Billing's setup chain now passes the GitHub identity that Orca Cloud auth
verified from a GitHub sign-in (githubUserId, githubLogin). The install URL's
signed state carries it, and the setup URL checks it against the installation
with the App's own credentials: the user's own account, or an active org admin
(members:read installation token). A match binds with method 'idp' and skips
GitHub's separate Authorize page. Anything else falls back to the OAuth step
(A4b) as before.
GOLDEN_IMAGE_SOURCE=git:<repo>#<branch>: each cron tick resolves the branch HEAD through the GitHub
App installation on that repo (read-only single-repo token, operator-only request surface) and, when
HEAD differs from the active image's commit and the compare touches VM paths, starts a source build:
fetch the commit, build orcad + bundled orca CLI, provision, then the existing wipe, snapshot, smoke,
atomic activate (previous image kept as rollback). The commit is recorded as bundle_sha256 git:<sha>
(kept through clone refreshes) and in /opt/orca/runtime/orcad/SOURCE_COMMIT. Also (W2): openssh-server
in the image (on demand only), https apt sources, unlocked password field for key-only sshd.
Security (B1): repo tokens were minted for any repo.url where the app was installed. Now an
installation must be bound to the caller's account (signed single-use connect state + OAuth proof
that the installer owns the account or is an org admin), tokens are scoped to the one repo and the
binding is re-checked on cached tokens. Operator binding route for support/dev.
Guardrails (B3/G4): D1 kill switch + static flag refuse create/resume/rollover and drain running
sandboxes; global running cap; 3/seat per-account backstop; per-account create rate limit.
Retention (B4/B6): hourly orphan sweep (stop, then delete after grace; partial listings delete
nothing), 30-day deletion after cancel/unpaid with a T-7 warning hook, 90-day idle retention,
104-day provider snapshot expiry backstop, repo_url tombstoned on destroy.