Files
native/src/lib/oauth.ts
T
2026-06-05 19:25:00 +02:00

251 lines
8.3 KiB
TypeScript

import * as WebBrowser from 'expo-web-browser';
import { secureFetch } from './client-cert';
// Webmail-mediated login. The app opens the webmail's normal login page with
// extra `mobile_redirect_uri` and `mobile_state` query params. The webmail
// uses its existing password and OAuth flows, and once the user is signed
// in, redirects back to the app's custom scheme with credentials packed into
// the URL fragment. Fragments aren't sent to the server, so password and
// token material don't appear in HTTP access logs along the way.
export const HANDOFF_REDIRECT_URI = 'bulwarkmobile://auth/callback';
export interface OAuthTokens {
accessToken: string;
refreshToken?: string;
expiresAt?: number; // epoch ms
tokenEndpoint: string;
clientId: string;
}
export type HandoffResult =
| {
flow: 'password';
serverUrl: string;
username: string;
password: string;
}
| {
flow: 'oauth';
serverUrl: string;
tokens: OAuthTokens;
};
export class HandoffError extends Error {}
export class HandoffCancelledError extends HandoffError {
constructor() {
super('Sign-in cancelled');
}
}
function randomState(): string {
const bytes = new Uint8Array(16);
for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) bytes[i] = Math.floor(Math.random() * 256);
let s = '';
for (const b of bytes) s += b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0');
return s;
}
function buildHandoffUrl(webmailUrl: string, state: string): string {
const base = webmailUrl.replace(/\/+$/, '');
const params = new URLSearchParams({
mobile_redirect_uri: HANDOFF_REDIRECT_URI,
mobile_state: state,
});
return `${base}/login?${params.toString()}`;
}
function parseFragment(url: string): URLSearchParams {
const hashIdx = url.indexOf('#');
if (hashIdx === -1) return new URLSearchParams();
return new URLSearchParams(url.slice(hashIdx + 1));
}
export async function runWebmailHandoff(webmailUrl: string): Promise<HandoffResult> {
const state = randomState();
const handoffUrl = buildHandoffUrl(webmailUrl, state);
const result = await WebBrowser.openAuthSessionAsync(handoffUrl, HANDOFF_REDIRECT_URI);
if (result.type === 'cancel' || result.type === 'dismiss') {
throw new HandoffCancelledError();
}
if (result.type !== 'success' || !result.url) {
throw new HandoffError(`Sign-in failed: ${result.type}`);
}
const params = parseFragment(result.url);
const err = params.get('error');
if (err) throw new HandoffError(err);
// CSRF guard: the state we generated must round-trip through the webmail
// unchanged. A mismatch means the redirect didn't come from the flow we
// started, and the rest of the fragment shouldn't be trusted.
if (params.get('state') !== state) {
throw new HandoffError('State mismatch');
}
const flow = params.get('flow');
const serverUrl = params.get('server_url');
if (!serverUrl) throw new HandoffError('Sign-in response missing server URL');
if (flow === 'password') {
const username = params.get('username');
const password = params.get('password');
if (!username || !password) {
throw new HandoffError('Sign-in response missing credentials');
}
return { flow: 'password', serverUrl, username, password };
}
if (flow === 'oauth') {
const accessToken = params.get('access_token');
const tokenEndpoint = params.get('token_endpoint');
const clientId = params.get('client_id');
if (!accessToken || !tokenEndpoint || !clientId) {
throw new HandoffError('Sign-in response missing OAuth tokens');
}
const refreshToken = params.get('refresh_token') ?? undefined;
const expiresIn = params.get('expires_in');
return {
flow: 'oauth',
serverUrl,
tokens: {
accessToken,
refreshToken,
expiresAt: expiresIn ? Date.now() + parseInt(expiresIn, 10) * 1000 : undefined,
tokenEndpoint,
clientId,
},
};
}
throw new HandoffError(`Unknown sign-in flow: ${flow ?? 'missing'}`);
}
// QR login payloads. A QR scanned on the login screen either bootstraps the
// server URL for the normal webmail handoff (`connect`), or carries a one-time
// cross-device pairing code minted by an already-signed-in webmail (`pair`).
// The payload never contains credentials — the `pair` code is redeemed for
// tokens over the network, once.
export type QrLoginPayload =
| { kind: 'connect'; webmailUrl: string }
| { kind: 'pair'; webmailUrl: string; code: string };
export function parseQrLoginPayload(raw: string): QrLoginPayload | null {
const trimmed = raw.trim();
// Custom scheme: bulwarkmail://connect?server=... | bulwarkmail://pair?server=...&code=...
const match = /^bulwarkmail:\/\/(connect|pair)\?(.*)$/i.exec(trimmed);
if (match) {
const kind = match[1].toLowerCase();
const params = new URLSearchParams(match[2]);
const server = params.get('server');
if (!server || !/^https?:\/\//i.test(server)) return null;
if (kind === 'pair') {
const code = params.get('code');
if (!code) return null;
return { kind: 'pair', webmailUrl: server, code };
}
return { kind: 'connect', webmailUrl: server };
}
// A bare https URL is treated as a server-bootstrap target so admins can
// hand out a plain webmail URL QR without the custom-scheme wrapper.
if (/^https?:\/\//i.test(trimmed)) {
return { kind: 'connect', webmailUrl: trimmed };
}
return null;
}
// Cross-device pairing redemption. Posts the scanned code to the webmail that
// minted it and maps the token bundle into the same shape the in-browser OAuth
// handoff produces, so the caller can reuse the existing connectWithOAuth path.
export async function redeemPairingCode(webmailUrl: string, code: string): Promise<HandoffResult> {
const base = webmailUrl.replace(/\/+$/, '');
let response: Response;
try {
response = await secureFetch(`${base}/api/auth/pair/redeem`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', Accept: 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({ pairing_code: code }),
});
} catch {
throw new HandoffError('Could not reach the server to complete pairing');
}
if (!response.ok) {
// The code was unknown, already used, or expired (server returns 400) —
// or something else went wrong. Either way the user needs a fresh QR.
throw new HandoffError('Pairing code is invalid or has expired');
}
const data = (await response.json()) as {
server_url?: string;
access_token?: string;
refresh_token?: string;
expires_in?: number;
token_endpoint?: string;
client_id?: string;
};
if (!data.server_url || !data.access_token || !data.token_endpoint || !data.client_id) {
throw new HandoffError('Pairing response missing token material');
}
return {
flow: 'oauth',
serverUrl: data.server_url,
tokens: {
accessToken: data.access_token,
refreshToken: data.refresh_token ?? undefined,
expiresAt: data.expires_in ? Date.now() + data.expires_in * 1000 : undefined,
tokenEndpoint: data.token_endpoint,
clientId: data.client_id,
},
};
}
// OAuth refresh — exchanges the refresh token at the original token endpoint
// for a new access token. Returns the updated bundle so the caller can
// persist it.
export async function refreshOAuthAccessToken(tokens: OAuthTokens): Promise<OAuthTokens> {
if (!tokens.refreshToken) {
throw new HandoffError('No refresh token available');
}
const body = new URLSearchParams({
grant_type: 'refresh_token',
refresh_token: tokens.refreshToken,
client_id: tokens.clientId,
});
const response = await secureFetch(tokens.tokenEndpoint, {
method: 'POST',
headers: {
'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded',
Accept: 'application/json',
},
body: body.toString(),
});
if (!response.ok) {
throw new HandoffError(`Token refresh failed: ${response.status}`);
}
const data = (await response.json()) as {
access_token?: string;
refresh_token?: string;
expires_in?: number;
};
if (!data.access_token) {
throw new HandoffError('Token refresh response missing access_token');
}
return {
accessToken: data.access_token,
refreshToken: data.refresh_token ?? tokens.refreshToken,
expiresAt: data.expires_in ? Date.now() + data.expires_in * 1000 : undefined,
tokenEndpoint: tokens.tokenEndpoint,
clientId: tokens.clientId,
};
}
WebBrowser.maybeCompleteAuthSession();