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fix/diff-shift-wheel-horizontal-scroll
14
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5ff1aa540e |
fix(codex): re-land WSL direct-home cutover with counsel findings fixed (#16854)
* fix(codex): safely re-land WSL direct homes * fix(codex): finish WSL direct-home cutover * fix(codex): coalesce WSL launch hook installs * perf(codex): avoid duplicate retired WSL session scan * fix(codex): retain canonical WSL retired-home path * fix(codex): fail closed before retiring WSL auth * fix(codex): reopen WSL drain after rollback * fix(codex): preserve WSL source on unknown panes * fix(codex): harden repeated WSL runtime drains * perf(codex): bound pending WSL session scans * fix(codex): recover invalid WSL session watermarks * fix(codex): validate retained WSL scan state * fix(codex): accept durable WSL scan state * test(codex): cover the drain's inode-identity guard against destination replacement Removing the four `target_auth -ef temporary_destination_auth` assertions left all 33 apply-script tests passing, so a regression deleting them would have shipped silently. Reproduced before writing this. A hash check cannot catch the case. The pinned hard link keeps the original inode, so it still hashes correctly after another writer atomically renames a different file over the destination path; only inode identity sees it. Without the guard the script exits 0 and retires the source, leaving the user holding bytes nothing validated. The new case asserts the source survives. The harness is split by responsibility so no file exceeds its max-lines budget: fixtures, the coreutils interference shims, the run types, the apply runner, and the recovery/absent runners. The atomic-rename hook is deliberately separate from the in-place rewrite shim because different guards catch them. * fix(codex): keep the split drain harness inside the child-process boundaries Extracting the harness into non-test modules moved it out of the exemptions the single test file had: three new files import child_process, and two spawned without windowsHide. Adds the three to the import allowlist, and sets windowsHide on the spawns rather than exempting them - the flag is correct for these calls regardless of the ratchet, and they are skipped on win32 anyway. --------- Co-authored-by: Merge Sim <sim@local> |
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58a52a8ce3 |
test(wsl): guard probes that report failure as a negative answer (#17352)
* test(wsl): guard probes that report failure as a negative answer A WSL probe that cannot reach its distro returns the same value as one that asked and got "no". Downstream nothing can tell them apart, so a distro that was busy for a second reports no git, or no agent sessions, until relaunch — sticky, silent, and identical to the real thing. That has shipped three times: preflight CLI probes, the glab auth fallback (#8941), and listRunningWslDistrosAsync failing closed with no last-known-good while polled every 2s (PR #17072). Scan the WSL and preflight probe modules for the shape and hold the current set in an allowlist that only shrinks. Scoped deliberately: the same shape appears ~850 times across src/ and is usually correct, because for most callers a failure really does mean absent. It is only dangerous where the answer describes a distro. The guard cannot see the dangerous part — whether the value is later cached or gates discovery is dataflow, not syntax. It stops a new swallow site appearing here without someone saying why it is safe to pin, which is the review that was missing all three times. * test(wsl): make ratchet failures actionable A red build must say what to do. Name the offending files, say the allowlist is where a safe case goes, and — for a stale entry — say the change is fine and the list just needs to shrink. * docs(wsl): track the probe failure-semantics reference docs/** is gitignored with an explicit allowlist, so the reference the ratchet points contributors to was silently left out of the branch. A guard whose error message cites a doc that is not in the repo is worse than no doc. * test(wsl): catch a swallow whose reason trails the return The guard only tolerated comments before `return`, so `return false // ...` slipped past — including the exact snippet the doc and the test's own docstring use as the canonical example. The doc asks authors to write down why a swallow is safe, and the natural place for that sentence is trailing the return, so following the guidance defeated the guard. Verified against both shapes: trailing comment and comment on the line after. |
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5650ec8c6b |
Split local PTY provider responsibilities (#17206)
* Split speech session lifecycle * Split terminal output scheduler pipeline * Split mobile browser pane modules * Prune resolved max-lines suppressions * Split pane tree equalization logic * Extract mobile troubleshoot screen styles * Split external automation manager * Split main window service attachments * Split hosted review creation checks * Split automation dispatch event handling * Split settings navigation metadata * Split daemon initialization lifecycle * Split GitLab item dialog * Split relay dispatcher layers * Split mobile host screen * Retarget mobile view settings source test * Split runtime file client layers * Split ports panel layers * Split runtime environments pane layers * Split local PTY provider responsibilities * Fix F3-speech for #17123 * Fix F1-cycle for #17131 * Fix F4-navtest for #17157 * Fix F2-allowlist for #17161 |
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9c01e09ecc |
Revert "fix(codex): launch WSL accounts from direct homes" and "refactor(codex): remove WSL runtime mirror machinery" (#16722)
This reverts commit |
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673842db35 |
refactor(codex): remove WSL runtime mirror machinery (#16505)
* refactor(codex): remove WSL runtime mirror machinery * test(codex): drop allowlist entries the mirror removal made stale runtime-home-service.ts no longer spawns wsl.exe or imports child_process; both boundary guards fail closed on a stale entry so the goalpost keeps moving. * fix(codex): drain legacy WSL auth before restart * fix(codex): await WSL auth drain before restart |
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ef0d5931bc |
fix(source-control): budget WSL bulk git command lines by bytes, not path count (#16634)
Selecting ~100 changed files in a WSL worktree and hitting Stage All did nothing: the files stayed unstaged and the operation reported a failure. Bulk stage/unstage/discard chunked pathspecs 100 at a time, a count picked against a raw argv. A WSL-routed write is not a raw argv -- it is folded into one login-shell command line that shell-quotes every pathspec, quotes the result again, and embeds it three times (one branch per guest shell), so the finished line runs ~3.4x the raw pathspec bytes. Realistic project paths blew past the 32767-character CreateProcess cap at 100 paths and wsl.exe refused to spawn, with nothing staged. Chunking now measures the finished command line through the real resolver, so the wrapper's quoting rules live in one place and native, WSL and SSH hosts each get the budget of the host that actually spawns. A pathspec too long to fit alone still ships alone rather than being dropped, and no chunk is ever emitted empty -- a pathspec-free `clean -ffdx` would have swept the whole worktree. The tracked-path listing behind that discard also fences the WSL login shell now. Its stdout was parsed NUL-delimited without a fence, so Ubuntu's interactive rc banner glued itself onto the first record: that path failed to match anything git reported and was treated as untracked, sending a tracked file to `git clean` instead of `git restore`. Not observing a path in ls-files output is not evidence the path is untracked. The Windows command-line cap and its libuv-aware length estimate move out of the WSL runner into src/shared/windows-command-line-budget.ts, shared by both callers. |
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a9781a4118 |
STA-4150: client-hosted remote browser (consolidated) (#15448)
Co-authored-by: Jinwoo-H <jinwoo@stably.ai> |
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822087c8ec |
refactor(git): split runner.ts into focused command-runner modules (#16395)
* refactor(git): split runner.ts into focused command-runner modules * chore(ratchets): repoint child_process and wsl.exe allowlists at the split modules --------- Co-authored-by: Neil <n@example.com> |
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48e63c015f |
refactor agent config and auth services (#16195)
* refactor: split agent config and auth services * chore: repoint wsl and global-fetch guards at split module paths * fix: restore merge-base Claude CLI error propagation Drop the secret-redaction rewriting added to Claude CLI error paths in the refactor: spawn errors again reject with the original Error (preserving .code/.errno/.syscall/.stack) and command output/auth-status logs are no longer rewritten. |
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087b895524 |
refactor(daemon): split oversized PTY services (#16160)
* refactor(daemon): split oversized PTY services * revert(daemon): restore merge-base session listing and canceled-spawn behavior Two behavior changes rode along with the file-splitting refactor: - listLiveTerminalHostSessions dropped sessions with isTerminating, not just dead ones, hiding sessions the merge base still advertised. - spawnAndPublishSession called session.beginTermination() before publishing a canceled spawn into the host map. Both hunks are reverted to the merge base; the refactor is untouched. |
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e26f849682 |
fix(wsl): budget the whole command line, not just the script (#16032)
* fix(wsl): budget the whole command line, not just the script The argv/stdin threshold measured `script.length`, but the cap applies to the finished command line -- which also carries `PATH=<login PATH>` and `HOME=`. A login PATH is itself a few KB. That produced a perverse band: with a long enough PATH, a 7,999-char hook was placed on argv and CreateProcess refused it, while the SAME hook at 8,001 chars flipped to stdin and ran. Size decided how a hook behaved, in the wrong direction, and the failure looked like "your setup hook failed" with nothing pointing at length. Now the argv form is built, measured, and only used if the whole line fits; otherwise the script goes to stdin as before. The count over-estimates slightly (it charges quoting for every argument) because over-counting is the safe direction for a cap. The regression test uses a 7,000-char script -- deliberately under any script-only threshold -- with a 27KB PATH, and asserts it lands on stdin. My first attempt used 7,999 + `echo `, which is 8,004 and flipped under the old rule too, so it passed either way and proved nothing. Credit: Grok. * fix(wsl): charge quoting and measure the line that is actually spawned Two under-counts the review found in the estimator I added. The doc comment claimed it over-counts. It did not: libuv escapes every `"` and doubles a backslash run before a quote, so a quote-dense script costs more than its length. And `wsl.exe` plus `-d <distro> --exec` are prepended AFTER the measurement, so ~45 characters of the budget were never counted. Together those put a quote-heavy ~26KB script on argv and over the real 32767 ceiling -- where the old script-only rule would have sent it to stdin and it would have run. A narrower band than the one this PR removes, but the same shape of bug, so worth closing before merge rather than after. Now charges one character per `"` or backslash and measures the full spawn line. New test: 26,000 quote characters must land on stdin; verified to fail with the quoting charge removed. |
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e9e238c883 |
refactor(wsl): delete the environment-policy layer the reviews kept failing on (#16007)
* refactor(wsl): delete the environment-policy layer the reviews kept failing on
A design council (Opus, Grok, GPT-5.6-Sol) reviewed the merged runner after it
took eleven review rounds to land. All three reached the same conclusion: the
invocation half is sound, the environment/probe half is not, and every round had
been debugging the second one.
The finding that settled it, from Opus: `environmentResolved` had **54
references, all in tests and the runner itself. Not one production reader.** The
safety mechanism the strict default existed for was never wired to anything, so
all 19 degrading sites reported absence with full confidence anyway -- #9725
live at every one, under comments claiming it was handled. Two of those comments
say so out loud; I wrote them.
Root cause, in one line: every knob existed only because a failed probe was
fatal. So it no longer is.
- `allowDegradedEnvironment` and `WslGuestEnvironmentUnavailableError` are gone.
A missing login PATH is a fact in the result, not an exception. That deletes
23 opt-outs, six catch-and-remap blocks, the transient/rejected cooldown
split, `probedWithBudget`, and the 1.5x re-probe heuristic -- none of which
had a reason to exist once the case stopped throwing.
- `lane` + `allowDegradedEnvironment` collapse into `loginPath: 'none' |
'preferred'`. 19 of 23 sites passed the opt-out, and two said in comments that
they did not want the login PATH at all: the flag had become the `'none'` the
union was missing.
- The `interactive` lane is deleted. It had zero production callers and kept ~30
lines of fence plumbing alive for tests only.
Net -98 production lines; the runner itself sheds 86 for 38.
Also carries three fixes from the W3 orphan-PR sweep I had not done:
- `WSL_UTF8=1` in the runner. My relay migration deleted the only place setting
it, so wsl.exe's own error text arrived UTF-16LE and read as NUL-riddled.
A regression I introduced. Credit: #9010 (Chang-Jin-Lee).
- `GITLAB_HOST` is now named in WSLENV, so a ported self-hosted host actually
crosses into a distro-routed glab (#12557). Credit: #12558 (makoto-developer).
- The WSL skill-setup command pipes into `sh` instead of `eval "$(...)"`, whose
nested quoting produced `word unexpected (expecting "in")` (#14292). Credit:
#14785 (innocarpe).
* fix(wsl): restore the login PATH for the Codex availability lookup
loginPath:'none' on a PATH lookup reports an nvm-installed codex as absent,
which is #9725. A miss without a resolved environment is now 'could not
check', not 'not installed'.
Also hardens the guards that should have caught it:
- bashism ratchet is per-call, not per-file, and fails closed on lexer desync
- blankStringContents handles regex literals (an apostrophe in /'/g desynced
the lexer, so the scan silently found zero calls)
- windowsHide allowlist 85 -> 80, stale once the lexer parsed those files
Credit: Grok (P0), GPT-Sol (ratchet gaps).
* test(wsl): close the two ratchet gaps that let planted spawns pass
- variable-indirected wsl.exe (`const b = 'wsl.exe'; spawnProcess(b)`) is now
tracked, so the 5 files recorded only in a comment become real allowlist
entries. Three actually spawn that way; the other two never spawned wsl.exe
at all, so the prose record was wrong by three in the hiding direction.
- promisify(renamedAlias) is now resolved, so `const run = promisify(execFile)`
behind an `execFile as x` import can no longer skip windowsHide.
Each verified by planting the violation, watching it fail, restoring, watching
it pass. Credit: GPT-Sol.
* fix(source-scan): stop the regex-literal reader from eating block comments
At index 0 there is no preceding token, so a file opening with a banner
comment had its `/*` read as a pattern and swallowed to the next slash --
110k characters of preload/index.ts, in the direction that hides offenders.
Measured across the tree, old lexer vs new: worst-case over-blanking drops
from -110564 to -1116 characters, and files that desync drop from 51 to 22.
The remaining extra blanking is regex interiors, which is the intent.
Regression tests for both lexer bugs, each verified to fail with its fix
reverted. The first draft of the comment test did not bind -- it asserted on
text after the swallowed span.
* fix(wsl): restore the unverifiable signal on the two remaining probe sites
Round 2. Three call sites used to throw when the login-PATH probe failed;
the redesign rewired one (Codex) and left two reporting confident absence.
- skill-wsl-provider-detection: the script ends in `|| true`, so a lookup
without the login PATH exits 0 with empty stdout -- identical to 'nothing
installed'. Callers skip the ~/.codex and ~/.claude skill roots on an empty
list, losing an nvm-installed provider's skills.
- wsl-cli-installer: the dead catch is replaced by an explicit check. Its
`case ":$PATH:"` probe otherwise answers from the distro default PATH and
Settings states as fact that the CLI is not on PATH. Timeout is checked
first, since a timed-out run also leaves the environment unresolved.
Also narrows the regex-literal prev-token set. '!', '+', '-', '>' and '}' are
value terminators as often as operators, so postfix `n-- / 2` and JSX
`<A size={14} /> : <B` were read as patterns and their spans blanked -- 13
live JSX spans, and one swallowed execFile call that left no desync behind.
False negatives only risk a desync, and desync fails closed.
Plus: WSL_UTF8 on the probe spawn (#9010 reached the runner, not the probe),
and the allowlist header I shuffled by sorting comments along with entries.
Credit: Grok (both P1s), Opus (lexer false positives).
* docs(wsl): drop the lane comments the redesign made false
The interactive lane is gone, so 'both lanes' and the fenced-stdout note
described code that no longer exists. Also states plainly that
environmentResolved is always true under loginPath:'none' -- the field cannot
rescue a PATH lookup that was mislabelled, which is how #9725 came back.
Credit: Grok.
* fix(wsl): stop piping user scripts into the shell's stdin
The W3 migration moved hooks from `wsl.exe --exec bash -c <script>` to a
script piped into `bash -s`. Anything the script runs that reads stdin then
drains the rest of the script, bash hits EOF and exits 0, and the caller logs
success -- an orca.yaml hook of `ssh -T git@github.com || true` followed by
`pnpm install` silently never installs.
Scripts now travel in argv by default, which is what the pre-migration code
did and what --exec makes safe. `scriptDelivery: 'stdin'` stays for the one
caller that needs it: the hook-relay installer embeds a base64 JS bundle far
past any command-line limit, and reads no stdin.
A runner test already described this exact EOF hazard -- for the login shell,
not for the guest command it was itself creating.
Credit: code review.
* fix(skills): make the unverifiable check unconditional, and stop double-probing
Round 3.
- provider detection threw only on an EMPTY result, so a degraded partial hit
slipped through: `claude` visible on the default PATH via Windows interop
plus an nvm-only `codex` returns a plausible ['claude'], and the caller then
skips the ~/.codex skill roots for a provider that is installed. The
installer already got this right with an unconditional throw.
- three sites asked for 'preferred' without needing it. The GROK_HOME probe
runs its own `"$login_shell" -lc`, so the runner's probe was a second login
shell eating up to half an 8s budget; the two skill scans are
find/base64/head/printf/stat over $HOME.
- the indirection binder missed `private readonly x = 'wsl.exe'` (the
modifier was captured as the name), backtick literals, and
`spawnProcess(this.x)`. Commit
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5651662494 |
fix(wsl): migrate 21 call sites onto the WSL runner (#15923)
* fix(wsl): migrate 21 call sites onto the runner, after five review rounds Rebased onto main now that the runner (#15903) has landed. 21 sites across 15 files move off ad-hoc `execFile('wsl.exe', ...)`. Allowlist 23 -> 16 on the WSL guard; 163 -> 152 on the W1 child_process guard, which moved as a consequence. Five review rounds, each finding real defects -- several introduced by the previous round's fixes: 1. Hooks ran user orca.yaml scripts under dash; probe failure fell back to the login shell, reintroducing the ~/.profile stall the runner exists to remove. 2. An unparseable probe was cached permanently, disabling every WSL feature on the distro; hooks regressed from "runs degraded" to "fails". 3. Exit 127 had no expiry; a starved 5s probe hard-failed the 10s scan behind it; a joiner burned its budget on someone else's probe. 4. The comment stripper blanked live code, so the windowsHide guard walked past a real unguarded spawn and reported the file clean; an ownership-probe timeout silently deselected the user's Claude account. 5. Verification of the guards themselves. The recurring finding -- a call answering "is this installed?" on a degraded PATH -- was eventually fixed structurally rather than per-caller: the runner refuses an unresolved guest PATH unless the caller opts in. Per-site vigilance was demonstrably not holding; 3 of 8 sites had already forgotten the analogous exit-code check. Remaining 16 files need a runner mode that does not exist: a long-lived streaming child (OAuth logins, hook relay), a synchronous caller, or a host-level flag like --status that the guest-command API cannot express. * fix(wsl): close round 5's P1s -- degrade where PATH was never needed Round 5 measured the guards by re-executing their algorithms standalone rather than reading them, and found four things. P1 -- four skill/plugin paths gained a hard dependency on the login-shell probe that they never had. They ran under a plain non-login `sh -c` on main, so a probe failure now breaks WSL skill discovery and install on exactly the distro the runner was built for: one with a slow `~/.profile`. Worse, the throw escapes before each site's own error mapping, so the UI gets a raw internal string. They degrade now, per the rule this branch already wrote down in `wsl-fish-history-cleanup.ts`. P1 -- Codex and Claude were asymmetric. Claude's five credential sites degrade; Codex's were strict, so adding a WSL Codex account failed where adding a Claude one succeeded. Three of the four are byte-equivalent to Claude sites, and their scripts read `$HOME`/`$WSL_DISTRO_NAME`, which wsl.exe supplies without a login shell. `assertWslCodexCliAvailable` stays strict on purpose -- that one really does answer "is this installed?" (#9725). P1 -- the ownership-probe timeout fix did not survive the rebase onto main. A timeout still returned "not owned", which the caller *persists*, clearing the user's account selection. P1 -- `blankStringContents` desynced on a nested template literal (`` `${`x`}` ``), leaving 116 lines of a child_process importer outside the ratchet, with 27 importers structurally at risk. Now tracks template depth. Regenerating against the fixed blanker: 70 -> 68 offenders. Also: the windowsHide vacuity check could not fail while the allowlist alone exceeded its bound -- the exact defect the sibling guard documents avoiding. It now names a file that definitely offends. * fix(wsl): close round 6 -- my blanker fix had traded a false positive for a miss Round 6 re-derived the guard's answer from a TypeScript AST instead of trusting the regex, and caught two things. P1 -- the nested-template fix I shipped in round 5 introduced a worse bug than the one it closed. Switching to "code mode" inside `${...}` without also resetting the quote at a newline meant an apostrophe in a regex literal -- `` `'${value.replace(/'/g, "'\\''")}'` `` , which is exactly the shellQuote shape all over this codebase -- inverted the lexer for the rest of the file. `claude-accounts/service.ts` went blind from line 96, hiding a REAL unguarded `spawn` at :1097: the WSL Claude managed-login path, which opens a console and steals foreground on Windows. Round 5 traded one false positive for one false negative and I did not notice, because the offender count went down. The blanker now resets non-backtick quotes at a newline (the rule stripComments already had) and tracks brace depth per interpolation. The spawn is fixed rather than allowlisted, and the count is 69 -- the number the AST predicted. P1 -- the ownership-timeout guard was dead code: it threw into its own `catch` three lines below, which returned null, which the caller persists as "not owned" and clears the user's account selection. Now a typed sentinel the catch rethrows. P2 -- `WslGuestEnvironmentUnavailableError` reached the UI verbatim from the CLI installer and the Codex availability check. Both mapped. Method note: I had been regenerating the allowlist with a Python transcription of the scanner, and the two drifted -- the same two-implementations problem this workstream keeps finding. The allowlist is now generated by running the shipped test with an empty list and taking what it reports. * fix(guards): stop patching the lexer -- make the scanner fail closed instead Round 7 proved my round-6 fix also did not work, by planting a plainly-named unguarded `spawn` in `claude-accounts/service.ts` and watching the guard pass 3/3. That is three consecutive attempts at an exact lexer, each shipping a desync that hid real calls, and each time the offender count went DOWN, which I read as progress. Round 6's diagnosis was wrong too: the culprit is the `templates` brace-depth stack, which nothing resets, not quote state. So stop trying to be exact. `blankStringContentsDesynced` reports when the lexer lost its bearings, and the guard treats that as an offender. Over-reporting is a nuisance; under-reporting is a false clean, and a false clean is what let a real console-flash spawn out of the ratchet twice. The allowlist goes 69 -> 82: the 13 extra are files whose scan cannot be trusted, now named rather than assumed fine. The planted violation is now caught. Also from round 7: - `SPAWN_CALL` missed promisified and renamed bindings, so `exec('where gemini')` (a real Windows cmd.exe spawn) and a detached `shell: true` in `cli/runtime/launch.ts` were invisible. Added execAsync/execFileAsync/ execFileCb/spawnDetached. - `BASHISM` matched `set -o pipefail` but not `set -euo pipefail`, which is the only spelling this tree uses -- so the check could not have caught the #14292 signature it exists for. Fixed, and it immediately flagged a file; that one turned out to be a comment, so the bashism scan now strips comments too. - The CLI installer error mapping my round-6 commit claimed was "both mapped" was never applied -- only the Codex side had been. Now actually mapped. * fix(guards): close the four holes round 8 found by planting violations Round 8 stopped reasoning about the guard and planted spawns into it. Four holes, none of which reading had found: - `windowsHide: false` **passed**. The check was `args.includes('windowsHide')`, a substring test. Now matches `windowsHide: true`. - A ternary first argument was silently skipped: the method-declaration filter `/^\(\s*\w+\s*[:?]/` also matches `exec(useAlt ? 'a' : 'b', …)`. Now requires a type after the colon. - Renamed bindings were not covered, despite the comment I wrote saying they were -- I had hardcoded three names. Aliases are now resolved from the import. Each is verified closed by planting it and watching the guard fail. `fork` is deliberately still unscanned. Round 8 is right that Node forwards the option, but `ForkOptions` does not declare it, so the two live sites cannot be fixed without a cast. Recorded in the verification doc rather than left as a silent gap, along with two others worth knowing: the allowlist is file-granular, so its ~18 false-positive entries carry a standing pre-approval for real regressions in those files and cannot be retired by fixing code; and `stripComments` has no desync report, so the fail-closed check is only half applied. The doc now also says how to verify a guard change: plant a violation. Every guard fix here that was verified by reading was wrong. * fix(wsl): stop preflight reporting installed CLIs as absent on a slow distro Round 9's merge blocker, and the sharpest finding of the whole workstream: the branch built to close #9725 had reopened it from the other side. `preflight-wsl-command.ts` was one of five sites without `allowDegradedEnvironment`, so a guest-PATH probe failure threw. Every consumer collapses a throw into a verdict: `isCommandAvailable` and `isCommandOnPath` catch to `false` ("not installed"), `isGhAuthenticated` and `isGlabAuthenticated` read an empty payload as "not authenticated". So a slow distro made WSL git, gh and glab read as missing. Two things made it likely rather than theoretical. The probe took two thirds of a 5s budget, leaving the command ~1667ms where main gave it the full 5s inside its own login shell -- a cold WSL VM start routinely lands in that band. And a probe timeout is cached for 30s with a re-probe threshold of 1.5x the failed budget, which a 5s caller can never clear, so every preflight command short-circuited without spawning wsl.exe at all -- and Re-check does not invalidate the cache. Fixes: preflight degrades instead of refusing, and the probe is capped at half the caller's budget and at 4s, so no caller ends up with less time than it had before the runner existed. Also fixes a real console flash found on the way: `preflight-command-exec.ts` spawns git/gh/node through `promisify(execFile)` with no `windowsHide`. Round 9 also confirmed the credential paths are now *safer* than main: all 11 account sites degrade, every destructive guest operation is still marker-gated, and main's `getOwnedManagedAuthPath` could disown an account on a 5s timeout -- which this branch turns into a failed launch instead of a destroyed selection. * fix(wsl): make "Try again" able to succeed, and test the round-9 fix Round 10 returned MERGE with one residual worth closing first. A transient probe failure left the null-resolving promise in `inFlight`, so the only way back was `retryAfter` -- and the 4s probe cap made the 1.5x budget escape unreachable, because no caller can pass more than 4s. For the full 30s window the four non-degrading sites returned their error *without spawning wsl.exe at all*, and each of those errors says "Try again". The advice was guaranteed to fail. The entry is now dropped on a transient outcome and an explicit cooldown gate replaces it, so the window alone decides. The window drops 30s -> 5s: long enough to stop a stampede, short enough that the user's next click reaches a distro that has since warmed up. Round 10 also noted the round-9 fix shipped untested, which was fair. Added: the probe-budget floor for 5s/8s/10s callers, and preflight's degrade opt-in plus its stdout/stderr-carrying rejection, which isGhAuthenticated reads off the caught error as an auth-success fallback. * test(wsl): make the probe-budget guard actually guard Round 11 caught that the regression test I added for the probe cap did not bind: it seeded the guest environment, so the probe resolved in ~0ms and the assertion read the command leg's timeout instead. Reverting the cap to the old 2/3 split left all three cases green. Dropping the seed and asserting on the probe leg fixes it -- verified by reverting the cap and watching all three fail. A regression guard that cannot fail is the shape that has cost the most in this workstream: the windowsHide guard silently passed a real unguarded spawn twice for the same reason. |
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6b51ef4e2c |
feat(wsl): one runner for every wsl.exe invocation (#15903)
Five decisions have to be made on each `wsl.exe` call. Each has a right answer,
each is invisible in a diff, and each has shipped wrong:
- **Separator.** `--` makes wsl.exe expand `$name` in every forwarded argument
before the guest runs -- even with no shell in the command -- so `awk
'{print $2}'` loses its field reference (#12964).
- **Shell.** A login shell on a probe path sources `~/.profile`, so one blocking
line eats the whole timeout (#14288) and every call pays startup (#9768). No
login shell on a user-facing path means PATH does not match the user's own
terminal, so nvm-installed agents read as absent (#9725, #7563, #8366).
- **Fencing.** An interactive login shell runs the distro rc, and stock Ubuntu
writes its "run as administrator" hint to *stdout* -- so anything parsing that
stream reads the banner as data (#11327, #11823).
- **WSLENV.** Unset, a Windows-side variable silently never crosses (#12557).
- **Payload.** Scripts go in on stdin. A script on stdin has no quoting boundary
to escape from, which is what the base64 and `eval` wrappers work around
(#14292). `filesystem-watcher-wsl.ts` already does this and is the only WSL
caller with no quoting bug in its history.
`runWslProcess` makes them once, on top of W1's `runProcess` so it inherits
windowsHide, shell:false, timeouts and abort. `lane` is required with no
default: picking the wrong lane by omission is the most common WSL defect here.
The probe lane resolves the login PATH/HOME once per distro and then runs with
no shell at all, so #14288 and #9768 are closed by construction rather than by a
longer timeout. An unprobed distro degrades to the interactive lane -- "we could
not ask" must not become "run with no PATH".
Additive only: no call site is migrated yet. The new guard allowlists the 23
files that still spawn directly, and its length is the workstream's goalpost.
Two guard bugs found by testing the guards against planted call sites: a bare
`main/wsl` prefix also exempted `main/wsl.ts`, `wsl-availability.ts` and
`wsl-unc-delete.ts` -- three real offenders.
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