diff --git a/src/components/EmailBodyView.tsx b/src/components/EmailBodyView.tsx
index bc2068f9..86c47d6d 100644
--- a/src/components/EmailBodyView.tsx
+++ b/src/components/EmailBodyView.tsx
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import { useNavigation } from '@react-navigation/native';
 import type { NativeStackNavigationProp } from '@react-navigation/native-stack';
 import { Image as ImageIcon, ShieldCheck } from './icons';
 import type { Email } from '../api/types';
-import { extractCidRefs } from '../lib/email-html';
+import { extractCidRefs, isUserLinkNavigation } from '../lib/email-html';
 import { hasTruncatedDisplayedBody, pickEmailBody, selectRenderableHtml } from '../lib/email-body';
 import { buildQuoteCollapseScript } from '../lib/quote-collapse';
 import { bodyDocument } from '../lib/email-body-document';
@@ -834,6 +834,11 @@ export default function EmailBodyView({
             // any other) navigation would replace the email body with no way
             // back, so it is refused; images are reachable via the chips.
             if (!url || url === 'about:blank') return true;
+            // A message opens links only when the user taps one. The page
+            // runs no script of its own, so nothing else should navigate;
+            // iOS says how a navigation started, so anything but a tap is
+            // refused there as well. Android always reports 'other'.
+            if (!isUserLinkNavigation(request, Platform.OS)) return false;
             if (/^mailto:/i.test(url)) {
               openMailto(url);
               return false;
diff --git a/src/lib/__tests__/editor-html.test.ts b/src/lib/__tests__/editor-html.test.ts
index 9e4a3265..a5f192b6 100644
--- a/src/lib/__tests__/editor-html.test.ts
+++ b/src/lib/__tests__/editor-html.test.ts
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import {
 import { LIGHT_COLORS, DARK_COLORS } from '../../theme/tokens';
 
 function extractScript(html: string): string {
-  const m = html.match(/<script>([\s\S]*?)<\/script>/);
+  const m = html.match(/<script(?: nonce="[0-9a-f]+")?>([\s\S]*?)<\/script>/);
   expect(m, 'page must contain an inline <script>').toBeTruthy();
   return m![1];
 }
@@ -72,7 +72,18 @@ describe('editor CSP', () => {
     const html = buildEditorHtml(base);
     expect(html.indexOf('Content-Security-Policy')).toBeLessThan(html.indexOf('<body>'));
     expect(cspOf(html)).toContain("default-src 'none'");
-    expect(cspOf(html)).toContain("script-src 'unsafe-inline'");
+  });
+
+  // An `<img onerror>` in a quoted original or a paste must not run: only the
+  // page's own script, which carries a fresh nonce, may.
+  it('runs only its own script, never inline handlers', () => {
+    const html = buildEditorHtml(base);
+    const csp = cspOf(html);
+    const nonce = csp.match(/script-src 'nonce-([0-9a-f]{32})'/)?.[1];
+    expect(nonce).toBeTruthy();
+    expect(csp).not.toMatch(/script-src[^;]*unsafe-inline/);
+    expect(html).toContain(`<script nonce="${nonce}">`);
+    expect(cspOf(buildEditorHtml(base))).not.toBe(csp);
   });
 
   it('blocks remote images and fonts but keeps data: and blob: images', () => {
@@ -84,7 +95,9 @@ describe('editor CSP', () => {
 
   it('allows remote images when not blocking', () => {
     expect(buildEditorCsp(false)).toContain('img-src data: blob: https: http:');
-    expect(cspOf(buildEditorHtml(base))).toBe(buildEditorCsp(false));
+    const csp = cspOf(buildEditorHtml(base));
+    const nonce = csp.match(/'nonce-([0-9a-f]+)'/)![1];
+    expect(csp).toBe(buildEditorCsp(false, nonce));
   });
 });
 
diff --git a/src/lib/__tests__/email-html.test.ts b/src/lib/__tests__/email-html.test.ts
index c69f3bf6..a0a53c77 100644
--- a/src/lib/__tests__/email-html.test.ts
+++ b/src/lib/__tests__/email-html.test.ts
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ import {
   hasNativeDarkMode,
   sniffImageMime,
   TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL,
+  isUserLinkNavigation,
 } from '../email-html';
 
 describe('stripDangerousTags', () => {
@@ -46,6 +47,46 @@ describe('stripDangerousTags', () => {
     expect(stripDangerousTags('<a href="&#x6A;avascript:alert(1)">x</a>')).toContain('#blocked');
     expect(stripDangerousTags('<a href="java\nscript:alert(1)">x</a>')).toContain('#blocked');
   });
+
+  // GHSA-g35q-3gpc-x2rr: the browser starts a new attribute after a slash or
+  // right after a closing quote, with no whitespace in between.
+  it('drops on* handlers that follow a slash or a quote', () => {
+    for (const input of [
+      '<img src="x"/onerror=alert(1)>',
+      '<img/onerror=alert(1) src=x>',
+      '<img src="x"onerror="alert(1)">',
+      "<img src='x'/onerror='alert(1)'>",
+      '<body/onload=alert(1)>',
+      '<img src=x ONERROR=alert(1)>',
+    ]) {
+      expect(stripDangerousTags(input), input).not.toMatch(/onerror|onload/i);
+    }
+  });
+
+  it('reads an attribute after a slash as a new, URI-checked attribute', () => {
+    expect(stripDangerousTags('<a title="x"/href="javascript:alert(1)">l</a>')).toContain('href="#blocked"');
+  });
+
+  it('leaves no tag hidden behind a stray quote in an attribute name', () => {
+    expect(stripDangerousTags('<img x"=y onerror=alert(1) src=z>')).not.toMatch(/onerror/i);
+  });
+
+  it('does not read tags inside a stylesheet, where the browser sees text', () => {
+    const out = stripDangerousTags('<style>/*<a b="*/</style><img src=x onerror=alert(1) c="">');
+    expect(out).toContain('<style>/*<a b="*/</style>');
+    expect(out).not.toMatch(/onerror/i);
+  });
+
+  it('ends comments where the browser does', () => {
+    expect(stripDangerousTags('a<!-- x --!><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>')).not.toMatch(/onerror/i);
+    expect(stripDangerousTags('<p>a</p><!--> <img src=x onerror=alert(1)>')).not.toMatch(/onerror/i);
+  });
+
+  it('writes a < that starts no tag as text and keeps ordinary markup', () => {
+    expect(stripDangerousTags('<p>1 < 2</p>')).toBe('<p>1 &lt; 2</p>');
+    expect(stripDangerousTags('<p class="a" data-x=\'b "c"\'>t</p><br/>'))
+      .toBe('<p class="a" data-x="b &quot;c&quot;">t</p><br />');
+  });
 });
 
 describe('isExternalResourceUrl', () => {
@@ -126,6 +167,21 @@ describe('blockExternalResources', () => {
     expect(html).not.toContain('https://t');
   });
 
+  it('keeps CSS-escaped markup inside the scrubbed sheet', () => {
+    const { html } = prepareEmailHtml(
+      '<style>.a{background:url(https://t/x.png)} \\3c /style\\3e \\3c img src=x onerror=alert(1)\\3e </style><p>x</p>',
+      { blockRemoteImages: true },
+    );
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/<img/i);
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/<\/style>\s*<img/i);
+  });
+
+  it('finds the image behind a stray quote, as the browser does', () => {
+    const { html, blocked } = blockExternalResources('<img x"=y src=https://t/a.png>');
+    expect(blocked).toBe(true);
+    expect(html).toContain('data-blocked-src="https://t/a.png"');
+  });
+
   it('reports nothing blocked for a local-only body', () => {
     const { html, blocked } = blockExternalResources('<p style="color:red">hi</p><img src="cid:x">');
     expect(blocked).toBe(false);
@@ -144,6 +200,16 @@ describe('prepareEmailHtml', () => {
     expect(open.html).toContain('img-src data: cid: https: http:');
   });
 
+  // The bridge scripts are injected by the WebView, so the page itself never
+  // needs to run a script or an inline handler.
+  it('runs no script or inline handler from the page in either mode', () => {
+    for (const blockRemoteImages of [true, false]) {
+      expect(prepareEmailHtml('<p>x</p>', { blockRemoteImages }).html).toContain("script-src 'none'");
+    }
+    expect(wrapPlainTextEmail('x')).toContain("script-src 'none'");
+    expect(prepareEmailHtml('<p>x</p>').html).not.toMatch(/<script/i);
+  });
+
   it('evaluates native dark mode once and reports the inversion decision', () => {
     const native = prepareEmailHtml('<style>@media (prefers-color-scheme: dark){body{color:#fff}}</style><p>x</p>', { isDark: true });
     expect(native.hasNativeDark).toBe(true);
@@ -263,3 +329,17 @@ describe('reading width on a wide pane', () => {
     expect(plain).toContain('@media (min-width: 840px) { body { max-width: 80ch; } }');
   });
 });
+
+describe('isUserLinkNavigation', () => {
+  it('opens only tapped links in the top frame on iOS', () => {
+    expect(isUserLinkNavigation({ navigationType: 'click', isTopFrame: true }, 'ios')).toBe(true);
+    expect(isUserLinkNavigation({ navigationType: 'other', isTopFrame: true }, 'ios')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isUserLinkNavigation({ navigationType: 'formsubmit' }, 'ios')).toBe(false);
+    expect(isUserLinkNavigation({ navigationType: 'click', isTopFrame: false }, 'ios')).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('keeps taps working on Android, which always reports other', () => {
+    expect(isUserLinkNavigation({ navigationType: 'other', isTopFrame: true }, 'android')).toBe(true);
+    expect(isUserLinkNavigation({ navigationType: 'other', isTopFrame: false }, 'android')).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
diff --git a/src/lib/editor-html.ts b/src/lib/editor-html.ts
index 6db806ae..f3d2ad41 100644
--- a/src/lib/editor-html.ts
+++ b/src/lib/editor-html.ts
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 // page verbatim; write escape-free code or double the backslash.
 
 import type { ThemePalette } from '../theme/tokens';
+import { randomHex } from './random';
 
 // Minimum visible editor height (px). The editor auto-grows beyond this as the
 // user types, and the parent ScrollView handles overflow.
@@ -27,14 +28,19 @@ export const CHANGE_THROTTLE_MS = 400;
  * what the composer produces itself - `data:` (inline and hydrated `cid:`
  * images) and `blob:` (pasted images) - so a quoted original's tracking
  * pixels and remote images don't fire just because it is replied to.
+ *
+ * Scripts need the page's `nonce`: the editor's own script carries it, and
+ * inline handlers in seeded or pasted HTML (a quoted `<img onerror=…>`)
+ * don't run. Commands from the app arrive through injectJavaScript, which
+ * page CSP doesn't govern.
  */
-export function buildEditorCsp(blockRemoteImages: boolean): string {
+export function buildEditorCsp(blockRemoteImages: boolean, nonce?: string): string {
   const resources = blockRemoteImages
     ? ['img-src data: blob:', 'font-src data:', "media-src 'none'"]
     : ['img-src data: blob: https: http:', 'font-src data: https: http:', 'media-src data: https: http:'];
   return [
     "default-src 'none'",
-    "script-src 'unsafe-inline'",
+    nonce ? `script-src 'nonce-${nonce}'` : "script-src 'none'",
     "style-src 'unsafe-inline'",
     ...resources,
     "base-uri 'none'",
@@ -108,13 +114,14 @@ export function buildEditorHtml(opts: {
   // Inject initial content as a JSON-encoded string so any HTML/quotes inside
   // are safely embedded (no template literal collision with the script body).
   const initialJson = JSON.stringify(initialHtml);
+  const nonce = randomHex(16);
   const placeholderJson = JSON.stringify(placeholder);
 
   return `<!DOCTYPE html>
 <html>
 <head>
 <meta charset="utf-8" />
-<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="${buildEditorCsp(blockRemoteImages)}" />
+<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="${buildEditorCsp(blockRemoteImages, nonce)}" />
 <meta name="referrer" content="no-referrer" />
 <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1, maximum-scale=1, user-scalable=no" />
 <style>
@@ -167,7 +174,7 @@ export function buildEditorHtml(opts: {
 </head>
 <body>
 <div id="editor" contenteditable="true" dir="auto" data-placeholder=${placeholderJson}></div>
-<script>
+<script nonce="${nonce}">
 (function () {
   var editor = document.getElementById('editor');
   var lastHtml = null;
diff --git a/src/lib/email-html.ts b/src/lib/email-html.ts
index 8cd28df1..24c296f8 100644
--- a/src/lib/email-html.ts
+++ b/src/lib/email-html.ts
@@ -9,12 +9,11 @@
 //      initial about:blank doc - links are opened in the OS browser / composer.
 //   3. This module pre-strips known-dangerous tags and on* attributes so the
 //      rendered DOM is also clean. Regex stripping is imperfect; it is here
-//      as belt-and-suspenders, not the primary defense. `script-src
-//      'unsafe-inline'` has to stay on for the injected measurement bridge,
-//      so a parser-differential bypass of the regex stripper would execute in
-//      the WebView. The blast radius is small: the page has no origin, no
-//      storage, no cookies, and the bridge only accepts height/swipe/zoom
-//      strings - but it is the residual risk of not using a real HTML parser.
+//      as belt-and-suspenders, not the primary defense. The attribute pass
+//      reads tags the way the browser's tokenizer does, and the page CSP is
+//      `script-src 'none'` (the bridge scripts are injected by the WebView,
+//      which CSP doesn't govern), so an inline handler that slipped through
+//      would still not run.
 //
 // Tag/attribute lists mirror `lib/email-sanitization.ts` from the webmail.
 // `<style>` is kept on purpose: the WebView is an isolated document, so the
@@ -67,54 +66,260 @@ export const TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL =
 const RASTER_IMAGE_DATA_URI =
   /^data:image\/(?:png|jpe?g|gif|webp|bmp|avif|x-icon|vnd\.microsoft\.icon)[;,]/i;
 
-// Matches one start tag, keeping quoted attribute values (which may contain
-// `>`) intact. Group 1 = tag name, group 2 = raw attribute text.
-const TAG_RE = /<([a-z][a-z0-9-]*)\b((?:[^>"']|"[^"]*"|'[^']*')*)>/gi;
-// One attribute inside a tag's attribute text.
-const ATTR_RE = /([^\s=/]+)(?:\s*=\s*("[^"]*"|'[^']*'|[^\s>]+))?/g;
+// ─── Tag tokenizer ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+//
+// The attribute passes read markup the way the browser's HTML tokenizer does
+// (WHATWG HTML §13.2.5), not with a tag regex. A regex that disagrees with
+// the browser about where a tag or an attribute starts is a bypass: the old
+// one wanted whitespace before `on*`, so `<img src="x"/onerror=…>` kept its
+// handler, and a stray quote could hide a whole tag from it. Every tag is
+// rebuilt in one canonical form (`name="value"`, no stray quotes), comments
+// and bogus comments are dropped, and a `<` that starts no tag is written as
+// `&lt;`, so later passes and the WebView see the same tags this one did.
 
 interface ParsedAttr {
   name: string;
-  /** Unquoted value, or null for a boolean attribute. */
+  /** Raw value (character references intact), or null for a boolean attribute. */
   value: string | null;
 }
 
-function parseAttrs(raw: string): ParsedAttr[] {
-  const out: ParsedAttr[] = [];
-  ATTR_RE.lastIndex = 0;
-  let m: RegExpExecArray | null;
-  while ((m = ATTR_RE.exec(raw)) !== null) {
-    if (!m[1]) continue;
-    const rawValue = m[2];
-    if (rawValue === undefined) {
-      out.push({ name: m[1], value: null });
+interface ParsedTag {
+  /** Tag name as written. */
+  name: string;
+  attrs: ParsedAttr[];
+  selfClosing: boolean;
+  /** Index just past the closing `>`. */
+  end: number;
+}
+
+function isHtmlSpace(ch: string | undefined): boolean {
+  return ch === ' ' || ch === '\t' || ch === '\n' || ch === '\f' || ch === '\r';
+}
+
+function isAsciiAlpha(ch: string | undefined): boolean {
+  if (!ch) return false;
+  const code = ch.charCodeAt(0) | 0x20;
+  return code >= 97 && code <= 122;
+}
+
+/** The browser lowercases tag and attribute names in ASCII only. */
+function asciiLower(s: string): string {
+  return s.replace(/[A-Z]+/g, (m) => m.toLowerCase());
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read a start or end tag whose name begins at `i`. Returns null when the
+ * input ends inside the tag: the browser drops such a tag and everything
+ * after it.
+ */
+function readTag(html: string, i: number): ParsedTag | null {
+  const n = html.length;
+  let j = i;
+  while (j < n && !isHtmlSpace(html[j]) && html[j] !== '/' && html[j] !== '>') j++;
+  const name = html.slice(i, j);
+  const attrs: ParsedAttr[] = [];
+  while (j < n) {
+    const ch = html[j];
+    if (isHtmlSpace(ch)) { j++; continue; }
+    if (ch === '>') return { name, attrs, selfClosing: false, end: j + 1 };
+    if (ch === '/') {
+      // A slash only self-closes right before `>`; anywhere else it just
+      // separates attributes, which is what `<img/onerror=…>` relies on.
+      j++;
+      if (html[j] === '>') return { name, attrs, selfClosing: true, end: j + 1 };
+      continue;
+    }
+    // Attribute name. Its first character may be `=`; after that it runs to
+    // whitespace, `/`, `>` or `=`. Quotes and `<` are part of the name.
+    const start = j;
+    j++;
+    while (j < n && !isHtmlSpace(html[j]) && html[j] !== '/' && html[j] !== '>' && html[j] !== '=') j++;
+    const attrName = html.slice(start, j);
+    while (j < n && isHtmlSpace(html[j])) j++;
+    if (html[j] !== '=') {
+      attrs.push({ name: attrName, value: null });
+      continue;
+    }
+    j++;
+    while (j < n && isHtmlSpace(html[j])) j++;
+    if (j >= n) return null;
+    const q = html[j];
+    if (q === '"' || q === "'") {
+      const close = html.indexOf(q, j + 1);
+      if (close < 0) return null;
+      attrs.push({ name: attrName, value: html.slice(j + 1, close) });
+      j = close + 1;
+    } else if (q === '>') {
+      attrs.push({ name: attrName, value: '' });
     } else {
-      const q = rawValue[0];
-      const unquoted = (q === '"' || q === "'") ? rawValue.slice(1, -1) : rawValue;
-      out.push({ name: m[1], value: unquoted });
+      const s = j;
+      while (j < n && !isHtmlSpace(html[j]) && html[j] !== '>') j++;
+      attrs.push({ name: attrName, value: html.slice(s, j) });
     }
   }
-  return out;
+  return null;
 }
 
+// Elements whose content the tokenizer reads as text up to their end tag.
+// Only `style` and `title` survive the sanitiser; the rest are listed so a
+// forbidden one is dropped together with its content.
+const RAW_TEXT_TAGS = new Set([
+  'style', 'title', 'script', 'textarea', 'xmp', 'iframe', 'noembed', 'noframes', 'noscript',
+]);
+
+// Attribute names written in a form that every later pass reads the same way.
+const SAFE_ATTR_NAME = /^[a-zA-Z_:][-a-zA-Z0-9_:.]*$/;
+
 function serializeAttrs(attrs: ParsedAttr[]): string {
   return attrs
     .map((a) => (a.value === null ? a.name : `${a.name}="${a.value.replace(/"/g, '&quot;')}"`))
     .join(' ');
 }
 
+function serializeTag(name: string, attrs: ParsedAttr[], selfClosing: boolean): string {
+  const body = serializeAttrs(attrs);
+  return `<${name}${body ? ' ' + body : ''}${selfClosing ? ' /' : ''}>`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Tokenize `html` and rebuild every start tag through `fn`, which gets the
+ * ASCII-lowercased tag name and the attributes (first of each name only, as
+ * the browser keeps them) and returns the list to write, `null` to keep the
+ * attributes unchanged, or `false` to drop the tag. End tags are written
+ * without attributes; comments, doctypes and bogus comments are dropped.
+ */
+function rewriteTags(
+  html: string,
+  fn: (tag: string, attrs: ParsedAttr[]) => ParsedAttr[] | null | false,
+): string {
+  const n = html.length;
+  let out = '';
+  let i = 0;
+  while (i < n) {
+    const lt = html.indexOf('<', i);
+    if (lt < 0) {
+      out += html.slice(i);
+      break;
+    }
+    out += html.slice(i, lt);
+    const next = html[lt + 1];
+
+    if (isAsciiAlpha(next)) {
+      const tag = readTag(html, lt + 1);
+      if (!tag) break;
+      const lower = asciiLower(tag.name);
+      const seen = new Set<string>();
+      const attrs = tag.attrs.filter((a) => {
+        const key = asciiLower(a.name);
+        if (seen.has(key)) return false;
+        seen.add(key);
+        return true;
+      });
+      const result = fn(lower, attrs);
+      i = tag.end;
+      if (result !== false) out += serializeTag(tag.name, result ?? attrs, tag.selfClosing);
+      if (RAW_TEXT_TAGS.has(lower)) {
+        // Copy the element's text verbatim up to its end tag, which the loop
+        // then reads as a tag. A dropped element loses its text too.
+        const close = new RegExp(`</${lower}[\\t\\n\\f\\r />]`, 'gi');
+        close.lastIndex = i;
+        const m = close.exec(html);
+        const textEnd = m ? m.index : n;
+        if (result !== false) out += html.slice(i, textEnd);
+        i = textEnd;
+      }
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    if (next === '/') {
+      const after = html[lt + 2];
+      if (isAsciiAlpha(after)) {
+        const tag = readTag(html, lt + 2);
+        if (!tag) break;
+        if (fn(asciiLower(tag.name), []) !== false) out += `</${tag.name}>`;
+        i = tag.end;
+        continue;
+      }
+      if (after === '>') {
+        i = lt + 3;
+        continue;
+      }
+      if (after === undefined) {
+        out += '&lt;/';
+        break;
+      }
+      // Bogus comment up to the next `>`.
+      const gt = html.indexOf('>', lt + 2);
+      i = gt < 0 ? n : gt + 1;
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    if (next === '!') {
+      if (html.startsWith('<!--', lt)) {
+        // A comment ends at `-->` or `--!>`; `<!-->` and `<!--->` end at once.
+        const k = lt + 4;
+        if (html[k] === '>') { i = k + 1; continue; }
+        if (html.startsWith('->', k)) { i = k + 2; continue; }
+        const a = html.indexOf('-->', k);
+        const b = html.indexOf('--!>', k);
+        if (a < 0 && b < 0) { i = n; continue; }
+        i = a >= 0 && (b < 0 || a < b) ? a + 3 : b + 4;
+        continue;
+      }
+      // Doctype, CDATA outside foreign content and other bogus comments all
+      // end at the first `>`.
+      const gt = html.indexOf('>', lt + 2);
+      i = gt < 0 ? n : gt + 1;
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    if (next === '?') {
+      const gt = html.indexOf('>', lt + 2);
+      i = gt < 0 ? n : gt + 1;
+      continue;
+    }
+
+    // A `<` that starts no tag is text.
+    out += '&lt;';
+    i = lt + 1;
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
 /** Rebuild every start tag through `fn`, which may edit its attribute list. */
 function mapTags(
   html: string,
   fn: (tag: string, attrs: ParsedAttr[]) => ParsedAttr[] | null,
 ): string {
-  return html.replace(TAG_RE, (full, tag: string, rawAttrs: string) => {
-    const attrs = parseAttrs(rawAttrs);
-    const next = fn(tag.toLowerCase(), attrs);
-    if (next === null) return full;
-    const selfClosing = /\/\s*$/.test(rawAttrs);
-    const body = serializeAttrs(next);
-    return `<${tag}${body ? ' ' + body : ''}${selfClosing ? ' /' : ''}>`;
+  return rewriteTags(html, fn);
+}
+
+const FORBIDDEN_TAG_SET = new Set(FORBIDDEN_TAGS);
+// `on*` handlers, and the rarer `formmethod`, `srcdoc`, `ping` families that
+// have a side-channel.
+const DANGEROUS_ATTR = /^(?:on|srcdoc$|ping$|formmethod$|formenctype$|formtarget$|form$)/;
+const URI_ATTRS = new Set(['href', 'src', 'action', 'xlink:href', 'formaction', 'poster', 'background']);
+
+/** Drop forbidden tags and dangerous attributes, neutralise unsafe URIs. */
+function sanitizeTags(html: string): string {
+  return rewriteTags(html, (tag, attrs) => {
+    if (FORBIDDEN_TAG_SET.has(tag)) return false;
+    const kept: ParsedAttr[] = [];
+    for (const attr of attrs) {
+      if (!SAFE_ATTR_NAME.test(attr.name)) continue;
+      const name = asciiLower(attr.name);
+      if (DANGEROUS_ATTR.test(name)) continue;
+      if (attr.value !== null && URI_ATTRS.has(name)) {
+        kept.push({ name: attr.name, value: safeUri(attr.value) });
+      } else if (attr.value !== null && name === 'srcset') {
+        // srcset is a list: check every candidate's scheme individually so
+        // an allowed first candidate can't wave a `data:image/svg+xml` through.
+        kept.push({ name: attr.name, value: safeSrcset(attr.value) });
+      } else {
+        kept.push(attr);
+      }
+    }
+    return kept;
   });
 }
 
@@ -137,31 +342,10 @@ export function stripDangerousTags(html: string): string {
     }
   } while (out !== prev);
 
-  // Strip inline event handlers - both `on*` and the rarer `formmethod`,
-  // `srcdoc`, `ping` attribute families that have a side-channel.
-  const dangerousAttrs = '(?:on[a-z]+|srcdoc|ping|formmethod|formenctype|formtarget|form)';
-  out = out.replace(new RegExp(`\\s+${dangerousAttrs}\\s*=\\s*"[^"]*"`, 'gi'), '');
-  out = out.replace(new RegExp(`\\s+${dangerousAttrs}\\s*=\\s*'[^']*'`, 'gi'), '');
-  out = out.replace(new RegExp(`\\s+${dangerousAttrs}\\s*=\\s*[^\\s>]+`, 'gi'), '');
-
-  // Neutralize dangerous URI schemes. Allow raster `data:image/*` and `cid:`.
-  out = out.replace(
-    /(\b(?:href|src|action|xlink:href|formaction|poster|background)\s*=\s*)(")([^"]*)(")/gi,
-    (_m, pre, q1, value, q2) => `${pre}${q1}${safeUri(value)}${q2}`,
-  );
-  out = out.replace(
-    /(\b(?:href|src|action|xlink:href|formaction|poster|background)\s*=\s*)(')([^']*)(')/gi,
-    (_m, pre, q1, value, q2) => `${pre}${q1}${safeUri(value)}${q2}`,
-  );
-
-  // srcset is a list: check every candidate's scheme individually so an
-  // allowed first candidate can't wave a `data:image/svg+xml` through.
-  out = out.replace(
-    /(\bsrcset\s*=\s*)(["'])([^"']*)\2/gi,
-    (_m, pre, q, value: string) => `${pre}${q}${safeSrcset(value)}${q}`,
-  );
-
-  return out;
+  // Then read what is left the way the browser will and rebuild every tag:
+  // dangerous attributes and unsafe URIs go whatever precedes them, and
+  // whatever the passes above left half-cut is settled one way.
+  return sanitizeTags(out);
 }
 
 function decodeUriEntities(raw: string): string {
@@ -409,8 +593,13 @@ export function blockExternalResources(html: string): BlockExternalResult {
 
   // <style> block CSS.
   out = out.replace(/(<style\b[^>]*>)([\s\S]*?)(<\/style\s*>)/gi, (_m, open, css: string, close) => {
-    const cleaned = stripExternalStyleSheetCss(css);
-    if (cleaned !== css) blocked = true;
+    const stripped = stripExternalStyleSheetCss(css);
+    if (stripped === css) return `${open}${css}${close}`;
+    blocked = true;
+    // The cleaned sheet comes back with its CSS escapes decoded, so an
+    // escaped `\3c /style\3e <img onerror=…>` would turn into markup that
+    // leaves the sheet. Write every `<` as the CSS escape again.
+    const cleaned = stripped.replace(/</g, '\\3c ');
     return `${open}${cleaned}${close}`;
   });
 
@@ -595,10 +784,12 @@ export interface PreparedEmailHtml {
 }
 
 function buildCsp(strict: boolean): string {
-  // Strict CSP. Inline <script> and handlers from the email are stripped by
-  // `stripDangerousTags`, so script-src only needs to allow our own injected
-  // measurement bridge - 'unsafe-inline' is the minimum that lets RN WebView's
-  // injected script run on Android (where page CSP can apply to evaluateJs).
+  // Strict CSP. The document carries no script of its own: the measurement,
+  // swipe, zoom and quote bridges arrive as react-native-webview's injected
+  // JavaScript (evaluateJavascript on Android, WKUserScript/evaluateJavaScript
+  // on iOS), which page CSP doesn't govern, and they attach listeners with
+  // addEventListener. So script-src is 'none': if markup ever slips past
+  // `stripDangerousTags`, its inline handlers and scripts still don't run.
   //
   // In blocking mode img/media/font are restricted to data: only - the
   // network-level backstop for every tracking vector, including ones the
@@ -608,7 +799,7 @@ function buildCsp(strict: boolean): string {
     : ['img-src data: cid: https: http:', 'font-src data: https: http:', 'media-src data: https: http:'];
   return [
     "default-src 'none'",
-    "script-src 'unsafe-inline'",
+    "script-src 'none'",
     "style-src 'unsafe-inline'",
     ...resources,
     "base-uri 'none'",
@@ -754,3 +945,18 @@ export function sniffImageMime(bytes: Uint8Array, fallback?: string): string {
   if (f.startsWith('image/')) return f;
   return 'application/octet-stream';
 }
+
+/**
+ * Whether a navigation request from the message WebView is the user tapping
+ * a link in the top document. iOS reports how a navigation started; Android
+ * leaves `navigationType` at 'other' for everything, so there only the frame
+ * check applies.
+ */
+export function isUserLinkNavigation(
+  request: { navigationType?: string; isTopFrame?: boolean },
+  platform: string,
+): boolean {
+  if (request.isTopFrame === false) return false;
+  if (platform === 'ios') return request.navigationType === 'click';
+  return true;
+}