public_ip() called requests.get with verify=False and wrapped it in a
context manager that silenced urllib3's InsecureRequestWarning, so the
disabled verification produced no output either.
These requests are routed through the user's proxy, which is the exact
position an attacker occupies. A forged response controls the value
public_ip() returns, and that value is used to spoof the WebRTC IP --
so the leak the function exists to prevent becomes attacker-selectable.
validate_ip() bounds this to a well-formed address, but the address is
still theirs to choose.
Set verify=True and drop the warning suppression. requests raises
SSLError, a subclass of RequestException, which the existing loop
already catches -- a host with a bad certificate is now skipped in
favour of the next one in URLS instead of being trusted.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9de97513b0)
passing a proxy to camoufox with the "bypass"-argument while using geoip=True runs into an exception.
extending the class attributes fixes the problem on my local machine
- Allow Browerforge fingerprints to override screen & viewport data.
- Set Camoufox's window dimensions to a fixed width/height generated from Browserforge.
- If the browser is headful, do not exceed 125% of the screen size.
Other changes:
- Allow public IP finder to work without verification.
- Add script to publish to pypi.
- More descriptive progress bars when downloading default addons.
- Bump to 0.2.2
- Added `geoip` parameter to automatically find the target IP's longitude, latitude, timezone, country, language/region locale, & spoof the WebRTC IP address. #5
- Added parameter to set the locale #16
- Automatically calculate the locale based on the distribution of speakers in the target geoip region.
- Added allow_webgl option #17
- By default, use the current version of Camoufox instead of Browserforge's Firefox versions #14.