A send from a shared or group account's identity (quick reply with the
undo-send delay, or a message scheduled in the webmail) is held in that
account. The Scheduled screen only looked in the primary account, so it
never listed such a message, and it could not be cancelled, rescheduled
or edited before it went out (webmail #874).
The Scheduled list now covers every account that advertises submission
and can hold mail. Each entry carries its account, and cancel,
reschedule, "Send now" and edit act there. Edit restores the message
into that account's Drafts and opens it as a shared draft. A shared
account that fails to answer is skipped, so the user's own scheduled
mail still shows.
Stalwart advertises `maxDelayedSend` as a fixed 30 days, but its MTA
rejects any hold beyond its `futureRelease` limit, 7 days by default.
Now that scheduled send works on Stalwart, a time 8 to 30 days ahead
passed the checks and then failed with the raw "501 5.5.4 Requested
hold time exceeds maximum of 604800 seconds" reply.
Ported from the webmail:
- on Stalwart the advertised 30 days count as 7
- a submission or reschedule refused for its hold time throws
`ScheduleTooLateError`, and the limit it names replaces the advertised
one for that server
- the composer and the Scheduled screen show "Too far ahead" for it
instead of the SMTP reply
The composer's and the Scheduled screen's presets now only list times
within the limit, and the undo-send hold, from the composer and from
quick reply, is capped at it.
When a proxy redirects the session request (an http to https upgrade, a
trailing slash, another port), iOS and OkHttp follow it without the
Authorization header. The server then answers 401 or, like Stalwart, an
empty session, which the client reported as invalid credentials, so a
restored account was evicted and its stored credentials deleted. The
retry that was meant to catch this keyed on `response.redirected`,
which React Native's fetch never sets.
Session discovery now also detects a redirect by comparing the final
`response.url` with the requested URL, and on a 401 or an empty session
refetches the final URL with the header. Credentials only follow within
the same host or its https upgrade, the rule `secureFetch` applies; a
redirect elsewhere fails as a discovery error, which `loadAccount`
turns into a `NetworkError`, so the stored account is kept.
RFC 8621 puts the submission limits (`maxDelayedSend`,
`submissionExtensions`) and the mail limits
(`maxSizeAttachmentsPerEmail`) under each account's
`accountCapabilities`. Stalwart advertises an empty object for them at
session level, which is the only place the client looked, so scheduled
send was refused, the undo-send delay silently fell back to an instant
send, the Scheduled view listed nothing and the per-message attachment
cap was never enforced.
The client now reads these from the account that sends (the account's
own submission capability, else the session's primary submission
account, like the webmail), falling back to the session-level object
for servers that only advertise it there. Quick reply, which can send
from a shared account, now checks that account before holding the
message for the undo-send delay.
Signing in from the iOS build against a Stalwart server fails with "No
account found in JMAP session".
Stalwart's discovery endpoint /.well-known/jmap answers with a 307 to
/jmap/session. iOS NSURLSession strips the Authorization header when it
auto-follows that redirect, so the app gets an unauthenticated session
back — HTTP 200, empty accounts — and resolveAccountId throws. Browsers
keep the auth header on same-origin redirects, which is why the webmail
never saw this; it only bites the native app on iOS.
Request /jmap/session directly so the header stays attached, falling
back to /.well-known/jmap on 404 for servers that don't expose the
Stalwart path.
Also treat a 200 with no accounts as an auth failure. Stalwart answers
that way for missing or invalid credentials instead of sending a 401, so
a user who fat-fingers their password currently gets "No account found
in JMAP session" rather than "Invalid credentials".
Tests updated for both behaviours; full suite passes (the pre-existing
auth-store.test.ts parse failure on main is unrelated).
Coalesces concurrent OAuth token refreshes using a Promise-based lock map keyed by the refresh token. This prevents the app from firing duplicate refresh requests with the same expired refresh token, which causes replay revocations on OIDC providers (e.g. Authelia/Hydra) enforcing strict rotation.
Also optimizes persistRefreshedTokens and ensureFreshCredentials to prevent redundant SecureStore/disk writes when concurrent operations complete.
Fixes#14
Linus Rath
Ninad Chandorkar
arnauda-gh
