diff --git a/src/main/codex/codex-hooks-read-denial-followup.test.ts b/src/main/codex/codex-hooks-read-denial-followup.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..1efb40f571d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/main/codex/codex-hooks-read-denial-followup.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
+import type * as NodeFs from 'node:fs'
+import type * as NodeOs from 'node:os'
+import type * as CodexManagedTrustReconciliation from './codex-managed-trust-reconciliation'
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
+import { join } from 'node:path'
+
+// Follow-up to STA-4823: two more reads on the Codex hook paths acted on
+// "absent" when the real answer was "could not read". Both were found while
+// reviewing #15417 and are not covered by it.
+//
+// The denial shape here is the MEASURED one: chmod 000 / icacls deny leave
+// existsSync true and stat succeeding, and fail only the content read
+// (EACCES -13 on macOS, EPERM -4048 on Windows). No mode fakes existsSync,
+// because no platform does.
+
+const denials = vi.hoisted(() => {
+  const state = {
+    paths: new Set<string>(),
+    deny(path: string): void {
+      state.paths.add(path)
+    },
+    reset(): void {
+      state.paths.clear()
+    },
+    check(target: unknown, syscall: string): void {
+      if (typeof target !== 'string' || !state.paths.has(target)) {
+        return
+      }
+      const error: NodeJS.ErrnoException = new Error(
+        `EACCES: permission denied, ${syscall} '${target}'`
+      )
+      error.code = 'EACCES'
+      error.errno = -13
+      error.syscall = syscall
+      error.path = target
+      throw error
+    }
+  }
+  return state
+})
+
+vi.mock('node:fs', async (importOriginal) => {
+  const actual = await importOriginal<typeof NodeFs>()
+  const guardRead = (fn: unknown, syscall: string): unknown => {
+    const original = fn as (...args: unknown[]) => unknown
+    const wrapped = (...args: unknown[]): unknown => {
+      denials.check(args[0], syscall)
+      return original(...args)
+    }
+    return Object.assign(wrapped, original)
+  }
+  const patched: Record<string, unknown> = {
+    ...actual,
+    readFileSync: guardRead(actual.readFileSync, 'read'),
+    // Why: existsSync and stat stay HEALTHY. That is the whole point — a
+    // permission denial does not hide the file, it only refuses its contents.
+    openSync: Object.assign((...args: unknown[]): unknown => {
+      const flags = args[1]
+      if (flags === undefined || (typeof flags === 'string' && flags.startsWith('r'))) {
+        denials.check(args[0], 'open')
+      }
+      return (actual.openSync as (...a: unknown[]) => unknown)(...args)
+    }, actual.openSync)
+  }
+  return { ...patched, default: patched }
+})
+
+const { getPathMock, homedirMock } = vi.hoisted(() => ({
+  getPathMock: vi.fn<(name: string) => string>(),
+  homedirMock: vi.fn<() => string>()
+}))
+
+vi.mock('electron', () => ({ app: { getPath: getPathMock } }))
+vi.mock('node:os', async () => {
+  const actual = await vi.importActual<typeof NodeOs>('node:os')
+  return { ...actual, homedir: homedirMock }
+})
+
+const realFs = await vi.importActual<typeof NodeFs>('node:fs')
+
+let fakeHomeDir: string
+let userDataDir: string
+let previousUserDataPath: string | undefined
+
+beforeEach(() => {
+  denials.reset()
+  fakeHomeDir = realFs.mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'orca-hooksread-home-'))
+  userDataDir = realFs.mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'orca-hooksread-data-'))
+  previousUserDataPath = process.env.ORCA_USER_DATA_PATH
+  process.env.ORCA_USER_DATA_PATH = userDataDir
+  homedirMock.mockReturnValue(fakeHomeDir)
+  getPathMock.mockImplementation((name: string) => {
+    if (name === 'userData') {
+      return userDataDir
+    }
+    throw new Error(`unexpected app.getPath(${name})`)
+  })
+  realFs.mkdirSync(join(fakeHomeDir, '.codex'), { recursive: true })
+})
+
+afterEach(() => {
+  denials.reset()
+  realFs.rmSync(fakeHomeDir, { recursive: true, force: true })
+  realFs.rmSync(userDataDir, { recursive: true, force: true })
+  if (previousUserDataPath === undefined) {
+    delete process.env.ORCA_USER_DATA_PATH
+  } else {
+    process.env.ORCA_USER_DATA_PATH = previousUserDataPath
+  }
+  vi.clearAllMocks()
+})
+
+describe('an unreadable legacy hooks.json must not clear managed trust or its ledger', () => {
+  it('returns before the removal branch instead of discarding approvals', async () => {
+    const legacyHooksPath = join(fakeHomeDir, '.codex', 'hooks.json')
+    realFs.writeFileSync(legacyHooksPath, JSON.stringify({ hooks: { Stop: [] } }), 'utf-8')
+
+    const removeSpy = vi.fn()
+    vi.resetModules()
+    vi.doMock('./codex-managed-trust-reconciliation', async (importOriginal) => {
+      const actual = await importOriginal<typeof CodexManagedTrustReconciliation>()
+      return { ...actual, removeCodexManagedHookTrustEntries: removeSpy }
+    })
+    try {
+      // The removal only fires when a real-home grant is on record — without
+      // this the branch is inert and the test proves nothing either way.
+      const ledger = await import('./codex-trust-grant-ledger')
+      ledger.writeCodexTrustGrantLedgerHome(
+        join(fakeHomeDir, '.codex'),
+        { entries: { 'seed:1': { trustedHash: 'sha256:seed' } } } as never,
+        ledger.getCodexTrustGrantLedgerPath()
+      )
+
+      const hookService = await import('./hook-service')
+      denials.deny(legacyHooksPath)
+
+      hookService._internals.cleanupLegacySystemManagedHooks()
+
+      // `readHooksJsonWithRaw` catches the denial and reports {raw:null,
+      // config:null} — "could not read". Before the fix that fell into the same
+      // branch as "no hooks configured", which removes the managed trust
+      // entries AND their grant-ledger record. A read that failed is not
+      // permission to discard approvals the user already gave.
+      expect(removeSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
+    } finally {
+      vi.doUnmock('./codex-managed-trust-reconciliation')
+      vi.resetModules()
+    }
+  })
+})
diff --git a/src/main/codex/hook-service.ts b/src/main/codex/hook-service.ts
index a0e30c5941c..270906012b5 100644
--- a/src/main/codex/hook-service.ts
+++ b/src/main/codex/hook-service.ts
@@ -601,6 +601,13 @@ function cleanupLegacySystemManagedHooks(): void {
   // Why: the pre-write guard below compares against these bytes; a separate
   // later read would let a concurrent save land between parse and snapshot.
   const { raw: previousRaw, config } = readHooksJsonWithRaw(legacyConfigPath)
+  // Why: `config === null` with no raw is the "could not read" answer, not the
+  // "no hooks here" one — the branch below removes managed trust entries AND
+  // their grant-ledger record, so acting on it would discard approvals over a
+  // read that merely failed. A genuine absence still returns `config: {}`.
+  if (config === null && previousRaw === null) {
+    return
+  }
   if (!config?.hooks || previousRaw === null) {
     if (hasRecordedRealHomeGrant) {
       removeSystemManagedHookTrustEntries(systemHomePath, legacyConfigPath)
@@ -1637,6 +1644,7 @@ export class CodexHookService {
 export const codexHookService = new CodexHookService()
 
 export const _internals = {
+  cleanupLegacySystemManagedHooks,
   getManagedScript,
   installManagedHooksIntoWslRuntime,
   refreshWslRuntimeUserHooks,