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The failure-count lockout keyed on request source was the wrong control for this deployment: behind the mandated reverse proxy every login shares the proxy peer address, so an unauthenticated attacker could trip the shared bucket and lock the real administrator out for the window, renewably. Remove the throttle end to end — the LoginError::Throttled state, the LoginCommand source, the AuthStore/AdminAuthStateRepository failure-window ports and their Redis Lua script, and the login-source middleware — and let a wrong password return InvalidCredentials directly. Online brute-force is bounded by the Argon2 verification cost and admin password strength; deployments wanting rate limiting apply it at the reverse proxy, which sees real client IPs. Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>