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neon/proxy/src/scram
Conrad Ludgate e7a1d5de94 proxy: cache for password hashing (#12011)
## Problem

Password hashing for sql-over-http takes up a lot of CPU. Perhaps we can
get away with temporarily caching some steps so we only need fewer
rounds, which will save some CPU time.

## Summary of changes

The output of pbkdf2 is the XOR of the outputs of each iteration round,
eg `U1 ^ U2 ^ ... U15 ^ U16 ^ U17 ^ ... ^ Un`. We cache the suffix of
the expression `U16 ^ U17 ^ ... ^ Un`. To compute the result from the
cached suffix, we only need to compute the prefix `U1 ^ U2 ^ ... U15`.
The suffix by itself is useless, which prevent's its use in brute-force
attacks should this cached memory leak.

We are also caching the full 4096 round hash in memory, which can be
used for brute-force attacks, where this suffix could be used to speed
it up. My hope/expectation is that since these will be in different
allocations, it makes any such memory exploitation much much harder.
Since the full hash cache might be invalidated while the suffix is
cached, I'm storing the timestamp of the computation as a way to
identity the match.

I also added `zeroize()` to clear the sensitive state from the
stack/heap.

For the most security conscious customers, we hope to roll out OIDC
soon, so they can disable passwords entirely.

---

The numbers for the threadpool were pretty random, but according to our
busiest region for sql-over-http, we only see about 150 unique endpoints
every minute. So storing ~100 of the most common endpoints for that
minute should be the vast majority of requests.

1 minute was chosen so we don't keep data in memory for too long.
2025-07-29 06:48:14 +00:00
..
2025-07-22 09:31:39 +00:00