// Safe HTML shaping for email bodies rendered inside a sandboxed WebView.
//
// Layered defenses (in order of importance):
//   1. The WebView runs the content with `originWhitelist={['about:blank']}`
//      and a strict Content-Security-Policy meta (default-src 'none'), so
//      external resources are blocked by the engine itself unless the policy
//      allows them. This is the primary boundary.
//   2. `onShouldStartLoadWithRequest` refuses any navigation except the
//      initial about:blank doc - links are opened in the OS browser / composer.
//   3. This module pre-strips known-dangerous tags and on* attributes so the
//      rendered DOM is also clean. Regex stripping is imperfect; it is here
//      as belt-and-suspenders, not the primary defense. The attribute pass
//      reads tags the way the browser's tokenizer does, and the page CSP is
//      `script-src 'none'` (the bridge scripts are injected by the WebView,
//      which CSP doesn't govern), so an inline handler that slipped through
//      would still not run.
//
// Tag/attribute lists mirror `lib/email-sanitization.ts` from the webmail.
// `<style>` is kept on purpose: the WebView is an isolated document, so the
// email's own stylesheet can't leak into the app, and stripping it destroyed
// class-based colours (native #46/#49). When external content is blocked the
// sheet is scrubbed of url()/@import/@font-face references instead.

const FORBIDDEN_TAGS = [
  'script', 'iframe', 'object', 'embed', 'form',
  'input', 'button', 'textarea', 'select', 'option',
  'meta', 'link', 'base', 'svg', 'math',
  'frame', 'frameset', 'applet', 'portal',
  // Mutation-XSS / parser-quirk vectors. `noscript` flips parsing modes when
  // JS is enabled, `xmp`/`plaintext`/`listing` switch the parser into raw-text
  // mode and can stash code that re-emerges after later transforms. Drop them
  // wholesale rather than try to reason about their interaction with the
  // strip pipeline below.
  'noscript', 'noembed', 'noframes', 'xmp', 'plaintext', 'listing',
  'template', 'slot', 'shadow',
];

// HTML comments can hide otherwise-stripped tags and survive certain DOM
// transforms (especially conditional comments, which old IE parsed as code).
// Strip comments too so nothing rides along inside them.
function stripHtmlComments(html: string): string {
  return html.replace(/<!--[\s\S]*?-->/g, '');
}

const HTML_ESCAPES: Record<string, string> = {
  '&': '&amp;',
  '<': '&lt;',
  '>': '&gt;',
  '"': '&quot;',
  "'": '&#39;',
};

export function escapeHtml(str: string): string {
  return str.replace(/[&<>"']/g, (c) => HTML_ESCAPES[c]!);
}

/**
 * 1x1 transparent GIF used to replace a blocked external <img> so the layout
 * doesn't reflow to a broken-image icon. The real URL is stashed in
 * `data-blocked-src`.
 */
export const TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL =
  '';

/** Raster image types that stay allowed as a data: URI (mirrors the webmail allowlist). */
const RASTER_IMAGE_DATA_URI =
  /^data:image\/(?:png|jpe?g|gif|webp|bmp|avif|x-icon|vnd\.microsoft\.icon)[;,]/i;

// ─── Tag tokenizer ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
//
// The attribute passes read markup the way the browser's HTML tokenizer does
// (WHATWG HTML §13.2.5), not with a tag regex. A regex that disagrees with
// the browser about where a tag or an attribute starts is a bypass: the old
// one wanted whitespace before `on*`, so `<img src="x"/onerror=…>` kept its
// handler, and a stray quote could hide a whole tag from it. Every tag is
// rebuilt in one canonical form (`name="value"`, no stray quotes), comments
// and bogus comments are dropped, and a `<` that starts no tag is written as
// `&lt;`, so later passes and the WebView see the same tags this one did.

interface ParsedAttr {
  name: string;
  /** Raw value (character references intact), or null for a boolean attribute. */
  value: string | null;
}

interface ParsedTag {
  /** Tag name as written. */
  name: string;
  attrs: ParsedAttr[];
  selfClosing: boolean;
  /** Index just past the closing `>`. */
  end: number;
}

function isHtmlSpace(ch: string | undefined): boolean {
  return ch === ' ' || ch === '\t' || ch === '\n' || ch === '\f' || ch === '\r';
}

function isAsciiAlpha(ch: string | undefined): boolean {
  if (!ch) return false;
  const code = ch.charCodeAt(0) | 0x20;
  return code >= 97 && code <= 122;
}

/** The browser lowercases tag and attribute names in ASCII only. */
function asciiLower(s: string): string {
  return s.replace(/[A-Z]+/g, (m) => m.toLowerCase());
}

/**
 * Read a start or end tag whose name begins at `i`. Returns null when the
 * input ends inside the tag: the browser drops such a tag and everything
 * after it.
 */
function readTag(html: string, i: number): ParsedTag | null {
  const n = html.length;
  let j = i;
  while (j < n && !isHtmlSpace(html[j]) && html[j] !== '/' && html[j] !== '>') j++;
  const name = html.slice(i, j);
  const attrs: ParsedAttr[] = [];
  while (j < n) {
    const ch = html[j];
    if (isHtmlSpace(ch)) { j++; continue; }
    if (ch === '>') return { name, attrs, selfClosing: false, end: j + 1 };
    if (ch === '/') {
      // A slash only self-closes right before `>`; anywhere else it just
      // separates attributes, which is what `<img/onerror=…>` relies on.
      j++;
      if (html[j] === '>') return { name, attrs, selfClosing: true, end: j + 1 };
      continue;
    }
    // Attribute name. Its first character may be `=`; after that it runs to
    // whitespace, `/`, `>` or `=`. Quotes and `<` are part of the name.
    const start = j;
    j++;
    while (j < n && !isHtmlSpace(html[j]) && html[j] !== '/' && html[j] !== '>' && html[j] !== '=') j++;
    const attrName = html.slice(start, j);
    while (j < n && isHtmlSpace(html[j])) j++;
    if (html[j] !== '=') {
      attrs.push({ name: attrName, value: null });
      continue;
    }
    j++;
    while (j < n && isHtmlSpace(html[j])) j++;
    if (j >= n) return null;
    const q = html[j];
    if (q === '"' || q === "'") {
      const close = html.indexOf(q, j + 1);
      if (close < 0) return null;
      attrs.push({ name: attrName, value: html.slice(j + 1, close) });
      j = close + 1;
    } else if (q === '>') {
      attrs.push({ name: attrName, value: '' });
    } else {
      const s = j;
      while (j < n && !isHtmlSpace(html[j]) && html[j] !== '>') j++;
      attrs.push({ name: attrName, value: html.slice(s, j) });
    }
  }
  return null;
}

// Elements whose content the tokenizer reads as text up to their end tag.
// Only `style` and `title` survive the sanitiser; the rest are listed so a
// forbidden one is dropped together with its content.
const RAW_TEXT_TAGS = new Set([
  'style', 'title', 'script', 'textarea', 'xmp', 'iframe', 'noembed', 'noframes', 'noscript',
]);

// Attribute names written in a form that every later pass reads the same way.
const SAFE_ATTR_NAME = /^[a-zA-Z_:][-a-zA-Z0-9_:.]*$/;

function serializeAttrs(attrs: ParsedAttr[]): string {
  return attrs
    .map((a) => (a.value === null ? a.name : `${a.name}="${a.value.replace(/"/g, '&quot;')}"`))
    .join(' ');
}

function serializeTag(name: string, attrs: ParsedAttr[], selfClosing: boolean): string {
  const body = serializeAttrs(attrs);
  return `<${name}${body ? ' ' + body : ''}${selfClosing ? ' /' : ''}>`;
}

/**
 * Tokenize `html` and rebuild every start tag through `fn`, which gets the
 * ASCII-lowercased tag name and the attributes (first of each name only, as
 * the browser keeps them) and returns the list to write, `null` to keep the
 * attributes unchanged, or `false` to drop the tag. End tags are written
 * without attributes; comments, doctypes and bogus comments are dropped.
 */
function rewriteTags(
  html: string,
  fn: (tag: string, attrs: ParsedAttr[]) => ParsedAttr[] | null | false,
): string {
  const n = html.length;
  let out = '';
  let i = 0;
  while (i < n) {
    const lt = html.indexOf('<', i);
    if (lt < 0) {
      out += html.slice(i);
      break;
    }
    out += html.slice(i, lt);
    const next = html[lt + 1];

    if (isAsciiAlpha(next)) {
      const tag = readTag(html, lt + 1);
      if (!tag) break;
      const lower = asciiLower(tag.name);
      const seen = new Set<string>();
      const attrs = tag.attrs.filter((a) => {
        const key = asciiLower(a.name);
        if (seen.has(key)) return false;
        seen.add(key);
        return true;
      });
      const result = fn(lower, attrs);
      i = tag.end;
      if (result !== false) out += serializeTag(tag.name, result ?? attrs, tag.selfClosing);
      if (RAW_TEXT_TAGS.has(lower)) {
        // Copy the element's text verbatim up to its end tag, which the loop
        // then reads as a tag. A dropped element loses its text too.
        const close = new RegExp(`</${lower}[\\t\\n\\f\\r />]`, 'gi');
        close.lastIndex = i;
        const m = close.exec(html);
        const textEnd = m ? m.index : n;
        if (result !== false) out += html.slice(i, textEnd);
        i = textEnd;
      }
      continue;
    }

    if (next === '/') {
      const after = html[lt + 2];
      if (isAsciiAlpha(after)) {
        const tag = readTag(html, lt + 2);
        if (!tag) break;
        if (fn(asciiLower(tag.name), []) !== false) out += `</${tag.name}>`;
        i = tag.end;
        continue;
      }
      if (after === '>') {
        i = lt + 3;
        continue;
      }
      if (after === undefined) {
        out += '&lt;/';
        break;
      }
      // Bogus comment up to the next `>`.
      const gt = html.indexOf('>', lt + 2);
      i = gt < 0 ? n : gt + 1;
      continue;
    }

    if (next === '!') {
      if (html.startsWith('<!--', lt)) {
        // A comment ends at `-->` or `--!>`; `<!-->` and `<!--->` end at once.
        const k = lt + 4;
        if (html[k] === '>') { i = k + 1; continue; }
        if (html.startsWith('->', k)) { i = k + 2; continue; }
        const a = html.indexOf('-->', k);
        const b = html.indexOf('--!>', k);
        if (a < 0 && b < 0) { i = n; continue; }
        i = a >= 0 && (b < 0 || a < b) ? a + 3 : b + 4;
        continue;
      }
      // Doctype, CDATA outside foreign content and other bogus comments all
      // end at the first `>`.
      const gt = html.indexOf('>', lt + 2);
      i = gt < 0 ? n : gt + 1;
      continue;
    }

    if (next === '?') {
      const gt = html.indexOf('>', lt + 2);
      i = gt < 0 ? n : gt + 1;
      continue;
    }

    // A `<` that starts no tag is text.
    out += '&lt;';
    i = lt + 1;
  }
  return out;
}

/** Rebuild every start tag through `fn`, which may edit its attribute list. */
function mapTags(
  html: string,
  fn: (tag: string, attrs: ParsedAttr[]) => ParsedAttr[] | null,
): string {
  return rewriteTags(html, fn);
}

const FORBIDDEN_TAG_SET = new Set(FORBIDDEN_TAGS);
// `on*` handlers, and the rarer `formmethod`, `srcdoc`, `ping` families that
// have a side-channel.
const DANGEROUS_ATTR = /^(?:on|srcdoc$|ping$|formmethod$|formenctype$|formtarget$|form$)/;
const URI_ATTRS = new Set(['href', 'src', 'action', 'xlink:href', 'formaction', 'poster', 'background']);

/** Drop forbidden tags and dangerous attributes, neutralise unsafe URIs. */
function sanitizeTags(html: string): string {
  return rewriteTags(html, (tag, attrs) => {
    if (FORBIDDEN_TAG_SET.has(tag)) return false;
    const kept: ParsedAttr[] = [];
    for (const attr of attrs) {
      if (!SAFE_ATTR_NAME.test(attr.name)) continue;
      const name = asciiLower(attr.name);
      if (DANGEROUS_ATTR.test(name)) continue;
      if (attr.value !== null && URI_ATTRS.has(name)) {
        kept.push({ name: attr.name, value: safeUri(attr.value) });
      } else if (attr.value !== null && name === 'srcset') {
        // srcset is a list: check every candidate's scheme individually so
        // an allowed first candidate can't wave a `data:image/svg+xml` through.
        kept.push({ name: attr.name, value: safeSrcset(attr.value) });
      } else {
        kept.push(attr);
      }
    }
    return kept;
  });
}

export function stripDangerousTags(html: string): string {
  // Strip comments first so they can't hide forbidden tags from the loops below.
  let out = stripHtmlComments(html);

  // Remove entire forbidden tag blocks (paired). Non-greedy across lines.
  // Loop-until-stable so nested forbidden tags collapse fully.
  let prev: string;
  do {
    prev = out;
    for (const tag of FORBIDDEN_TAGS) {
      const paired = new RegExp(`<${tag}\\b[^>]*>[\\s\\S]*?<\\/${tag}\\s*>`, 'gi');
      out = out.replace(paired, '');
      const selfClosing = new RegExp(`<${tag}\\b[^>]*\\/?>`, 'gi');
      out = out.replace(selfClosing, '');
      const closing = new RegExp(`<\\/${tag}\\s*>`, 'gi');
      out = out.replace(closing, '');
    }
  } while (out !== prev);

  // Then read what is left the way the browser will and rebuild every tag:
  // dangerous attributes and unsafe URIs go whatever precedes them, and
  // whatever the passes above left half-cut is settled one way.
  return sanitizeTags(out);
}

function decodeUriEntities(raw: string): string {
  return raw
    .replace(/&#x([0-9a-f]+);?/gi, (_m, hex: string) => String.fromCharCode(parseInt(hex, 16)))
    .replace(/&#(\d+);?/g, (_m, dec: string) => String.fromCharCode(parseInt(dec, 10)))
    .replace(/&(?:amp|colon|tab|newline);/gi, (m) =>
      m.toLowerCase() === '&amp;' ? '&' : m.toLowerCase() === '&colon;' ? ':' : '',
    )
    // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
    .replace(/[\u0000-\u0020]+/g, '');
}

function safeUri(raw: string): string {
  // Decode HTML entities and strip control chars before scheme matching:
  // `&#x6A;avascript:` and `java\nscript:` are the two classic bypass shapes
  // that survive a naive prefix check.
  const trimmed = decodeUriEntities(raw).toLowerCase();
  // Block every non-allowlisted scheme rather than denylist-known-bad. Any
  // scheme followed by a colon that isn't on the allow list goes to #blocked.
  const schemeMatch = trimmed.match(/^([a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*):/);
  if (schemeMatch) {
    const scheme = schemeMatch[1];
    const allowed = new Set(['http', 'https', 'mailto', 'tel', 'sms', 'cid']);
    if (allowed.has(scheme)) return raw;
    if (scheme === 'data') {
      // Only raster data:image/* is safe to inline. SVG is excluded because
      // the regex sanitizer cannot inspect bytes inside a data: URI, so an SVG
      // payload can carry <script>/<foreignObject> it never sees.
      return RASTER_IMAGE_DATA_URI.test(trimmed) ? raw : '#blocked';
    }
    return '#blocked';
  }
  // No scheme: relative URL, fragment, or plain text. Safe to keep as-is.
  return raw;
}

/**
 * srcset candidates are comma-separated `url [descriptor]` pairs, but a data:
 * URI itself contains commas, so the value can't be split reliably. Check
 * every `data:` occurrence where it stands and drop the whole attribute when
 * one is not an allowed raster image; otherwise keep only http(s)/cid/data
 * candidates.
 */
function safeSrcset(value: string): string {
  const dataUris = value.match(/data:[^,\s]*,?/gi);
  if (dataUris && dataUris.some((uri) => !RASTER_IMAGE_DATA_URI.test(uri))) return '';
  if (/data:/i.test(value)) return value;
  const candidates = value.split(',').map((c) => c.trim()).filter(Boolean);
  const kept = candidates.filter((cand) => {
    const url = decodeUriEntities(cand.split(/\s+/)[0] ?? '').toLowerCase();
    const scheme = url.match(/^([a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*):/)?.[1];
    return !scheme || scheme === 'http' || scheme === 'https' || scheme === 'cid';
  });
  return kept.join(', ');
}

export function plainTextToSafeHtml(text: string): string {
  const escaped = escapeHtml(text);
  return escaped.replace(
    /(https?:\/\/[^\s<>"']+)/g,
    (url) => `<a href="${url}" rel="noopener noreferrer">${url}</a>`,
  );
}

// ─── External-resource detection / blocking ──────────────────────────────

/**
 * True if a resource URL would trigger an external (network) fetch once the
 * engine normalizes it. The URL parser removes ASCII tab/newline characters
 * anywhere in the string and trims leading/trailing C0-control + space before
 * resolving, so `"\n\nhttps://t"` and `"h\ttps://t"` are both external even
 * though they don't literally start with "https://". Protocol-relative
 * `//host` is external too. data:, blob:, and cid: never count as external.
 */
export function isExternalResourceUrl(value: string | null | undefined): boolean {
  if (!value) return false;
  // eslint-disable-next-line no-control-regex
  const normalized = value.replace(/[\u0000-\u0020]+/g, '');
  return /^(?:https?:\/\/|\/\/)/i.test(normalized);
}

/**
 * Decode CSS escape sequences so escaped tracking URLs can be recognised.
 * `\68ttp://x` and `\000068ttp://x` both decode to `http://x`. Handles the two
 * CSS escape forms: 1-6 hex digits (optionally followed by one whitespace)
 * and a backslash before any other character.
 */
export function decodeCssEscapes(value: string): string {
  return value.replace(/\\([0-9a-fA-F]{1,6})\s?|\\(.)/g, (_full, hex, char) => {
    if (hex) {
      const code = parseInt(hex, 16);
      return code ? String.fromCodePoint(code) : '';
    }
    return char ?? '';
  });
}

const CSS_URL_PATTERN = /url\(\s*(['"]?)([^)]*?)\1\s*\)/gi;

/** True if any `url(...)` in a CSS string resolves to an external resource. */
export function styleHasExternalUrl(style: string): boolean {
  let found = false;
  style.replace(CSS_URL_PATTERN, (full, _q, inner) => {
    if (isExternalResourceUrl(decodeCssEscapes(inner))) found = true;
    return full;
  });
  return found;
}

/** Replace every external `url(...)` in a CSS string with an empty `url()`. */
export function stripExternalCssUrls(style: string): string {
  return style.replace(CSS_URL_PATTERN, (full, _q, inner) =>
    isExternalResourceUrl(decodeCssEscapes(inner)) ? 'url()' : full,
  );
}

/**
 * Neutralise external references in a full stylesheet (a kept `<style>`
 * block): background `url()`, `@font-face` sources and `@import`. Escapes are
 * decoded on the WHOLE block first because the "css escape" tracker escapes
 * the `url` keyword itself (`\75\72\6C(` -> `url(`). Returns the original
 * (escapes intact) when nothing external is present, so callers can detect a
 * change by identity. (#457)
 */
export function stripExternalStyleSheetCss(css: string): string {
  if (!css) return css;
  const decoded = decodeCssEscapes(css);
  if (!/url\(|@import/i.test(decoded)) return css;
  let changed = false;
  let result = decoded.replace(CSS_URL_PATTERN, (full, _q, inner: string) => {
    if (isExternalResourceUrl(inner)) {
      changed = true;
      return 'url()';
    }
    return full;
  });
  result = result.replace(
    /@import\s+(['"])\s*(?:https?:)?\/\/[^'"]*\1[^;]*;?/gi,
    () => {
      changed = true;
      return '';
    },
  );
  return changed ? result : css;
}

function srcsetHasExternalUrl(srcset: string): boolean {
  return srcset
    .split(',')
    .some((candidate) => isExternalResourceUrl(candidate.trim().split(/\s+/)[0]));
}

function appendStyle(attrs: ParsedAttr[], extra: string): void {
  const style = attrs.find((a) => a.name.toLowerCase() === 'style');
  if (style) {
    style.value = `${style.value ?? ''};${extra}`;
  } else {
    attrs.push({ name: 'style', value: extra });
  }
}

export interface BlockExternalResult {
  html: string;
  /** True when at least one external resource was actually neutralised. */
  blocked: boolean;
}

/**
 * Neutralise every external-resource vector, stashing the original value in
 * a `data-blocked-*` attribute. Covers the vectors beyond a bare `<img src>`:
 * whitespace/newline in src, `<picture><source srcset>`, `<video poster>` /
 * media src, the legacy `background` attribute, inline `style` url()
 * (including CSS-escaped URLs) and `<style>` block CSS. The strict CSP the
 * caller derives from the policy is the guaranteed network-level backstop;
 * this pass drives the banner and the placeholder swap.
 */
export function blockExternalResources(html: string): BlockExternalResult {
  let blocked = false;

  let out = mapTags(html, (tag, attrs) => {
    let changed = false;
    const get = (name: string) => attrs.find((a) => a.name.toLowerCase() === name);
    const remove = (name: string) => {
      const i = attrs.findIndex((a) => a.name.toLowerCase() === name);
      if (i >= 0) attrs.splice(i, 1);
    };

    if (tag === 'img') {
      const src = get('src');
      if (src?.value && isExternalResourceUrl(src.value)) {
        attrs.push({ name: 'data-blocked-src', value: src.value.trim() });
        src.value = TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL;
        const alt = get('alt');
        if (alt) alt.value = ''; else attrs.push({ name: 'alt', value: '' });
        appendStyle(attrs, 'display:none');
        changed = true;
      }
    }

    if (tag === 'img' || tag === 'source') {
      const srcset = get('srcset');
      if (srcset?.value && srcsetHasExternalUrl(srcset.value)) {
        attrs.push({ name: 'data-blocked-srcset', value: srcset.value });
        remove('srcset');
        changed = true;
      }
    }

    if (tag === 'source' || tag === 'video' || tag === 'audio') {
      const src = get('src');
      if (src?.value && isExternalResourceUrl(src.value)) {
        attrs.push({ name: 'data-blocked-src', value: src.value.trim() });
        remove('src');
        changed = true;
      }
    }

    if (tag === 'video' || tag === 'audio') {
      const poster = get('poster');
      if (poster?.value && isExternalResourceUrl(poster.value)) {
        attrs.push({ name: 'data-blocked-poster', value: poster.value.trim() });
        remove('poster');
        changed = true;
      }
    }

    const bg = get('background');
    if (bg?.value && isExternalResourceUrl(bg.value)) {
      attrs.push({ name: 'data-blocked-background', value: bg.value.trim() });
      remove('background');
      changed = true;
    }

    const style = get('style');
    if (style?.value && styleHasExternalUrl(style.value)) {
      attrs.push({ name: 'data-blocked-style', value: style.value });
      style.value = stripExternalCssUrls(style.value);
      changed = true;
    }

    if (changed) blocked = true;
    return changed ? attrs : null;
  });

  // <style> block CSS.
  out = out.replace(/(<style\b[^>]*>)([\s\S]*?)(<\/style\s*>)/gi, (_m, open, css: string, close) => {
    const stripped = stripExternalStyleSheetCss(css);
    if (stripped === css) return `${open}${css}${close}`;
    blocked = true;
    // The cleaned sheet comes back with its CSS escapes decoded, so an
    // escaped `\3c /style\3e <img onerror=…>` would turn into markup that
    // leaves the sheet. Write every `<` as the CSS escape again.
    const cleaned = stripped.replace(/</g, '\\3c ');
    return `${open}${cleaned}${close}`;
  });

  return { html: out, blocked };
}

/** True when the HTML references at least one external (network) resource. */
export function hasRemoteContent(html: string): boolean {
  return blockExternalResources(html).blocked;
}

// ─── Styles ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

// Base styles for HTML emails - mirrors the webmail iframe body.
// Emails are authored for light mode; we render them true-to-life and apply a
// filter inversion trick for dark mode (unless the email has native dark
// support via @media (prefers-color-scheme: dark)).
function baseStyles(bodyPadding: string): string {
  return `
html { background: #ffffff; height: auto !important; }
/* The injected reporter lays wide content out at its natural width and scales
   it down to fit; overflow-x: hidden kills any residual sideways scrolling. */
html, body { overflow-x: hidden; }
/* Some emails put height:100% on a full-bleed wrapper, which with our
   auto-height measurement clips the content to a sliver. Neutralise it. */
[style*="height:100%"], [style*="height: 100%"] { height: auto !important; }
body {
  margin: 0;
  padding: ${bodyPadding};
  height: auto !important;
  font-family: -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, "Segoe UI", Roboto, sans-serif;
  font-size: 14px;
  line-height: 1.6;
  color: #1a1a1a;
  background: #ffffff;
  word-wrap: break-word;
  overflow-wrap: break-word;
}
/* A wide reading pane (tablet): keep lines readable instead of running
   150+ characters across. Phones never reach the breakpoint. */
@media (min-width: 840px) {
  body { max-width: 720px; margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; }
}
/* Only force the cap on images and tables that set no max-width of their own:
   an !important 100% also overrides a sender's inline max-width, so an image
   sized by max-width + max-height + width:100% grows to the pane width while
   its max-height still clamps the height (squashed), and a table with
   max-width:300px spans the pane. Content wider than the pane is still
   scaled to fit by the injected reporter. height stays !important so a fixed
   inline height cannot squash an image. (#790) */
img:not([style*="max-width"]) { max-width: 100% !important; }
img[style*="max-width"] { max-width: 100%; }
img { height: auto !important; }
a { color: #1a73e8; }
table:not([style*="max-width"]) { max-width: 100% !important; }
table[style*="max-width"] { max-width: 100%; }
table { table-layout: auto; overflow-wrap: break-word; }
td, th { overflow-wrap: break-word; }
pre { white-space: pre-wrap; word-wrap: break-word; }
`;
}

// Word emails rely on empty <p class=MsoNormal>&nbsp;</p> spacers for vertical
// rhythm. With our default line-height: 1.6 these stack into oversized gaps;
// tighten to match how Outlook/Gmail render the same source.
const WORD_HTML_CSS = `
body { line-height: 1.15; }
p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal { margin: 0 0 6px; }
`;

// Applied when the host is in dark mode and the email does NOT have native
// dark-mode CSS. Matches the webmail's darkModeCSS verbatim.
//
// Background-COLOR containers (bgcolor, background: shorthand) are re-inverted
// so their fill flips to a dark tone, but skipped when they wrap media: the
// inner image already gets its own re-invert, and a filter on the container
// would double-invert it. Nested colour containers must NOT stack another
// invert either - each filter toggles the inversion, so an odd number of
// stacked filters lands back on light-on-light; the descendant rule disables
// filter on a colour container nested inside another.
//
// Background-IMAGE containers are different: a real photo and whatever is
// composited over it was designed by the sender to read together, so the
// whole subtree should return to its original light-mode appearance - even
// when it wraps media. Re-invert those unconditionally (no :has guard) and
// cancel the per-image re-invert for media inside them.
const DARK_INVERSION = `
html { background: #121212; }
body { filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg); background: #ededed; }
img, video, svg, canvas, object, embed, input[type="image"] {
  filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg);
}
[style*="background:"]:not(:has(img, video, svg, canvas, object, embed)),
[bgcolor]:not(:has(img, video, svg, canvas, object, embed)) {
  filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg);
}
:where([style*="background:"], [bgcolor])
  :where([style*="background:"], [bgcolor]):not(:has(img, video, svg, canvas, object, embed)) {
  filter: none !important;
}
[style*="background-image"],
[background] {
  filter: invert(1) hue-rotate(180deg);
}
[style*="background-image"] :where(img, video, svg, canvas, object, embed, input[type="image"]),
[background] :where(img, video, svg, canvas, object, embed, input[type="image"]) {
  filter: none;
}
`;

// Matches the webmail's `emailHasNativeDarkMode` detector: true if the HTML
// contains a `@media (prefers-color-scheme: dark)` rule.
export function hasNativeDarkMode(html: string): boolean {
  return /prefers-color-scheme\s*:\s*dark/i.test(html);
}

function isWordHtml(html: string): boolean {
  return /class=["']?(?:Mso|WordSection)|<o:p[\s>/]|urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office/i.test(html);
}

// The parser merges the attributes of an email's own <html>/<body> tags into
// our document's where ours lack them, so a direction the sender declared
// there applies as long as we don't set one first.
function declaresOwnDirection(html: string): boolean {
  return /<(?:html|body)\b[^>]*\sdir\s*=/i.test(html);
}

// "auto" spacing: only drop our gutter when the mail paints a full-bleed
// background canvas (a width:100% element carrying a background colour) - the
// one case where the gutter shows as a frame around the email's own
// background.
function hasFullBleedCanvas(html: string): boolean {
  return (
    /<(?:table|div|body)\b[^>]*(?:\bwidth\s*=\s*["']?\s*100%|width\s*:\s*100%)[^>]*(?:\bbgcolor\s*=|background(?:-color)?\s*:)/i.test(html) ||
    /<(?:table|div|body)\b[^>]*(?:\bbgcolor\s*=|background(?:-color)?\s*:)[^>]*(?:\bwidth\s*=\s*["']?\s*100%|width\s*:\s*100%)/i.test(html)
  );
}

// ─── cid: inline images ──────────────────────────────────────────────────

// Returns the set of cid references (without the `cid:` prefix or angle
// brackets) used by <img src="cid:...">, for callers that prefetch inline blobs.
export function extractCidRefs(html: string): string[] {
  const out = new Set<string>();
  const re = /\bcid:([^"'\s)>]+)/gi;
  let m: RegExpExecArray | null;
  while ((m = re.exec(html)) !== null) {
    out.add(m[1].replace(/^<|>$/g, ''));
  }
  return Array.from(out);
}

function replaceCidRefs(html: string, cidMap: Record<string, string>): string {
  return html.replace(/\bcid:([^"'\s)>]+)/gi, (_m, ref: string) => {
    const key = ref.replace(/^<|>$/g, '');
    return cidMap[key] ?? TRANSPARENT_BLOCKED_PIXEL;
  });
}

// ─── Document assembly ───────────────────────────────────────────────────

export type MessageSpacing = 'auto' | 'always' | 'edge';

export interface WrapOptions {
  /** Neutralise external resources and switch to the strict CSP. */
  blockRemoteImages?: boolean;
  cidMap?: Record<string, string>;
  /** When true, the host renders in dark mode; inversion is applied unless
   *  the email already has native dark-mode CSS. */
  isDark?: boolean;
  messageSpacing?: MessageSpacing;
}

export interface PreparedEmailHtml {
  html: string;
  /** Inversion CSS is in effect; the DOM re-invert pass should run. */
  applyInversion: boolean;
  /** The email ships its own `prefers-color-scheme: dark` rules. */
  hasNativeDark: boolean;
  /** At least one external resource was neutralised. */
  blockedExternal: boolean;
}

function buildCsp(strict: boolean): string {
  // Strict CSP. The document carries no script of its own: the measurement,
  // swipe, zoom and quote bridges arrive as react-native-webview's injected
  // JavaScript (evaluateJavascript on Android, WKUserScript/evaluateJavaScript
  // on iOS), which page CSP doesn't govern, and they attach listeners with
  // addEventListener. So script-src is 'none': if markup ever slips past
  // `stripDangerousTags`, its inline handlers and scripts still don't run.
  //
  // In blocking mode img/media/font are restricted to data: only - the
  // network-level backstop for every tracking vector, including ones the
  // attribute pass can't see.
  const resources = strict
    ? ['img-src data: cid:', 'font-src data:', "media-src 'none'"]
    : ['img-src data: cid: https: http:', 'font-src data: https: http:', 'media-src data: https: http:'];
  return [
    "default-src 'none'",
    "script-src 'none'",
    "style-src 'unsafe-inline'",
    ...resources,
    "base-uri 'none'",
    "form-action 'none'",
    "frame-ancestors 'none'",
  ].join('; ');
}

/**
 * Turn a raw HTML body into a complete, sandboxed document. `hasNativeDark`
 * and `applyInversion` are evaluated once on the sanitised input and returned
 * so the caller injects the matching DOM pass (a mismatch between the CSS
 * decision and the script decision was native #49).
 */
export function prepareEmailHtml(innerHtml: string, options: WrapOptions = {}): PreparedEmailHtml {
  const { blockRemoteImages = false, cidMap, isDark = true, messageSpacing = 'auto' } = options;
  const cleaned = stripDangerousTags(innerHtml);
  const withCids = cidMap ? replaceCidRefs(cleaned, cidMap) : cleaned;
  let processed = withCids;
  let blockedExternal = false;
  if (blockRemoteImages) {
    const res = blockExternalResources(withCids);
    processed = res.html;
    blockedExternal = res.blocked;
  }

  const hasNativeDark = hasNativeDarkMode(processed);
  const applyInversion = isDark && !hasNativeDark;
  const colorScheme = isDark && hasNativeDark ? 'light dark' : 'light';
  const darkCss = applyInversion ? DARK_INVERSION : '';

  const word = isWordHtml(processed);
  const hasStyleTag = /<style\b/i.test(processed);
  const autoDropsGutter = hasStyleTag && !word && hasFullBleedCanvas(processed);
  const dropGutter = messageSpacing === 'edge' || (messageSpacing === 'auto' && autoDropsGutter);
  const bodyPadding = dropGutter ? '0' : '16px';
  // dir="auto" lets the first strong character pick the direction, so
  // right-to-left mail reads right-to-left.
  const bodyDir = declaresOwnDirection(processed) ? '' : ' dir="auto"';

  const html = `<!doctype html>
<html style="color-scheme: ${colorScheme};">
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8">
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1, maximum-scale=1, user-scalable=no">
<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="${buildCsp(blockRemoteImages)}">
<meta name="referrer" content="no-referrer">
<style>${baseStyles(bodyPadding)}${word ? WORD_HTML_CSS : ''}${darkCss}</style>
</head>
<body${bodyDir}>${processed}<style>html,body{height:auto!important;min-height:0!important;max-height:none!important}</style></body>
</html>`;

  return { html, applyInversion, hasNativeDark, blockedExternal };
}

export function wrapEmailHtml(innerHtml: string, options: WrapOptions = {}): string {
  return prepareEmailHtml(innerHtml, options).html;
}

export type PlainTextFont = 'sans' | 'mono';

// Wrap a plain-text body (already run through `plainTextToSafeHtml`) for the
// WebView. Mirrors the webmail's plain-text render path: app font by default
// (monospace on request, #830), `white-space: pre-wrap`, native dark theme
// (no filter inversion), and a dark-mode-appropriate link colour.
export function wrapPlainTextEmail(
  innerHtml: string,
  options: { isDark?: boolean; font?: PlainTextFont } = {},
): string {
  const { isDark = true, font = 'sans' } = options;
  const cleaned = stripDangerousTags(innerHtml);

  const bg = isDark ? '#0a0a0a' : '#ffffff';
  const fg = isDark ? '#fafafa' : '#1a1a1a';
  const link = isDark ? '#60a5fa' : '#1a73e8';
  const fontFamily = font === 'mono'
    ? 'ui-monospace, Menlo, Consolas, "SF Mono", monospace'
    : '-apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, "Segoe UI", Roboto, sans-serif';

  const styles = `
html, body { background: ${bg}; }
/* Pinch-zoomed content overflows sideways; it is panned via the injected
   transform, never via native horizontal scrolling. */
html, body { overflow-x: hidden; }
body {
  margin: 0;
  padding: 16px;
  font-family: ${fontFamily};
  font-size: 14px;
  line-height: 1.6;
  color: ${fg};
  white-space: pre-wrap;
  word-break: break-word;
  overflow-wrap: break-word;
}
a { color: ${link}; text-decoration: underline; }
details > summary::-webkit-details-marker { display: none; }
/* A wide reading pane (tablet): about 80 characters a line. */
@media (min-width: 840px) { body { max-width: 80ch; } }
`;

  return `<!doctype html>
<html style="color-scheme: ${isDark ? 'dark' : 'light'};">
<head>
<meta charset="utf-8">
<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1, maximum-scale=1, user-scalable=no">
<meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="${buildCsp(true)}">
<style>${styles}</style>
</head>
<body dir="auto">${cleaned}</body>
</html>`;
}

// Mirrors the webmail's `hasMeaningfulHtmlBody` (lib/signature-utils.ts).
// Returns false when the HTML is an auto-generated minimal wrapper around plain
// text (no <br>, no links, no rich tags) - the caller should fall back to the
// textBody in that case, since the server-side HTML often collapses newlines.
const MEANINGFUL_HTML_RE =
  /<(?:table|img|style|b|strong|i|em|u|font|h[1-6]|ul|ol|blockquote|br)\b|<a\b[^>]*\bhref=|<(?:div|span|p)\b[^>]*\bstyle=/i;

export function hasMeaningfulHtmlBody(html: string): boolean {
  if (!html.trim()) return false;
  if (MEANINGFUL_HTML_RE.test(html)) return true;
  // Fallback: more than one block element suggests structure.
  const blockMatches = html.match(/<(?:p|div|blockquote|li)\b/gi);
  return (blockMatches?.length ?? 0) > 1;
}

// Inspect the first bytes of an inline image so the data: URI carries a MIME
// the engine will decode. Some clients label cid parts `application/octet-
// stream` (#543), which Chromium/WebKit refuse to render as an image.
export function sniffImageMime(bytes: Uint8Array, fallback?: string): string {
  if (bytes.length >= 8 && bytes[0] === 0x89 && bytes[1] === 0x50 && bytes[2] === 0x4e && bytes[3] === 0x47) return 'image/png';
  if (bytes.length >= 3 && bytes[0] === 0xff && bytes[1] === 0xd8 && bytes[2] === 0xff) return 'image/jpeg';
  if (bytes.length >= 6 && bytes[0] === 0x47 && bytes[1] === 0x49 && bytes[2] === 0x46 && bytes[3] === 0x38) return 'image/gif';
  if (
    bytes.length >= 12
    && bytes[0] === 0x52 && bytes[1] === 0x49 && bytes[2] === 0x46 && bytes[3] === 0x46
    && bytes[8] === 0x57 && bytes[9] === 0x45 && bytes[10] === 0x42 && bytes[11] === 0x50
  ) return 'image/webp';
  if (bytes.length >= 2 && bytes[0] === 0x42 && bytes[1] === 0x4d) return 'image/bmp';
  const f = (fallback || '').toLowerCase().split(';')[0].trim();
  if (f.startsWith('image/')) return f;
  return 'application/octet-stream';
}

/**
 * Whether a navigation request from the message WebView is the user tapping
 * a link in the top document. iOS reports how a navigation started; Android
 * leaves `navigationType` at 'other' for everything, so there only the frame
 * check applies.
 */
export function isUserLinkNavigation(
  request: { navigationType?: string; isTopFrame?: boolean },
  platform: string,
): boolean {
  if (request.isTopFrame === false) return false;
  if (platform === 'ios') return request.navigationType === 'click';
  return true;
}