From 0ad33d83714c19d08bcf99984ef6806bc21f7b16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: ldm0 Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2026 19:36:55 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] fix(csp): retain inherited self for script element admission Check enforced and report-only script URLs against the policy's retained self URL while preserving the protected Document URL in violation reports. This lets initial about:blank popup script elements load same-origin modules without widening cross-origin policy. Strengthen the real auxiliary-target regression with inherited script-src/connect-src self and an unchanged about:blank URL. Cover positive and negative script policies plus reporting for blank, srcdoc and data Documents. Validation: cargo fmt --all; cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets --all-features -- -D warnings; cargo nextest run --no-fail-fast (23552 passed, 18 existing skips; 32 threads, no retries). --- .../auxiliary_module_completion.rs | 11 ++- .../fixtures/auxiliary-module-completion.js | 3 + .../src/document_runtime/security_policy.rs | 92 +++++++++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/moli-protocol-server/src/protocol_server/tests/cdp_dynamic_page/auxiliary_module_completion.rs b/moli-protocol-server/src/protocol_server/tests/cdp_dynamic_page/auxiliary_module_completion.rs index 19b0e9fa9a2..3156265cb49 100644 --- a/moli-protocol-server/src/protocol_server/tests/cdp_dynamic_page/auxiliary_module_completion.rs +++ b/moli-protocol-server/src/protocol_server/tests/cdp_dynamic_page/auxiliary_module_completion.rs @@ -42,10 +42,15 @@ async fn auxiliary_module_completions_follow_the_committed_document_without_a_fr [("content-type", mime), ("access-control-allow-origin", "*")], body, ).into_response(); - if uri.path() == "/popup-blocked" { + let policy = match uri.path() { + "/parent" => Some("script-src 'self' 'unsafe-eval'; connect-src 'self'"), + "/popup-blocked" => Some("script-src 'unsafe-eval'; connect-src 'self'"), + _ => None, + }; + if let Some(policy) = policy { response.headers_mut().insert( "content-security-policy", - axum::http::HeaderValue::from_static("script-src 'unsafe-eval'; connect-src 'self'"), + axum::http::HeaderValue::from_static(policy), ); } response @@ -69,6 +74,8 @@ async fn auxiliary_module_completions_follow_the_committed_document_without_a_fr // Never discover or attach a frontend to the auxiliary target. Its own // networking tasks must finish while only the opener is being observed. + // The blank Document inherits 'self' from its opener without changing + // its about:blank URL to the opener's URL. for mode in ["blank", "navigate", "blocked"] { let source = format!( "{}\nstartAuxiliaryModuleProbe({}, {});true", diff --git a/moli-protocol-server/tests/fixtures/auxiliary-module-completion.js b/moli-protocol-server/tests/fixtures/auxiliary-module-completion.js index 784ecc45345..4929a4bb8e2 100644 --- a/moli-protocol-server/tests/fixtures/auxiliary-module-completion.js +++ b/moli-protocol-server/tests/fixtures/auxiliary-module-completion.js @@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ function startAuxiliaryModuleProbe(base, mode) { if (!value) throw Error(name); checks.push(name); }; + if (mode === 'blank' && document.URL !== 'about:blank') { + throw Error('initial Document URL must remain about:blank'); + } if (mode === 'blocked') { const events = []; addEventListener('securitypolicyviolation', event => events.push(event)); diff --git a/moli-renderer-v8/src/document_runtime/security_policy.rs b/moli-renderer-v8/src/document_runtime/security_policy.rs index 582bd32db18..a6b5060e104 100644 --- a/moli-renderer-v8/src/document_runtime/security_policy.rs +++ b/moli-renderer-v8/src/document_runtime/security_policy.rs @@ -1214,19 +1214,29 @@ impl DocumentRuntime { request: ContentSecurityPolicyScriptElementRequest<'_>, ) -> Option { let document_url = self.document_url(); + let policy_url = self + .policy_container + .content_security_policy_self_url + .as_ref() + .unwrap_or(document_url); let policies = self.document_content_security_policies_for_optional_document( Some(self.document_handle()), &self.policy_container.response_content_security_policies, &self.policy_container.content_security_reporting_endpoints, ); - document_script_element_url_policy_violation_from_document_policies( + let violation = document_script_element_url_policy_violation_from_document_policies( policies, - document_url, + policy_url, request_url, redirect_status, ContentSecurityPolicyDisposition::Enforce, request, - ) + )?; + Some(DocumentContentSecurityPolicyViolation { + document_uri: crate::content_security_policy::csp_url_for_report(document_url), + source_file: crate::content_security_policy::csp_url_for_report(document_url), + ..violation + }) } #[cfg(test)] @@ -1268,17 +1278,27 @@ impl DocumentRuntime { request: ContentSecurityPolicyScriptElementRequest<'_>, ) -> Option { let document_url = self.document_url(); - document_script_element_url_policy_violation( + let policy_url = self + .policy_container + .content_security_policy_self_url + .as_ref() + .unwrap_or(document_url); + let violation = document_script_element_url_policy_violation( &self .policy_container .response_content_security_report_only_policies, &self.policy_container.content_security_reporting_endpoints, - document_url, + policy_url, request_url, redirect_status, ContentSecurityPolicyDisposition::Report, request, - ) + )?; + Some(DocumentContentSecurityPolicyViolation { + document_uri: crate::content_security_policy::csp_url_for_report(document_url), + source_file: crate::content_security_policy::csp_url_for_report(document_url), + ..violation + }) } pub(crate) fn document_connect_csp_check_with_redirect_status( @@ -4268,6 +4288,66 @@ mod tests { ); } + #[test] + fn script_requests_keep_inherited_self_separate_from_the_protected_document() { + let policy_url = Url::parse("https://example.test/parent").unwrap(); + let policy_text = b"script-src 'self'; report-uri /report"; + for document_url in [ + "about:blank", + "about:srcdoc", + "data:text/html,local-document", + ] { + let document_url = Url::parse(document_url).unwrap(); + let document = HtmlParser::SCRIPTING_ENABLED + .parse(document_url.clone(), "".to_owned()); + let mut runtime = DocumentRuntime::from_document(document); + runtime.set_initial_document_policy_container( + DocumentPolicyContainer::from_navigation_response_headers( + &[ + ("Content-Security-Policy".to_owned(), policy_text.to_vec()), + ( + "Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only".to_owned(), + policy_text.to_vec(), + ), + ], + &policy_url, + ), + ); + for (request_url, blocked) in [ + ("https://example.test/script.js", false), + ("https://other.test/script.js", true), + ] { + let request_url = Url::parse(request_url).unwrap(); + let enforced = runtime.script_element_request_csp_violation(&request_url); + let reported = + runtime.script_element_request_csp_report_only_violation(&request_url); + assert_eq!(enforced.is_some(), blocked); + assert_eq!(reported.is_some(), blocked); + for (violation, disposition) in enforced + .iter() + .map(|v| (v, ContentSecurityPolicyDisposition::Enforce)) + .chain( + reported + .iter() + .map(|v| (v, ContentSecurityPolicyDisposition::Report)), + ) + { + assert_eq!(violation.disposition, disposition); + assert_eq!( + violation.document_uri, + crate::content_security_policy::csp_url_for_report(&document_url) + ); + assert_eq!(violation.source_file, violation.document_uri); + assert_eq!( + violation.report_uri_endpoints, + ["https://example.test/report"] + ); + } + } + assert_eq!(runtime.document_url(), &document_url); + } + } + #[test] fn csp_host_source_path_allows_directory_descendants_only() { let runtime = runtime_for_html(