A host with no working GPU driver kept a drawn GPU name, on the theory that it
read as a machine whose driver failed to load. It does not. Firefox reads
UNMASKED_RENDERER_WEBGL and the pixels from one GL context, so stock 159 on an
RX 7900 XTX with a broken Mesa driver reports llvmpipe with the same readPixels
hash as Xvfb. A GPU name over those pixels never happens on a real machine, and
two reads expose it.
The launchers now claim the host's software renderer as they claim its GPU, so
name and pixels agree without canvas noise. A drawn identity still never picks
a software renderer, and a software renderer fpgen has not recorded on that OS
takes the same path as an unrecorded GPU.
This reads as a server or a broken driver, and checks that flag llvmpipe will
flag it. Rendering on a GPU with headless="virtual-gpu" is the way to report one.
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- A named executable's application.ini is found beside it, or in
Contents/Resources of a macOS app bundle (pkgman.build_file / buildFile),
and a named executable without one raises instead of borrowing the paired
build's version. browser= on macOS no longer raises CamoufoxNotInstalled
or claims the wrong Firefox major.
- browser= together with executable_path or CAMOUFOX_EXECUTABLE_PATH raises
ValueError instead of silently dropping browser=.
- One function per launcher (plan_rendering / planRendering) decides whether
the identity claims the host's GPU or the canvas is covered, for the launch
and for the host identity its contexts keep. A GPU named by webgl_config or
a preset, or a host GPU fpgen never recorded, now covers the canvas by
default, and such a browser binds no context to the host.
- setWebgpu keeps a caller pref set to null, as Python's setdefault does.
- stock-gpu-parity verifies SHA256SUMS.asc against Mozilla's release key and
uses camoufox.webgl.recorded_devices instead of private helpers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Canvas, WebGL and WebGPU output come from the real OS, driver and GPU. On the
host's OS the identity now claims the GPU Firefox actually renders with; on
another OS canvas and WebGL readback use privacy.resistFingerprinting's canvas
placeholder (canvas_noise, on by default only for another OS, with a LeakWarning).
WebGPU follows the claimed device: navigator.gpu only where Firefox exposes it
(Windows, Apple Silicon), and the host's adapter only when the identity claims
the host's hardware GPU. Otherwise gfx.blacklist.webgpu marks the device
blocked, so requestAdapter() resolves to null as it does for real users on a
blocked or software GPU. The pref is read at startup, so it goes through
CAMOU_PREFS.
Spoofed avail-screen and touch values now pass through stock baseline
fingerprinting protection for the claimed platform (screen-spoofing,
touchscreen-fingerprint-spoofing).
fpgen's records are mostly Firefox 146, and two WebGL values are decided by
the browser rather than the device: Windows extension lists now include
EXT_depth_clamp (ANGLE's D3D11 backend reports it on every feature level in
156), and WebGL1's ALIASED_LINE_WIDTH_RANGE takes the device's WebGL2 value
(Firefox 156 no longer forces a compatibility profile for WebGL1 on Linux).
A new parity guard, stock-gpu-parity, compares stock Firefox at the build's
version, stock Firefox at the release fpgen recorded, and Camoufox claiming the
host's GPU, and fails when Camoufox differs from stock on a value the two stock
releases disagree on. Decisions are recorded in ci/tribal-rules.yml
(cross-os-canvas-is-the-rfp-placeholder, webgpu-follows-the-claimed-device,
webgl-browser-owned-values-follow-firefox).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>