camoufox

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3 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Jake WriterandClaude Opus 5	3f0f850bf3	fix(pythonlib): identity draws that match real machines and stay stable Launcher-side fixes found by comparing camoufox against stock Firefox 152.0.4 on Linux, Windows 11 and macOS hosts: - DNT / GPC: BrowserForge draws doNotTrack "1" on most Firefox samples, but a stock Firefox 152 reports "unspecified" and globalPrivacyControl false; the stock defaults are used unless the caller sets them, and both are applied as prefs so the API, the worker and the DNT / Sec-GPC headers agree (#760). - Timezone and geolocation: the timezone is passed to the browser, and a configured position sets permissions.default.geo so permissions.query agrees with the auto-grant (#769, #773). - hardwareConcurrency: the reported count is the fingerprint's and the browser is pinned to that many cores (cpu_affinity.py, Linux/Windows), so worker timing agrees with it; otherwise the host count snapped into the core counts real machines ship with (never 2, Firefox's resistFingerprinting value). - Fonts: the OS base is always present in full, OS-version variants are drawn all-or-nothing, co-shipped groups stay together, Cascadia is never claimed off Windows, a native macOS/Windows identity claims only the real OS base, and gfx.font_rendering.fallback.async is off on Linux so per-character fallback does not depend on cmap-load timing. - Speech voices: a per-OS installed-voice model (voice-manifests.json) with the voiceURI formats each backend really produces (voice-uris.json); no default voice where stock has none. - WebGL: extensions a release Firefox never exposes are filtered, but OVR_multiview2 stays for Windows D3D11 renderers, which expose it. - Media devices: a seeded draw of common per-OS devices with OS-style labels. - Windows scrollbars follow the drawn Windows version (overlay on 11). - Glyph-advance perturbation (fonts:spacing_seed) defaults to off: it moved every measureText width off the value the same font gives on a real machine. - Launcher prefs are also exported as CAMOU_PREFS_1..N so camoufox.cfg applies them at startup, and the browser UI locale follows the spoofed locale. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-16 22:09:40 -06:00
Jake Writer	160c806ad1	fix(stealth): make spoofed speech voices fail closed (#731 ) Firefox registers the host's speech-dispatcher / SAPI / NSSpeech voices unless something stops it, and nsSynthVoiceRegistry only stopped it when the explicit `voices:blockIfNotDefined` flag was set. Nothing set that flag, so the host was suppressed only as a side effect of a non-empty spoofed list -- and the Python layer built that list inside a bare `except Exception: pass`. Any path that left the list empty or unset therefore fell through to the host backend. On a stock Linux box that exposes 14805 espeak-ng voices to the page under a fingerprint claiming macOS or Windows, which both leaks the real host OS and contradicts the rest of the profile. Reproduced on 152.0.4-beta.29: config voices exposed generation raises 14805 (all host speechd) {"voices": []} 14805 (all host speechd) valid list 115 (correct) Three changes, so the failure is closed at both layers: * nsSynthVoiceRegistry::AddVoice now also blocks when MaskConfig carries a `voices` array at all -- including an empty one, or one whose entries were all rejected as malformed. An empty spoofed list must mean "no voices", never "all of the host's". With no `voices` key the browser still behaves like stock Firefox, so a bare binary is unaffected. * launch_options pins `voices:blockIfNotDefined` (via set_into, so an explicit caller value still wins) and degrades a generation failure to an empty list rather than leaving the key unset. It also passes the spoofed navigator.language through, so the default voice matches the locale. * validate_voices rejects the shapes MaskConfig::MVoices() silently drops -- bare "Name:lang:type" strings and half-filled objects -- before launch instead of letting them degrade into a host-voice leak. Both failure paths now expose 0 voices; the normal path still exposes 115.	2026-08-28 13:21:32 -06:00
Jake Writer	0e4151f820	fix: page-recycle hang under spoofed window dims, and the unmerged halves of #637-#647 Fixes the new_page() hang from #666, and restores the pythonlib/ + settings/ halves of #637-#647 that were dropped when those PRs were consolidated into #666 (that PR only carried patches/ + additions/, so these never actually landed). ## new_page() hangs when window.outer* is spoofed (#666) The outer-size hijack in browser-init.patch pinned the chrome documentElement to the spoofed size. That caps .browserStack, which caps the content viewport, so the content window can never reach the size Juggler asks for in updateViewportSize() -- and awaitViewportDimensions awaits exact equality with no timeout, so it deadlocks rather than erroring. The second new_page() hung forever and took the context with it. The pin was never load-bearing: GetOuterWidth/GetOuterHeight already consult MaskConfig unconditionally (fingerprint-injection.patch), so window.outerWidth is spoofed in C++ regardless of the real chrome window size. Resizing is enough. Measured on the official v152.0.4-beta.26 build (headless): config before after none pass pass inner pass pass outer HANG pass both HANG pass (iw:360 ih:740 ow:360 oh:800 -- exact) This corrects the diagnosis in #666, which blamed the inner+outer combination and the `!(outerWidth \|\| outerHeight)` guard. outer* ALONE is sufficient to hang, and dropping inner* does not help, so that guard is not the culprit. Also fixed driver-side: Playwright's implicit 1280x720 viewport is what asks for the impossible size, so the driver now defaults to no_viewport when the config spoofs any window dimension. That fixes the hang on already-released builds without a rebuild. An explicit viewport=/no_viewport= from the caller wins. ## WebRTC ICE prefs (#538) #666 merged the C++ half of the WebRTC fix but not the prefs, so the shipped build still has no_host=true and none of the proxy_only prefs. proxy_only_if_behind_proxy is the pref that actually stops the real-IP leak: it prevents a UDP STUN request routing around a TCP proxy. no_host=false keeps the stock two-candidate shape, which obfuscate_host_addresses makes leak-free. ## Also restored from the consolidation - fix(proxy): dom.security.https_first rewrote http:// before the launch-arg proxy filter saw it, breaking CONNECT-only proxies (#638). - fix(stealth): speech-voice spoofing + stop leaking host voices (#646). - fix(stealth): clamp inner <= outer <= avail <= screen; BrowserForge can emit impossible geometries that leak as tells (#647). Refs: https://github.com/daijro/camoufox/pull/666 Refs: https://github.com/daijro/camoufox/issues/538	2026-07-16 14:38:39 -06:00

Author

SHA1

Message

Date

Jake WriterandClaude Opus 5

3f0f850bf3

fix(pythonlib): identity draws that match real machines and stay stable

Launcher-side fixes found by comparing camoufox against stock Firefox 152.0.4
on Linux, Windows 11 and macOS hosts:

- DNT / GPC: BrowserForge draws doNotTrack "1" on most Firefox samples, but a
  stock Firefox 152 reports "unspecified" and globalPrivacyControl false; the
  stock defaults are used unless the caller sets them, and both are applied as
  prefs so the API, the worker and the DNT / Sec-GPC headers agree (#760).
- Timezone and geolocation: the timezone is passed to the browser, and a
  configured position sets permissions.default.geo so permissions.query agrees
  with the auto-grant (#769, #773).
- hardwareConcurrency: the reported count is the fingerprint's and the browser
  is pinned to that many cores (cpu_affinity.py, Linux/Windows), so worker
  timing agrees with it; otherwise the host count snapped into the core counts
  real machines ship with (never 2, Firefox's resistFingerprinting value).
- Fonts: the OS base is always present in full, OS-version variants are drawn
  all-or-nothing, co-shipped groups stay together, Cascadia is never claimed
  off Windows, a native macOS/Windows identity claims only the real OS base,
  and gfx.font_rendering.fallback.async is off on Linux so per-character
  fallback does not depend on cmap-load timing.
- Speech voices: a per-OS installed-voice model (voice-manifests.json) with
  the voiceURI formats each backend really produces (voice-uris.json); no
  default voice where stock has none.
- WebGL: extensions a release Firefox never exposes are filtered, but
  OVR_multiview2 stays for Windows D3D11 renderers, which expose it.
- Media devices: a seeded draw of common per-OS devices with OS-style labels.
- Windows scrollbars follow the drawn Windows version (overlay on 11).
- Glyph-advance perturbation (fonts:spacing_seed) defaults to off: it moved
  every measureText width off the value the same font gives on a real machine.
- Launcher prefs are also exported as CAMOU_PREFS_1..N so camoufox.cfg applies
  them at startup, and the browser UI locale follows the spoofed locale.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

2026-09-16 22:09:40 -06:00

Jake Writer

160c806ad1

fix(stealth): make spoofed speech voices fail closed (#731 )

Firefox registers the host's speech-dispatcher / SAPI / NSSpeech voices
unless something stops it, and nsSynthVoiceRegistry only stopped it when the
explicit `voices:blockIfNotDefined` flag was set. Nothing set that flag, so
the host was suppressed only as a side effect of a non-empty spoofed list --
and the Python layer built that list inside a bare `except Exception: pass`.

Any path that left the list empty or unset therefore fell through to the host
backend. On a stock Linux box that exposes 14805 espeak-ng voices to the page
under a fingerprint claiming macOS or Windows, which both leaks the real host
OS and contradicts the rest of the profile. Reproduced on 152.0.4-beta.29:

    config                     voices exposed
    generation raises          14805  (all host speechd)
    {"voices": []}             14805  (all host speechd)
    valid list                   115  (correct)

Three changes, so the failure is closed at both layers:

  * nsSynthVoiceRegistry::AddVoice now also blocks when MaskConfig carries a
    `voices` array at all -- including an empty one, or one whose entries were
    all rejected as malformed. An empty spoofed list must mean "no voices",
    never "all of the host's". With no `voices` key the browser still behaves
    like stock Firefox, so a bare binary is unaffected.
  * launch_options pins `voices:blockIfNotDefined` (via set_into, so an
    explicit caller value still wins) and degrades a generation failure to an
    empty list rather than leaving the key unset. It also passes the spoofed
    navigator.language through, so the default voice matches the locale.
  * validate_voices rejects the shapes MaskConfig::MVoices() silently drops --
    bare "Name:lang:type" strings and half-filled objects -- before launch
    instead of letting them degrade into a host-voice leak.

Both failure paths now expose 0 voices; the normal path still exposes 115.

2026-08-28 13:21:32 -06:00

Jake Writer

0e4151f820

fix: page-recycle hang under spoofed window dims, and the unmerged halves of #637-#647

Fixes the new_page() hang from #666, and restores the pythonlib/ + settings/
halves of #637-#647 that were dropped when those PRs were consolidated into #666
(that PR only carried patches/ + additions/, so these never actually landed).

## new_page() hangs when window.outer* is spoofed (#666)

The outer-size hijack in browser-init.patch pinned the chrome documentElement to
the spoofed size. That caps .browserStack, which caps the content viewport, so
the content window can never reach the size Juggler asks for in
updateViewportSize() -- and awaitViewportDimensions awaits exact equality with
no timeout, so it deadlocks rather than erroring. The second new_page() hung
forever and took the context with it.

The pin was never load-bearing: GetOuterWidth/GetOuterHeight already consult
MaskConfig unconditionally (fingerprint-injection.patch), so window.outerWidth is
spoofed in C++ regardless of the real chrome window size. Resizing is enough.

Measured on the official v152.0.4-beta.26 build (headless):

    config      before        after
    none        pass          pass
    inner       pass          pass
    outer       HANG          pass
    both        HANG          pass  (iw:360 ih:740 ow:360 oh:800 -- exact)

This corrects the diagnosis in #666, which blamed the inner+outer combination and
the `!(outerWidth || outerHeight)` guard. outer* ALONE is sufficient to hang, and
dropping inner* does not help, so that guard is not the culprit.

Also fixed driver-side: Playwright's implicit 1280x720 viewport is what asks for
the impossible size, so the driver now defaults to no_viewport when the config
spoofs any window dimension. That fixes the hang on already-released builds
without a rebuild. An explicit viewport=/no_viewport= from the caller wins.

## WebRTC ICE prefs (#538)

#666 merged the C++ half of the WebRTC fix but not the prefs, so the shipped
build still has no_host=true and none of the proxy_only prefs.
proxy_only_if_behind_proxy is the pref that actually stops the real-IP leak: it
prevents a UDP STUN request routing around a TCP proxy. no_host=false keeps the
stock two-candidate shape, which obfuscate_host_addresses makes leak-free.

## Also restored from the consolidation

- fix(proxy): dom.security.https_first rewrote http:// before the launch-arg
  proxy filter saw it, breaking CONNECT-only proxies (#638).
- fix(stealth): speech-voice spoofing + stop leaking host voices (#646).
- fix(stealth): clamp inner <= outer <= avail <= screen; BrowserForge can emit
  impossible geometries that leak as tells (#647).

Refs: https://github.com/daijro/camoufox/pull/666
Refs: https://github.com/daijro/camoufox/issues/538

2026-07-16 14:38:39 -06:00