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orchestration-dispatch-error-codes
11
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Neil
|
6815fed6d6 |
perf(worktrees): converge the trash sweep instead of re-walking doomed trees (#18429)
* perf(worktrees): converge the trash sweep instead of re-walking doomed trees
`transientLockRemovalOptions()` only asked for `maxRetries` on Windows, and
`removeHostTree`'s retry ladder was gated on `process.platform === 'win32'`.
A concurrent writer is not Windows-specific: Spotlight/`mds`, a scanner, or a
live process writing under the tree surface the same EBUSY/ENOTEMPTY/EPERM on
macOS and Linux. So on POSIX the startup sweep got exactly one attempt per
entry, failed, and re-issued the same guaranteed-to-fail walk on every launch.
- Extend the retry policy to every platform. Windows keeps its error set,
its message fallback, and its delays; the message fallback stays
Windows-only because POSIX always sets a code.
- Persist a per-entry failure ledger in the trash root so a repeatedly
failing entry is retried on a 15m/1h/6h ladder rather than on every launch.
Nothing is abandoned: the ladder clamps, records are pruned when the entry
goes, and a torn ledger fails open to a full sweep.
- Defer the sweep behind first paint, so its recursive readdir/rm no longer
competes with window creation and worktree-catalog hydration.
* fix(worktrees): keep Node's per-level rm retries Windows-only
Node's rimraf hands every child back to the retrying entry point
(`_rmchildren` -> `rimraf`), so `maxRetries` is applied once per directory
level and compounds: a permanently-failing leaf at depth d costs roughly
`retryDelay * 36 * 9^(d-1)`. Measured on macOS against one `chflags uchg`
file at depth 2, `{recursive, force}` rejected in 1 ms while
`{maxRetries: 8, retryDelay: 150}` had not settled after 5 minutes.
Handing those options to POSIX removals turned every `removeHostTree` on a
worktree residue (`node_modules/.pnpm/...`, a dozen levels deep) into a
promise that never settles -- wedging the serialized trash-deletion queue,
hanging the sweep on its first failing entry so no backoff is ever recorded,
and leaving the unregistered-worktree removal IPC pending forever.
Keep the cross-platform retry where this PR put it -- the bounded outer
ladders that re-issue one whole `rm` against the same already-chosen path --
and restore `transientLockRemovalOptions()` to Windows-only `maxRetries`.
Also guard the deferred first-window task: off whenReady's promise chain a
synchronous throw is an uncaughtException, which the pipe-error guard
re-throws fatally.
* fix(worktrees): make host tree removal see through Electron's asar shim
The 267 stranded trash entries were not a concurrent-writer race. Electron
patches `fs` so a `*.asar` file reports `isDirectory() === true`, so Node's
recursive `rm` descends into the archive, `rmdir`s a real file, and fails the
parent with ENOTEMPTY — deterministically, on every attempt. Every worktree
that has run `pnpm install` carries a `default_app.asar`, which is why every
residue stopped at the same path.
Route `removeHostTree` through `original-fs` (Electron's unpatched `fs`, with a
`node:fs/promises` fallback outside Electron) instead of retrying a failure that
can never succeed. `removalPath`, `rmOptions` and the Windows retry ladder are
byte-identical to `main`.
Reverts the POSIX retry ladder, the `isTransientRemovalError` widening, the
sweep backoff ledger and the inverted `does not retry host removal failures
outside Windows` ratchet — none of them were fixing the actual failure.
* fix(worktrees): drop the stray orchestration test and bundle the asar guard like production
`orchestration-statement-compilation.test.ts` belongs to #18420 and was swept
into this branch by accident. It imports `./prepared-statement-cache`, which
does not exist here, so `tsc -p config/tsconfig.node.json` failed on this
branch. Removed; typecheck is clean again.
The Electron asar guard pre-externalized `original-fs` in its own Vite build,
which is not what the shipped bundle does. Mirror `isExternalMainModule` from
electron.vite.config.ts instead, so the guard also proves the production
bundler leaves `createRequire(__filename)('original-fs')` as a runtime require
— if that ever became a static import or got folded, production would silently
degrade to the shimmed `fs` while the old test kept passing.
|
||
  Brennan BensonandMerge Sim
|
5150c52045 |
fix(dev): skip blocking keychain diagnostic (#17877)
* fix(dev): skip blocking keychain diagnostic * fix(dev): preserve forced secret protection report --------- Co-authored-by: Merge Sim <sim@local> |
||
|
Brennan Benson
|
ca0a6ec9be |
Stop the OS keyring probe from gating the first window on Linux (#16912)
* Stop the OS keyring probe from gating the first window on Linux 1.4.190 added an at-rest secret protection report and called it from the `app.whenReady()` startup path, before the first window is created. `describeProtectionGap()` asks Electron `safeStorage` whether the OS keyring is usable, and on Linux that is a blocking D-Bus round trip to `org.freedesktop.secrets`. A keyring that is present but locked with no unlock prompter never answers, so the call sits until D-Bus times it out and the app shows no window for over a minute. Measured on Ubuntu 24.04 against a Secret Service that accepts the connection and never replies, time to first window: 1.4.188 1.06s (never contacts the keyring) 1.4.190 76.05s 1.4.190 --password-store=basic 1.06s (probe bypassed) Nothing on the startup path consumes the report, so it now waits for the first window's `ready-to-show`, with a timer fallback because that event can fail to fire when the GPU cannot present and headless serve has no window at all. Same build under the same hanging keyring: first window 80.48s -> 5.31s, with the report still delivered. STA-5765 * Pin the deferral the keyring-probe test exists to protect The suite passed with the probe fired on browser-window-created instead of ready-to-show, with setImmediate dropped, and with the fallback stretched to 10 minutes — every one of which reintroduces the STA-5765 stall. Drain the queue before asserting and bracket the fallback so those mutations fail. Also reformats the file to oxfmt. * Report the keyring gap inline in headless serve Deferring the probe to the first window is right for the desktop app, but serve never opens one, so the fallback timer became its only path. That moved the stall to after `printServeReady`: the runtime advertises itself, a relay or mobile client pairs, and only then does the main thread freeze on the keyring — stalling pings and PTY pumps, which a client reads as a dead host. Serve now reports inline, which is the timing it already had, and blocks before anything is advertised rather than under a live client. STA-5765 * test(secrets): pin the once-guard against a late window reveal The fallback can report first and the window reveal arrive after it; without the guard that probes the keyring a second time, blocking the main thread just as the user starts interacting. No existing case covered that order — removing the guard left all six tests green. * fix(secrets): keep the deferred protection report non-fatal, and pin the wiring Deferring the report moved it off `whenReady`'s promise chain. A throw there was an unhandled rejection the app survives; inside `setImmediate` it is an uncaught exception, and `installUncaughtPipeErrorGuard` re-throws those fatally — so a diagnostic the module documents as deliberately not fatal could kill the app. Wrap the deferred call so it degrades to a warn. Serve keeps the inline posture. Nothing outside index.ts referenced the scheduler, so reverting the call site, or flipping `deferUntilFirstWindow`, left the whole suite green — including the headless-serve regression an earlier review already caught once. Pin the wiring as source text, following the host-port-bootstrap-wiring idiom with every anchor bounded, and pin the two module gates that were only jointly covered. * test(secrets): make the deferral wiring pin resist an inert call site Round 2 of the review gamed the pin it had just added. Both anchors were bounded against -1 but not against overshoot, and the marker matched anywhere in the file — so nesting the call in a block, prefixing it with a guard, or commenting it out all left three green tests standing over a call that never runs. Bound the slice length, and anchor the marker to a statement at whenReady's own indent. Commenting the call out, wrapping it in `if (...) schedule(...)` with or without a block, and flipping the flag each redden now; previously only the unused-import typecheck error caught the first. |
||
|
Neil
|
a7a4f5d987 | style(secrets): trim backend probe comments (#16136) | ||
|
Neil
|
7a739c6bf5 |
fix(secrets): probe the Linux-only storage backend defensively (#16046)
`safeStorage.getSelectedStorageBackend` is `@platform linux`, so it is genuinely undefined on macOS and Windows — confirmed against the installed Electron 43, where it reads `undefined` on darwin and `function` on Linux. The shipped code called it behind a `process.platform === 'linux'` check, so it never threw, but the guard was the only thing standing between that call and a startup TypeError. The platform check now lives with the probe, alongside a typeof check and a try/catch, and an unreadable or unknown backend reports no gap — claiming one we cannot prove would be its own kind of lie. The gap this closes is in the tests, not just the code: every suite here mocks safeStorage with the method present, so the suite could stay green while the shipped app threw. The new case deletes the member from the live mock rather than re-mocking, because the module already holds that object and a later vi.doMock is inert — the first version of this test passed against the unguarded code, which is the failure mode it exists to catch. Verified against the expression currently on main: three cases fail. |
||
|
Neil
|
1375c57b16 |
fix(secrets): report the protection gap on change, not on every launch (#16044)
The gap warning fired every startup with no way to stop it. It usually needs a keyring installed and unlocked to fix, so repeating it every launch is nagging the user cannot act on and will learn to ignore. It now reports when the answer changes: once when the gap starts being true, again if it becomes true for a different reason, and once when it is fixed — because silence after a "your secrets are not protected" warning would leave the user assuming that is still the case. State lives beside the profile data file, which is why the call moved out of the port bootstrap: that state has nowhere to live until the profile exists. A corrupt state file re-reports rather than trusting it, and a failed write logs instead of failing startup, since re-reporting next launch is the safe direction. ORCA_ALWAYS_REPORT_SECRET_PROTECTION=1 forces a re-report for support without disturbing the stored state. |
||
|
Neil
|
838f5bfb75 |
fix(secrets): tell Linux users when their secrets are only obfuscated (#16033)
On Linux with no keyring, Electron falls back to the `basic_text` backend, which "encrypts" with a hardcoded password. `isEncryptionAvailable()` returns true for it, so Orca reported those secrets as sealed. They are not. The obvious fix — returning false for basic_text — is wrong and would have been a credential regression: `decryptWithStatus()` skips decryption entirely when encryption is unavailable, so every already-stored secret would read back empty. Sealing genuinely works on basic_text and must keep working. So capability and trust are now separate questions. `isEncryptionAvailable()` still answers "can this host seal and unseal", and `describeProtectionGap()` (renamed from `describeUnavailable`) answers "is my data actually protected", covering both no-sealing and weak-sealing. That method had no production caller — the port documented a promise nothing kept. `reportSecretProtectionGap()` now reads it at startup. A user-visible surface is follow-up; this at least stops the silence. Adds a bootstrap wiring guard over all nine host port installs. The no-op defaults are correct for a renderer-less host and silently wrong for the desktop, and a dropped or reordered install fails no existing test. Verified in both directions: it fails when an install is removed, and when one moves after the runtime is constructed. |
||
|
Neil
|
03fcfdfb92 |
feat(orcad): boot the Orca runtime on plain Node (#15968)
* refactor(host): resolve the app root through the port in fork-reachable modules
`parcel-watcher-entry-path.ts` and `session-scanner-service-entry-path.ts` read the
app root via `require('electron').app` inside a try/catch that already returns null
when Electron is absent. They were therefore correct under plain Node at runtime and
only failed the *static* text check — which is real, not pedantic: the comment in
`ports/port-scan-command-client.ts:19` records that the plain-node-entry-guard fails
on that literal text, try/catch or not.
`hasAppEnvironment() ? getAppEnvironment() : null` gives the identical "no app root
here" answer without the text. That restores `hasAppEnvironment`, which an earlier
commit in this stack deleted as unused — it now has the caller it was waiting for.
Ratchet baseline 27 → 25.
Verified: 74 files / 458 tests; `pnpm typecheck` clean; `oxlint` clean.
* feat(orcad): boot the Orca runtime on plain Node
Closes the last two Electron couplings and makes `orcad` a working artifact:
a 4.43 MB Node bundle that boots, pairs, registers a repo, creates a real git
worktree and round-trips a PTY — with zero `require("electron")`.
Ratchet 2 -> 0, so `config/runtime-electron-baseline.txt` is now empty and its
test asserts exactly that: any reachable electron import is a regression.
- speech: inject the service factories, so importing ModelManager for its type
no longer drags Electron's streaming net.request into the graph
- filesystem-watcher: add a WorktreeWatcherRemoval port. Every entry in those
maps arrives through an ipcMain handler carrying a renderer sender, so a host
with no renderer has nothing to close, restore or forget — the inert default
is what the desktop code does against empty maps, not a stub hiding work
- user-data-path / profile-storage-paths: resolve userData through
AppEnvironment. These surfaced only once orcad pulled the store in
Both host ports now anchor to a realm-global symbol. `vi.resetModules()` gives
the re-imported graph a fresh module copy, so a binding installed before the
reset silently read back as uninstalled.
The acceptance smoke drives both hosts through one code path (`--target
orcad|electron`) and seeds its own git repo, so it is hermetic and asserts the
same contract of each. Wired into PR CI.
* test(smoke): remove the seeded workspace container, not just the worktree
* test(smoke): surface the server's stderr when it dies before ready
* fix(smoke): build node-pty for Node before booting orcad in CI
* fix(smoke): drive the CLI built from this checkout, not one on PATH
* docs(ratchet): say the baseline must stay empty, not merely shrink
* build(orcad): externalize only the native modules actually in the graph
|
||
|
Neil
|
f975035809 |
refactor(ipc): split preflight and SSH registry out of the ipcMain modules (#15927)
* refactor(preflight): split agent detection out of the ipcMain registration
First of the IPC extractions the revised design requires. `src/main/ipc/preflight.ts`
mixed 285 lines of agent/tool detection with 35 lines of `ipcMain.handle`
registration, and the runtime calls that detection during normal operation
(`orca-runtime.ts:573`, plus the preflight RPC methods). So the runtime dragged
`ipcMain` into its graph to reach pure logic.
Detection moves to `src/main/preflight/agent-detection.ts` — named for what it
contains, per AGENTS.md. `ipc/preflight.ts` keeps only the handler registration and
re-exports the domain module so existing importers are unaffected. The runtime and
its RPC methods now import the domain module directly.
Ratchet baseline 36 → 35: `src/main/ipc/preflight.ts` is no longer reachable from
the runtime. The gate detected the improvement and refused to pass until the
baseline tightened, which is the behaviour it was built for.
Verified: 2 files / 1,187 tests pass across every suite touching preflight;
`pnpm typecheck` clean; `oxlint` clean.
* refactor(ssh): split the SSH target registry out of the ipcMain module
Second IPC extraction, and by far the biggest win: this removes **eight** modules
from the runtime's Electron graph, taking the ratchet baseline 35 → 27.
The runtime needed five thin accessors from `src/main/ipc/ssh.ts` —
`connectRegisteredSshTarget`, `getRegisteredSshState`, `listRegisteredSshTargets`,
`listRegisteredRemovedSshTargetLabels`, `getActiveMultiplexer`. Each is a one-line
read over module-level state. Importing them dragged in `ipcMain`, `powerMonitor`
and a `BrowserWindow` accessor — and, transitively, `ipc/pty.ts` (8,031 lines),
`ssh-browse`, `ssh-passphrase`, `ssh-relay-deploy`, `ssh-remote-cli-host-passthrough`,
`wsl-hook-relay-launch` and `user-data-path`.
`src/main/ssh/ssh-target-registry.ts` now holds that state plus its accessors.
`registerSshHandlers` populates it; the runtime reads it. The indirection is kept
deliberately: SSH providers register after construction and may reconnect, so
callers must resolve the current generation rather than freeze one.
`ipc/ssh.ts` re-exports all five, so non-test importers are unaffected.
`connectRegisteredSshTarget` still throws `ssh_handlers_not_registered` when no
handler layer registered — a headless host must fail loudly rather than report a
target as unreachable, which would read as `exited` (see ssh-execution-boundary.md).
Verified: 9 files / 59 tests across the ssh, automations and trust-preset suites;
orca-runtime.test.ts 1,183 pass; `pnpm typecheck` clean; `oxlint` clean.
* refactor(host): resolve the app root through the port in fork-reachable modules
`parcel-watcher-entry-path.ts` and `session-scanner-service-entry-path.ts` read the
app root via `require('electron').app` inside a try/catch that already returns null
when Electron is absent. They were therefore correct under plain Node at runtime and
only failed the *static* text check — which is real, not pedantic: the comment in
`ports/port-scan-command-client.ts:19` records that the plain-node-entry-guard fails
on that literal text, try/catch or not.
`hasAppEnvironment() ? getAppEnvironment() : null` gives the identical "no app root
here" answer without the text. That restores `hasAppEnvironment`, which an earlier
commit in this stack deleted as unused — it now has the caller it was waiting for.
Ratchet baseline 27 → 25.
Verified: 74 files / 458 tests; `pnpm typecheck` clean; `oxlint` clean.
* test(ssh): mock the SSH target registry alongside the ipc/ssh mock
Thirty-eight suites mocked `vi.mock('./ssh')` for `getActiveMultiplexer`. That
factory went inert when production started importing the accessor from
`../ssh/ssh-target-registry`, so the real module loaded and the assertions drifted.
Adds a companion registry mock returning the same stub, plus a
`sshTargetRegistryModuleMock` builder beside the existing `sshModuleMock` so the
shared harness stays one place. No assertion changed.
Found by a full-suite run: the targeted ssh/runtime suites were green while
30 tests in ipc/worktrees and ipc/repos were not.
* refactor(runtime): read app paths and the packaged flag through the port
`orca-runtime.ts` is the last module in its own graph that imports `electron`
directly. Nineteen of its uses were `app.getPath` (12) and `app.isPackaged` (7) —
exactly what the AppEnvironment port already covers.
Also removes a dead `const { app } = require('electron')` inside
`getOrchestrationDb`. It was left unused once the path came from the port, and it
is precisely the dynamic-require pattern `plain-node-entry-guard.ts` exists to
catch, sitting in the runtime's own constructor path.
What still binds `orca-runtime.ts` to Electron is now three sites, not nineteen:
`new Notification(...)` (one), `BrowserWindow.fromId` (one), and the
`ipcMain.on('terminal:tabCreateReply')` renderer round-trip — which is the browser
tab path, and the same one that would hang a headless host for ten seconds.
Two suites drove `electronMocks.app.isPackaged` directly; they now install a fake
AppEnvironment reading the same mutable field, so their per-test toggles work
unchanged and no assertion moved.
Verified: 376 files / 4,717 tests across src/main/runtime; typecheck and oxlint clean.
* test(serve): add the built-artifact terminal round-trip acceptance smoke
"The server started" proves almost nothing. Terminal creation dispatches into
OrcaRuntimeService, and without an installed headless PTY controller that path
falls through to a renderer reply that never arrives and times out after ten
seconds. A boot probe, a port bind, and a `host.platform` call all pass against a
server whose terminals are dead — which is exactly the gap the design doc's own
boot proof was retracted for.
This boots the BUILT `out/main/index.js --serve`, parses its ready payload, pairs a
real client over the advertised endpoint, lists worktrees, creates a terminal, runs
a command through the PTY, asserts the output comes back, and asserts clean
shutdown. It drives nothing but the public pairing + RPC surface, so the same
script is the acceptance gate a future Node-only backend must pass unchanged.
The sentinel invokes `process.execPath` rather than `echo`, because the shell
differs per platform and node does not.
Verified both directions: passes against the real server, and fails with an
actionable message when the command produces no output — a smoke that cannot fail
is worthless.
* fix(ssh): fail loudly when the multiplexer resolver was never installed
`getActiveMultiplexer` resolves through a resolver that `ipc/ssh.ts` installs at
module scope. A process that never loads the SSH layer — which is the whole point
of the Node-only backend — would get `undefined` from every call.
`undefined` already means something specific here: "not connected". So a missing
resolver and a disconnected target were indistinguishable, and a host with no SSH
layer would quietly report every target as not connected. That is the
unverifiable-reported-as-exited conflation `docs/reference/ssh-execution-boundary.md`
exists to prevent — the doc is explicit that absence of contact is never evidence
of absence of the thing.
A missing resolver is a wiring error, not a connection state, so it throws, matching
what `connectRegisteredSshTarget` already does for unregistered handlers.
Verified: 432 files / 4,759 tests across ipc, ssh, preflight, automations and trust
presets; typecheck and oxlint clean.
* refactor(pty): stop faking a BrowserWindow for the headless PTY path
`registerHeadlessPtyRuntime` passed `registerPtyHandlers` a stub object cast to
`BrowserWindow` whose `isDestroyed()` returned true and whose `webContents.send`
was a no-op — a window-shaped thing that lied about being a window, purely to
satisfy the type. Adversarial review named it as the same "looks fine, silently
returns a lie" pattern this codebase rejects elsewhere, and it is the shape that
keeps `electron` on a path that otherwise needs none.
`registerPtyHandlers` now takes `BrowserWindow | null`. An absent renderer is
semantically identical to a destroyed one — all 42 call sites already guarded on
`isDestroyed()` and skipped — so `src/main/ipc/pty-renderer-surface.ts` states that
directly: `isRendererGone`, `sendToRenderer`, `rendererWebContents`. The compound
`isDestroyed() || webContents.isDestroyed()` guards collapse into one predicate.
`isPtyWriteEventFromMainWindow` becomes null-tolerant and fails closed: with no
renderer no sender can legitimately match, so every write is rejected. Those
handlers cannot fire headless today, but failing closed is the right answer if that
ever changes.
This is the precondition for installing a PTY controller without Electron, which is
what a Node-only backend needs and what `terminal.create` actually calls.
Verified: 129 files / 2,473 tests across ipc/pty, providers and orca-runtime; the
built-artifact acceptance smoke still passes end-to-end (boot → pair →
terminal.create → sentinel → close), which is the check that matters most here
since this changes the headless PTY path itself; typecheck and oxlint clean.
* refactor(pty): read app paths and the packaged flag through the port
Follows the fake-window removal. `ipc/pty.ts` had nine `app.*` reads — all
`getPath`, `getVersion` or `isPackaged` — which the AppEnvironment port already
covers. The `BrowserWindow` import was also dead after the null-window change.
What still binds this file to Electron is now `ipcMain` (75 uses, all handler
registration) and `powerMonitor` (2). That is a clean statement of the remaining
job: split logic from registration, the same shape already applied to preflight
and the SSH registry.
Test wiring: the shared `pty-ipc-suite-environment` beforeEach installs a fake
AppEnvironment that reads through the existing `vi.mock('electron')` app object
rather than freezing values — suites toggle `app.isPackaged` mid-test to exercise
dev-mode spawn paths, so the port has to observe the same mutable field. One edit
in the shared harness covers every pty suite.
Verified: 128 files / 1,290 tests across ipc/pty and providers; the built-artifact
acceptance smoke passes; typecheck and oxlint clean; ratchet unchanged at 25.
* refactor(pty): inject the ipcMain surface so the PTY module loads without Electron
This closes the round-3 blocker: "the doc never says how orcad installs
setPtyController without Electron."
`registerPtyHandlers` owns the `RuntimePtyController` that `terminal.create`
actually spawns through — the thing a Node backend needs and cannot get from the
provider thunks. The module was otherwise host-agnostic already; the only thing
pinning 8,031 lines to Electron was a static `ipcMain` / `powerMonitor` import used
purely to register renderer handlers that no headless host will ever receive.
`src/main/ipc/pty-host-bindings.ts` makes those surfaces settable, defaulting to
no-ops. Unlike AppEnvironment and SecretStore, the default does NOT throw: a host
with no renderer legitimately has nothing to register against, so not registering
handlers nobody can call is correct rather than a hidden downgrade. The desktop
installs the real objects in `attach-main-window-services` before its handlers run.
Also converts the remaining electron import to a top-level `import type`. oxlint's
`no-import-type-side-effects` caught that inline `type` specifiers still leave a
side-effect import — precisely the "type-only is not enough if esbuild still emits
require('electron')" trap a reviewer flagged.
**`src/main/ipc/pty.ts` now bundles with zero `require("electron")`.** A Node entry
can call `registerPtyHandlers(null, runtime, …)` and get a working PTY controller.
Verified: 128 files / 1,290 tests across ipc/pty and providers; the built-artifact
acceptance smoke passes end-to-end — which is the check that matters, since this
changes how every PTY handler registers; typecheck and oxlint clean.
* fix(pty-bindings): drop two unused eslint-disable directives
CI runs oxlint with unused-disable reporting; the two
`@typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any` suppressions I added were never triggered by
any enabled rule, so they failed static analysis as dead directives. The `any[]`
rest args stay — they mirror electron's own IpcMain signature, and narrowing them
would reject the real object at the desktop call site.
Verified with the exact CI invocation: `oxlint --format github` reports 0 warnings,
0 errors across the repo.
* fix(pty): install the host bindings per process, not per window
A real regression my own change introduced, caught by the SSH docker E2E
(`paired-startup-exec-readiness` — "recovers startup exec through a headed paired
desktop owner"). It reproduced on rerun, so it was not a flake.
`setPtyHostBindings` was called inside `attachMainWindowServices`, i.e. when a
window attaches. But `registerHeadlessPtyRuntime` (index.ts:3163) calls
`registerPtyHandlers` on the serve path *before* any window exists — so those
handlers registered against the no-op default and never reached the real `ipcMain`.
A paired desktop owner then attached to a runtime whose PTY handlers were wired to
nothing.
The bindings describe the *host*, not the *window*: an Electron main process always
has `ipcMain`, whether or not a window is open. Installing them beside
`setAppEnvironment`/`setSecretStore` at the top of bootstrap fixes both paths.
Verified: 128 files / 1,290 tests; the built-artifact acceptance smoke passes;
typecheck clean; `oxlint --format github` (the exact CI invocation) reports 0/0.
* feat(orcad): de-electron the runtime core and add the Node entry + build gate
**`src/main/runtime/orca-runtime.ts` — 41,048 lines — no longer imports electron.**
Its last three sites go through `runtime-desktop-surface.ts`: a native notification,
the authoritative-window lookup, and the one `ipcMain` channel used by the
renderer-backed tab-create fallback. All three are unreachable without a renderer —
`createTerminal` already takes the background branch when no window exists (#10333) —
so a Node host installs none and the runtime relays notifications to paired clients,
which is the better destination anyway. Ratchet 25 → 24.
Adds `src/main/orcad/orcad-entry.ts`: Node host adapters plus a `startOrcad` that
constructs the runtime, installs the PTY controller via `registerPtyHandlers(null, …)`,
and serves RPC. It sets two defaults the constructor gets wrong for a headless host —
`canRecoverPersistentLocalPtys: false` (no daemon here) and
`getDesktopWindowStatus: 'blocked'` (a Node host can never be promoted to a desktop
window, which is what `'openable'` claims).
Adds `config/scripts/build-orcad.mjs`, which **currently fails, on purpose**: 25
modules still import electron (browser and speech clusters, plugins, jira/proxy,
filesystem-watcher, and four `require('electron').app` one-liners). It names them.
Two bugs found while building it, both worth recording:
- The first bundle looked clean and was not. `electron` was bundleable, so esbuild
rewrote the metafile `path` to the resolved file under node_modules and a check for
`path === 'electron'` passed while the package was in the bundle — it failed at
runtime with electron's own installer message. The check now reads `original`, and
electron is marked external so a residual import fails loudly instead.
- `jsonc-parser`'s UMD build breaks the bundle at load; aliased to its ESM entry, the
same fix `build-relay.mjs` already carries.
Verified: desktop unchanged — the built-artifact acceptance smoke passes, runtime/pty/
provider suites green, typecheck clean, `oxlint --format github` 0/0.
* refactor(host): drop the last two require('electron') app lookups
`computer/sidecar-client.ts` and `ports/port-scan-command-client.ts` read the app
root through `require('electron').app` inside a try/catch. Both were already correct
under plain Node at runtime — they return null when it throws — but the literal text
fails the plain-Node entry guard regardless, which is why port-scan carried a comment
warning it must never become reachable from a fork entry.
Reading the AppEnvironment port gives the identical "no app root here" answer without
the text, so that warning is now obsolete and the comment says so.
Ratchet 24 → 22. Every remaining entry is a real coupling: the browser cluster (15,
which variant B does not ship), speech (2), plugins (2), and jira/proxy-settings (2,
needing an HttpClient port for Chromium session partitions).
Verified: 25 files / 209 tests; acceptance smoke passes; typecheck and
`oxlint --format github` clean.
* docs(orcad): record that the ratchet under-counts orcad's graph
The ratchet reports 22 electron importers; the orcad build reports 23. The extra is
agent-hooks/wsl-hook-relay-launch.ts, and the cause is a gap in the gate rather than
a rounding error: the ratchet measures what orca-runtime + runtime-rpc reach, while
orcad's entry also imports ipc/pty directly to install the PTY controller.
Once orcad ships it must become a ratchet entry point, or the two numbers drift and
the gate quietly stops covering the artifact it exists for.
* refactor(runtime): inject the browser commands factory
Drops 14 modules from the runtime's Electron graph in one change — the whole Chromium
browser cluster. Ratchet 22 → 8.
`OrcaRuntimeService` constructed `RuntimeBrowserCommands` as a field initializer, and
that construction is what pulled in `BrowserWindow`, `session`, `webContents` and the
cookie jars. Importing the class for its *type* is free; only building it costs.
So the class import becomes `import type`, and the instance comes from
`runtime-browser-commands-factory.ts`. The desktop installs the real factory at the
Electron entry. **All ~80 existing `this.browserCommands.*.bind(...)` delegations are
untouched** — a review round specifically warned that rewriting those was the
expensive, risky part, and this avoids it entirely.
With no factory installed, browser commands reject per call with `browser_unavailable`
rather than resolving to a stub that silently succeeds. The runtime already filters
browser capabilities out of `getStatus()` when no backend exists, so clients do not
offer the affordance in the first place.
Also corrects a stale comment in `pty-renderer-surface.ts` that still described the
fake window as present tense; it was deleted two commits ago.
Verified: 451 files / 5,513 tests across `src/main/browser` and `src/main/runtime` —
the entire browser automation suite; the built-artifact acceptance smoke passes;
`pnpm typecheck` and `oxlint --format github` clean.
* refactor(host): extract the plugin client list and port two app lookups
Ratchet 8 → 5.
- `listPluginsForClients` moves to `src/main/plugins/plugin-client-list.ts`. It needed
only three `plugins/*` helpers, none of them Electron — it was colocated with
`ipcMain.handle` registrations, so the runtime's `plugins.list` RPC dragged all of
Electron in to call a function that reads a lockfile. Same shape as preflight.
Dropping it also releases `ipc/plugin-marketplaces.ts`.
- `agent-hooks/wsl-hook-relay-launch.ts` and `speech/stt-service.ts` read `getAppPath`
and `isPackaged` through the AppEnvironment port.
The five that remain are all genuinely Chromium and need the HttpClient port or a
watcher split, not another mechanical swap: `browser/cdp-bridge` (webContents),
`ipc/filesystem-watcher` (ipcMain), `jira/authenticated-request` and
`network/proxy-settings` (net + session partitions), `speech/model-manager`
(`net.request`, which honors app proxy settings that Node https does not — replacing
it is a behaviour change, not a rename).
Verified: 219 files / 1,922 tests across plugins, speech, agent-hooks and the runtime
RPC methods; the built-artifact acceptance smoke passes; typecheck and
`oxlint --format github` clean.
* refactor(network): resolve the default proxy session lazily
Ratchet 5 → 4.
`proxy-settings.ts` needed exactly one Electron value: `session.defaultSession`, as
the fallback when a caller does not pass `options.proxySession`. Callers could already
inject a session; only the default was hard-wired. It now comes from a settable
resolver, so the module loads under plain Node.
**A resolver rather than a Session, because a Session eagerly throws.** The first
attempt installed `session.defaultSession` directly in pre-ready bootstrap and broke
startup outright — `TypeError: Session can only be received when app is ready`. The
acceptance smoke caught it before commit. Deferring to first use is always after ready.
Behaviour with no session is not a degradation: there is no Chromium proxy config to
discover, so `resolveProxy` is skipped and the environment variables become the whole
answer rather than a fallback. Applying rules to a session that does not exist is
likewise skipped; settings are still honoured because outbound requests read the env.
This reaches past Jira — a review round noted `ensureElectronProxyFromEnvironment` is
also on the Claude HTTP path via `oauth-refresh.ts` and `rate-limits/claude-fetcher.ts`.
Verified: 48 files / 526 tests across network, jira and rate-limits; the
built-artifact acceptance smoke passes; typecheck and `oxlint --format github` clean.
* fix(index): merge the duplicate proxy-settings import
CI's code-quality lint (`oxlint --config config/oxlint-code-quality-native-plugins.json
--deny-warnings`) flags a module imported twice in one file. My earlier insertion added
a second `./network/proxy-settings` import beside the existing one.
Verified with CI's exact invocation: exit 0.
* refactor(network): add the HttpClient port and lift BrowserError out of cdp-bridge
Ratchet 4 → 2.
Two unrelated couplings, both of the same shape — a small thing living inside a
Chromium-heavy file.
`BrowserError` is a seven-line error class with no dependencies, but it lived in
`browser/cdp-bridge.ts`, which imports `webContents`. The runtime catches that type on
paths with nothing to do with CDP, so one import kept a Node host from loading the
runtime at all. Moved to `browser/browser-error.ts`; cdp-bridge re-exports it.
`jira/authenticated-request.ts` fetches through `net.fetch` and reads
`session.defaultSession`. `network/http-client.ts` makes both settable. This one is a
**named port rather than a silent fallback, because the fallback is not transparent**:
Electron's net follows Chromium session/proxy state, avoids undici's stale keep-alive
sockets after a VPN path change, and sends a Chrome user agent that Jira's XSRF check
depends on. A Node host gets `globalThis.fetch`, reads proxy config from the
environment, and sends Node's user agent. That difference is documented at the port.
`session.defaultSession` is read per call, not captured at install — it throws before
the app is ready, which is the mistake the previous commit made and the acceptance
smoke caught.
Test wiring: `jira/client.test.ts` installs the port *inside* `loadClientModule`, after
its `vi.resetModules()`, since the reset gives the module a fresh singleton.
Verified: 461 files / 5,616 tests across jira, browser, network and runtime; the
built-artifact acceptance smoke passes; typecheck, `oxlint --format github` and the
code-quality lint with `--deny-warnings` all clean.
* fix(http-client): register the Node fetch fallback with the call-site audit
`global-fetch-call-site-audit.test.ts` guards every global-fetch use, because the
global runs on undici where an unread response body can crash the whole process
(orca#8695). The HttpClient port's Node fallback is a new such call site and was
unregistered — the guard caught it in a full-suite run.
Registered with the reasoning, and the port's doc comment now states the body-safety
contract explicitly: it hands the Response straight to its caller and never inspects
it, so the consume/cancel obligation stays exactly where it already was — with the
caller, unchanged from when they called Electron's net directly.
Two comments elsewhere mentioned the global by name and tripped the line scan as false
positives; reworded to describe the behaviour rather than name the API.
Verified: audit passes; typecheck and `oxlint --format github` clean.
* fix(app-environment): read hasAppEnvironment through the realm slot
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Neil
|
0bbc6c80e8 |
refactor(host): route app paths and version through an AppEnvironment port (#16019)
* refactor(host): route app paths and version through an AppEnvironment port
`app.getPath('userData')` is the single largest Electron coupling in the main
process — 37 call sites — and it is one of the things stopping the Orca runtime
from booting on plain Node. Give it the same treatment as SecretStore.
- `src/shared/app-environment.ts` — the port plus a settable registry, covering
the members the runtime's module graph actually reads: paths, app path,
version, packaged flag, shutdown hook, exit, and Chromium process metrics.
`getAppEnvironment()` throws until installed, for the same reason the secret
store does: a silent default resolves `userData` to the wrong directory and the
caller writes real state there before anyone notices. No `node:` imports,
because `src/shared/**` is in the web build graph.
- `src/main/host/electron-app-environment.ts` — the desktop adapter, a
pass-through to `electron.app`.
- 9 modules migrated: telemetry, opencode/mimo/pi hook services,
terminal-history-paths, terminal-scrollback-snapshots, cli-installer,
clipboard-image-temp-file, memory/collector.
Deliberately NOT migrated: `src/main/browser/**`. That cluster is Chromium-
adjacent by nature — cookie jars, download destinations, offscreen pages — and a
Node backend does not ship it at all, so porting it buys nothing and churns
heavily-mocked suites. Also left alone for now: the call sites that additionally
touch `app.asar` path literals or `app.setName`, which need more than a
mechanical swap.
`getAppMetrics` stays on the port rather than being injected because
memory/collector.ts is its only caller and reads it from module scope; a Node
host returns [], having no Chromium processes to measure.
Test wiring: the secret-store setup file becomes `vitest-host-ports-setup.ts` and
installs both ports, exporting `fakeAppEnvironment`/`installFakeAppEnvironment`
so suites needing one specific member state only that instead of restating all
seven — which is boilerplate, and had pushed one suite past the max-lines budget.
Verified: 159 files / 1651 tests pass across every touched area; `tsc` clean on
both the node and web projects; `oxlint` clean.
* fix(typecheck): list the vitest host-ports setup in the node project
Three suites import `installFakeAppEnvironment` from config/scripts, but that
directory is outside tsconfig.node.json's include list, so composite typecheck
failed with TS6307. Listing the one file matches how this config already pins
individual files it needs.
Local `tsc --composite false` does not reproduce this — only `pnpm typecheck`
does, which is what CI runs.
* refactor(host): drop two unused AppEnvironment exports
hasAppEnvironment() and resetAppEnvironmentForTests() had zero callers. The
secret-store equivalents are used, so these were mirror-symmetry rather than
need; add them back when something actually needs them.
* test(terminal-history): install the AppEnvironment fake instead of mocking electron
These three suites mocked `electron.app.getPath` to point at a fixture dir. The
production module now reads the port, so the mock was inert and the global test
default's temp dir won — which broke the WSL path assertions and every deletion
count.
Found by a full-suite run, not by the targeted checks around the migrated modules,
which is the argument for running the whole suite on a refactor this wide.
* test(host-ports): remove the per-environment temp dir on teardown
The setup allocated a mkdtemp directory at module scope, which vitest evaluates
once per test *environment* — one per test file, not one per worker. Nothing
removed them, so a full 6,000-file run left thousands behind.
Proven: with an isolated TMPDIR, a three-file run previously added directories and
now leaves zero.
* fix(app-environment): anchor the installed environment to a realm global
Same reason as the SecretStore: vi.resetModules() rebuilds the module registry,
and an environment installed before the reset read back as uninstalled.
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Neil
|
d07ce15cff | refactor(host): route secret storage through a SecretStore port (#15916) |