feat: redeem a one-time code from the webmail instead of reading the sign-in from the link

locales/rn/en.json

@@ -799,6 +799,15 @@
       "err_code_used_title": "That code was already used",
       "err_generic_detail": "Something went wrong. Try again.",
       "err_generic_title": "Sign-in failed",
+      "err_handoff_expired_detail": "The browser handed the sign-in back after it had expired. Sign in again.",
+      "err_handoff_expired_title": "The sign-in took too long",
+      "err_handoff_network_detail": "The webmail could not be reached after you signed in. Check your connection and sign in again.",
+      "err_handoff_network_title": "Couldn't finish signing in",
+      "err_handoff_rate_detail": "Wait a few minutes, then sign in again.",
+      "err_handoff_refused_detail": "The sign-in link was already used or did not come from this sign-in. Sign in again.",
+      "err_handoff_refused_title": "The webmail didn't accept this sign-in",
+      "err_handoff_server_detail": "Sign in again. If it keeps failing, ask your administrator.",
+      "err_handoff_server_title": "The webmail couldn't complete the sign-in",
       "err_interrupted_detail": "The response didn't match the request we started. Try signing in again.",
       "err_interrupted_title": "Sign-in was interrupted",
       "err_no_server_detail": "Double-check the address, or scan a sign-in code from the webmail instead.",

src/lib/__tests__/oauth-handoff-code.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+import { createHash } from 'crypto';
+import { beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
+import * as WebBrowser from 'expo-web-browser';
+
+const { mockFetch } = vi.hoisted(() => ({ mockFetch: vi.fn() }));
+vi.mock('../client-cert', () => ({ secureFetch: mockFetch, fetchWithoutForeignRedirect: mockFetch }));
+
+import { createHandoffPkce, HandoffRedeemError, runWebmailHandoff } from '../oauth';
+import { describeHandoffRedeemError } from '../../screens/login/handoff-errors';
+
+// The browser hand-off with a one-time code (webmail fb3ba0275,
+// bulwarkmail.org/docs/development/mobile-handoff): the app sends a PKCE
+// challenge, the webmail answers with ?code=&state=, and the app redeems the
+// code with its verifier. Older webmails still answer in the fragment.
+
+const WEBMAIL = 'https://webmail.example.com';
+const SERVER = 'https://webmail.example.com';
+const CODE = 'a'.repeat(64);
+
+let opened: URL;
+let callback: (url: URL) => string;
+let redeem: (body: { code: string; code_verifier: string }) => { status: number; data: unknown };
+
+function jsonResponse(url: string, status: number, data: unknown): Response {
+  return { ok: status >= 200 && status < 300, status, url, redirected: false, json: async () => data } as Response;
+}
+
+const s256 = (verifier: string) => createHash('sha256').update(verifier).digest('base64url');
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  vi.resetAllMocks();
+  callback = (url) => `bulwarkmobile://auth/callback?${new URLSearchParams({ code: CODE, state: url.searchParams.get('mobile_state')! })}`;
+  redeem = () => ({
+    status: 200,
+    data: { flow: 'password', server_url: SERVER, username: 'alice@example.org', password: 'pw', state: opened.searchParams.get('mobile_state') },
+  });
+  vi.mocked(WebBrowser.openAuthSessionAsync).mockImplementation(async (url) => {
+    opened = new URL(url);
+    return { type: 'success', url: callback(opened) };
+  });
+  mockFetch.mockImplementation(async (url: string, init?: RequestInit) => {
+    if (url === `${WEBMAIL}/api/auth/handoff/redeem`) {
+      const { status, data } = redeem(JSON.parse(String(init?.body)));
+      return jsonResponse(url, status, data);
+    }
+    throw new Error(`Unexpected fetch: ${url}`);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('createHandoffPkce', () => {
+  it('makes a fresh 43-character verifier and its S256 challenge', () => {
+    const a = createHandoffPkce();
+    const b = createHandoffPkce();
+    expect(a.verifier).toMatch(/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/);
+    expect(a.challenge).toMatch(/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/);
+    expect(a.challenge).toBe(s256(a.verifier));
+    expect(b.verifier).not.toBe(a.verifier);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('runWebmailHandoff with a one-time code', () => {
+  it('sends a challenge and redeems the code with the matching verifier', async () => {
+    let sent: { code: string; code_verifier: string } | null = null;
+    const next = redeem;
+    redeem = (body) => { sent = body; return next(body); };
+
+    await expect(runWebmailHandoff(WEBMAIL)).resolves.toEqual({
+      flow: 'password', serverUrl: SERVER, username: 'alice@example.org', password: 'pw',
+    });
+
+    const challenge = opened.searchParams.get('mobile_code_challenge');
+    expect(challenge).toMatch(/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/);
+    expect(opened.searchParams.get('mobile_redirect_uri')).toBe('bulwarkmobile://auth/callback');
+    expect(sent!.code).toBe(CODE);
+    expect(s256(sent!.code_verifier)).toBe(challenge);
+
+    const [, init] = mockFetch.mock.calls[0];
+    expect(init.method).toBe('POST');
+    const headerNames = Object.keys(init.headers).map((h) => h.toLowerCase());
+    expect(headerNames).not.toContain('origin');
+    expect(headerNames).not.toContain('sec-fetch-site');
+  });
+
+  it('uses a new challenge for every sign-in', async () => {
+    await runWebmailHandoff(WEBMAIL);
+    const first = opened.searchParams.get('mobile_code_challenge');
+    await runWebmailHandoff(WEBMAIL);
+    expect(opened.searchParams.get('mobile_code_challenge')).not.toBe(first);
+  });
+
+  it('reads an OAuth bundle whose expires_in is a number', async () => {
+    vi.spyOn(Date, 'now').mockReturnValue(1_000_000);
+    redeem = () => ({
+      status: 200,
+      data: {
+        flow: 'oauth', server_url: SERVER, access_token: 'at', refresh_token: 'rt', expires_in: 3540,
+        token_endpoint: `${WEBMAIL}/api/auth/pair/token`, client_id: 'bulwark-webmail',
+        state: opened.searchParams.get('mobile_state'),
+      },
+    });
+    await expect(runWebmailHandoff(WEBMAIL)).resolves.toEqual({
+      flow: 'oauth',
+      serverUrl: SERVER,
+      tokens: {
+        accessToken: 'at', refreshToken: 'rt', expiresAt: 1_000_000 + 3540 * 1000,
+        tokenEndpoint: `${WEBMAIL}/api/auth/pair/token`, clientId: 'bulwark-webmail', source: 'handoff',
+      },
+    });
+    vi.mocked(Date.now).mockRestore();
+  });
+
+  it('refuses a link whose state does not match, without spending the code', async () => {
+    callback = () => `bulwarkmobile://auth/callback?${new URLSearchParams({ code: CODE, state: 'forged' })}`;
+    await expect(runWebmailHandoff(WEBMAIL)).rejects.toThrow('State mismatch');
+    expect(mockFetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('refuses a redeem answer that names another state', async () => {
+    redeem = () => ({ status: 200, data: { flow: 'password', server_url: SERVER, username: 'a', password: 'b', state: 'other' } });
+    await expect(runWebmailHandoff(WEBMAIL)).rejects.toThrow('State mismatch');
+  });
+
+  for (const error of ['expired_code', 'invalid_code', 'invalid_verifier', 'invalid_request'] as const) {
+    it(`turns a 400 ${error} into a redeem error that asks to sign in again`, async () => {
+      redeem = () => ({ status: 400, data: { error } });
+      const err = await runWebmailHandoff(WEBMAIL).catch((e: unknown) => e);
+      expect(err).toBeInstanceOf(HandoffRedeemError);
+      expect(err).toMatchObject({ reason: error, status: 400 });
+      const copy = describeHandoffRedeemError(err, (_k, fallback) => fallback ?? _k);
+      expect(copy?.detail).toMatch(/sign in again/i);
+    });
+  }
+
+  it('treats an unknown 400 as a used code', async () => {
+    redeem = () => ({ status: 400, data: null });
+    await expect(runWebmailHandoff(WEBMAIL)).rejects.toMatchObject({ name: 'HandoffRedeemError', reason: 'invalid_code' });
+  });
+
+  it('keeps reading the fragment of an older webmail or Lite', async () => {
+    callback = (url) => `bulwarkmobile://auth/callback#${new URLSearchParams({
+      flow: 'password', server_url: SERVER, username: 'bob@example.org', password: 'pw2', state: url.searchParams.get('mobile_state')!,
+    })}`;
+    await expect(runWebmailHandoff(WEBMAIL)).resolves.toEqual({
+      flow: 'password', serverUrl: SERVER, username: 'bob@example.org', password: 'pw2',
+    });
+    expect(mockFetch).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('refuses a fragment with the wrong state', async () => {
+    callback = () => `bulwarkmobile://auth/callback#${new URLSearchParams({
+      flow: 'password', server_url: SERVER, username: 'bob@example.org', password: 'pw2', state: 'forged',
+    })}`;
+    await expect(runWebmailHandoff(WEBMAIL)).rejects.toThrow('State mismatch');
+  });
+
+  it('sends no challenge to a plain-http webmail, which answers in the fragment', async () => {
+    callback = (url) => `bulwarkmobile://auth/callback#${new URLSearchParams({
+      flow: 'password', server_url: 'https://mail.example.org', username: 'c', password: 'd', state: url.searchParams.get('mobile_state')!,
+    })}`;
+    await runWebmailHandoff('http://webmail.example.com');
+    expect(opened.searchParams.has('mobile_code_challenge')).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

src/lib/oauth.ts

@@ -1,13 +1,16 @@
 import * as WebBrowser from 'expo-web-browser';
 import { fetchWithoutForeignRedirect, secureFetch } from './client-cert';
-import { randomHex } from './random';
+import { base64UrlEncode, randomBytes, randomHex } from './random';
+import { sha256Hex } from './sha256';
 
 // Webmail-mediated login. The app opens the webmail's normal login page with
-// extra `mobile_redirect_uri` and `mobile_state` query params. The webmail
+// extra `mobile_redirect_uri`, `mobile_state` and `mobile_code_challenge`
-// uses its existing password and OAuth flows, and once the user is signed
+// query params. The webmail uses its existing password and OAuth flows, and
-// in, redirects back to the app's custom scheme with credentials packed into
+// once the user is signed in, redirects back to the app's custom scheme with
-// the URL fragment. Fragments aren't sent to the server, so password and
+// a one-time code in the query string; the app redeems it with the PKCE
-// token material don't appear in HTTP access logs along the way.
+// verifier for the sign-in (another app that catches the link can't). Older
+// webmails and Lite ignore the challenge and put the credentials in the URL
+// fragment, which is still read.
 
 export const HANDOFF_REDIRECT_URI = 'bulwarkmobile://auth/callback';
 
@@ -190,12 +193,30 @@ async function isTrustedHandoffEndpoint(
   }
 }
 
-function buildHandoffUrl(webmailUrl: string, state: string): string {
+/**
+ * PKCE pair for the hand-off (bulwarkmail.org/docs/development/mobile-handoff):
+ * a fresh 43-character verifier from the CSPRNG for every sign-in, and its
+ * S256 challenge.
+ */
+export function createHandoffPkce(): { verifier: string; challenge: string } {
+  const verifier = base64UrlEncode(randomBytes(32));
+  const challenge = base64UrlEncode(hexToBytes(sha256Hex(new TextEncoder().encode(verifier))));
+  return { verifier, challenge };
+}
+
+function hexToBytes(hex: string): Uint8Array {
+  const out = new Uint8Array(hex.length / 2);
+  for (let i = 0; i < out.length; i++) out[i] = parseInt(hex.slice(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);
+  return out;
+}
+
+export function buildHandoffUrl(webmailUrl: string, state: string, codeChallenge?: string): string {
   const base = webmailUrl.replace(/\/+$/, '');
   const params = new URLSearchParams({
     mobile_redirect_uri: HANDOFF_REDIRECT_URI,
     mobile_state: state,
   });
+  if (codeChallenge) params.set('mobile_code_challenge', codeChallenge);
   return `${base}/login?${params.toString()}`;
 }
 
@@ -205,12 +226,168 @@ function parseFragment(url: string): URLSearchParams {
   return new URLSearchParams(url.slice(hashIdx + 1));
 }
 
+function parseQuery(url: string): URLSearchParams {
+  const q = url.indexOf('?');
+  if (q === -1) return new URLSearchParams();
+  const h = url.indexOf('#', q);
+  return new URLSearchParams(url.slice(q + 1, h === -1 ? undefined : h));
+}
+
+/**
+ * Why redeeming a hand-off code failed. Every failure spends the code, so the
+ * sign-in has to start over.
+ *   invalid_request / invalid_code / expired_code / invalid_verifier: the
+ *     webmail's 400 answers
+ *   rate_limited: 429; forbidden: 403 (a same-origin refusal)
+ *   network / server / bad_response: the request itself
+ */
+export type HandoffRedeemReason =
+  | 'invalid_request'
+  | 'invalid_code'
+  | 'expired_code'
+  | 'invalid_verifier'
+  | 'rate_limited'
+  | 'forbidden'
+  | 'network'
+  | 'server'
+  | 'bad_response';
+
+export class HandoffRedeemError extends HandoffError {
+  readonly reason: HandoffRedeemReason;
+  readonly status?: number;
+
+  constructor(reason: HandoffRedeemReason, message: string, status?: number) {
+    super(message);
+    this.name = 'HandoffRedeemError';
+    this.reason = reason;
+    this.status = status;
+  }
+}
+
+export const HANDOFF_REDEEM_TIMEOUT_MS = 15_000;
+const HANDOFF_400_REASONS: readonly HandoffRedeemReason[] = ['invalid_request', 'invalid_code', 'expired_code', 'invalid_verifier'];
+
+/**
+ * Trade the one-time code from the callback link for the parked sign-in.
+ * Sent like every native request, without Origin or Sec-Fetch-Site, which
+ * the route would refuse as cross-origin. The code is a credential, so a
+ * redirect to another host is not followed.
+ */
+export async function redeemHandoffCode(
+  webmailUrl: string,
+  code: string,
+  codeVerifier: string,
+): Promise<Record<string, unknown>> {
+  const base = webmailUrl.replace(/\/+$/, '');
+  const controller = new AbortController();
+  let timer: ReturnType<typeof setTimeout> | undefined;
+  const deadline = new Promise<never>((_, reject) => {
+    timer = setTimeout(() => {
+      controller.abort();
+      reject(new HandoffRedeemError('network', 'Timed out redeeming the sign-in code'));
+    }, HANDOFF_REDEEM_TIMEOUT_MS);
+  });
+  let status: number;
+  let ok: boolean;
+  let data: Record<string, unknown> | null;
+  try {
+    const exchange = (async () => {
+      let response: Response;
+      try {
+        response = await fetchWithoutForeignRedirect(`${base}/api/auth/handoff/redeem`, {
+          method: 'POST',
+          headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Accept: 'application/json' },
+          body: JSON.stringify({ code, code_verifier: codeVerifier }),
+          signal: controller.signal,
+          timeoutMs: HANDOFF_REDEEM_TIMEOUT_MS,
+        });
+      } catch (err) {
+        throw new HandoffRedeemError(
+          'network',
+          `Could not redeem the sign-in code: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
+        );
+      }
+      return { status: response.status, ok: response.ok, data: await readJsonBody(response) };
+    })();
+    ({ status, ok, data } = await Promise.race([exchange, deadline]));
+  } finally {
+    clearTimeout(timer);
+  }
+
+  if (!ok) {
+    const error = data ? stringField(data, 'error') : undefined;
+    if (status === 400) {
+      const reason = HANDOFF_400_REASONS.find((r) => r === error) ?? 'invalid_code';
+      throw new HandoffRedeemError(reason, `The sign-in code was refused (${error ?? status}). Sign in again.`, status);
+    }
+    if (status === 429) throw new HandoffRedeemError('rate_limited', 'Too many sign-in attempts (429)', status);
+    if (status === 403) throw new HandoffRedeemError('forbidden', 'The webmail refused the sign-in code (403)', status);
+    throw new HandoffRedeemError('server', `Redeeming the sign-in code failed with status ${status}`, status);
+  }
+  if (!data) throw new HandoffRedeemError('bad_response', 'The sign-in response was not JSON', status);
+  return data;
+}
+
+// Reads one field of the sign-in, from the fragment (strings) or the redeem
+// answer (JSON, where expires_in is a number).
+type BundleField = (key: string) => string | undefined;
+
+async function handoffResultFrom(field: BundleField, webmailUrl: string): Promise<HandoffResult> {
+  const flow = field('flow');
+  const serverUrl = field('server_url') ?? null;
+  if (!serverUrl) throw new HandoffError('Sign-in response missing server URL');
+  if (!isHttpsUrl(serverUrl) && !isLoopbackHttp(serverUrl)) {
+    throw new HandoffError('Sign-in response server URL must use https');
+  }
+
+  if (flow === 'password') {
+    const username = field('username');
+    const password = field('password');
+    if (!username || !password) {
+      throw new HandoffError('Sign-in response missing credentials');
+    }
+    return { flow: 'password', serverUrl, username, password };
+  }
+
+  if (flow === 'oauth') {
+    const accessToken = field('access_token');
+    const tokenEndpoint = field('token_endpoint');
+    const clientId = field('client_id');
+    if (!accessToken || !tokenEndpoint || !clientId) {
+      throw new HandoffError('Sign-in response missing OAuth tokens');
+    }
+    if (!(await isTrustedHandoffEndpoint(tokenEndpoint, serverUrl, webmailUrl, clientId))) {
+      throw new HandoffError('Sign-in response token endpoint is not trusted');
+    }
+    const refreshToken = field('refresh_token');
+    const expiresIn = Number.parseInt(field('expires_in') ?? '', 10);
+    return {
+      flow: 'oauth',
+      serverUrl,
+      tokens: {
+        accessToken,
+        refreshToken,
+        expiresAt: Number.isFinite(expiresIn) && expiresIn > 0 ? Date.now() + expiresIn * 1000 : undefined,
+        tokenEndpoint,
+        clientId,
+        source: 'handoff',
+      },
+    };
+  }
+
+  throw new HandoffError(`Unknown sign-in flow: ${flow ?? 'missing'}`);
+}
+
 export async function runWebmailHandoff(
   webmailUrl: string,
   opts?: { addAccount?: boolean },
 ): Promise<HandoffResult> {
   const state = randomState();
-  const handoffUrl = buildHandoffUrl(webmailUrl, state);
+  // The redeem answer carries the sign-in, so it only goes over TLS (or
+  // loopback http in development). A plain-http webmail gets no challenge
+  // and answers in the fragment, as before.
+  const pkce = isHttpsUrl(webmailUrl) || isLoopbackHttp(webmailUrl) ? createHandoffPkce() : null;
+  const handoffUrl = buildHandoffUrl(webmailUrl, state, pkce?.challenge);
 
   // Adding an account: on iOS, keep the browser's webmail and identity
   // provider cookies out of the session so the signed-in account can't
@@ -229,60 +406,36 @@ export async function runWebmailHandoff(
     throw new HandoffError(`Sign-in failed: ${result.type}`);
   }
 
-  const params = parseFragment(result.url);
+  const fragment = parseFragment(result.url);
-  const err = params.get('error');
+  const query = parseQuery(result.url);
+  const err = fragment.get('error') ?? query.get('error');
   if (err) throw new HandoffError(err);
 
+  // A webmail that got the challenge answers with a one-time code in the
+  // query string; older webmails and Lite put the sign-in in the fragment.
+  const code = query.get('code');
+  if (pkce && code && !fragment.has('flow')) {
+    // CSRF guard: the state must round-trip unchanged before the code is
+    // spent; a link with another state didn't come from this sign-in.
+    if (query.get('state') !== state) throw new HandoffError('State mismatch');
+    const bundle = await redeemHandoffCode(webmailUrl, code, pkce.verifier);
+    const echoed = stringField(bundle, 'state');
+    if (echoed !== undefined && echoed !== state) throw new HandoffError('State mismatch');
+    return handoffResultFrom((key) => {
+      const value = bundle[key];
+      if (typeof value === 'number' && Number.isFinite(value)) return String(value);
+      return typeof value === 'string' && value ? value : undefined;
+    }, webmailUrl);
+  }
+
   // CSRF guard: the state we generated must round-trip through the webmail
   // unchanged. A mismatch means the redirect didn't come from the flow we
   // started, and the rest of the fragment shouldn't be trusted.
-  if (params.get('state') !== state) {
+  if (fragment.get('state') !== state) {
     throw new HandoffError('State mismatch');
   }
 
-  const flow = params.get('flow');
+  return handoffResultFrom((key) => fragment.get(key) || undefined, webmailUrl);
-  const serverUrl = params.get('server_url');
-  if (!serverUrl) throw new HandoffError('Sign-in response missing server URL');
-  if (!isHttpsUrl(serverUrl) && !isLoopbackHttp(serverUrl)) {
-    throw new HandoffError('Sign-in response server URL must use https');
-  }
-
-  if (flow === 'password') {
-    const username = params.get('username');
-    const password = params.get('password');
-    if (!username || !password) {
-      throw new HandoffError('Sign-in response missing credentials');
-    }
-    return { flow: 'password', serverUrl, username, password };
-  }
-
-  if (flow === 'oauth') {
-    const accessToken = params.get('access_token');
-    const tokenEndpoint = params.get('token_endpoint');
-    const clientId = params.get('client_id');
-    if (!accessToken || !tokenEndpoint || !clientId) {
-      throw new HandoffError('Sign-in response missing OAuth tokens');
-    }
-    if (!(await isTrustedHandoffEndpoint(tokenEndpoint, serverUrl, webmailUrl, clientId))) {
-      throw new HandoffError('Sign-in response token endpoint is not trusted');
-    }
-    const refreshToken = params.get('refresh_token') ?? undefined;
-    const expiresIn = params.get('expires_in');
-    return {
-      flow: 'oauth',
-      serverUrl,
-      tokens: {
-        accessToken,
-        refreshToken,
-        expiresAt: expiresIn ? Date.now() + parseInt(expiresIn, 10) * 1000 : undefined,
-        tokenEndpoint,
-        clientId,
-        source: 'handoff',
-      },
-    };
-  }
-
-  throw new HandoffError(`Unknown sign-in flow: ${flow ?? 'missing'}`);
 }
 
 // QR login payloads. A QR scanned on the login screen either bootstraps the

src/screens/LoginScreen.tsx

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ import {
   normalizeServerUrl,
 } from '../lib/server-discovery';
 import { describeLoginError, type LoginErrorCopy } from '../lib/login-errors';
+import { describeHandoffRedeemError } from './login/handoff-errors';
 import {
   clearClientCertAlias,
   getClientCertAlias,
@@ -346,7 +347,8 @@ export default function LoginScreen({ onLogin, isAddMode = false, onCancel }: Lo
       } catch (err) {
         if (!isLive(attempt) || isSignInCancelled(err)) return;
         if (continueWithSecondFactor(err, target)) return;
-        setNotice(describeLoginError(err, { serverUrl: target, t }));
+        // A refused sign-in code is spent: say so; Continue starts over.
+        setNotice(describeHandoffRedeemError(err, t) ?? describeLoginError(err, { serverUrl: target, t }));
       } finally {
         if (endAttempt(attempt)) setBusy(null);
       }

src/screens/login/handoff-errors.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+import type { LoginErrorCopy } from '../../lib/login-errors';
+
+type Translate = (key: string, fallback?: string, params?: Record<string, string | number>) => string;
+
+/**
+ * What to show when the webmail refused the one-time code of a browser
+ * sign-in (HandoffRedeemError in lib/oauth). Every refusal spends the code,
+ * so each message ends with signing in again, which the Continue button on
+ * the same step does. Null for any other error.
+ */
+export function describeHandoffRedeemError(err: unknown, t: Translate): LoginErrorCopy | null {
+  if (!(err instanceof Error) || err.name !== 'HandoffRedeemError') return null;
+  const reason = (err as { reason?: string }).reason;
+  switch (reason) {
+    case 'expired_code':
+      return {
+        title: t('login.mobile.err_handoff_expired_title', 'The sign-in took too long'),
+        detail: t('login.mobile.err_handoff_expired_detail', 'The browser handed the sign-in back after it had expired. Sign in again.'),
+      };
+    case 'invalid_code':
+    case 'invalid_verifier':
+    case 'invalid_request':
+      return {
+        title: t('login.mobile.err_handoff_refused_title', "The webmail didn't accept this sign-in"),
+        detail: t('login.mobile.err_handoff_refused_detail', 'The sign-in link was already used or did not come from this sign-in. Sign in again.'),
+      };
+    case 'rate_limited':
+      return {
+        title: t('login.mobile.err_rate_title', 'Too many attempts'),
+        detail: t('login.mobile.err_handoff_rate_detail', 'Wait a few minutes, then sign in again.'),
+      };
+    case 'network':
+      return {
+        title: t('login.mobile.err_handoff_network_title', "Couldn't finish signing in"),
+        detail: t('login.mobile.err_handoff_network_detail', 'The webmail could not be reached after you signed in. Check your connection and sign in again.'),
+      };
+    default:
+      return {
+        title: t('login.mobile.err_handoff_server_title', "The webmail couldn't complete the sign-in"),
+        detail: t('login.mobile.err_handoff_server_detail', 'Sign in again. If it keeps failing, ask your administrator.'),
+      };
+  }
+}