `tokio::spawn_blocking(...).await.unwrap()` is common because it will
only error if the blocking fn panics, so continuing the panic is also
correct
I've introduced two extension traits to help with these last two, that
are a bit more explicit so they don't need an expect message every time.
Follow up to #9803
See https://github.com/neondatabase/cloud/issues/14378
In collaboration with @cloneable and @awarus, we sifted through logs and
simply demoted some logs to debug. This is not at all finished and there
are more logs to review, but we ran out of time in the session we
organised. In any slightly more nuanced cases, we didn't touch the log,
instead leaving a TODO comment.
I've also slightly refactored the sql-over-http body read/length reject
code. I can split that into a separate PR. It just felt natural after I
switched to `read_body_with_limit` as we discussed during the meet.
The overall idea of the PR is to rename a few types to make their
purpose more clear, reduce abstraction where not needed, and move types
to to more better suited modules.
It seems the ecosystem is not so keen on moving to aws-lc-rs as it's
build setup is more complicated than ring (requiring cmake).
Eventually I expect the ecosystem should pivot to
https://github.com/ctz/graviola/tree/main/rustls-graviola as it
stabilises (it has a very simply build step and license), but for now
let's try not have a headache of juggling two crypto libs.
I also noticed that tonic will just fail with tls without a default
provider, so I added some defensive code for that.
The forever ongoing effort of juggling multiple versions of rustls :3
now with new crypto library aws-lc.
Because of dependencies, it is currently impossible to not have both
ring and aws-lc in the dep tree, therefore our only options are not
updating rustls or having both crypto backends enabled...
According to benchmarks run by the rustls maintainer, aws-lc is faster
than ring in some cases too <https://jbp.io/graviola/>, so it's not
without its upsides,
preliminary for #9270
The auth::Backend didn't need to be in the mega ProxyConfig object, so I
split it off and passed it manually in the few places it was necessary.
I've also refined some of the uses of config I saw while doing this
small refactor.
I've also followed the trend and make the console redirect backend it's
own struct, same as LocalBackend and ControlPlaneBackend.
```shell
$ cargo run -p proxy --bin proxy -- --auth-backend=web --webauth-confirmation-timeout=5s
```
```
$ psql -h localhost -p 4432
NOTICE: Welcome to Neon!
Authenticate by visiting within 5s:
http://localhost:3000/psql_session/e946900c8a9bc6e9
psql: error: connection to server at "localhost" (::1), port 4432 failed: Connection refused
Is the server running on that host and accepting TCP/IP connections?
connection to server at "localhost" (127.0.0.1), port 4432 failed: ERROR: Disconnected due to inactivity after 5s.
```
## Problem
#8736 is getting too big. splitting off some simple changes here
## Summary of changes
Local proxy wont always be using tls, so make it optional. Local proxy
wont be using ws for now, so make it optional. Remove a dead config var.
## Problem
1. Hard to correlate startup parameters with the endpoint that provided
them.
2. Some configurations are not needed in the `ProxyConfig` struct.
## Summary of changes
Because of some borrow checker fun, I needed to switch to an
interior-mutability implementation of our `RequestMonitoring` context
system. Using https://docs.rs/try-lock/latest/try_lock/ as a cheap lock
for such a use-case (needed to be thread safe).
Removed the lock of each startup message, instead just logging only the
startup params in a successful handshake.
Also removed from values from `ProxyConfig` and kept as arguments.
(needed for local-proxy config)
## Problem
#7809 - we do not support sslnegotiation=direct
#7810 - we do not support negotiating down the protocol extensions.
## Summary of changes
1. Same as postgres, check the first startup packet byte for tls header
`0x16`, and check the ALPN.
2. Tell clients using protocol >3.0 to downgrade
Before this PR, `RemoteStorageConfig::from_toml` would support
deserializing an
empty `{}` TOML inline table to a `None`, otherwise try `Some()`.
We can instead let
* in proxy: let clap derive handle the Option
* in PS & SK: assume that if the field is specified, it must be a valid
RemtoeStorageConfig
(This PR started with a much simpler goal of factoring out the
`deserialize_item` function because I need that in another PR).
## Problem
Computes that are healthy can manage many connection attempts at a time.
Unhealthy computes cannot. We initially handled this with a fixed
concurrency limit, but it seems this inhibits pgbench.
## Summary of changes
Support AIMD for connect_to_compute lock to allow varying the
concurrency limit based on compute health
## Problem
Despite making password hashing async, it can still take time away from
the network code.
## Summary of changes
Introduce a custom threadpool, inspired by rayon. Features:
### Fairness
Each task is tagged with it's endpoint ID. The more times we have seen
the endpoint, the more likely we are to skip the task if it comes up in
the queue. This is using a min-count-sketch estimator for the number of
times we have seen the endpoint, resetting it every 1000+ steps.
Since tasks are immediately rescheduled if they do not complete, the
worker could get stuck in a "always work available loop". To combat
this, we check the global queue every 61 steps to ensure all tasks
quickly get a worker assigned to them.
### Balanced
Using crossbeam_deque, like rayon does, we have workstealing out of the
box. I've tested it a fair amount and it seems to balance the workload
accordingly
## Problem
Some HTTP client connections can stay open for quite a long time.
## Summary of changes
When there are too many HTTP client connections, pick a random
connection and gracefully cancel it.
## Problem
Usually, the connection itself is quite fast (bellow 10ms for p999:
https://neonprod.grafana.net/goto/aOyn8vYIg?orgId=1).
It doesn't make a lot of sense to wait for a lot of time for the lock,
if it takes a lot of time to acquire it, probably, something goes wrong.
We also spawn a lot of retries, but they are not super helpful (0 means
that it was connected successfully, 1, most probably, that it was
re-request of the compute node address
https://neonprod.grafana.net/goto/J_8VQvLIR?orgId=1). Let's try to keep
a small number of retries.
## Problem
Too many connect_compute attempts can overwhelm postgres, getting the
connections stuck.
## Summary of changes
Limit number of connection attempts that can happen at a given time.
## Problem
Currently we cannot configure retries, also, we don't really have
visibility of what's going on there.
## Summary of changes
* Added cli params
* Improved logging
* Decrease the number of retries: it feels like most of retries doesn't
help. Once there would be better errors handling, we can increase it
back.
## Problem
Many users have access to ipv6 subnets (eg a /64). That gives them 2^64
addresses to play with
## Summary of changes
Truncate the address to /64 to reduce the attack surface.
Todo:
~~Will NAT64 be an issue here? AFAIU they put the IPv4 address at the
end of the IPv6 address. By truncating we will lose all that detail.~~
It's the same problem as a host sharing IPv6 addresses between clients.
I don't think it's up to us to solve. If a customer is getting DDoSed,
then they likely need to arrange a dedicated IP with us.
## Problem
Actually read redis events.
## Summary of changes
This is revert of https://github.com/neondatabase/neon/pull/7350 +
fixes.
* Fixed events parsing
* Added timeout after connection failure
* Separated regional and global redis clients.
## Problem
Proxy doesn't know about existing endpoints.
## Summary of changes
* Added caching of all available endpoints.
* On the high load, use it before going to cplane.
* Report metrics for the outcome.
* For rate limiter and credentials caching don't distinguish between
`-pooled` and not
TODOs:
* Make metrics more meaningful
* Consider integrating it with the endpoint rate limiter
* Test it together with cplane in preview
## Problem
https://github.com/neondatabase/cloud/issues/9642
## Summary of changes
1. Make `EndpointRateLimiter` generic, renamed as `BucketRateLimiter`
2. Add support for claiming multiple tokens at once
3. Add `AuthRateLimiter` alias.
4. Check `(Endpoint, IP)` pair during authentication, weighted by how
many hashes proxy would be doing.
TODO: handle ipv6 subnets. will do this in a separate PR.
## Problem
Support of IAM Roles for Service Accounts for authentication.
## Summary of changes
* Obtain aws 15m-long credentials
* Retrieve redis password from credentials
* Update every 1h to keep connection for more than 12h
* For now allow to have different endpoints for pubsub/stream redis.
TODOs:
* PubSub doesn't support credentials refresh, consider using stream
instead.
* We need an AWS role for proxy to be able to connect to both: S3 and
elasticache.
Credentials obtaining and connection refresh was tested on xenon
preview.
https://github.com/neondatabase/cloud/issues/10365
## Problem
Not really a problem, just refactoring.
## Summary of changes
Separate authenticate from wake compute.
Do not call wake compute second time if we managed to connect to
postgres or if we got it not from cache.
## Problem
HTTP connection pool was not respecting the PitR options.
## Summary of changes
1. refactor neon_options a bit to allow easier access to cache_key
2. make HTTP not go through `StartupMessageParams`
3. expose SNI processing to replace what was removed in step 2.
## Problem
Current cache doesn't support any updates from the cplane.
## Summary of changes
* Added redis notifier listner.
* Added cache which can be invalidated with the notifier. If the
notifier is not available, it's just a normal ttl cache.
* Updated cplane api.
The motivation behind this organization of the data is the following:
* In the Neon data model there are projects. Projects could have
multiple branches and each branch could have more than one endpoint.
* Also there is one special `main` branch.
* Password reset works per branch.
* Allowed IPs are the same for every branch in the project (except,
maybe, the main one).
* The main branch can be changed to the other branch.
* The endpoint can be moved between branches.
Every event described above requires some special processing on the
porxy (or cplane) side.
The idea of invalidating for the project is that whenever one of the
events above is happening with the project, proxy can invalidate all
entries for the entire project.
This approach also requires some additional API change (returning
project_id inside the auth info).
## Summary of changes
### RequestMonitoring
We want to add an event stream with information on each request for
easier analysis than what we can do with diagnostic logs alone
(https://github.com/neondatabase/cloud/issues/8807). This
RequestMonitoring will keep a record of the final state of a request. On
drop it will be pushed into a queue to be uploaded.
Because this context is a bag of data, I don't want this information to
impact logic of request handling. I personally think that weakly typed
data (such as all these options) makes for spaghetti code. I will
however allow for this data to impact rate-limiting and blocking of
requests, as this does not _really_ change how a request is handled.
### Parquet
Each `RequestMonitoring` is flushed into a channel where it is converted
into `RequestData`, which is accumulated into parquet files. Each file
will have a certain number of rows per row group, and several row groups
will eventually fill up the file, which we then upload to S3.
We will also upload smaller files if they take too long to construct.
