17 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
88f2f01061 fix(daemon): escape the terminal daemon into its own systemd scope so a service restart no longer kills every live PTY (#19430)
* fix(daemon): escape the terminal daemon into its own systemd scope so a service restart no longer kills every live PTY

Root cause: daemon-launched-child.ts forks the detached terminal daemon with
detached: true, which escapes the POSIX process group (setsid) but never the
systemd cgroup. Every PTY the daemon owns is itself an undetached direct
child of the daemon (native-pty-spawn.ts). Under a combined systemd unit
(Type=simple, KillMode=mixed, per docs/reference/headless-linux-server.md),
a systemctl restart/stop SIGKILLs every process still in the cgroup at the
stop timeout -- the daemon and every live terminal -- even though the
codebase already has a fully-built adoption/reattachment path for a
surviving daemon (orcad-entry.ts's refreshRestoredOrchestrationAuthority +
reconcileLegacyWorkerTerminals, gated on daemonOwnsFreshPersistentPtys()).
That path never fires today because the daemon never survives long enough.

Fix: when systemd is actually supervising the process and the OS user has a
reachable systemd --user manager (isDurableDaemonScopeSupported(), Linux
only), launch the daemon via systemd-run --user --scope so it lands in a
cgroup that is a sibling of the service unit's cgroup, not a descendant of
it. A systemctl restart of the combined unit then never reaches it. Any
failure of the scoped launch (no reachable bus, D-Bus policy rejection,
etc.) falls back transparently to the existing plain fork() launch, so
every platform/environment without this capability is unaffected.

The daemon self-detects its own resulting cgroup scope via /proc/self/cgroup
(detectOwnCgroupScopeUnit()) rather than trusting the launcher's intent, and
publishes it as cgroupUnit in its pid record and orcad's health/readiness
payload (health.terminalDaemon.cgroupUnit), so a running deployment can be
observed to confirm the fix actually engaged.

No new session registry is added: the existing daemon pid-record + adoption
protocol (publishDaemonPidFile, daemon-pid-record-quarantine.ts's
dead-record reclaim, refreshRestoredOrchestrationAuthority) already
implements durable, crash-safe reattachment for a surviving daemon -- it
was simply never exercised against a full unit restart before now.

Proven via a systemd-in-Docker recovery test: a live PTY session's shell
process, its daemon, and the daemon's cgroup scope were all confirmed
unchanged across a real systemctl restart of a Type=simple/KillMode=mixed
unit, while the main process pid changed (confirming the unit actually
restarted) and the new process's health payload recognized the surviving
daemon as adopted and live. A fresh write into the same PTY post-restart
reached the same running shell. Ordinary terminal create/work/release and
the #18789/#18790 worker-release reap-fix regression tests are unaffected.

Fixes stablyai/orca#19408

* fix(daemon): probe the real per-UID XDG_RUNTIME_DIR before trusting the process's own env

isDurableDaemonScopeSupported()/buildDurableDaemonScopeCommand() trusted the current
process's own XDG_RUNTIME_DIR env var first, falling back to /run/user/<uid> only when
that var was unset entirely. On mtl-02, orca-serve@factory.service's RuntimeDirectory=
hardening directive makes systemd export XDG_RUNTIME_DIR=/run/orca_serve/factory into the
unit's process -- a private scratch dir that shares the env var's name but has nothing to
do with the user session bus. /proc/<pid>/environ on that host confirmed exactly that path
plus DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS=disabled:, while the real bus was reachable the whole time at
/run/user/985 (confirmed via systemctl --user is-system-running with that dir exported by
hand). The probe treated the hardened override as authoritative, found no bus socket there,
and reported unsupported on every launch -- so the cgroup-escape fix from #19408/#19430
never actually engaged on real hardware, even though tonight's factory deployment picked it
up.

Fix: resolveUserRuntimeDir() now always tries the conventional /run/user/<uid> path first
(computed independently via getuid(), never trusted from env), checking for a genuinely
connectable bus socket via statSync(...).isSocket() rather than a bare existsSync. It falls
back to the process's own XDG_RUNTIME_DIR only when that canonical path has no reachable
bus -- covering hosts that legitimately have no /run/user/<uid> at all but do have a
working bus wherever their own environment points. buildDurableDaemonScopeCommand() now
explicitly sets XDG_RUNTIME_DIR to whichever path this resolution picked, rather than
inheriting the spread env's (possibly hardened-wrong) value.

Both isDurableDaemonScopeSupported() and buildDurableDaemonScopeCommand() gained an
injectable canonicalRuntimeDir parameter (defaulting to the real computed path) so tests
can exercise the hardened-override scenario deterministically with a real, connectable
AF_UNIX socket fixture instead of the live host's actual runtime directory.

Docker's stock jrei/systemd-ubuntu test container never had this hardening directive, so
this gap was structurally invisible to the container-based verification in #19430 -- only
caught against real mtl-02 hardware.

* fix(daemon): report the daemon's own pid over the ready handshake, not systemd-run's

The launcher used to infer the daemon's identity pid from the immediate
spawned child (`child.pid`). On the durable-scope path that child is
`systemd-run --user --scope`, not the daemon, so the launcher was asserting
an identity it had no authority over.

`DaemonReadyIdentity` now carries a required `pid` populated from
`process.pid` inside the daemon itself, and `daemon-launched-child.ts` takes
`launchedIdentity.pid` from that self-report. Both sides of the
`holdDaemonAdoptionLease` pid comparison therefore originate inside the
daemon process, which is the idiom this branch already uses for cgroup
membership (`detectOwnCgroupScopeUnit` reads `/proc/self/cgroup` rather than
trusting what the launcher intended).

Note on the reported consequence: `systemd-run --scope` registers its *own*
pid on the transient scope unit and then `execvpe()`s the target command --
same pid, no intermediate process -- so adoption did not in fact fail on
systemd >= 206 (verified against systemd 255.4-1ubuntu8.17 and current main,
`src/run/run.c` `start_transient_scope()`). The fix stands on its own merits:
it removes a silent dependency on that exec-vs-fork implementation detail,
which a `systemd-run` shim earlier in PATH or any future systemd change would
have broken with no diagnostic.

`terminateLaunchedDaemonChild` was audited and deliberately left on
`child.pid`: for the same execve-preserves-pid reason that pid is either
still systemd-run mid-scope-setup (killing it correctly aborts the launch) or
already the daemon, so it targets the right process either way.

Regression coverage: `daemon-launched-child-identity.test.ts` pins the
identity source, and `daemon-ready-identity.test.ts` gains pid-validation
cases. Ready-message fixtures across the `daemon-init-*` suites were updated
for the now-mandatory field.

Addresses:
https://github.com/stablyai/orca/pull/19430#discussion_r3953722704
https://github.com/stablyai/orca/pull/19430#discussion_r3954346518

* test(daemon): assert cgroupUnit in the pid-file parse contract

`parseDaemonPidFile` returns `cgroupUnit` on every branch as of the
durable-scope commit on this branch, but five exhaustive `toEqual`
assertions in daemon-health.test.ts still described the pre-scope shape, so
they failed on the branch independently of any later change.

Adds the field to those expectations. Deliberately not relaxed to
`toMatchObject`: asserting the full parsed shape is what makes these tests
catch a field silently dropped from the pid-file contract.

* refactor(daemon): resolve the canonical user runtime dir at one point

The per-UID path cannot change for a live process, so compute it once into a module
const instead of threading the same default call through three signatures, and drop
the try/catch around a getuid() that cannot throw once it exists. Trims the module
prose to the non-obvious facts and corrects the pid-file record comment: an unscoped
daemon writes null; only records no daemon wrote are absent.

* test(daemon): clean up the cgroup-scope fixtures and assert a verdict

The cgroup fixture tracked only the file it wrote, leaking one temp dir per case.
Drains both fixture lists with splice so the pop-may-be-undefined guards go away,
and replaces a not-throw/typeof-boolean pair with the verdict it was circling:
no resolvable runtime dir means unsupported.

* refactor(daemon): share the detached child options across both launch paths

cwd, detached and stdio were repeated in the fork and systemd-run branches, which
left the two comments explaining them hovering over the env block instead. Names
them once so each branch carries only its own delta.

* refactor(daemon): validate the ready pid like every other field

typeof-first narrows the value, so the two 'as number' casts the isSafeInteger check
needed disappear and the pid guard reads like the startedAtMs guard below it.

* fix(daemon): don't retry the launch unscoped after losing the endpoint race

A scoped attempt that lost the endpoint to another daemon was retried unscoped: a
second doomed fork, a misleading 'cgroup-scope launch failed' warning, and the same
DaemonEndpointUnavailableError the caller was already going to adopt on. Rethrows it
instead, since no launch mode can win a race that is already lost.

Also drops a private alias for DaemonChildSpawnOptions and the two 'as number' casts
on child.pid in the startup-failure cleanup.

* fix(daemon): unlink the pid record by the pid the daemon published

The record holds the daemon's self-reported pid, so match on that rather than on the
immediate child's, which is the systemd-run wrapper's until it execs.

* fix(daemon): route the scope launch through the child-process chokepoint

The two files this PR added imported `node:child_process` directly, which
`child-process-import-boundary.test.ts` fails on deterministically: the
offender count went 155 -> 157 against a pin of exactly 155. Raising the pin
or listing the files is what that test explicitly forbids, and the allowlist's
own note says a split "moved the import, it did not add one" -- so the fix is
to get both new files off the module and put the count back at 155.

- `daemon-cgroup-scope.ts`: the `systemd-run --version` probe now uses
  `runProcessSync` instead of `execFileSync`, so it gets the shared spawn
  decisions. Kept synchronous deliberately: `launchDaemonChild` attaches the
  readiness listener in the same tick it is called, and an await before the
  spawn moves the child past that tick. A non-zero exit is data rather than a
  throw here, so the verdict now checks `code === 0 && !timedOut`.
- `daemon-launched-child-spawn.ts`: the scoped launch uses `spawnProcess`, and
  the long-standing unscoped launch keeps `fork` semantics through a new
  `forkProcess`.
- `src/shared/child-process/fork-process.ts`: the fork arm of the chokepoint.
  `spawnProcess` cannot express a Node child with an IPC channel started from
  a module path under an overridden `execPath`, and the existing launch tests
  are written against `fork`'s contract, so a spawn rewrite would have changed
  module resolution, `execPath` and `execArgv` at once. It passes
  `windowsHide: true` -- the flag every other call site in that directory
  sets, reachable via an assertion because `ForkOptions` omits it -- which
  keeps `windows-console-visibility.test.ts` at its pin of 65 too.

Both ratchets pass with both pins and both allowlists untouched.

Docs: `orcad-operations.md` and `headless-linux-server.md` still described the
limitation this PR removes as permanent. Both now describe the durable-scope
survival path and its preconditions (systemd as PID 1, a reachable user bus /
`loginctl enable-linger`, `systemd-run` on PATH), and scope the old text to
the unscoped-fallback case, pointing at `health.terminalDaemon.cgroupUnit` as
the way to tell the two apart on a running host.

* fix(daemon): seal the cgroup capability probe from the host and correct KillMode=mixed docs

The capability probe consulted the host's own /run/systemd/system marker and
spawned the real systemd-run binary, so the hermetic unit tests could only pass
on a systemd host (and fail closed otherwise, even with faked bus sockets).

- Thread systemdBootPath and runVersionProbe as test seams through
  isDurableDaemonScopeSupported, defaulting to the real boot marker and
  systemd-run --version probe in production.
- Narrow the injected probe to the ProcessResult slice it consumes.
- Cover: no-systemd-boot, non-zero probe exit, and probe-timeout cases.
- Correct KillMode=mixed semantics in the docs: the cgroup-wide SIGKILL fires
  the instant the main process exits, not after TimeoutStopSec; document the
  Docker-container caveat and add KillMode=mixed to the multi-service template.

* fix(daemon): satisfy assertion checks in scoped launch

* fix(daemon): satisfy anti-slop and console guards

* test(serve): update shutdown docs assertions for daemon scope

* fix(daemon): migrate adopted legacy scopes

* docs: qualify restart safety by daemon scope

* docs(daemon): qualify Upgrade restart prose with durable scope caveat

Align the Upgrade section in docs/reference/headless-linux-server.md with
the earlier preservation section and docs/reference/orcad-operations.md:
a service restart terminates live processes only when running under the
unscoped fallback, and stops should be treated as destructive unless
health.terminalDaemon.cgroupUnit names an orca-daemon-*.scope.

Update the shutdown workflow test assertion in
config/scripts/headless-serve-shutdown-workflow.test.mjs to match.

* fix(daemon): harden legacy scope migration

---------

Co-authored-by: Lesley Murfin <260182349+LesleyMurfin@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: m4air <m4air@Mac.localdomain>
2026-09-21 17:23:30 -07:00
Jinwoo Hong 74cc9b5039 feat(desktop): native mobile push integration (2/3) (#19935)
* feat(desktop): integrate native mobile push delivery and lifecycle

* fix(desktop): preserve notification replay policy and review invariants

* fix(desktop): correct notification locale namespace and auto-ack tests
2026-09-10 20:16:56 -04:00
Jinwoo Hong d53cbed43f revert: hold mobile push feature for user testing (#19203)
Reverts 3160b54c69. Restore through a separate draft PR after user validation.
2026-09-07 00:30:21 -04:00
Jinwoo Hong 3160b54c69 feat: real background push notifications for the mobile app (#8129) (#18554)
* feat(cloud): add the mobile push gateway and its contract package (#8129)

A small open-source service that holds the APNs key and FCM credentials and
sends background push to paired phones on the desktop's behalf. Hosts
authenticate with a box challenge and HMAC proof on their pairing key, the
same shape the relay uses, so signed-in and accountless desktops share one
path. Tokens are stored; alert text is held only for the coalescing window.

The contract doc in docs/reference is the source of truth for every wire
shape. The interop test runs the real desktop answerer against a real
gateway-issued challenge so transcript drift fails in CI.

* feat(push): register phones and send background push from the desktop (#8129)

Adds the notifications.remote-push.v1 capability, the registerPush and
unregisterPush RPCs on the mobile allowlist, a gateway client with a cached
session and 401 re-auth, a durable unregister outbox, and a dispatcher that
offers every mobile notification to the gateway after the socket fan-out.
The dispatcher is fire-and-forget with one retry and drops registrations the
gateway reports dead.

Puts agentState on the mobile frame and fixes the #4375 wording so a working
agent is never announced as finished. The relay host-proof code moves onto a
shared envelope module with no behaviour change.

* feat(mobile): background push registration, receive, and settings (#8129)

Fetches the native APNs or FCM token, registers it with every paired host
that advertises the capability, and re-registers on token change. Foreground
pushes are suppressed inside handleNotification against the same seen set
the socket path uses, so nothing shows twice. Taps route by host fingerprint.
One Background notifications switch, off by default, with the disclaimer and
needs-input / finished sub-switches; hidden until a paired desktop is new
enough. Adds google-services.json and the expo-notifications plugin.

* chore(cloud): Terraform and deploy workflow for the push gateway (#8129)

Declares the Cloud Run service, runtime account, secrets, and orca_push
database behind push_gateway_enabled, true only in production. The deploy
workflow is gated like the relay's, deploys with no traffic, probes /ready
and a validate-only FCM send, then shifts traffic. It runs as the shared
production deploy account because the Cloud SQL rollout lease grant is
foundation-owned; its extra authority is three bindings on the push service.
docs/push-gateway.md carries the import commands for the resources created
by hand and the APNs key rotation procedure.

* docs: describe background notifications on the phone (#8129)

* docs: check in the mobile push contract (#8129)

Seven committed files cite it as the source of truth for every wire shape;
docs/reference is allowlisted per file, so add the entry.

* test(push): replay one checked-in host-proof vector on both sides (#8129)

Cloud Verify installs only the cloud workspace, so the gateway suite cannot
import the desktop answerer. Replace the cross-workspace import with a fixed
challenge vector generated from the contract package; the gateway fixture and
the desktop answerer each replay it and must produce the same HMAC. A
transcript drift on either side now fails in that side's own suite.

* fix(cloud): open the push gateway with invoker_iam_disabled, not an allUsers binding (#8129)

The production domain-restricted-sharing policy rejects an allUsers
run.invoker member, which the runbook anticipated. Opt the service out of
invoker IAM the way the relay director already does; the host proof is the
authentication either way.

* docs(cloud): the push.onorca.dev record exists and is hand-managed (#8129)

* fix(push): close review findings in the gateway (#8129)

- Quota reservation takes a per-host advisory lock; READ COMMITTED admitted
  a whole burst past the cap (80/80 without, 60/80 with, against Postgres 16).
- Challenge issuance no longer writes push_hosts; the row lands on proof
  verification. Stale hosts prune after 30 days. Per-IP token bucket on the
  two unauthenticated routes.
- Streaming body limit via hono bodyLimit; a chunked body bypassed the
  Content-Length check.
- registrationIds deduped in the schema; per-host device cap of 64; list
  bounded to its schema.
- Gateway-side challenge TTL is the specified 10 s, not 40 s.
- APNs stream settles on close as well as end/error.

* fix(push): close review findings in the desktop client (#8129)

- A gateway registration the registry cannot persist is enqueued for delete
  instead of leaking a live token.
- Unregister outbox re-reads pending per pass, honours enqueues during a
  drain, and retries with backoff instead of waiting for the next launch.
- Dispatcher batches registrations by 20 rather than starving the rest.
- 401 compare-and-clear; a 401 after re-auth is unreachable; refused
  handshakes and 429s are cached briefly instead of re-handshaking per event.
- Service is stopped on quit.

* fix(mobile): close review findings in push registration and receive (#8129)

- Consent generation guards a register that finishes after the switch went
  off; the host is re-queued for unregister instead of recorded live.
- Foreground pushes seed the watermark before adopting the epoch, so a push
  on a never-connected session cannot wipe a valid watermark.
- aps-environment follows the build via app.config.js; the iOS release
  workflow sets it to production. A bare plugin entry wrote development.
- Pushes the OS showed while closed are marked seen before catch-up replay.
- Token null result is not cached; failed capability probes are retried and
  never block an unregister; coalesced summaries are shown but not marked.
- Unresolvable fingerprint routes nowhere and is suppressed in foreground.
- Android channel ensured at boot; capability hook diffs clients by identity.

* fix(cloud): harden the push deploy workflow and size the gateway to the budget (#8129)

- Roll traffic back on a failed post-shift check; delete a candidate that
  never took traffic; retry the origin probe and the FCM probe.
- Assert Terraform-owned scaling instead of mutating it from the workflow.
- Build before taking the Cloud SQL rollout lease.
- Declare the database pool in Terraform (2 per instance, max 2 instances)
  and add the gateway to the connection budget; the previous default put the
  shared instance 65 connections over its ceiling.
- State plainly that the shared deploy identity's relay authority is inherited.

* fix(push): read the runtime from shared state at push startup (#8129)

Threading the runtime through launchDesktopMode put the launch module one
line over the 300-line lint budget after the rebase.

* fix(push): key the unauthenticated rate limit on the hop Cloud Run wrote (#8129)

Cloud Run appends the connecting peer to x-forwarded-for; the limiter read
the left-most value, which the caller controls, so a forged first hop earned
a fresh bucket per request.

* fix(push): close the final security review findings in the gateway and infra (#8129)

- app.onError logs only the error name and answers a bare 500; hono's default
  handler printed the whole error, and a pg error carries the row in detail
- a second per-IP bucket (240/min) runs ahead of the bearer lookup on every
  authenticated route, so forged bearers cannot spend the two-connection pool
- one live session per host: minting deletes the host's earlier row
- device-less hosts are pruned after 1 h, not 30 d; any keypair mints one free
- notificationId is printable ASCII, since it becomes the APNs collapse header
- the impersonated FCM probe token is masked in the workflow log
- prevent_destroy on the Apple secrets and the orca_push database

* fix(push): close the final security review findings in the desktop client (#8129)

- fetch never follows a redirect: a 307 would replay the host proof and the
  phone's token to whatever origin the redirect named
- registerPush params are strict and the paired identity is spread last
- a per-device bucket (10/min) bounds a phone looping registerPush, which
  costs a gateway write and a synchronous registry write each time

* fix(mobile): close the final security review findings in push receive (#8129)

- a push with no epoch can no longer claim a seq-derived dedup key, in the
  foreground or from the tray; a forged seq:N could otherwise swallow the
  real bell at that seq
- a provider-delivered push with no host catalog, or no fingerprint at all,
  stays unrouted instead of falling back to the hostId its raw data carries

* docs(push): record the ip buckets, session and host retention, and the token-ownership limit (#8129)

* fix(push): apply the schema on an untimed pool and retry statement-timeout aborts (#8129)

Ports the relay's #18722 pattern to the gateway: DDL runs on a one-connection
pool with statement_timeout 0 that is closed before the serving pool opens, and
SQLSTATE 57014 joins the bounded transaction retry path.

* fix: harden mobile push delivery and deployment recovery

* feat: align mobile notification preferences with desktop delivery

* fix: accept variable-length APNs device tokens

* fix: deduplicate native APNs and background socket notifications
2026-09-06 23:16:29 -04:00
Neil e5a1e79e8e docs(linux): say which package to install and how updates arrive (#18123)
* docs(linux): say which package to install and how updates arrive

Closes #5188. Closes #10987.

The install guide's entire Linux section was "AppImage and `.deb` builds are
available. See the Releases page for details." It named two of the three
published packages, gave no basis for choosing between them, and said nothing
about updating -- which is the one thing that actually differs between them.
Separately, nothing human-facing said the Linux CLI is `orca-ide`; only
skills/orca-cli/SKILL.md carried it, which agents read and humans do not.

Install page now picks the package by update behaviour: the AppImage
self-updates, deb/rpm report the new version and hand over the install command,
and a repackaged build is not offered a download it cannot apply. Records that
Orca never escalates privileges for the package install, and points at #18086
for the signed repo as planned, not shipped.

Adds .rpm to the download list. Release CI builds it
(release-cut.yml: `--linux AppImage deb rpm`) and
verify-release-required-assets.mjs requires the artifact, so omitting it was
just wrong.

The CLI command name is now stated where humans hit it -- the CLI reference and
overview -- with the GNOME Orca collision as the reason, plus the two places
bare `orca` does work: inside Orca-managed terminals (PTY PATH shim) and on a
packaged `orca serve` host (the ~/.local/bin dispatcher). The headless guide
gains the same note, which is what makes its `orca skills install` lines
correct rather than a typo.

* docs(linux): fix install ordering, CLI verification, and serve bootstrap

Readiness review found ten defects. Two would have had a reader run the wrong
program, and one would have had them install a .deb over a live app.

Install ordering was reversed. The page said "run it, then quit and reopen
Orca"; the ref this is gated to land with says the opposite in four places
(linux-package-downloaded-status.ts LINUX_PACKAGE_MANUAL_INSTALL_MESSAGE,
"Quit Orca before running the system package install command", plus the
recovery card's title, summary and explainer). That wording came from main's
older run-then-quit card, which the stack deliberately reversed when it
retitled the card to "Manual Install Required". Now: quit first.

CLI verification put the Linux caveat *below* `command -v orca`. That check
succeeds on any GNOME desktop and resolves to the screen reader, so the reader
got a confident hit from the page's own verification step and then invoked the
wrong program. Caveat moved above, and the block now spells `orca-ide`
literally instead of asking the reader to substitute.

The serve bootstrap was circular: the bare-`orca` dispatcher is written *during*
serve startup (main-process-runtime-launch.ts), so it can never be the command
that starts serve. First launch is `orca-ide serve`. Fixed here and in the two
pages this links to.

Accuracy: the install command now matches what the code emits -- absolute paths
resolved from the trusted directories and a POSIX-single-quoted package path,
as pinned by linux-package-install-command.test.ts -- and names the manager
fallbacks (dpkg; zypper/dnf/yum/rpm) rather than presenting apt as the only
form. The pending path honours XDG_CACHE_HOME. rpm arch tokens are x86_64 and
aarch64, not deb's amd64/arm64. arm64 AppImage is linked. Dropped the container
example: isExternallyManagedLinuxInstall() needs a root marker AND no trusted
package manager, and a Debian-based container has apt, so it is not flagged.
2026-09-02 03:49:40 -07:00
Neil f37d2fec97 fix(linux): land the reviewed Linux packaging stack on main (#18100)
* fix(linux): give the CLI one entrypoint by extracting the AppImage once

* refactor(linux): trim AppImage CLI registration seams

* test(cli): assert registration lock serialization

* fix(linux): fence AppImage terminal shim mounts

* fix(linux): accept extracted AppImage runtimes with APPDIR only

* docs(linux): make headless AppImage extraction runnable

* refactor(linux): import bundled launcher directly

* fix(linux): reclaim superseded AppImage payloads and packaged symlinks

Pruning removed 3215 of 3216 files from a superseded generation and always
stranded resources/app.asar, leaking ~105 MB per version update. Electron's
asar shim reports a *.asar file as a directory, so the recursive remove tried
to rmdir a real file and failed with ENOTEMPTY; the .catch(() => {}) hid it.
Reproduced end to end on Ubuntu 24.04: 519M -> 623M across one update, and
519M again once the payload is actually reclaimed.

removeExtractedAppImagePayload holds process.noAsar for the removal, counted
so overlapping removals cannot hand the shim back early, and the prune site
now warns with the path instead of swallowing the rejection. All three
removal sites use it -- staging cleanup and displaced roots leaked the same
way.

Also reclaim symlinks left by a packaged deb/rpm install, which the
extracted-cache-only rule turned into a hard conflict on a deb -> AppImage
migration, and name the remedy in the conflict error.

* fix(linux): bound the CLI registration lock wait

`retries: 1000` caps the attempt count, not elapsed time, so at up to 1s per
attempt an IPC-driven registration could hang ~16 minutes against a wedged
holder with no feedback.

A legitimate holder is bounded by the extraction timeout, so wait that plus
slack and then fail with a message naming the lock file, rather than hanging.
`maxRetryTime` is forwarded verbatim to the `retry` package by proper-lockfile.

* fix(linux): stop re-extracting the AppImage on inode metadata churn

The extracted-payload cache key hashed ctime alongside dev/ino/size/mtime.
ctime moves on any inode metadata write -- `chmod +x`, which every AppImage
user is told to run, plus `chown`, an ACL or SELinux relabel, and a backup
restore -- none of which alter a byte of the payload.

Measured on Ubuntu 24.04: `chmod +x` leaves dev, ino, size and mtime
identical and moves ctime alone, so the key changed and the next launch paid
a full ~519 MB re-extraction and a multi-second stall to rebuild a payload it
already had, then pruned the old generation.

Key on content identity instead. An in-place content change moves mtime and
almost always size; a replacement moves the inode. The existing
replace-in-place test still passes.

* fix(linux): stop CLI commands from falling through to Chromium startup

* refactor(cli): remove redundant command membership check

* test(cli): cover command-named project selectors

* fix(cli): redirect the open-url command before startup

* test(linux): cover AUR serve wrapper flags

* fix(linux): tighten CLI launch detection

* fix(linux): respect CLI flag value boundaries

* fix(linux): strip injected Chromium switches from CLI args

* fix(linux): report a missing display instead of dying in uv_close

* refactor(linux): read display locks without a preflight race

* fix(linux): preserve unverified external displays

* chore: format reliability gate manifest

* test(packaging): split runtime resource checks

* fix(linux): fail serve when no display is available

* fix(linux): do not treat a lockless X socket as a dead display

An X server writes its lock beside its socket and both survive a crash
(verified against Xvfb under SIGKILL), so a socket with no lock was never
left by a crashed server. It is an endpoint published from elsewhere: a
container bind-mounting only /tmp/.X11-unix, WSLg, or a foreign PID
namespace. Declaring those dead made the desktop gate exit(1) on displays
that work, with no workaround, and the serve gate refuse to start.

Liveness now splits by ownership. A foreign DISPLAY trusts a lockless
socket; Orca's own :99 does not, because removeStaleDisplayArtifacts
unlinks the lock before the socket and so manufactures that state itself --
adopting it would resurrect the orphan-socket bug and stop the cleanup from
self-healing. The stale-lock rejection is unchanged.

Also correct four doc statements this behaviour falsified.

* fix(linux): fail closed when a stale socket blocks the Xvfb rebind

Readiness only checked that /tmp/.X11-unix/X99 exists. A stale socket we
could not unlink still exists after our own Xvfb refused to bind, so Orca set
DISPLAY to a dead server and Chromium died in Ozone init.

Measured on Ubuntu 24.04 against the pre-fix build: with a leftover :99
socket and no lock, serve exits 139 (SIGSEGV), the socket inode is unchanged
before and after, and no lock is recreated -- it neither cleaned up nor
respawned. To a user that is a crash, not a misconfiguration.

This is reachable in the documented topology, where orca-xvfb.service has no
User= and runs as root while serve runs as User=orca: /tmp is sticky, so the
orca uid cannot unlink a root-owned socket, rmSync fails, and Xvfb exits with
the display already active.

Readiness now requires the display to actually be live -- our socket plus a
lock naming a running process -- so the same state reports an unusable
display and exits 1 with the existing diagnosis.

* fix(linux): recognise abstract X sockets and inherited Wayland fds

Two display setups this gate could not prove were refused outright, and on the
desktop path that is app.exit(1) with no workaround.

An X server may bind only the abstract namespace (`@/tmp/.X11-unix/X0`), which
leaves no filesystem socket to stat. Abstract addresses are kernel-owned and
vanish the moment the owner exits, so an entry in /proc/net/unix is proof of a
live server -- no lock file needed and no stale entry possible. Verified on
Ubuntu 24.04, where 139 such addresses were present.

WAYLAND_SOCKET is an already-connected fd handed over by the compositor, so
there is no path to stat and WAYLAND_DISPLAY may be unset entirely. Its
presence is the display.

Both are consulted only after the filesystem-socket check fails, so no
existing verdict changes.

* fix(linux): never treat Orca's own display number as a foreign endpoint

Recognising a lockless X socket as live is correct for an endpoint published
from elsewhere -- a container bind mount, WSLg -- because an X server writes
its lock beside its socket and both survive a crash. It is wrong for
VIRTUAL_DISPLAY_NUMBER, because Orca's own teardown unlinks the lock before
the socket and so manufactures that exact state.

The managed branch was already strict, but a caller that sets DISPLAY=:99
explicitly takes the foreign path and skipped it, accepting a dead display
left by Orca's own interrupted cleanup. Route the managed number through the
strict probe on both paths.

Found by an adversarial audit of the asymmetry introduced earlier in this
branch; the documented systemd topology is unaffected because its Xvfb writes
a real lock.

* test(linux): add a packaged-artifact contract for the CLI launch paths

* test(linux): avoid buffered serve readiness detection

* test(linux): signal AppImage serve owner directly

* test(linux): tolerate readiness timeout boundary

* test(linux): add startup margin to shutdown oracle

* ci(linux): give package contracts timeout headroom

* fix(ci): route all Linux packaging contract changes

* test(linux): poll shutdown readiness without tail leaks

* test(linux): bound shutdown cleanup grace

* test(linux): assert on CLI output, not the harness's own control lines

run-cli-case.sh echoes `RESULT status=N case=<name>`, and the two cases named
*-skills asserted `expectOutput: 'skills'`. That substring was satisfied by
the case name in the harness's own line, so 2 of 8 cases asserted nothing
about the command -- gutting `skills` entirely would still have gone green.

Control lines are now excluded before matching, and both cases assert the
rendered help header, which only real help output produces. Verified on an
Ubuntu 24.04 host: 8/8 still pass against a stack-tip AppImage.

Also register the gate in reliability-gates.jsonc, which #15085 added a CI
Docker gate without. Red/green is recorded from a stock release AppImage
failing 4 of 8, three of them at status 133 (SIGTRAP).

* fix(linux): require static AppImage runtimes (#17319)

* test(linux): reject a wrong-architecture native binary at packaging time

Cross-building the arm64 slice on an x64 host silently packed an x86-64
`pty.node` -- the rebuild logged "Forcing native rebuild for linux-arm64" and
shipped the host's binary anyway. Every gate here inspects symbol versions,
which are perfectly valid on the wrong architecture, so nothing noticed.

Observed on a Raspberry Pi 5: the packaged app loaded, then failed with
"Failed to load native module: pty.node", and the launch contract reported
3 of 8 cases crashed rather than naming the cause. Swapping in the aarch64
`pty.node` took the same build to 8/8.

Compare ELF `e_machine` against the slice being packaged and fail with the
offending path. Checked before the glibc pass, because a wrong-architecture
binary's symbol versions are valid but meaningless and would send the reader
down the wrong path.

Release CI builds arm64 on a native runner, so this guards local and future
cross-builds rather than a shipped artifact.

* test(linux): judge per-arch vendored binaries against their own path

The first CI run of the architecture gate failed the x64 package job on
`@parcel/watcher-linux-arm64-glibc/watcher.node`. That binary is arm64 on
purpose: the package ships every architecture and its loader picks the match,
so its presence in an x64 build is correct.

Judge a binary against the architecture its own path names, falling back to
the slice when the path names none. That keeps the case this gate exists for
-- `bin/linux-arm64-*/node-pty.node` holding an x86-64 binary, which is what
shipped to a Raspberry Pi 5 -- while letting multi-arch dependencies through.

Dry-run over the real dependency tree flags nothing for either target arch.

* fix(linux): move deb/rpm update installation outside Orca (#17318)

* fix(linux): complete deb/rpm package metadata

* fix(linux): preserve CLI link during package upgrades

* docs(linux): document local RPM build prerequisites

* fix(linux): move deb/rpm update installation outside Orca

* fix(updater): preserve Linux recovery across stale events

* fix(updater): fence stale downloaded events by active target

* fix(updater): preserve active Linux package recovery

* test(linux): keep workflow order assertion in scope

* test(updater): assert stale recovery stays silent

* fix(updater): preserve Linux package recovery after checks

* refactor(updater): keep Linux marker message with status

* fix(linux): describe the right manual update path for deb/rpm hosts

A remote host installed from .deb or .rpm now reports
manual-service-update-required, and the guidance told the operator to
"update through the service manager that starts this server" -- which is
correct for unsupported-headless-serve but wrong for a package install,
where nothing about the remedy involves the service manager.

Say both, keyed on how the host was installed.

* docs(linux): document orcad update restart safety

* docs(linux): scope restart census omissions

* docs(linux): use absolute service CLI launcher

* fix(serve): validate in-process serve options before startup (#17683)

* fix(linux): stop offering updates a distro-managed install cannot apply (#17918)

Closes #17702.

The resources/package-type marker is authoritative but never checked against
the host, so any repackager that unpacks Orca's .deb -- AUR, Nix, a container
rebuild -- inherits `deb` verbatim. Install feasibility was then computed
after a ~165 MB download, so those users got check -> download -> a card
promising an install command -> a dead end.

Validate the marker against the host: a deb/rpm marker with no matching
package manager in the trusted directories means a package manager owns this
install. This reuses the exact lists and resolver that
buildLinuxPackageInstallCommand already loops over, so a false positive is
impossible by construction -- any host flagged here would have failed with
no-package-manager after the download anyway. The gate only moves that
verdict earlier. Verified across Debian 12, Ubuntu 24.04, Arch, Fedora 40 and
openSUSE Leap: no false positive on a real deb host, correct on every
repackaging host.

The release is still reported, because the user does want to know 1.4.194
exists and to update through their distro; only the download path is closed.
`externallyManaged` is an additive optional field on the existing `available`
status, so older paired clients decode it unchanged. downloadUpdate() refuses
authoritatively, since main owns this verdict rather than the card, and
unwinds any pinned-build state first -- a Linux pinned jump resolves to
'release', and stranding isPinnedBuildActive would silently kill every
background check for the rest of the process.

Note the fix the issue suggests cannot work: electron-updater builds a
PacmanUpdater whose doDownloadUpdate looks for a .pacman asset Orca does not
publish, then dereferences undefined.

* style(cli): restore prettier wrapping on install error copy

* test(linux): re-pin the child-process ratchets and the batch-shim allowlist after the merge
2026-09-02 03:08:01 -07:00
Neil 95212ef572 docs(linux): make headless AppImage extraction runnable 2026-09-01 14:06:16 -07:00
Neil da4a83bd22 fix(linux): give the CLI one entrypoint by extracting the AppImage once 2026-09-01 14:06:16 -07:00
Neil a4762f1c1d docs(headless-server): fix package list, extraction perms, and ldd command (#17002)
* docs(headless-server): fix package list, extraction perms, and ldd command

Three fixes to the headless Linux server guide, each of which stops a
first-time setup from working.

The prerequisite list installed only CLI tools and Xvfb, none of the
shared libraries Electron links against. On a minimal server or
container image `orca serve` then fails before Electron starts. Adds the
library set, plus the unsuffixed package names for releases that predate
the 64-bit time_t transition.

The guide tells you to run --appimage-extract and, separately, to run
the service as a dedicated non-root user with the install directory
root-owned. Those two halves combine badly: extraction leaves
squashfs-root as drwx------, so the service user cannot traverse it, and
chmod 755 /opt/orca does not reach inside. Adds the missing chmod to
both places.

The troubleshooting step said to run `ldd squashfs-root/orca`. The
Electron binary is orca-ide, and ldd on a path that does not exist
prints nothing and exits cleanly — a clean-looking result in exactly the
situation where you are hunting a missing library.

* docs(headless-server): correct the t64 substitution failure mode

The mixed-list warning named the wrong mechanism. Old names mostly still
resolve on 24.04, because each renamed package declares Provides: its
unsuffixed name. The exception is libasound2, which liboss4-salsa-asound2
in universe also claims — apt refuses to choose between two providers and
aborts the whole install line rather than silently installing a shim.

Also pins libfuse2t64 as definite rather than possible, and widens the
libfuse2 line to cover 20.04, which is in the support matrix.
2026-08-28 02:37:52 -07:00
Jinjing c4b39295c1 style: format codebase (#16935)
* style: format codebase

* style: format codebase

* refactor: extract skill install dialog footer and content

Extract footer and content sections from SkillInstallDialog and
SkillInstallManagementDialog into separate components for improved
maintainability and clarity of component responsibilities.
2026-08-28 00:59:21 -07:00
Jinwoo Hong ff8dda81e8 fix(serve): exit cleanly after headless Linux signals (#14334)
* fix(serve): keep owned Xvfb alive through Electron teardown

* test(serve): gate packaged signal shutdown

* test: harden headless shutdown lifecycle gate

* fix(serve): isolate Xvfb from foreground signals

* docs(serve): preserve Xvfb during systemd stop

* test(serve): pin shutdown policy to owned Xvfb unit

* test(serve): harden shutdown gate portability

* test(serve): bound systemd unit parsing
2026-08-13 15:45:00 -07:00
NeilandOrca d8e5944b60 Stop a duplicate headless orca serve from crash-looping and exhausting AppImage FUSE mounts (#12212)
* fix(startup): stop a duplicate headless serve from crash-looping and leaking AppImage mounts

A second Orca launch that loses the single-instance lock called app.quit()
before `ready`. That quit is deferred, so the doomed process kept booting into
Chromium's Linux display initialization, failed with "Missing X server or
$DISPLAY", and died with SIGSEGV. systemd read that as a crash and restarted it
forever; each restart re-mounted the AppImage and left the squashfuse mount
behind, until the host hit the 1000-mount FUSE ceiling and every later launch
failed.

The lock-losing launch now calls app.exit(3), which terminates synchronously
before any display init. Exit code 3 is a stable "another process already owns
this userData profile" contract, and the documented systemd unit uses
RestartPreventExitStatus=3 plus a real StartLimitIntervalSec/StartLimitBurst
window so a permanently failing launch can no longer retry unbounded.

Second-instance argv is now forwarded to the owner, and a duplicate `orca serve`
no longer asks the live headless server to open a desktop window. Desktop
activation for ordinary launches and macOS dock re-activation is unchanged.

Closes #11935

* docs(headless): clear the start limit before the scripted service starts

StartLimitIntervalSec=300/StartLimitBurst=5 rate-limits operator starts too, so
after a crash-loop trips the burst systemd refuses a plain `systemctl start` for
the rest of the window. The Upgrade and Roll back scripts run under
`set -euo pipefail`, so that refusal aborted the rollback mid-flight and left the
server down on the exact recovery path the doc prescribes.

Both scripts (and their EXIT-trap recoveries) now run `systemctl reset-failed`
first, the unit reference explains the interaction, and the crash-loop bullet
points at it for manual starts.

Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>

* test(startup): reproduce the #11935 duplicate-serve crash loop under real Electron

The committed coverage for #11935 was source-text greps, so nothing gated the
mechanism the fix rests on: pre-`ready` `app.quit()` is deferred, which is why
the lock-losing headless `orca serve` kept booting into Linux display init.

This runs two real Electron processes against one disposable profile. The
duplicate executes the lock-loss gate's own `app.*` statement, lifted out of
`src/main/index.ts`, so reverting to `app.quit()` fails the test. It also feeds
the owner's real forwarded argv through `shouldActivateDesktopForSecondInstance`.

Also record why the activation predicate matches `--serve` and not the `serve`
subcommand: an AppImage launched as `orca serve` exits at the CLI redirect
before requesting the lock.

* test(startup): wait for the owner process to exit before removing its profile

Windows holds the profile's handles for a beat after SIGKILL, so an immediate
rmSync can fail with EBUSY/EPERM.

Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>

* test(startup): pass the fixture marker path by env, not argv

Chromium reorders argv and the duplicate's argv is itself under test, so a
trailing positional was the wrong channel for it.

Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>

* test(startup): only the activation case waits on the owner notification

The exit-contract cases assert on the duplicate's own already-terminated
process, so they should not block on cross-process delivery.

Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>

* test(startup): drop the staged lock race, keep the real-Electron gate contract

CI proved the two-process form cannot work on a display-less Linux runner:
Chromium's ProcessSingleton needs the browser IO thread, which needs `ready`,
which needs a display. The pre-`ready` owner looked stale and the duplicate took
the lock (`expected [ 'DUPLICATE_WON_LOCK' ] to include 'DUPLICATE_LOST_LOCK'`).

Lock acquisition and argv forwarding are already covered in
single-instance-lock.test.ts. What only a real process can settle is what the
loser does next, so that is all this file now runs -- display-independent.

Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
2026-08-03 23:34:22 -07:00
Sebastián Castañoandscastanoh21 676ef7fab8 feat(cli): add orca skills install and orca skills update for headless skill setup (#9201)
Adds `orca skills install` and `orca skills update` so skills can be set up without the GUI — SSH hosts, containers, CI. Previously `orca skills` had only `list` and `get`, so there was no headless path.

**Agent targeting is scoped explicitly rather than delegated to detection.** The `skills` CLI decides which agents to install into, and with `-y` and zero detected agents it takes `targetAgents = validAgents` — all ~75. That is not a corner case for a headless CLI: a fresh SSH box or container with no agent installed is the normal starting state. Measured on a bare host, the unscoped command created **52 top-level agent directories and 54 junctions** (one real payload in `~/.agents/skills`, the rest links) on Windows, and 52/53 on macOS.

The CLI now passes `--agent` derived from Orca's own detection, mapped to the `skills` key namespace, plus `universal`. Supplying `--agent` makes `runAdd` use it directly and never call `detectInstalledAgents()`, so the fan-out branch is unreachable. On a bare host it now refuses with `No coding agent detected on this host` and exit 1, creating nothing. Same command with scoping: **1 directory, 0 junctions.**

`universal` alone would under-install — Claude Code is not in that set, and 19 of 28 mapped keys write agent-private homes `universal` never touches. `--agent '*'` is the bug itself. The mapping is hedged three ways: `null` for any agent whose key could not be confirmed, `satisfies Record<TuiAgent, …>` so a new Orca agent is a compile error, and a test pinning every mapped key against the CLI's own valid list.

Fixed during review — two holes that each restored the full fan-out through a different door:
- `--agent ','` trimmed to nothing, which skipped the refusal *and* emitted no `--agent`.
- `--agent -y` passed an emptiness check, and the vendor CLI silently drops `-`-leading values, re-emptying its list.

The real invariant is argument *shape*, not emptiness, and it is now enforced at the choke point in `buildAgentFeatureSkillInstallArgs`, so no caller can emit `-y` without a usable target. `*` remains allowed — asking for every agent explicitly is a choice, not an accident. Verified with 51 hostile inputs through the built binary, each recorded argv replayed through the vendor's own parser.

Also fixed: the `ORCA_CLI_CWD` refusal now runs before target resolution (it was quoting the wrong host's agent list), and `--dry-run` is refused in a forwarded shell rather than printing a command naming the wrong machine.

Validated on a real Windows host across PowerShell 7, PowerShell 5.1, cmd.exe and Git Bash: `.cmd` shims route through `cmd.exe` and `.exe` shims spawn directly (proved with instrumented shims, not inferred), the ENOENT path produces an actionable error rather than a silent failure, and `skills update` genuinely restores a corrupted skill byte-for-byte.

Known, not addressed here — both upstream behaviours this only forwards: a partial install failure exits 0, and "no installed skills found" exits 0. Both are invisible to the headless callers this feature exists for.

Co-authored-by: scastanoh21 <scastanoh21@gmail.com>
2026-07-30 11:20:29 -07:00
Neil a0944cc129 fix(linux): restore Ubuntu 20.04 launch — pin node-pty glibc symbols + add glibc/libstdc++ packaging gate (#9902) (#10019)
* fix(linux): restore Ubuntu 20.04 launch by pinning node-pty glibc symbols (#9902)

The bundled node-pty pty.node is compiled from source in release CI on
ubuntu-latest (glibc 2.39). glibc's 2.32-2.34 libpthread/libutil merge
relocated openpty/forkpty (GLIBC_2.34) and pthread_sigmask (GLIBC_2.32)
into libc under new symbol versions, so the from-source build bound to
versions absent on Ubuntu 20.04 (glibc 2.31). The main process imports
node-pty at startup, so the app crashed on launch. pty.node is the sole
blocker (Electron needs GLIBC_2.25; other native modules <= 2.17).

- Patch node-pty: a .symver shim pins the 3 symbols to their pre-merge
  version (GLIBC_2.2.5 x64 / GLIBC_2.17 arm64), and Linux-only ldflags
  force libutil.so.1/libpthread.so.0 back into DT_NEEDED. Guarded to
  Linux; macOS/Windows untouched.
- Add a packaging gate (verify-linux-glibc-floor.cjs, afterPack): reads
  each bundled native binary's objdump -p version needs and fails the
  Linux build if any strong GLIBC_/GLIBCXX_/CXXABI_ node exceeds stock
  Ubuntu 20.04 (glibc 2.31 / GLIBCXX_3.4.28 / CXXABI_1.3.12). Catches
  GLIBC_ABI_DT_RELR, rejects GLIBC_PRIVATE, skips weak needs, fail-closed.
- Docs + tests; the lazy sherpa-onnx speech prebuilt (GLIBCXX_3.4.29,
  never loaded at launch) is a documented libstdc++-floor exemption.

* fix(linux): assert DT_NEEDED provider deps in the glibc-floor gate

Harden the packaging gate (flagged in adversarial re-eval): the version-floor
check alone can false-pass if the patch's forced `-l:libutil.so.1` ever silently
drops — the pinned openpty@GLIBC_2.2.5 still resolves from libc's compat alias at
build time, but fails to load on Ubuntu 20.04 where openpty/forkpty live only in
libutil. The gate now also asserts that any binary importing openpty/forkpty
keeps libutil.so.1 in DT_NEEDED. Validated on a real symver-pinned .so with
libutil dropped (now fails) vs. present (passes). Documents the recommended
real-host smoke-test follow-up.
2026-07-22 19:11:44 -07:00
OrcaWin 34c160442f Fix headless Linux serve pairing readiness (#9785) 2026-07-21 18:23:20 -07:00
aad34cbb32 docs(headless-server): add upgrade SOP for orca serve on Linux (#9575)
* docs(headless-server): add upgrade SOP for orca serve on Linux

The headless Linux guide covered install/run/systemd but had no upgrade
section, leaving operators to guess how to move to a new AppImage without
losing state.

Add an "Upgrade" section documenting the manual SOP (serve mode never
auto-updates) and one troubleshooting bullet:

- State lives under the service user's ~/.config (orca + Orca dirs),
  independent of /opt/orca, and orca-data.json is forward-migrated on load,
  so a forward upgrade is safe.
- Replace the binary with an atomic same-filesystem rename (download to
  .new, verify, mv) — never curl -o over the FUSE-mounted live binary.
- Back up the whole .config before upgrading, because rollback is NOT
  binary-only safe: an older build strips newer orca-data.json fields it
  doesn't recognize, and the .bak.* ring is corruption-recovery, not a
  pre-upgrade copy.
- Note there is no headless version command; track the release tag instead.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(headless-server): harden the orca serve upgrade/rollback runbook

Address CodeRabbit review on #9575:

- Fail closed: run the upgrade block under `set -euo pipefail`, remove any stale
  `.new` file before download, and gate the atomic `mv` on an explicit ELF check
  so a failed/partial/non-ELF download can never be promoted.
- Keep /opt/orca/VERSION tied to the installed binary: a single `TAG` variable
  drives both the download URL and the recorded VERSION, saved as VERSION.prev on
  upgrade and restored on rollback so the audit file never drifts.
- Crash-loop troubleshooting now points to Roll back first (restores the
  pre-upgrade orca-data.json) instead of re-running Upgrade.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(headless): harden server upgrade SOP

---------

Co-authored-by: fanyunqian.1 <fanyunqian.1@bytedance.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: OrcaWin <293788423+OrcaWin@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-07-20 21:38:39 -04:00
9694830764 Document headless Linux server setup (#6802)
* docs: add headless Linux server guide

* docs: add ldd/appimage-extract tip for diagnosing missing libraries

Salvaged from #6817 before closing it as a duplicate.

Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: Jinwoo-H <jinwoo@stably.ai>
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
2026-06-30 00:04:47 -07:00