1086 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Neil	6bb2b0c6d7	test(runtime): capture real Antigravity transcripts — the detector is inverted on live output (#19983) ... * test(runtime): capture real agent PTY transcripts before rewriting Antigravity readiness Antigravity readiness has been written five times against a five-line screen typed from memory. There is no Antigravity transcript in this repository, so every attempt was a guess tested against another guess. This adds the recorder, the protocol and the fixture-driven suite so the sixth attempt can be written against evidence, and changes no detector logic. - config/scripts/capture-agent-pty-transcript.mjs records a live agent session through a real PTY, escapes and wrapping intact. Ctrl-] is consumed by the recorder and never forwarded, which is the only way to end a capture while a dialog still owns the screen. - config/scripts/pty-transcript-secret-scan.mjs finds account identifiers and credentials, redacts them with same-length placeholders so wrapping survives, and recognises its own placeholders so a scrubbed file verifies clean. - src/main/runtime/antigravity-readiness-transcripts.test.ts asserts a verdict per transcript and skips by name until the transcripts land, with a doc-coverage ratchet and a guard that a fixture contains escape bytes. The escape-byte guard exists because the three cursor-agent fixtures carry a comment claiming they were captured verbatim through Orca, yet contain zero ESC bytes and zero carriage returns. That comment is corrected here to say what those files are; the fixtures and the rules built on them are untouched. * test(runtime): capture real Antigravity transcripts, and pin what they prove `agy` 1.1.25 turned out to be installed, so the transcripts this scaffold was built for now exist. Six are recorded from live sessions and committed; the rest are named as skipped, because reaching them would mean signing the operator out or deleting their config. The captures invert the story. On real output the shipped detector refuses a genuinely ready screen and accepts a live `/model` picker: - Antigravity paints a block-glyph logo down the left, so the model row never starts a line. `startsWith('gemini', trimmedStart)` cannot match a real ready screen, on any account or model. Stripping the logo flips the same screen to ready, which means a decorative glyph decides readiness today. - The `/model` picker prints `Gemini 3.x Flash` one per line, at line start, and a bare `>` composer sits earlier in the tail. Both halves of the rule are satisfied while a dialog owns the screen. - For an API-key user the identity row reads `Gemini API key` — no `@`, no domain — and `AGY_CLI_HIDE_ACCOUNT_INFO=1` removes the row entirely. The account-row requirement of attempts 4 and 5 can never pass for those users. - The banner is printed once and never reprinted after a dialog is dismissed, so `headerIndex` cannot be the ordering anchor. Four suite cases are pinned as KNOWN DEFECT: they assert what the detector does so CI stays honest instead of permanently red, and flip to failing the moment someone fixes it. No detector logic changed. The recorder gains `--send "<ms>:<text>"` because a dialog capture has to be driven and an unattended run has no TTY, and the scrub scanner gains a UUID rule because agy prints a resumable conversation id on exit. * test(runtime): capture agy mid-turn, and make the scan file reviewable Answers the busy-frame question a P1 review raised against attempt six, with two new captures from a live turn. At the frame level the review is right: a busy frame parks the caret with the same bytes as an idle one, `CR ESC[2A ESC[2C`, and the only differing row — `esc to cancel` versus `? for shortcuts` — is erased by that park. At the retained-tail level it does not reproduce. Each spinner tick is its own repaint with its own `CR ESC[2A`, two rows higher than the frame's, which splices the composer away: a live turn's tail ends on `⣟ Generating...`, with no bare caret to match. A constructed input that keeps the park and edits only the status text is not faithful, because a live turn has a spinner row repainting below the composer. The residual is the gap between a frame park and the next tick, where the tail does end on the bare caret. Quiescence-gated paths are safe there because ticks keep arriving; text-only paths are not, and for those the capture supports one clause: a braille glyph on the last visible line means working. That predicate already exists here for cursor-agent and should be reused, scoped to the last line — a first-run transcript prints `⠾ Signing in...` during startup. Also in this commit, from the same review: - pty-transcript-secret-scan.mjs held raw 0x00-0x1f bytes in a character class, so the one file gating real PTY data into history was binary to git and unreviewable in a diff. It now tests codepoints, which the formatter cannot fold back into control bytes. - Pin `src/main/runtime/__fixtures__/*.txt` as -text. A Windows checkout would otherwise normalise line endings and rewrite the CR bytes that make these files evidence. The recorder now stops appending at the stop moment rather than through shutdown: an agent repaints an idle frame on its way out, which was overwriting the mid-turn state the capture existed to record. * test(tooling): allowlist the transcript scan test in the batch-shim ratchet pty-transcript-secret-scan.test.mjs asserts that the capture recorder routes an 'agy.cmd' shim through cmd.exe, so the shim literal it names is the assertion, not a spawn. Fits the existing assert-on-shim-files category.	2026-09-11 01:07:16 -07:00
Jinwoo Hong	c84007c541	feat(rpc): generate a shared params catalog from the host registry, gated on parse parity (#19961)	2026-09-10 21:18:39 -07:00
Neil	bba68b1bdd	fix(pi): finish the dialog-wait signal on every surface (#19533) ... * fix(pi): carry modal waits to mobile and stop losing the dialog close Follow-ups to #18836, from its readiness review. - Paint pi's `!` needs-input state marker while a dialog is open, so the 80ms spinner frame stops repainting a working title over a mid-turn wait. Mobile and the CLI read the title, so they saw `working` where the desktop already showed `waiting`. - Keep the assistant reply that lands while a dialog is open. The modal guard cleared tool fields and the `message_end` capture with them, so a turn ending under a dialog left the preview on the previous message. - Report `ui_prompt_end` even when `ctx.isIdle()` throws on a runner the modal itself invalidated; the lost post stranded the pane on `waiting`. - Declare the `esbuild` the runtime smoke tool imports. * fix(pi): hold the needs-input marker until the dialog actually closes From review of the previous commit. - Settling under an open dialog no longer retires the marker. stopAnimation painted the plain title unconditionally, so agent_settled, a resolved agent_end, or an idle auto_compaction_end erased it mid-dialog — and because that also cleared the timer, the close then painted the plain title again and the wait was lost for good. - Track the dialog as a boolean, not a depth counter. Pi does its own nesting accounting and emits one pair per stack, which is what the status extension already assumes; two files disagreeing on that would have let an inner close release the outer wait. - Reset the flag on agent_start in both extensions. A turn cannot begin under a dialog holding input focus, so it is the one boundary that can recover a close that never arrived instead of pinning the pane forever. - Leave OMP to its approval events: it reports waits through those already, and painting the marker there too would put title and hook in disagreement. * fix(pi): do not ring the completion bell for a dialog that lost its close From review of the previous commit. - Report working, not done, when ui_prompt_end's isIdle() throws. done is not cosmetic: it reaches dispatchCompletion and fires the pane's finished notification, so a turn that is still running would announce itself. The real done still arrives from agent_end/agent_settled. - Keep the idle-maintenance frame cap accruing while a dialog holds the title, so a dialog left open cannot suspend the guard that stops a compaction spinner whose end event never came. - Guard the dialog handlers against a ctx without ui. The source is generated and untypechecked, and pi does not document the ctx it passes these two events; a TypeError there would surface on every dialog. * fix(pi): let a turn still complete after a dialog loses its runner From review of the previous commit. - Re-arm the completion report when ui_prompt_end's isIdle() throws. The fallback posts working, but the finished turn had already reported its end, so nothing further would ever fire and an idle pane sat spinning. - Count dialog depth in both extensions instead of trusting pi to emit one pair per stack. The guarantee is undocumented, and if it ever does emit a pair per dialog, an inner close would release the wait the outer dialog still holds. A counter costs nothing and drops the dependency. * fix(pi): decide a dialog close from turn state, not from a guess From review of the previous commit. - Fall back to agentEndReported when ctx.isIdle is unavailable or throws. The previous guess of working stranded the common case — a dialog opened at idle — because no later event was coming to correct it, and the agentEndReported re-arm it relied on could not fire either. A turn that already reported its end is not still running, and that is knowledge this process holds without needing ctx at all. - Only suppress spinner frames once the marker is actually painted. Pi may pass a ctx with no ui, and freezing the title on its last working frame is the opposite of what the marker is for. - Gate the titlebar dialog handlers on the OMP runtime too, not just the installed kind: a bare-shell OMP launch runs inside a pi-kind pane, and the status extension already defers there. Extracted that check so both extensions share it rather than carrying two copies. * fix(pi): treat a pane that never ran a turn as idle, not busy From review of the previous commit. - Track turn-in-flight separately from agentEndReported. That flag also dedupes the completion post, so it starts false on a pane that has not run a turn — which read as still-running and left a dialog opened before the first prompt spinning forever. - Retry the marker paint on each dialog open instead of only the outermost, so an outer ctx without ui cannot decide the whole nested stack goes unmarked. - Fall back to the opening ctx when the close carries no ui. Nothing else clears the needs-input marker, so the pane would have kept asking for attention until the next turn. * fix(pi): keep a dying dialog ctx from stranding the needs-input marker The close path paints through the ctx captured at open time, which is the one a session-switching modal is most likely to have invalidated. Guard both paint sites so a throw cannot reject the handler and leave the title on the needs-input marker, and make local turn state the floor for the status extension's idleness verdict instead of a fallback. * fix(pi): hold the dialog wait against pi's own title writes and lost closes Reviewed against real Pi 0.85.1 source rather than inference: - ctx.ui is a getter that calls assertActive() and throws once a session- replacing dialog invalidates the runner, so optional chaining never screened it out and the probe sat outside the try. A throw landed after the depth decrement but before markerPainted cleared, stranding the needs-input marker until the next turn. - Pi writes the same terminal title from its own writers with no event we observe, so the marker is now re-asserted rather than merely not overwritten, on a slow timer that outlives the spinner and its cap. - resetExtensionUI drops an open dialog without resolving its promise, so a replaced or reloaded session never emits the matching ui_prompt_end. Both extensions now release the wait on session_start and shutdown. * fix(pi): build the title inside the guard, not as an argument to it paintTitle caught the setTitle throw but not the two calls one argument to its left: pi.getSessionName() asserts runner liveness the same way ctx.ui does, and process.cwd() throws ENOENT once the worktree is unlinked under a live pane. Four of the six call sites are timer callbacks, where an escape is an uncaught exception and pi exits(1) through its own handler — so the cwd route was reachable today. paintTitle now takes a builder and runs it inside the existing try. * fix(pi): let only the pane-owning process assert the needs-input marker The spinner is harmlessly per-process, but the marker is status the pane reports, and child agents inherit ORCA_PANE_KEY. Gate the two dialog handlers on a PID claim, mirroring ORCA_PI_STATUS_OWNED in the status hook.	2026-09-08 03:06:54 -07:00
3 people	aeddfa463d	perf(renderer): avoid per-second spinner animation events (#19407) ... * perf(renderer): avoid per-second spinner animation events * fix(bench): ensure the Electron runtime before bench:spinners The script launches Electron via Playwright but skipped ensure:electron-runtime, which every other Electron-launching bench script runs first. * docs(renderer): scope spinner pixel-tolerance claim to paused-animation checks --------- Co-authored-by: m4air <m4air@m4airs-MacBook-Air.local> Co-authored-by: pullfrog[bot] <226033991+pullfrog[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-09-07 19:29:53 -07:00
OrcaWinandm4air	de0a91b99f	fix(deps): update Electron to reviewed 43.6 runtime (#19369) ... Co-authored-by: m4air <m4air@m4airs-MacBook-Air.local>	2026-09-07 19:12:12 -07:00
OrcaWinandm4air	102402e41e	fix(deps): update DOMPurify sanitizer hardening (#19377) ... Co-authored-by: m4air <m4air@m4airs-MacBook-Air.local>	2026-09-07 17:43:28 -07:00
OrcaWinandm4air	b8f6c7cabe	fix(deps): update react-i18next for TypeScript 7 and parser fixes (#19378) ... Co-authored-by: m4air <m4air@m4airs-MacBook-Air.local>	2026-09-07 17:43:18 -07:00
Neil	1848855515	test: enable software WebGL for Linux CI headful specs (#19001) ... * test: enable CI WebGL and route GPU-dependent regressions * test: retain headful atlas cases in terminal rendering goldens * test: reuse golden command in project coverage assertions	2026-09-06 19:27:12 -07:00
Neil	1924c8f5b1	feat(perf): lint repeated sort setup and schedule regression contracts (#18822) ... * feat(perf): audit comparator setup and schedule performance contracts * test(sqlite): close readers after expected busy failures * ci(perf): trigger contract workflow on the contract files themselves Without these paths a contract rename lands green on PR CI and only breaks the next nightly, where nobody owns the failure. Also run the OS-independent source audit once instead of on all three runners.	2026-09-05 13:56:06 -07:00
Neil	4c5077d57a	perf(persistence): skip rewriting unchanged terminal scrollback snapshots (#18764) ... * perf(terminal): tighten the partial-escape-tail benchmark and equivalence test * perf(terminal): spell the ESC gate the same way as the sibling ingest gates * test(terminal): differential-fuzz the ESC-free partial-escape-tail gate against the unguarded fold * test(terminal): make the escape-tail fuzz exhaustive at symbol depth, and cap the fold expectation Two review findings on the differential fuzz, both about the test faithfully modelling the function it guards. The odometer generated strings by symbol depth but the caller filtered on `chunk.length`, which is the UTF-16 code-unit count. An astral symbol is two code units, so every depth-4 string containing one was silently skipped and the corpus was not exhaustive at depth 4 the way the test name claimed. The generator now yields `{ depth, text }` and the caller filters on depth. That restores the missing strings and takes the pinned corpus from 516,566 to 593,468 - exactly the count CodeRabbit derived for the intended corpus. The pairing assertion in the sibling suite compared the capped `advancePartialEscapeTail` against an uncapped `extractPartialEscapeTail(pending + chunk)`. It passed only because no pairing in that corpus crosses MAX_PARTIAL_ESCAPE_TAIL_LENGTH; it would have stopped modelling the function the moment one did. The cap now lives in the expectation, matching the fuzz oracle. Re-verified the fuzz still fails on a wrong guard: mutating the gate to a bracket check fails all four tests with a `gate diverged` assertion on a lone ESC chunk. Reported by CodeRabbit and pullfrog on #18748.	2026-09-05 00:34:36 -07:00
Neil	320f4c8b87	perf(renderer): index four projections that rescanned their inputs per keystroke (#18747) ... Four renderer projections scanned a collection inside a loop over another collection, each on a path that reruns per keystroke or per store write. All four now build the index once per stable input, which is what the surrounding code already does for its other lookups. `workspace-kanban-search.ts` called `searchWorktrees`, the convenience wrapper that builds the palette document index inline. The board's filter hook memoized the whole call on the query, so every character re-normalized and re-segmented every indexed field of every worktree — and did it again on every agent-status tick while a query was active, since those churn board identities. `buildWorkspaceBoardPaletteDocuments` splits out, memoized on `[worktrees, repoMap]`; only the match reruns per keystroke. This is the shape `worktree-jump-palette-document-index.ts` already provides for Cmd-J. `useTabGroupItemProjections` resolved each editor tab against `state.openFiles` — the global list across every worktree — and each `tabOrder` entry against the group's tabs, with a `.find` per element. Both are now `Map` lookups, alongside the `terminalTabById` index the same file already built. The memo key `groupTabs` gets a new identity on any unified-tab write, so this ran on title, label and colour changes. `buildSourceControlTree` rebuilt every ancestor path with `segments.slice(0, i + 1).join('/')` per segment, making tree construction O(files x depth^2) in characters copied — on the path the Source Control file filter rebuilds per keystroke. The path now accumulates. `worktree-header-section-boundaries.ts` ran a full `findIndex` over the render rows for every header row, plus an `indexOf` over the bucket ordering, in two `useMemo`s keyed on `renderRows` — so it recomputed on every sidebar row-model change, not just during a drag. One indexing pass each, first-match-wins to match `findIndex`/`indexOf`. The successor index is keyed per bucket because a repo or group id can appear in more than one bucket ordering; a flat id-keyed map would pick whichever bucket was iterated first. `worktree-header-section-boundaries.test.ts` pins that and the first-wins duplicate-header case. Measured by `pnpm bench:renderer-quadratic-scans`. Three scenarios time the production export against a reproduction of the pre-change function; the tab-group scenario is modelled on both sides because the projection lives inside a React hook. Each asserts before/after agree first. | projection | drives | scale | before | after | | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | workspace board filter (per keystroke burst) | production | 300 worktrees x 12 keystrokes | 15.4 ms | 4.4 ms | 3.5x | | tab-group projections (per unified-tab write) | modelled | 60 tabs x 120 open files | 1.23 ms | 0.34 ms | 3.6x | | source-control tree build (per filter keystroke) | production | 5000 changed files | 6.2 ms | 3.9 ms | 1.6x | | sidebar header boundaries (per row-model rebuild) | production | 80 repos x 600 rows | 2.0 ms | 0.8 ms | 2.6x | The tree and sidebar wins are smaller than the scans they remove because the rest of each function (tree finalize/sort, per-row size estimation) is linear and now dominates. 4,537 existing sidebar, tab-group and right-sidebar tests pass unmodified.	2026-09-05 00:11:51 -07:00
Neil	c36dd5f4c7	perf(terminal): skip the partial-escape-tail walk on ESC-free PTY chunks (#18748) ... `advancePartialEscapeTail` runs once per PTY chunk, on the main thread, for every terminal — visible, hidden or parked — inside `HeadlessEmulator`'s write path. It unconditionally concatenated the pending tail with the whole chunk and then walked the result one code unit at a time through a VT500 state machine. `extractPartialEscapeTail` only leaves `ground` on an ESC byte, so with no pending tail and no ESC in the chunk the answer is always ''. Taking that case up front skips both the full-chunk concat and the walk. `String.prototype.includes` is a native scan, so the gate costs essentially nothing on the chunks it does not short-circuit. This is the same gate its two neighbours on the very same ingest path already apply — `TerminalOscCwdTitleScanner.scan` and `TerminalMouseModeMirror.scan`, both carrying a comment citing their measured share of a 2.2x ingest regression. This call was simply missed. Measured by `pnpm bench:terminal-partial-escape-tail` over 640 x 16 KB chunks (10 MB), median of 7 rounds: | stream shape | before | after | | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | ESC-free (build logs, `cat`, piped output) | 40.3 ms | 0.19 ms | 213x | | SGR-coloured output (gate does not apply) | 30.6 ms | 32.1 ms | 1.0x | The benchmark proves equivalence over a 226-case corpus before timing, and a new unit test pairs every pending-tail state the scanner can be left in against every chunk shape, asserting the gate is indistinguishable from the unconditional fold.	2026-09-05 00:11:48 -07:00
Neil	e1599c94b8	perf(terminals): let idle panes share one process-table capture instead of forking their own (#18742) ... * perf(terminals): let idle panes share one process-table capture instead of forking their own Every visible local pane runs an agent-completion cadence that resolves through `getStrictProcessTableSnapshot`, and the inspection queue already collapses every shared-observation task enqueued in the same tick onto a single whole-host `ps`. Independent ±10% jitter per pane defeated that: the jitter was re-rolled on each reschedule, so panes drifted permanently apart, each landing in its own tick and each missing the snapshot's 500 ms TTL. Four idle panes cost four captures where one would have served all of them. Idle panes now aim at a deadline grid anchored at the epoch. The pull-forward is clamped to the snapshot TTL, so no interval is ever longer than its tier and none is more than 500 ms shorter: a pane off the grid walks onto it over at most `tier / TTL` steps, costs at most one extra inspection in total, and no inspection is ever delayed. Scoped deliberately. A pane with a foreground agent, or one still inside the 10 s post-activity hot window, keeps its exact interval and its own phase, so the bounded hot cadence is unchanged. The error-backoff path keeps its jitter, where spreading retries across panes is the point. Measured by `pnpm bench:agent-inspection-cadence` — whole-host `ps` captures over 60 s at the 2 s idle tier, median of 21 rounds: | visible panes | before | after | reduction | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 1 | 29 | 29 | 0% | | 2 | 42 | 30 | 29% | | 4 | 62 | 31 | 50% | | 8 | 82 | 32 | 61% | `process-table-snapshot-reader.ts` measures the `command=` column at 1.15 s of work for 1,948 processes, so these are captures a quiet app was paying for continuously. All 4,202 existing terminal-pane tests pass unchanged, including the no-evidence cadence suite that pins the relaxed and hot intervals. * test(terminals): report n/a instead of dividing by a zero baseline in the cadence benchmark A window shorter than one cadence tier leaves the baseline capture count at zero, and the reduction line then divided by it and printed a meaningless percentage. Reported by CodeRabbit on #18742.	2026-09-05 00:05:29 -07:00
Neil	149732df6d	perf(persistence): stop the session write re-scanning and rebuilding unchanged state (#18739)	2026-09-04 23:39:02 -07:00
3 people	a65332a8bd	feat(claude): move structured native chat onto the Claude Agent SDK and enable it on macOS and Linux (#18560) ... * Join structured attach teardown through journal bind * fix: restore structured chat parity * feat: add Claude structured session adapter * fix: harden Claude structured adapter * fix: close Claude adapter edge cases * fix: start Claude init deadline after launch * feat: wire Claude structured sessions * fix: harden Claude structured runtime * fix: fence Claude structured compatibility * fix: preserve Claude free-text prompt answers * fix: decode addressed Claude prompt text * feat: enable Claude structured chat on mobile * fix(mobile): keep structured chat provider-aware * fix(mobile): negotiate Claude structured tabs * fix: keep scoped RPC tests native-free * fix: secure mobile structured image delivery * fix: close structured session data-loss gaps * fix: prove real Claude structured startup * fix: consume pre-spawn proof before retry * feat(native-chat): add desktop structured sessions * fix(native-chat): satisfy structured session cleanup gates * fix(native-chat): keep structured renders pure * fix(native-chat): open composer pickers upward * fix(native-chat): use existing view for structured sessions * fix: harden structured desktop status projection * fix: close structured desktop lifecycle gaps * fix: fence structured AI Vault resumes * fix: fence structured AI Vault resumes * fix: preserve structured tabs during activation * feat: toggle structured sessions between chat and TUI * fix: harden structured session handoffs * fix: bind structured TUI before rollout proof * fix: complete structured chat round trips * fix: align structured TUI return readiness * fix(native-chat): make reverse handoff transactional * Add Claude structured TUI handoff seams * fix(native-chat): clear sticky handoff recovery * fix(native-chat): complete mobile reverse after TUI exit * fix(native-chat): keep TUI transcripts readable * fix(native-chat): recover TUI transcript gaps * fix(native-chat): recover claimed TUI owners * fix(native-chat): retain cold TUI proof authority * fix(native-chat): preserve Claude handoff authority * fix(native-chat): recover TUI transcripts read-only * fix(native-chat): harden Claude handoff recovery * fix(native-chat): serialize structured handoff recovery * fix(native-chat): close handoff admission races * fix(native-chat): validate pinned launch environment * fix(native-chat): revalidate restored and retried owners * fix(native-chat): gate restart recovery publications * fix(i18n): catalog Claude session controls * fix(native-chat): wait for structured TUI process proof * fix(native-chat): queue stale idle TUI handoffs * fix(native-chat): route structured Codex options directly * fix(native-chat): persist structured session options * fix(native-chat): hydrate resumed structured options * fix(native-chat): preserve options across structured handoffs * fix(native-chat): replay pending option mutations * fix(native-chat): rotate settled handoff operations * fix(native-chat): rotate refused send operations * test(native-chat): derive refusal retry state from host * test(native-chat): give the host-oracle matrix test an explicit timeout * fix(native-chat): keep Claude option controls idle * fix mobile structured first-send hydration race * fix(native-chat): preserve handoff launch authority * fix(native-chat): harden shared handoff recovery * fix(native-chat): serialize structured handoff recovery * fix(native-chat): close handoff admission races * fix(native-chat): validate pinned launch environment * fix(native-chat): revalidate restored and retried owners * fix(native-chat): gate restart recovery publications * fix(i18n): catalog structured session recovery control * fix(native-chat): wait for structured TUI process proof * fix(native-chat): queue stale idle TUI handoffs * fix(native-chat): keep structured recovery provider-neutral * fix(native-chat): drop local terminal topology from structured sync * fix structured outbox and tab restore races * fix(native-chat): preserve Claude question groups * fix structured provider visibility and request handling * fix structured session TUI handoff recovery * fix reverse structured session handoff * fix(native-chat): recover Claude outbox and resume state * chore(mobile): preserve the working-tree lockfile state before the main merge Carries the pre-existing uncommitted mobile/pnpm-lock.yaml modification into history so the main merge cannot overwrite it. Verified benign pnpm drift (babel 7.29.7->7.29.8 transitives plus deprecation metadata); drops no patchedDependencies (the mobile lockfile declares none). * test(native-chat): drop orphaned Claude handoff-auth test left by the main merge 'pins Claude handoff auth through the terminal provider boundary' is absent from main and its production counterpart preserveClaudeAuthEnv no longer exists outside this test - orphaned residue of the terminal/native handoff work this PR excludes by scope. Removed rather than repaired: the failure was a renamed field (providerHome -> providerRoot), and renaming it would have carried out-of-scope handoff code into the merge. Body preserved as evidence and logged in CLAUDE-STRUCTURED-DISPOSITION-TABLE.md. * Fix mobile structured turn state * fix Claude structured session blockers * fix claude structured lane blockers * fix Claude acquisition exit proof * fix(claude): route stream-json launch through process wrapper * fix(claude): gate structured chat support * Fix Claude structured launch gating * fix(claude): split session acquisition and prune mobile scope * test(claude): align structured session fixtures * fix(agent-session): preserve handoff launch arguments * fix(claude): open journals through the factory after origin/main split The journal opener moved to journal-store-factory on main; retarget the Claude structured tests that still imported the old path. * fix(claude): resolve Claude structured launch args, auth, and win32 proof The origin/main merge re-expressed the lane's Claude wiring onto main's split orca-runtime facade and dropped three wires past green typecheck and lint. - resolveLaunchArgs discarded its provider parameter, so structured Claude sessions were launched with Codex app-server flags; Claude exits on --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox, and a Codex arg-parse throw could block Claude session creation outright. - resolveClaudeLaunchEnv was no longer supplied, so the launch resolver fell back to the whole process env as configuredEnv and buildClaudeChildProcessEnv re-applied every auth var it had just stripped. The resolver now merges the Claude overlay onto a strip-applied copy of the inherited env, which also keeps PATH intact for withCliRuntimeOnPath. - The windowsProcessStartTimeAvailable producer was gone while the contract field and both consumers survived, so the renderer gate fail-closed and structured native chat was unreachable on every win32 host. Separately, structured Claude pinned CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR unconditionally. An explicit pin makes the CLI abandon the macOS Keychain even when it names the CLI's own default, so a default claude.ai account could not authenticate where the legacy Claude terminal could. Pin only a home the CLI would not resolve on its own, matching ClaudeRuntimePathResolver, and compare against the env the child would otherwise inherit so a diverging overlay cannot outrank the record's account home. Also await the now-async revealNativeSession in its regression test, and set the native status before revealing so a rejecting reveal cannot leave a session released but never marked native. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013UqKCRB6k5e8UaYhXUHeWY * fix(claude): scrub case-insensitive Windows auth env * fix(native-chat): settle handoff outcome-write failures instead of leaking them A store write failure while recording a handoff outcome escaped the flow runner's catch handler, so the client never received the failure and the flow surfaced as an unhandled rejection (seen as an intermittent agent_session_store_corrupt error in the proven-dead-retry suite, whose teardown raced the flow's trailing outcome write). Record the failed outcome best-effort, and drain the coordinator before that test's teardown removes the store root. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011aXkcHyeiRJuezupQdjZaM * fix(native-chat): make the structured close-failure toast provider-neutral The structuredSessionCloseFailed toast fires for any structured session, but its copy said 'Codex chat', so a Claude structured session that fails to close showed the wrong provider name. The launch-failure toast is only reachable behind the agent === 'codex' gate, so its copy stays as is. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013ugSpCx4AWkySaJb69BQax * fix(native-chat): wire structured handoff proof recovery * fix(native-chat): wire structured handoff proof recovery * fix(native-chat): correct the structured chat opt-in copy The one `experimentalStructuredNativeChat` toggle gates both providers — `useStructuredAgentSessionCreate` runs `canUseStructuredNativeChat` for `'claude'` as well as `'codex'` — but its description named only Codex. Its scope line also said Windows keeps using terminal chat, while the gate refuses win32 only until the host proves it can read a process start time. `structured-native-chat-availability.test.ts` already pins that Windows is allowed once the proof is cached, so the two contradicted each other. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RJFsidQWmKYFmeoUuVu4Tp * test(claude): pin @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk 0.3.251 contracts against a scripted CLI PR 1 of the SDK migration: dependency + test-only harness, no product wiring. - Pin @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk to exactly 0.3.251 — not the newest release — because 0.3.251 (published 2026-08-28) clears the repo's 3-day minimumReleaseAge supply-chain gate with no exclusion, while the newest release was minutes old and would have required excluding a brand-new publish from the exact control built to catch brand-new malicious publishes. Every contract this design depends on was verified identical on 0.3.251: the full option surface, no pid on SpawnedProcess (custom spawner stays mandatory), env defaulting to process.env when omitted, and --replay-user-messages appearing only via extraArgs. - Exclude all eight bundled CLI platform binaries via ignoredOptionalDependencies. The setting lives in pnpm-workspace.yaml because pnpm 12 no longer reads the package.json "pnpm" field (it warns and ignores it; verified by install ablation). Excluding the binaries is what makes Orca's pathToClaudeCodeExecutable override mandatory rather than merely preferred. Note: pnpm 12.0.0 honors the ignore list when reconciling an existing lockfile but not on fresh resolution of a new dependency, so the lockfile's SDK entry was pinned surgically; both 'pnpm install' and 'pnpm install --frozen-lockfile' verify clean and stable against the committed lockfile. - Contract-pin suite drives the real SDK against a scripted fake CLI and pins: unknown type/field/content-block pass-through (and keep_alive interception), spawner env fidelity plus the omitted-env process.env inheritance sharp edge, extraArgs producing --replay-user-messages, argument parity for every CLAUDE_STRUCTURED_BASE_ARGS entry plus --session-id/--resume/ --resume-session-at, canUseTool wire request_id stability and abort on control_cancel_request, one spawn per query, pathToClaudeCodeExecutable honored by the default spawner, the exact SDK version, and the eight platform binaries staying uninstalled. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FGCRfYUnb4hbvfTAHGtJKQ * feat(claude): drive the structured transport through the agent SDK Replaces the hand-rolled `claude -p --input-format stream-json` transport with @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk 0.3.251, keeping the existing connection interface for this commit so the acquisition path changes minimally. The control-plane rewrite is a separate change. Orca still supplies the process. `spawnClaudeCodeProcess` routes through `spawnProcess`, retains the child and its pid — the triple the durable lease adjudicates on — drains stderr so exit errors keep their tail, and hands `.cmd` shims to Orca's Windows argument encoder rather than the SDK's plain spawn. `close()` keeps Orca's own bounded tree-kill and exit deadline, so it still resolves true only after an observed exit. Launch resolution emits an SDK options object instead of argv; durable `launchArgs` translate to a typed option where one exists and to `extraArgs` otherwise, refusing a token neither can carry rather than dropping it. The child env is always passed explicitly — omitting it would let the SDK inherit `process.env` and reintroduce the ambient `ANTHROPIC_*` leak. The stdout line parser is deleted; the SDK owns framing, and unknown frames still reach the translator verbatim. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JMhFjh9HEnkcJ5YTfCdgD3 * fix(claude): settle the frame the SDK pulled but never wrote The SDK's input pump is `for await (frame of prompt) { await transport.write(frame) }`. When that write rejects — the child dies between Orca's liveness guard and the write — the for-await ends abruptly and calls the generator's `return()`, so the code after `yield` never runs. The frame was already shift()ed out of `queued`, so the later `fail()` from the exit path could not reach it and `send()` never settled: `dispatchClaudeTurn` awaits that send before it can return `unknown`, wedging the caller and the durable outbox. The pre-SDK transport rejected on the stdin write callback instead. Retain the in-flight entry and settle it from the generator's cleanup, and let fail() reach it too for the pump that never resumes at all. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AobxxokqQ3qcxS7sy7ckum * fix(claude): keep the agent SDK behind the structured-Claude boundary The ordinary OrcaRuntimeService graph statically reaches the Claude adapter and so the transport module, whose first line imported @anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdk. The SDK is evaluated whenever the regular runtime loads, before any structured Claude session is chosen: it sets process.env.NoDefaultCurrentDirectoryInExePath, changing Windows executable resolution for later subprocesses, and a missing or incompatible install would break normal runtime startup — for a user who never leaves the terminal/TUI path. Defer the SDK to the connection, memoized so it loads once per process, and add the import-graph ratchet: a walk from the Electron main entry that fails on any static import of the package, plus a clean-fork check that loading the runtime leaves the Windows search variable untouched and a child-process pin that the side effect is still real. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AobxxokqQ3qcxS7sy7ckum * fix(claude): answer list_models so the picker stops serving the seed sendControlRequest had no list_models case, so every request hit the default reject; readClaudeStructuredSessionOptions swallows that with .catch(() => null) and falls back to the static catalog. Every structured session therefore served a hardcoded model list with no per-model effort levels, no resolvedModel and no default detection, and nothing surfaced the failure. The pre-SDK transport got the live catalog from the CLI. Route it through the SDK's supportedModels(), wrapped in the { models } envelope the existing parser reads. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AobxxokqQ3qcxS7sy7ckum * fix(claude): reap the child's descendants before killing it The forced step of the exit ladder went through the Codex helper, which spawns `pkill -KILL -P <pid>` and SIGKILLs the parent in the same tick: the parent usually dies first, the descendants reparent to pid 1, and `-P` matches nothing. An MCP or launcher descendant of a stubborn Claude child was left running. The test named for that requirement declined to assert it and killed the survivor by hand instead, so it could not fail for the thing it was named after. Route the Claude reap through Orca's existing sweep, which snapshots descendants while their parent link still exists and signals them before the root goes, and on Windows uses the identity-gated `taskkill /T /F`. The test now asserts the descendant is dead; the manual kill stays only as a failure-safe. close() still returns true only on an observed exit. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AobxxokqQ3qcxS7sy7ckum * fix(native-chat): merge the duplicated handoff type import CI's static-analysis lint (`oxlint --config config/oxlint-code-quality-native-plugins.json src config tests mobile --deny-warnings`) exits 1 on the two separate `import type` statements from the same module. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AobxxokqQ3qcxS7sy7ckum * fix(claude): answer a permission callback whose signal already aborted settleFrom registered the abort listener and then delivered the request. A callback that arrives already aborted never fires that event, so the promise stayed pending behind a durable prompt with no cancel path. Check the signal first, emit the cancel, and resolve the SDK's null sentinel without registering. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AobxxokqQ3qcxS7sy7ckum * test(claude): wait for the child to record the frame, not just for its report The scripted CLI writes its report at startup, so `until(readReport)` returned a report with no user messages whenever the child had not yet read the line. The assertion then failed under parallel load. Poll for the frame instead of for the file. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AobxxokqQ3qcxS7sy7ckum * fix(claude): coalesce partial deltas onto one assistant item and stop painting result frames Under --include-partial-messages every stream_event frame carries its own uuid, and the final assistant frame for a block carries yet another; only message.id ties them. The translator keyed each delta by its frame uuid, so a reply painted as one bubble per delta chunk followed by a complete duplicate under the final frame's uuid. The block's first stream frame now mints the claude:(sessionId, uuid) identity, deltas coalesce onto it through the shared 60ms seam, and the final frame reconciles onto that same item. Known SDK bookkeeping no longer reaches the provider-fallback row: result subtypes are catalogued and settled by the turn lifecycle, an empty thinking block (redacted thinking) is a modeled kind, a string-content user replay is a text block, and an empty user frame paints nothing. An unmodeled result subtype or content kind still lands on the bounded fallback row. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01GaP5HpYQbvy2hYehVhwfEW * fix(claude): prove descendant exit at the close boundary instead of on an unref'd timer close() reported proven=true as soon as the direct child exited while the descendant sweep's SIGKILL sat on an unref'd 2 s timer, so a SIGTERM-resistant MCP server outlived the lease release. The reaper now composes the same shared primitives the Codex structured provider uses: snapshot, verified bounded descendant termination on POSIX, taskkill /T /F on Windows. The proof is false whenever descendants outlive the deadline, a retried close re-verifies the retained snapshot rather than trusting the dead root, and the raw pipe child no longer goes through the PTY job sweep it never owned a job for. Measured on macOS: a killed child of a SIGSTOPped parent stays a matching zombie row in ps, so the root is killed while verification runs rather than stopped first as the Codex non-group path does. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_0161QFm3KVRNJKfdzWVGVNWk * feat(claude): replace the hand-rolled control plane with the SDK's native surface PR 3 of the Claude structured SDK migration removes the wire-frame scaffolding PR 2 kept, so Orca drives the SDK's typed control surface directly. Inbound permissions move from a rebuilt control_request dispatch to the SDK's canUseTool / onUserDialog callbacks. The prompt registry now carries the callback's own resolver: a decodable can_use_tool becomes a durable prompt whose answer settles the callback; a malformed one is denied without registering; the SDK's abort signal (fired on control_cancel_request, which the SDK matches and dedups itself) forgets the prompt and settles it null, and a late answer after abort finds no prompt and is refused. Closing settles every in-flight callback so no promise dangles. The claude-agent-sdk-control-bridge that rebuilt the wire frame is deleted. Outbound control maps to Query methods: interrupt() for cancel, setModel / setPermissionMode / applyFlagSettings for options, supportedModels for the model list, initializationResult() for init proof, each under Orca's own request deadline and error classification. Cancel is interrupt-receipt aware: a CLI advertising interrupt_cancel_queued_v1 gets cancel_queued in one round trip, otherwise the receipt's still_queued uuids are swept with cancel_async_message so a cancelled turn cannot spawn a later unexpected turn; older CLIs resolve no receipt. Init keeps the 10s deadline and the unauthenticated-startup guidance. Every behavior is failing-first and ablation-proven; the toggle-off import boundary and the accepted loss of unknown-control visibility rows are unchanged. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Pqjduxt5G4rr9aYvtp7rNm * fix(claude): arm the descendant snapshot before stdin closes and make the tree verdict unproven by default A healthy Claude root leaves within the graceful window, and the close ladder only snapshotted descendants when the root was still alive after that window. So the common close never looked at the tree: `treeExited` stayed null, `!== false` passed it, and close() reported a proven exit with an MCP child still running. A root that died before the walk made the snapshot vacuous too. The proof is now unproven by default. The reaper holds one verdict in Orca's vocabulary (exited / live / unverifiable), assigned in exactly one place from the bounded verification, and close() returns true only on `exited`. The snapshot is armed before stdin closes, while the root can still be walked, and is verified after the root exits; a root that left before any snapshot could be armed stays unverifiable rather than vouching for descendants it never showed us. The shared verifier gains the three-way verdict behind its boolean face, and the connection reports the root and tree verdicts separately along with the child's exit status. One verification per close attempt: the retried close re-verifies, so the intra-attempt re-reap is gone from the teardown budget. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BSmXgkWSsNHft8jFkdBFG9 * fix(claude): verify the Windows tree after taskkill instead of trusting that it ran `terminateWindowsProcessTree` resolves from taskkill's callback whatever the error says, so a timeout, an access denial, a recycled root and a surviving descendant all looked identical to the reaper — which then returned a proven exit unconditionally. close() reported true and the lease was released with an MCP descendant potentially still live. The Windows branch now snapshots the root's descendants while it is alive and, after taskkill, polls a fresh process table to a bounded deadline: a row still matching by pid AND creation time is `live`, an unreadable table is `unverifiable`, and only a table with no match is `exited`. Creation time is the PID-reuse guard the POSIX path gets from ps lstart, so a descendant that denied a creation-time query is omitted rather than signalled on a bare pid. A root already observed exited is never taskkilled: `/T /F` on a recycled pid would take an unrelated tree down with it. The captured tree is tagged by platform so neither verifier can be handed the other's rows. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BSmXgkWSsNHft8jFkdBFG9 * fix(claude): release a reservation on a first-hand root exit instead of latching it into manual recovery Making close() strict about the descendant tree exposed a second defect at the same boundary. A create-time acquisition has no ownerProcess until publication, so an unproven cleanup mapped to handoffStage `manual-recovery`, and adjudication then refuses every later attach with agent_session_ownership_unknown. A user who was merely signed out, or whose --resume the CLI rejected, wedged the session id permanently. Each question now answers from its own evidence. close() is unchanged and stays strict about the tree. Separately, the lease is keyed on the root's pid and start time, so when Orca's own child handle observed that root exit and no descendant snapshot was ever admissible, the reservation is released and the CLI's exit code and stderr reach the user. A descendant observed still alive, or a root Orca never saw leave, stays unproven and keeps the reservation. The settlement records only what was observed: the released lease says the provider process exited and its descendants were not verifiable, rather than reusing the wording that claims cleanup proved no child remains. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BSmXgkWSsNHft8jFkdBFG9 * fix(claude): surface an API error a result frame reports instead of settling the turn on it The SDK models an API failure as a SUCCESS-subtype result whose `result` string is the user-facing error text, with no assistant frame behind it. The translator suppressed every catalogued result subtype as turn bookkeeping, so that turn tombstoned its lifecycle and showed the user a completed, empty reply with no sign anything had failed. Suppression is now by meaning. A result reporting a failure routes to the bounded provider-error surface, leading with the provider's own sentence and keeping the raw frame behind the row's disclosure; ordinary successful results stay off the timeline as before. A turn the user aborted also stays suppressed: its interrupt frame already says so, and its execution diagnostic would only be noise on every stop. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BSmXgkWSsNHft8jFkdBFG9 * fix(claude): drop the stream state of turns that never received their final frame Every streamed delta recorded its block's identity, latest text and checkpoint length. Only the final assistant frame removed them, so an interrupted turn left its whole accumulated reply reachable until the session was disposed, and a long session with repeated interruptions grew those maps without bound. The partial text was already journaled by the flush that precedes settlement, so the live copy was pure retention. That state now lives in its own module, named for what it does — grow a streamed block's journal row between its deltas and its final frame — and turn settlement drops every block still awaiting a final. The translator reports how many remain, which is the invariant: a settled turn leaves none. Also makes a timed-out process-table read retryable while the root is still alive. A loaded host can miss the table's one-second deadline, and latching that as "no descendants" both lost the descendant sweep and, on a busy machine, made the close ladder report unproven for a tree it never actually looked at. Only the root's death still makes a missing snapshot final. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BSmXgkWSsNHft8jFkdBFG9 * perf(claude): capture the Windows descendant tree from one process-table read The capture walked the descendant tree and then read the table again for the creation times the walk's projection drops. Each read is bounded in seconds and both run inside the close ladder's budget, so the second one cost the worst-case teardown three seconds for data the first read already held. The walk is now exported from the module that owns it and runs over rows the caller has already read, which is also what lets the snapshot keep the PID-reuse guard the projection cannot carry. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BSmXgkWSsNHft8jFkdBFG9 * fix(pty): spend the descendant verification window instead of surrendering on one slow table read The verification abandoned the whole check the first time a process-table read missed its own one-second deadline, with seconds of its window still unspent. On a loaded host that reported a tree unverifiable without ever having looked at it, which the Claude close ladder then turned into an unproven close and a retried teardown. It also made the descendant-exit tests flake under a parallel suite run, for the same reason and with the same honest-but-premature verdict. A read that missed its deadline is now simply not an answer: the loop waits and reads again until its own deadline, and only a window that ends without a readable table reports unverifiable. This can only turn a premature verdict into one backed by evidence; it never manufactures a proof. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01BSmXgkWSsNHft8jFkdBFG9 * fix(claude): never let a later failed look collapse an observed live descendant into unverifiable The reaper's single assignment site latched only 'exited', so a second reap whose table reads all missed their deadline overwrote an earlier completed verification's 'live' with 'unverifiable'. The acquisition release gate discriminates on exactly that pair, so a root exit after such a decay released the lease over a descendant that had been observed alive. The latch is now monotone in trust order: exited is final, and live is only ever raised to exited. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HfdhsvSJucLw4cTZxzg2CP * fix(claude): never prove a Windows tree gone while a descendant denied identification The Windows snapshot dropped rows that denied the creation-time query, and an emptied snapshot was judged exited without any table read: a descendant Orca was refused information about was treated as one that had left. The snapshot now counts the unidentified rows it saw, and verification caps its verdict at unverifiable while any exist. Nothing is ever signalled on a bare pid, as before. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HfdhsvSJucLw4cTZxzg2CP * fix(claude): classify cleanup after a first-hand exit as a root exit instead of a proven tree When the CLI died between a successful acquire and the host's commit or proof of the lease, handleExit had already removed the session, so releaseAcquisition found nothing and reported true. The attach flow then settled exit-proven with deathEvidence claiming cleanup proved no provider child remains, though the tree was never verified. The adapter now keeps the exit that removed a published session until the session is acquired again; acquisition cleanup runs that connection's close ladder and classifies its verdict exactly as a start-time failure would be, so the record reads root-exit-observed. The wire helper keeps that typed classification and its provider diagnostic instead of wrapping it as unproven, and the router gives up its owner even when the release throws. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HfdhsvSJucLw4cTZxzg2CP * fix(claude): integrate SDK teardown and picker lifecycle fixes * fix(claude): preserve resume leaf and settle processless spawns * fix(claude): reacquire from persisted resume leaf * fix(native-chat): restore Claude grouped question handling * fix(claude): persist only resumable transcript leaves * fix(claude): recover structured session exits safely * fix(claude): close remaining structured session P1s * fix(claude): harden transcript branch proof * Remove superseded root fix reports * fix(windows): restore indexed descendant row walk * fix(router): forward force-close lifecycle * fix(claude): fence stale turn cancellations * fix(claude): fence cancellation after unknown dispatch * fix(claude): fence replay and option recovery races * fix(claude): block replay fallback after waiter eviction * fix(claude): fence evicted slash results * fix(claude): fence ambiguous results and restore options safely * fix(claude): scrub SDK child env and localize pending launch * fix(claude): pin transcript roots and exit recovery proofs * fix(claude): retain unproven SDK exits * fix(claude): settle retained exit before reacquire * fix(claude): resume from settled retained cursor * chore: remove tracked review artifact * fix: harden Claude SDK transport session cleanup * fix: close Claude sessions safely * fix(claude): close races with fresh child snapshots * fix(claude): fail closed on recycled child identities * fix(claude): gate root cleanup on process identity * fix(claude): fence same-second root identity reuse * fix(claude): restore the root SIGKILL fallback the identity gate took away The direct root kill goes through the handle Node owns, not through a pid: libuv drops that handle in the same turn it reaps, so the signal either reaches the process Orca spawned or reaches nothing at all. Gating it on a process-table probe therefore bought no safety and cost the tree its only fallback whenever the probe declined -- a first capture landing in the fork's own second, a recycled descendant pid voiding the snapshot, or a process table that could not be read on either platform. Identity verification stays where a bare pid is genuinely addressed: Windows `taskkill /T /F`, and the descendant sweep's own revalidation before it signals. Also stops a declined root probe from collapsing an observed `live` or `exited` descendant verdict into `unverifiable`, and stops a successful taskkill from reporting `unverifiable` because a later probe found the root correctly dead. * docs(claude): rewrap the root-kill ordering comment * Match the Claude structured launch to the terminal path's managed-account auth rules The SDK path stripped ambient Anthropic auth unconditionally, let an explicit agentDefaultEnv override beat a pinned managed account, and had no account-switch guard. Reuse the terminal preflight's own predicate and messages so both transports strip, refuse, and report identically, and cover the CLI transcript location that mobile native chat depends on. * Reach the Claude structured chat lane from the desktop UI The main process has had a complete, correctly gated Claude Agent SDK lane for a while, but no renderer ever asked for it: the launch route accepted only `codex`, and the create path was typed `agent: 'codex'` end to end. Widen both to the structured provider union that already exists (`AgentSessionHandleProvider`), and generalize the codex-named create path instead of adding a Claude twin beside it. The pending-launch registry is now keyed by agent as well as workspace — a shared key handed a second caller the first agent's intent, so a Claude and a Codex launch in one worktree collided. Windows, per agent. Codex's client-side win32 refusal is deliberate and settled elsewhere, so it stays exactly as it was. Claude's answer is no longer guessed from the client's platform: a structured session fences its provider child on that child's process start time, and only the executing host knows whether it can read one. `agentSession.createSupport` already answers precisely that, per agent, and had no renderer caller — so the Claude create path asks it before creating and turns a "no", or a probe it cannot get answered, into the definitive refusal the launch fallback already handles. Fail closed either way. That refusal mapping also closes a real gap: the host reports an unsupported location by throwing `structured_agent_session_unsupported`, which reaches the client as a transport rejection rather than a refusal envelope, so `StructuredAgentSessionCreateRefusalError` never fired. The launch would retry the create, strand itself in `visibilityUnknown`, run no legacy fallback, and show an error toast. Close a fail-open hole while Claude and win32 become reachable: `create` with a client-supplied location, and `ensure`, both skip the worktree-resolving support check. They now ask the executing host the same question directly, so a host that cannot fence a provider child no longer creates one on a client's say-so. Also deletes `structured-agent-session-provider-routing.ts`, a duplicate of `structured-agent-session-provider-support.ts` with no importers. WSL, SSH and paired hosts, floating workspaces, draft prompt delivery, explicit TUI customization and initial session options all keep refusing; folder workspaces keep working. * P1-1: make the structured Claude auth policy required and testable The optional dep plus a {stripAuthEnv:false} fallback meant a dropped wiring under-stripped silently. Required at all three hops, asserted at install time for the @ts-nocheck caller, and the settings-to-policy mapping is now a named tested function. * P2-3: mobile's default Claude transcript root must follow CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR session-file-resolver's default ignored the variable the pinned account home follows, so a CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR launch wrote one tree and mobile read another. The Task-4 test now resolves with no root override (mobile's own call) and checks the answer against the root the CLI itself reports, instead of mirroring the code under test's own expression. * P2-1/P2-2/P3: close the teardown window, join the live-auth gate, align the refusal P2-1: a switch beginning inside the acquire teardown left a dead chat and no replacement. Past that point the launch waits the swap out and refuses only if it never settles; the entry guard still refuses outright, because nothing is torn down there yet. P2-2: structured children now hold the same OAuth-refresh gate a Claude PTY does, so a managed refresh cannot rotate the token out from under a live turn. P3: the refusal now matches the strip it guards (case-folded on win32, presence not truthiness), and the dead structured-to-TUI builder states its auth policy instead of silently signing a system-auth user out. * Make the live-auth gate tests independent of sibling connection teardown order * Do not offer structured Claude under a WSL-only managed account Structured Claude launches against the ambient Claude config, which the account service keeps in sync with the selected HOST account. A WSL-bound managed account lives inside the distro and is never synced there, so on Windows a structured session would authenticate as whatever the ambient identity happens to be while the UI names the WSL account — the user is told one identity and given another. That was unreachable only because nothing offered structured Claude on win32. Enabling it makes it reachable, so gate it here rather than patching the auth layer: refuse the structured path when the active managed Claude account is WSL-bound, and let the terminal-backed path — which resolves the account per runtime — handle that account shape. The answer rides the agentSession.createSupport seam the renderer already consumes, so no new capability and no renderer knowledge of account internals. A create the host declines becomes the definitive refusal the launch fallback already turns into a legacy native chat tab, with no error toast. Unknown answers refuse. An install with no managed accounts claims no identity and is fine, but an active selection that cannot be resolved — or account state that cannot be read at all — is not evidence that the ambient identity is right. Claude only. Codex resolves its account through a different path and its createSupport answer is untouched, as is every Codex routing decision. * Read the structured Claude account gate through the auth policy's accessor The gate resolved the active account from the account-service snapshot's runtime map; the auth policy resolves it with getSelectedClaudeAccountIdForTarget(settings, { runtime: 'host' }). Those are two sources and two resolution rules, and they disagree on a legacy settings blob that carries the selection only in the flat activeClaudeManagedAccountId: the accessor falls through to it, a direct read of the runtime map does not. The gate would then refuse a launch the policy would have run under host-1 — and in the mirror case a session could be admitted under a policy computed from a different account than the gate approved. Read the same settings through the same accessor so agreement is structural rather than coincidental, and drop the controller accessor that existed only to reach the snapshot. No behaviour change for any state both already agreed on; Codex is untouched. * Round-3 review fixes: N-1 empty-value regression, N-2 gate leak window, N-4 lost history N-1: my presence-based conflict predicate refused a terminal launch that works today. 'ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=' is how a user blanks a variable and the settings pipeline preserves that empty value; an empty override cannot beat the pinned account and the strip removes the name anyway. Back to truthiness for the value, keeping the win32 case folding. N-2: enter the live-auth gate only after the exit/close handlers that release it, so no throw in between can leave an entry nothing reconciles. N-4: the Claude transcript resolver searches config-dir-then-default and de-dupes, matching the Codex sibling in the same file, so adopting CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR no longer hides history written before it. * Run the managed-account gate on every Claude acquisition, not just create createSupport gates the create path, but a session's account state can change while it lives. A reacquire after an unexpected child exit re-resolves the launch and re-derives auth, with nothing re-checking the gate — so a session created while supported could come back up in the refused shape. With the strip predicate keyed on there being an active non-WSL account, the WSL-only user's normalized steady state (accounts exist, none active) does not strip, and that reacquire reaches the child with ambient auth while the UI names the account. Gate at resolveLaunch, the one choke point every acquisition passes through, refusing with the pre-spawn error the caller already handles. Same predicate as create-time, now sharing one settings reader so the two cannot drift. Claude only; Codex resolves its account on a different path and is untouched. The runtime class that wires this does not typecheck its own `this` calls — a missing hookup compiles clean — so the wiring is pinned behaviourally rather than trusted to the compiler. * Move the structured Claude gate out of the @ts-nocheck runtime files Both call sites of the managed-account gate sat in files whose first line is `// @ts-nocheck`, so neither was typechecked: three arguments to a one-argument function plus an undeclared identifier compiled clean. New auth-identity decision logic had no compiler behind it. Move the verdict into a checked module that takes the two facts the runtime owns — the adapter's answer and a settings getter — and decides. The runtime class now only forwards. Move the gate reader's construction into the checked installer too, so the nocheck file passes a plain settings closure and never names a gate symbol. Every reference to the gate predicate and its reader now lives in a checked file, so the ablation that used to pass silently is a compile error at both the create-support and reacquire sites. Removing the file-level @ts-nocheck is a separate, larger job and is not attempted here. * Derive the gate test's auth policy from the settings under test A hardcoded stripAuthEnv asserts a gate/policy pairing production cannot produce, and false additionally lets launch.env inherit the runner's real process.env. Derive via claudeStructuredAuthPolicyForSettings instead: the gate settings type is the same Pick the policy takes, and both resolve the account through getSelectedClaudeAccountIdForTarget. * Pin the absent-vs-empty distinction in the managed-account gate An empty claudeManagedAccounts array is a real answer: the user has no managed accounts, nothing claims an identity, and the ambient path is legitimate. A readable settings object with no such field is settings we failed to parse — the same unknown as unreadable — so it refuses. The two are one character apart in the code and the difference is invisible without the reasoning, so record it at the branch and pin both sides. The test fails under the obvious "consistency fix" of treating a missing field as empty. * fix(claude): keep command queue bookkeeping out of the transcript Claude Code 2.1.258 emits a `command_lifecycle` frame for every uuid-stamped command it starts, completes or cancels. The frame carries a command uuid and a state and no content, and the CLI keeps it out of its own transcript -- but it is absent from the SDK's SDKMessage union and so from Orca's frame catalogue, where an uncatalogued kind defaults to a substantive row. Every structured turn therefore painted raw JSON rows into the user-visible transcript. Catalogue it and disposition it as status chrome. The unknown-kind default stays `timeline-substantive`: a kind we have never seen is likelier to carry content than to be chrome, and a visible row we can catalogue later beats content we silently dropped. A lifecycle state that reads as a failure still surfaces, because the payload error check in `classifyProviderFrame` outranks the catalogue. * fix(claude): let a re-walked descendant become eligible for the forced sweep A descendant first observed by a capture inside its own birth second could never be SIGKILLed: `ps lstart` is second-resolution, so that capture cannot rule out a pid recycled later in the same second, and the merge pinned each retained row to the boundary of the walk that first saw it. SIGTERM-resistant children forked in that window were signalled and then never escalated -- they survived close, quit and restart, reparented to init, and had to be killed by hand. Advancing that boundary on any later capture would be unsound: a later capture matching pid, pgid and start-second is exactly what an impostor would also show. But a capture is not a match -- it is a fresh ppid walk from a root Node pins through its own handle, so a row it re-derives is proved ours at that instant without appealing to its start time. Chain the fence from there instead, and take that walk at the close boundary while the root certainly still lives: the root may leave inside the grace window, and the post-timeout refresh never runs. A row absent from the later walk still keeps its earlier boundary, and a row no walk has ever re-derived in a later second is still never escalated. * Treat an absent managed-account list as empty, not as unreadable An empty claudeManagedAccounts array and a missing one are the same answer: this user has no managed Claude accounts, so nothing claims an identity and ambient auth is the truth. Refusing on absence strands any profile that simply never wrote the key, and it disagrees with the auth policy, whose own predicate takes `(accounts ?? [])` for exactly this reason. Only settings that cannot be READ stay unknown, and those still refuse — as do a WSL-bound active account and a selection naming an account the list does not explain. The earlier reasoning treated a missing field as settings we failed to parse. That conflated "not present" with "not readable"; only the second is unknown. * Support structured Claude when accounts are registered but none is selected Registered-but-deselected Claude accounts were refused, which is behaviourally identical to having no accounts at all: the auth policy does not strip, ambient auth is the truth, and the UI names no host identity. A user who deselected their accounts silently got legacy chat with nothing explaining why. Nothing selected for the host runtime is two states the settings cannot tell apart after the fact, because pruneInvalidClaudeRuntimeSelection empties the host slot and persists null in the second one: honest deselection -> ambient auth, UI names nothing -> SUPPORTED the WSL-only steady state -> ambient auth, UI names the WSL account -> REFUSED The presence of any WSL-bound account in the list decides. Simplifying this to "none active -> supported" re-opens the auth-identity misrepresentation, so the tests fail loudly on exactly that: five of them, across the unit rule and the createSupport path. * Stop treating an unanswerable create-support probe as a refusal A worktree is not resolvable for a beat after createWorktree resolves, so a probe fired immediately after creation fails the RPC with selector_not_found instead of answering. The catch collapsed that into `supported = false`, so the composer refused and quietly built a terminal session — the gate never said no, it was never asked successfully. Elapsed time was the only input that decided whether a Claude launch went structured. "Could not answer" and "answered no" are different states and only the second is a verdict. Retry while the host cannot yet resolve the selector, with a bounded backoff that covers the measured window with margin, and keep refusing on the first ask for everything else. Fail-closed is unchanged: a probe that still cannot be answered when the budget is spent refuses. The retry is narrowed with the shared error-code matcher, which classifies a token that transports re-wrap into a longer message without matching prose that merely mentions it. Codex never probes, so this race has never been able to refuse a Codex launch — the race itself is identical for it. Recorded at the early return, because whoever gives Codex a probe inherits the bug. * fix(claude): fence the forced sweep on re-derivation, not on lstart's second A descendant forked in the same wall-clock second as every walk that sees it was signalled with SIGTERM and then never escalated, so a SIGTERM-resistant child survived tab close, app quit and a full relaunch. Two children of one parent 96ms apart across a second boundary took opposite paths. The leak predates this branch: it reproduces with the change reverted. `ps lstart` has one-second resolution, so a walk landing inside a row's birth second can never rule out a pid recycled later in that same second. But a walk is not a match: a ppid walk only reaches what the root actually parents, and the root is pinned by Node's own handle, so a row the walk re-derived is ours whatever second it was born in -- a stranger would have to have been forked into our tree, and then it is not a stranger. Fence the escalation on that. Rows a merge retained from an earlier walk are not re-derived and still answer to the start-time fence, which remains correct for them. Scoped to callers that revalidate identity before signalling, which is the Claude close path. Codex teardown reaches this same verifier and is unchanged; the argument holds there too, but widening it is its own deliberate change. Also reverts two changes from the previous attempt at this leak. Advancing the capture boundary on a later walk is inert once the sweep fences on re-derivation -- both key on the same set of rows, so the new term short-circuits for exactly the rows whose boundary it advanced. The extra ladder refresh was a duplicate full process-table read: close() already awaits tree.refresh() immediately before proveClaudeChildExit, on the only path that reaches it. Known property: the kill lands roughly a grace window after the walk that proved membership, so a pid recycled inside that gap could in principle be signalled. It is bounded -- matchingSnapshotRows already requires the live row to carry the same start-second and pgid, so an impostor must be born in the remainder of that one second, land on that exact pid, and sit in the same process group, and it has already received the unfenced SIGTERM from the same loop. * Run the Claude structured integration suite as a runtime client The suite exercises agentSession.* for Claude, not the mobile surface: nothing in it asserts anything mobile-specific and its sibling integration suites use 'runtime'. Mobile now additionally requires the experimental structured-chat setting, which structured-agent-session.test.ts pins in both states, so the stale 'mobile' fixture was claiming coverage it never had. * fix(claude): report effort from get_settings, which is the only frame that has it The composer's Effort pill rendered blank in every structured session. This is not a missing source: the publication reads `effortLevel` off the `system/init` frame, and that frame has never carried an effort of any kind, while the correct value is already fetched at acquisition and thrown away on the auth diagnostic. Verified two ways -- a live get_settings probe against Claude Code 2.1.258, and the shipped binary's own init frame construction, which lists `model` and no effort. So `reportedOptions.effort` was always empty, the options reader dropped the key, and the pill had no value. Model survived only because `currentModelId()` has a fallback chain. The get_settings call acquisition already makes reports the session's current effort as `effective.effortLevel`; pass that into the publication instead. Selecting an effort already worked, so this is the arrival value only. The legacy PTY path is unaffected and must not be "fixed" to match: it reads its effort by parsing the startup banner (`CLAUDE_MODEL_EFFORT` in src/renderer/src/components/native-chat/claude-terminal-session-options.ts), which is why it shows a value where the structured path does not. Also removes the fixture that hid this: the fake init frame invented `effortLevel: 'high'`, a field the CLI does not send, which is why every gate stayed green over a value that is always empty in production. The fixture's get_settings now returns the real {applied, effective, sources} shape instead of a bare `{env: {}}`, so the two adapter tests that asserted an effort keep asserting it through the path production actually uses. The reader returns null rather than defaulting: an effort nothing measured would repeat the fixture's mistake, and a blank pill is the honest degradation if the provider ever renames the key. * fix(claude): only record an effort the child confirms it adopted apply_flag_settings answers `success` for an effort it then ignores. Measured against Claude Code 2.1.258: applying `bogus-effort-xyz` returns subtype "success" with no error while `applied.effort` stays at its previous value, and a valid `low` moves it. The option write treated the absence of a throw as adoption and recorded the requested value unconditionally, so Orca would show and persist an effort the child was not using, with nothing anywhere reporting a problem. Read the effort back after applying it, through the same reader the arrival value uses, and reject when the child reports a different one. A readback that could not be taken is not evidence of a refusal -- the apply itself succeeded -- so it still records; only a readback that disagrees rejects. Not reachable from today's picker, which offers catalog values only, but the CLI's effort catalog is server-delivered and has changed before, so a retired id would otherwise become a pill confidently displaying a setting that never took. * test(claude): assert the effort contract against the real binary The blank pill survived every gate because the only tests that touched it were fixture-backed, and the fixture invented the field. A test that pins the shape we read cannot catch the provider renaming the key, which is the failure mode that produced this defect. Asserts both halves against a live authenticated CLI: that no frame it publishes carries an effort at all, and that the session's current effort arrives through get_settings. Which frame proves the session varies by host -- this machine proves it with a SessionStart hook rather than a system/init frame -- so the negative half asserts over every published frame rather than picking one. Skips with the rest of the file when no authenticated CLI is present. * fix(claude): stop the synthesised content-part kinds leaking into the transcript Sending an image put a bare `claude · message:user:content:image` row between the user's bubble and the answer. Two causes, and only the second is a family. An image part counted as modelled only when `source.type === 'url'`, but claudeDispatchMessageContent sends a local attachment as a base64 source and the CLI replays that shape back, so every attached image was classified unmodelled. Accept the base64 and file sources Orca itself sends. The family is the real defect. `message:<role>:content:<type>` kinds are synthesised at runtime from whatever `part.type` arrives, so unlike the top-level frame catalogue they can never be enumerated ahead of time -- the `?? 'timeline-substantive'` default then prints the synthesised name at a user who cannot act on it. That default is right for top-level frames, where "substantive" means show the frame; here it meant show our own vocabulary, which drops the content AND leaks the opcode. So an unrenderable part now renders a sentence saying exactly that, with the kind and payload still on the row's disclosure. A part that carries its own readable sentence keeps it -- the placeholder is a fallback, not an override. An unknown future part type is therefore visible, never silently dropped and never printed as a kind: the same principle as the effort readback, which records only what the provider confirms. * Declare agentSession.requestHandoff on the cross-version wire surface The manifest is a ratchet for cross-version reachability, so the method is declared with real HandoffParams rather than counted. requestHandoff is capability-gated through requireStructuredHost and has no client caller, so declaring it is the whole of the change. Also model two host capabilities the harness omitted: the stub host's supportsCreate, and the fake adapter's, without which adapterSupportsCreate falls through to a supportsLocation the fake also lacks. Every ensure was refused for the harness's silence rather than for its location. * Gate structured Claude session tabs on the client capability that names them The Claude structured lane deleted the projection's `agent !== 'codex'` filter and added CLAUDE_STRUCTURED_AGENT_SESSION_RUNTIME_CAPABILITY in the same commit, but never wired the constant to anything. Paired clients then received agent-session tabs for Claude, which no shipped client renders -- mobile's resolveMobileNativeChat returns null for every agent but codex, so the row listed and selected into a pane with neither chat nor terminal. Restore the filter behind the declared capability instead of the bare agent name. No client advertises it yet, so this matches main's behaviour today and becomes a negotiation a future client can opt into. * Confirm the structured Claude model against the model the CLI reports set_model answers success for any string, including a model it cannot resolve — the failure only surfaces when the turn runs — and get_settings reports the settings-file model, not the session's. The init frame that opens each turn is the only channel carrying the adopted model, so keep the session's reported model current from it instead of reading it once at acquisition. Also stop rejecting an effort the readback cannot represent: max is session-scoped and excluded from the persisted effortLevel, so a readback reporting the level underneath it is an absence of evidence, not a refusal. * Clear the session-option hedge when the provider confirms the value The pill claimed every option was unconfirmed for the life of the session: the renderer recorded each write as dispatched and nothing ever moved it, so a model the CLI had already reported back still read as unconfirmed. Carry the provider's own confirmation to the surface. Main reports which option ids the provider named rather than merely accepted, and the client re-reads options as a turn changes, because the frame that opens a turn is where the adopted model arrives. A value the provider has not reported stays hedged, including an effort whose readback could not be taken. The confirmed list is optional on the wire: a host that predates it sends nothing and the client keeps hedging, which is the behaviour it had. * Keep the model report current across an acquisition fence bump * Show the picked session-option value and let the provider report correct it The pill showed a "not confirmed" second tooltip line for any value we had sent but not yet seen reported back. Nothing acts on it, and for the PTY lane it was permanent — that transport has no report channel. The pill now shows the picked value immediately and the provider's per-turn report corrects it when the two disagree; a newer local write still outranks a report that precedes it. `dispatched` stays as a provenance member rather than collapsing into `applied`: it is produced independently by the PTY lane, and it is where the `confirmed` wire field lands, which would otherwise be unobservable. Effort keeps its readback and its rejection path. That matters more now, not less: with the hedge gone the rejection is the only user-visible failure signal on this surface, so a spurious one would be the loudest bug here. Skipping the readback for an effort the settings response structurally cannot echo is what prevents it — the response carries the persisted level, so reading it back for a session-scoped value would report the level underneath and fail a valid write. * Hedge a session-option value only when the terminal transport sent it Both lanes emit `dispatched`, so it could never say which one produced a value. The descriptor now carries the transport that built it, set once in the shared snapshot builder from a parameter that is required rather than defaulted — the builder is the only place a descriptor is constructed, so a new producer has to name its lane or fail to compile. The structured lane confirms every value from the provider's own per-turn report, which makes the hedge transient noise there. The terminal lane can only learn an outcome by parsing the screen back, and only for Claude: every other agent's `dispatched` value stays unconfirmed for the life of the session, so the line is the only signal that we sent something we never saw land. * Refuse an effort the session's model advertises no control for * Refuse tab mutations on a Claude row the client never negotiated The branch added a case asserting a client advertising only agent-session.structured.v1 may mutate a claude row. That is the same ungated behaviour the projection gate removes, encoded a second time — mutation authorization reads the projection, so hiding the row refuses the write. Assert that contract instead, and add the positive case for a client that does negotiate Claude rows. * Resolve the Claude session's current model in one place so the effort guard and the pill agree * Record an effort the child did not adopt instead of refusing the write apply_flag_settings answers success for an effort it then ignores, so the readback exists to detect that. Refusing on it made the detection a veto, and a veto is only correct if the readback can never be wrong about which model is current -- which it was, twice. The pre-flight guard already refuses a level the model advertises no control for, so the veto guarded a door that is now locked upstream. Keep the detection, drop the refusal: a disagreement records the child's own answer and omits the option from confirmed, so main stops vouching for a value the provider rejected without blocking the user's write. * Stop a slow whole-machine ps from being read as an absent process `ps -axo ...command=` pays a per-pid argv read: measured 1.15s for 1,948 processes (0.03s without `command=`), and CPU contention stretched the same capture to 6.0s. Two budgets sized for a cheap look then misreport a readable machine. The reader's 3s ceiling killed 6 of 20 consecutive captures at load 27, so every consumer answered "unverifiable" about a table it could read. Raise it to 15s, and stamp the capture instant at ps START so `capturedAgeMs` is the upper bound its contract promises -- a 6s capture used to report itself as freshly taken, understating staleness against a 5s kill gate. The TTL keys on completion so a slow capture still coalesces instead of forking ps per caller. `readStructuredTuiProcessIdentity` then spent its whole 5s wait inside one capture and concluded "no exact child" after a single look taken before the child existed (observed landing at ~3.5s). Absence needs a look that did not race the spawn, so require two captures before the deadline can end the loop. Both surfaced by the real-binary Claude TUI resume test, which failed ~1 in 5 under load; 14/14 now, 8 of those runs containing a capture the old 3s budget would have killed. * Let the desktop renderer negotiate Claude structured tabs The paired-client gate hides agent-session rows an agent the client cannot render. The desktop renderer's own IPC dispatches as clientKind 'runtime' advertising only agent-session.structured.v1, so the gate hid Claude rows from the surface this feature ships on. It renders them; it should say so. * Stop a slow process table from silently blinding every freshness gate Stamping `capturedAgeMs` at ps START made the number honest, and honest broke both consumers that read it. `ps -axo ...command=` measured 2.5-9.0s on an idle 2,002-process laptop and 4.0-18.6s at load 46, so the age it now reports lands past every budget: `planRelayPtySweep` refuses the stop as "too old", and the renderer's `admitRemoteForegroundEvidence` refuses the record outright. That second one is the expensive half and was outside the diff -- a refusal bumps `consecutiveInspectionErrors`, the poll scheduler backs off to its 10s floor, and agent-completion detection stops for the pane. The subsystem went blind on exactly the loaded hosts the honest stamp was meant to serve. The evidence-publishing read now gives up at 1,200ms instead of waiting out `PS_TIMEOUT_MS`. It is one budget for one question: these consumers ask whether an observation describes NOW, and past this it does not -- a late answer is refused by the age gate anyway, having first blocked a polled path for the whole capture, so a prompt `unverifiable` is both the truthful verdict and the cheap one. Both relay call sites already produce it from a rejection, and an admitted `unverifiable` costs a poll where a refusal costs the cadence. Identity proof keeps the full 15s through `getFreshProcessTableSnapshot`, because it asks whether a process EXISTS and must never read slow as absent. The budget bounds the wait, never the capture: the reader coalesces, so an abandoned wait leaves its capture running to fill the cache rather than forking a second whole-machine `ps` on the host that can least afford one. 1,200ms is bracketed rather than picked. The floor is the capture's own cost -- `command=` measured 1.15s for 1,948 processes on an idle host, and a budget under that answers `unverifiable` about a machine nobody is straining. The ceiling is the consumer's: 2,000ms, less the 500ms a TTL-shared capture may already have aged, leaves 1,500ms, and transit takes the rest. That ceiling only fits once the capture stops being charged twice. `ps` runs inside the RPC round trip, so its duration is already in `receiveDelay`, and `capturedAgeMs` is that same duration on the host's clock; summing them halved the budget this gate grants a host from ~2.0s of `ps` to ~1.0s, which is why a 1.2s capture arriving at 1.3s read as 2.5s old and was refused. Admission now takes the larger of the two. The sweep's gate keeps its sum, which is correct there: `evidenceAgeSinceListingMs` is stamped after the listing ARRIVES, so it measures planning time and overlaps nothing. A stated limit rather than an assumed one: 15s is not proven sufficient for identity proof. The same capture reached 18.6s at load 46, so that path can still time out and answer "no exact child" about a host it simply could not read in time. Narrowing it needs a cheaper question than a whole-machine argv read, not a larger number. The one test guarding this field could not fail. `beginPtyHandlerTest` installs fake timers, so `Date.now()` is frozen, the real reader reports exactly +0, and `0 <= 500` held identically for a hardcoded zero, for completion-stamping and for start-stamping -- while the real reader on that host returns thousands of ms. It now drives a measured age in and asserts the handler publishes it rather than restamping; that the reader MEASURES it correctly stays pinned separately, against a controllable clock. Both consumers get boundary coverage either side, and each new gate was ablated red before it went green. * Keep the compatibility fields off the capture the budget just abandoned inspectProcess falls back to processHasChildren and listProcesses to getForegroundProcessName, and both read the same TTL-shared capture with no budget of their own. On a slow host they joined the in-flight capture the budgeted evidence read had just given up on, so the call still blocked for the full 6-18s and the budget bought nothing -- once for inspectProcess and once per managed PTY for listProcesses. Use the degraded answers those helpers already give for an unreadable table, reached promptly. pty.hasChildProcesses keeps its unbudgeted fresh probe: it is a one-shot destructive gate that can afford to wait. --------- Co-authored-by: Merge Sim <merge-sim@local> Co-authored-by: Merge Sim <sim@local>	2026-09-04 15:55:20 -07:00
Jinwoo Hong	aa78d4af17	fix(release): restore version and harden staging confirmation ... Resolves release scan blockers STA-6611 and STA-6612.	2026-09-03 16:53:32 -04:00
Jinwoo Hong	3eec77c11a	chore(cloud): add the relay fence broker, ops console, Terraform root, scripts, and 24 cloud-* workflows (#18413) ... Phase 6 of the relay split: the relay's deploy/operate surface moves under cloud/ with 24 cloud-* workflows gated on ORCA_CLOUD_OPERATIONS_ENABLED, the Cloud SQL rollout lease action, the relay Terraform root (dual-accept identities for both repositories), scripts, docs, CODEOWNERS, and a terraform validate job in Cloud Verify.	2026-09-03 06:55:14 -04:00
Neil	968dbd905f	perf(renderer): take the English catalog and the xterm WebGL addon off the boot graph (#18326) ... * perf(renderer): take the English catalog, xterm WebGL addon and emoji data off the boot graph The renderer's boot graph — the entry chunk plus its 331 modulepreload links, all fetched and evaluated before first paint — carried three payloads nothing needs at that moment. `en.json` (644 KB) was an eager i18next resource, but every renderer string goes through `translate(key, fallback)` and `en` resolves that inline default, so most of the catalog was dead weight. The renderer now bundles a generated `en-runtime-required.json` holding only the 2,583 of 13,828 entries a default cannot reproduce: plural-suffixed keys, keys whose catalog value differs from a call site's default, and keys no call site references with a literal default. `en.json` stays the translator source and the input to the four lazy catalogs. `@xterm/addon-webgl` (243.6 KB) and `emojibase-data` (170 KB) are now primed right after the React root renders instead of statically imported. The load stays eager and `attachWebgl` stays synchronous — it reads the resolved constructor — so no terminal ever falls back to the DOM renderer for a frame. `isPluginPanelTabKey`/`isQualifiedPluginKey` move to schema-free sibling modules, re-exported from `plugin-manifest.ts`. This evicts the plugin manifest schema graph from the boot chunk but measures ~0 KB, because six other shared modules still put zod on the boot path. Boot graph: 332 chunks / 5107.2 KB -> 336 chunks / 4161.5 KB (-945.7 KB, -18.5%). A new ratchet parses the built index.html and fails if `en.json`, `@xterm/addon-webgl` or `emojibase-data` is preloaded again; it runs at the end of every `build:electron-vite`. * chore(i18n): pin the generated English subset to LF and mark it generated * fix(i18n): make the runtime-catalog gate merge-robust and prime emoji data in tests CI builds the merge of a PR with main, so a byte-for-byte comparison against a committed generated file fails the moment any unrelated PR adds a translate() call — which is what happened here. The check now asserts the property that actually matters instead of byte equality: every runtime-required entry is shipped, and nothing shipped disagrees with en.json. Entries that stopped being required are dead weight, never a wrong string, so they are reported and tolerated. Failures now name the offending keys rather than saying "stale". The generator itself was already deterministic (plain code-unit sort, no locale collation, order-independent set construction); a test now pins that a reversed call-site walk produces byte-identical output. Test fixes for the catalog prune and the deferred emoji load: - browser-search / NativeChatSupportedAgents asserted key presence on the renderer's runtime resource. The durable contract is en.json — the renderer deliberately no longer bundles entries a call site default reproduces — so they assert against the translator catalog. - Four emoji tests typed a shortcode in the same tick as mount, before the catalog the hook primes on mount resolves. Not reachable by a human; the tests now await the prime. * revert(renderer): keep the emoji shortcode catalog statically imported Deferring emojibase-data introduced a window that did not exist before: until the dynamic import settled, getPrimedEmojiShortcodeEntries returned [], so exactShortcodeIndex built an empty map and replaceCompletedWorkspaceEmojiShortcode returned null — leaving a typed `:wink:` in the field literally, and persisting it as the workspace display name. Pre-change the shared catalog was statically imported, so the first call at any tick returned full data. The window is reachable by anything that dispatches input in the same task as the field's mount effect — Playwright/CDP in the e2e suite and agent automation both do, and the WorktreeMetaDialog test failure was exactly that, producing 'Feature 😉' instead of 'Feature 😉'. Nothing that resolves a shortcode can be async without that race, and a wrong persisted name is not an acceptable trade for 166.7 KB, so the deferral is reverted rather than papered over in the tests. The boot-graph ratchet drops its emojibase-data probe and records why. Boot graph: 5108.9 KB -> 4329.9 KB (-779.0 KB, -15.2%), down from -945.7 KB. * fix(terminal): make the deferred WebGL addon load recoverable and refit on late attach Two defects the deferral introduced, neither possible with a static import. A failed load latched the DOM renderer for the whole session. `.then(onOk, onError)` settles fulfilled, so the memoized promise was cached forever with a null constructor: attachWebgl's re-prime got the cached promise back, and resetTerminalWebglSuggestion — the documented "GPU setting changed, retry" path — could not clear it either. The rejection path now clears the memo, latches the queued panes the way a failed construction does so they retry at a recovery boundary rather than every frame, and caps attempts so a genuinely missing chunk is not re-fetched forever. The recovery boundary re-arms it. The queued-attach drain skipped the refit. Every other late-attach path pairs attach with a refit because the grid was measured under DOM cell metrics and WebGL floors the device cell width. Post-deferral, openTerminal's attachWebgl queued and returned, the initial fit rAF then measured DOM metrics and sized the PTY from them, and the addon attached with no refit — a persistently narrow PTY and an unpainted right gutter, not a one-frame flicker. Both paths now go through one attachWebglAndRefit pairing so they cannot diverge again. Regression tests cover both, and each was verified to fail without its fix. The addon-load state machine moves to terminal-webgl-addon-loader.ts and the viewport presentation helpers to pane-viewport-present.ts, keeping pane-webgl-renderer.ts under the 300-line budget without a suppression.	2026-09-03 00:26:30 -07:00
Neil	f37d2fec97	fix(linux): land the reviewed Linux packaging stack on main (#18100) ... * fix(linux): give the CLI one entrypoint by extracting the AppImage once * refactor(linux): trim AppImage CLI registration seams * test(cli): assert registration lock serialization * fix(linux): fence AppImage terminal shim mounts * fix(linux): accept extracted AppImage runtimes with APPDIR only * docs(linux): make headless AppImage extraction runnable * refactor(linux): import bundled launcher directly * fix(linux): reclaim superseded AppImage payloads and packaged symlinks Pruning removed 3215 of 3216 files from a superseded generation and always stranded resources/app.asar, leaking ~105 MB per version update. Electron's asar shim reports a *.asar file as a directory, so the recursive remove tried to rmdir a real file and failed with ENOTEMPTY; the .catch(() => {}) hid it. Reproduced end to end on Ubuntu 24.04: 519M -> 623M across one update, and 519M again once the payload is actually reclaimed. removeExtractedAppImagePayload holds process.noAsar for the removal, counted so overlapping removals cannot hand the shim back early, and the prune site now warns with the path instead of swallowing the rejection. All three removal sites use it -- staging cleanup and displaced roots leaked the same way. Also reclaim symlinks left by a packaged deb/rpm install, which the extracted-cache-only rule turned into a hard conflict on a deb -> AppImage migration, and name the remedy in the conflict error. * fix(linux): bound the CLI registration lock wait `retries: 1000` caps the attempt count, not elapsed time, so at up to 1s per attempt an IPC-driven registration could hang ~16 minutes against a wedged holder with no feedback. A legitimate holder is bounded by the extraction timeout, so wait that plus slack and then fail with a message naming the lock file, rather than hanging. `maxRetryTime` is forwarded verbatim to the `retry` package by proper-lockfile. * fix(linux): stop re-extracting the AppImage on inode metadata churn The extracted-payload cache key hashed ctime alongside dev/ino/size/mtime. ctime moves on any inode metadata write -- `chmod +x`, which every AppImage user is told to run, plus `chown`, an ACL or SELinux relabel, and a backup restore -- none of which alter a byte of the payload. Measured on Ubuntu 24.04: `chmod +x` leaves dev, ino, size and mtime identical and moves ctime alone, so the key changed and the next launch paid a full ~519 MB re-extraction and a multi-second stall to rebuild a payload it already had, then pruned the old generation. Key on content identity instead. An in-place content change moves mtime and almost always size; a replacement moves the inode. The existing replace-in-place test still passes. * fix(linux): stop CLI commands from falling through to Chromium startup * refactor(cli): remove redundant command membership check * test(cli): cover command-named project selectors * fix(cli): redirect the open-url command before startup * test(linux): cover AUR serve wrapper flags * fix(linux): tighten CLI launch detection * fix(linux): respect CLI flag value boundaries * fix(linux): strip injected Chromium switches from CLI args * fix(linux): report a missing display instead of dying in uv_close * refactor(linux): read display locks without a preflight race * fix(linux): preserve unverified external displays * chore: format reliability gate manifest * test(packaging): split runtime resource checks * fix(linux): fail serve when no display is available * fix(linux): do not treat a lockless X socket as a dead display An X server writes its lock beside its socket and both survive a crash (verified against Xvfb under SIGKILL), so a socket with no lock was never left by a crashed server. It is an endpoint published from elsewhere: a container bind-mounting only /tmp/.X11-unix, WSLg, or a foreign PID namespace. Declaring those dead made the desktop gate exit(1) on displays that work, with no workaround, and the serve gate refuse to start. Liveness now splits by ownership. A foreign DISPLAY trusts a lockless socket; Orca's own :99 does not, because removeStaleDisplayArtifacts unlinks the lock before the socket and so manufactures that state itself -- adopting it would resurrect the orphan-socket bug and stop the cleanup from self-healing. The stale-lock rejection is unchanged. Also correct four doc statements this behaviour falsified. * fix(linux): fail closed when a stale socket blocks the Xvfb rebind Readiness only checked that /tmp/.X11-unix/X99 exists. A stale socket we could not unlink still exists after our own Xvfb refused to bind, so Orca set DISPLAY to a dead server and Chromium died in Ozone init. Measured on Ubuntu 24.04 against the pre-fix build: with a leftover :99 socket and no lock, serve exits 139 (SIGSEGV), the socket inode is unchanged before and after, and no lock is recreated -- it neither cleaned up nor respawned. To a user that is a crash, not a misconfiguration. This is reachable in the documented topology, where orca-xvfb.service has no User= and runs as root while serve runs as User=orca: /tmp is sticky, so the orca uid cannot unlink a root-owned socket, rmSync fails, and Xvfb exits with the display already active. Readiness now requires the display to actually be live -- our socket plus a lock naming a running process -- so the same state reports an unusable display and exits 1 with the existing diagnosis. * fix(linux): recognise abstract X sockets and inherited Wayland fds Two display setups this gate could not prove were refused outright, and on the desktop path that is app.exit(1) with no workaround. An X server may bind only the abstract namespace (`@/tmp/.X11-unix/X0`), which leaves no filesystem socket to stat. Abstract addresses are kernel-owned and vanish the moment the owner exits, so an entry in /proc/net/unix is proof of a live server -- no lock file needed and no stale entry possible. Verified on Ubuntu 24.04, where 139 such addresses were present. WAYLAND_SOCKET is an already-connected fd handed over by the compositor, so there is no path to stat and WAYLAND_DISPLAY may be unset entirely. Its presence is the display. Both are consulted only after the filesystem-socket check fails, so no existing verdict changes. * fix(linux): never treat Orca's own display number as a foreign endpoint Recognising a lockless X socket as live is correct for an endpoint published from elsewhere -- a container bind mount, WSLg -- because an X server writes its lock beside its socket and both survive a crash. It is wrong for VIRTUAL_DISPLAY_NUMBER, because Orca's own teardown unlinks the lock before the socket and so manufactures that exact state. The managed branch was already strict, but a caller that sets DISPLAY=:99 explicitly takes the foreign path and skipped it, accepting a dead display left by Orca's own interrupted cleanup. Route the managed number through the strict probe on both paths. Found by an adversarial audit of the asymmetry introduced earlier in this branch; the documented systemd topology is unaffected because its Xvfb writes a real lock. * test(linux): add a packaged-artifact contract for the CLI launch paths * test(linux): avoid buffered serve readiness detection * test(linux): signal AppImage serve owner directly * test(linux): tolerate readiness timeout boundary * test(linux): add startup margin to shutdown oracle * ci(linux): give package contracts timeout headroom * fix(ci): route all Linux packaging contract changes * test(linux): poll shutdown readiness without tail leaks * test(linux): bound shutdown cleanup grace * test(linux): assert on CLI output, not the harness's own control lines run-cli-case.sh echoes `RESULT status=N case=<name>`, and the two cases named *-skills asserted `expectOutput: 'skills'`. That substring was satisfied by the case name in the harness's own line, so 2 of 8 cases asserted nothing about the command -- gutting `skills` entirely would still have gone green. Control lines are now excluded before matching, and both cases assert the rendered help header, which only real help output produces. Verified on an Ubuntu 24.04 host: 8/8 still pass against a stack-tip AppImage. Also register the gate in reliability-gates.jsonc, which #15085 added a CI Docker gate without. Red/green is recorded from a stock release AppImage failing 4 of 8, three of them at status 133 (SIGTRAP). * fix(linux): require static AppImage runtimes (#17319) * test(linux): reject a wrong-architecture native binary at packaging time Cross-building the arm64 slice on an x64 host silently packed an x86-64 `pty.node` -- the rebuild logged "Forcing native rebuild for linux-arm64" and shipped the host's binary anyway. Every gate here inspects symbol versions, which are perfectly valid on the wrong architecture, so nothing noticed. Observed on a Raspberry Pi 5: the packaged app loaded, then failed with "Failed to load native module: pty.node", and the launch contract reported 3 of 8 cases crashed rather than naming the cause. Swapping in the aarch64 `pty.node` took the same build to 8/8. Compare ELF `e_machine` against the slice being packaged and fail with the offending path. Checked before the glibc pass, because a wrong-architecture binary's symbol versions are valid but meaningless and would send the reader down the wrong path. Release CI builds arm64 on a native runner, so this guards local and future cross-builds rather than a shipped artifact. * test(linux): judge per-arch vendored binaries against their own path The first CI run of the architecture gate failed the x64 package job on `@parcel/watcher-linux-arm64-glibc/watcher.node`. That binary is arm64 on purpose: the package ships every architecture and its loader picks the match, so its presence in an x64 build is correct. Judge a binary against the architecture its own path names, falling back to the slice when the path names none. That keeps the case this gate exists for -- `bin/linux-arm64-*/node-pty.node` holding an x86-64 binary, which is what shipped to a Raspberry Pi 5 -- while letting multi-arch dependencies through. Dry-run over the real dependency tree flags nothing for either target arch. * fix(linux): move deb/rpm update installation outside Orca (#17318) * fix(linux): complete deb/rpm package metadata * fix(linux): preserve CLI link during package upgrades * docs(linux): document local RPM build prerequisites * fix(linux): move deb/rpm update installation outside Orca * fix(updater): preserve Linux recovery across stale events * fix(updater): fence stale downloaded events by active target * fix(updater): preserve active Linux package recovery * test(linux): keep workflow order assertion in scope * test(updater): assert stale recovery stays silent * fix(updater): preserve Linux package recovery after checks * refactor(updater): keep Linux marker message with status * fix(linux): describe the right manual update path for deb/rpm hosts A remote host installed from .deb or .rpm now reports manual-service-update-required, and the guidance told the operator to "update through the service manager that starts this server" -- which is correct for unsupported-headless-serve but wrong for a package install, where nothing about the remedy involves the service manager. Say both, keyed on how the host was installed. * docs(linux): document orcad update restart safety * docs(linux): scope restart census omissions * docs(linux): use absolute service CLI launcher * fix(serve): validate in-process serve options before startup (#17683) * fix(linux): stop offering updates a distro-managed install cannot apply (#17918) Closes #17702. The resources/package-type marker is authoritative but never checked against the host, so any repackager that unpacks Orca's .deb -- AUR, Nix, a container rebuild -- inherits `deb` verbatim. Install feasibility was then computed after a ~165 MB download, so those users got check -> download -> a card promising an install command -> a dead end. Validate the marker against the host: a deb/rpm marker with no matching package manager in the trusted directories means a package manager owns this install. This reuses the exact lists and resolver that buildLinuxPackageInstallCommand already loops over, so a false positive is impossible by construction -- any host flagged here would have failed with no-package-manager after the download anyway. The gate only moves that verdict earlier. Verified across Debian 12, Ubuntu 24.04, Arch, Fedora 40 and openSUSE Leap: no false positive on a real deb host, correct on every repackaging host. The release is still reported, because the user does want to know 1.4.194 exists and to update through their distro; only the download path is closed. `externallyManaged` is an additive optional field on the existing `available` status, so older paired clients decode it unchanged. downloadUpdate() refuses authoritatively, since main owns this verdict rather than the card, and unwinds any pinned-build state first -- a Linux pinned jump resolves to 'release', and stranding isPinnedBuildActive would silently kill every background check for the rest of the process. Note the fix the issue suggests cannot work: electron-updater builds a PacmanUpdater whose doDownloadUpdate looks for a .pacman asset Orca does not publish, then dereferences undefined. * style(cli): restore prettier wrapping on install error copy * test(linux): re-pin the child-process ratchets and the batch-shim allowlist after the merge	2026-09-02 03:08:01 -07:00
Neil	b94a65a4fc	fix(lint): preserve TaskPage effect suppressions after split ... (cherry picked from commit 4a3bc23670)	2026-09-01 00:06:23 -07:00
Neil	2e30187560	feat(dev): sweep the backlog of idle dev Electron bundles (#17803) ... * fix(dev): make reclaim report real sizes on Windows and keep setuid intact Two bugs found by running the reclaim script on real Linux and Windows hosts. The size report shelled out to `du`, which does not exist on Windows, so every worktree measured 0 bytes and the script reported nothing reclaimable on the platform with the largest dist (374MB). Walk the tree in Node instead. makeTreeReadOnly chmod'd files to a flat 0o555, which clears setuid. On Linux that would silently strip the bit from chrome-sandbox if a developer had run the usual `sudo chown root && chmod 4755` workaround -- and under hardlink sharing it would strip it from every worktree and the cache at once. Clear the write bits and nothing else. Measured after the fix: 7.30 GiB across 23 worktrees on one Windows host and 18.31 GiB across 56 on another, both previously reported as 0. * feat(dev): sweep the backlog of idle dev Electron bundles out/electron-dev holds one ~275MB patched Electron.app per branch title x Electron version. The dev runner already prunes them, but only inside the worktree it is starting and only when that worktree holds more than one bundle -- and a worktree almost always holds exactly one, so the sweep returns early every time and nothing ever reclaims another worktree's bundle. pnpm reclaim:dev-bundles sweeps across every worktree of the repo. Bundles are pure build output that pnpm dev rebuilds on demand, and rebuilding is cheap now that the Electron dist is shared. Reuses the runner's own staleness rules, so a bundle a live process is running from, or one whose build is still in flight, is never removed. Refuses to run at all if the process table cannot be read, rather than guessing. Measured: 120 bundles, 32.2 GiB, on one machine. Also guards both reclaim scripts behind a direct-invocation check; importing one for tests previously ran a full sweep at import time.	2026-08-31 22:18:50 -07:00
Neil	fe0f2f9be7	perf(dev): share one Electron dist per repo instead of per worktree (#17664) ... * perf(dev): clone one Electron dist per repo instead of per worktree Every worktree extracted its own ~295MB node_modules/electron/dist, measured at 69GB across 241 worktrees on one machine. Extract once per repository into <git-common-dir>/orca-cache/electron, then APFS-clone it into each worktree: copy-on-write, so the second worktree allocates ~0 bytes and still gets a real, private, writable directory. Hangs off install-electron-package-binary.mjs, inside the transaction it already uses to swap dist. Every cache path returns a boolean and false means "install normally", so non-APFS, cross-volume, corrupt entry, no Git, folder workspace and CI all keep today's behavior. No symlinks, no lifecycle changes. out/electron-dev's per-branch Electron.app copy clones too, via the same helper. Refs #13709 * perf(dev): share the Electron dist on Linux and Windows too Extends the shared dist cache beyond macOS APFS. Three mechanisms, strongest isolation first: macOS APFS cp -c private copy-on-write Linux btrfs cp --reflink private copy-on-write ext4 / NTFS hardlink + 0555 shared inodes, forced read-only Reflinks cover btrfs/XFS/bcachefs/ZFS but not ext4, and Windows block cloning is ReFS-only, so most Linux and effectively all Windows developers need hardlinks to get any saving at all. Extracted dist is 327MB on linux-x64 and 374MB on win32-x64, both larger than macOS. Hardlinks share inodes, so a write through one worktree would rewrite every sibling and the cache. Nothing in this repo writes inside dist -- every mutation replaces the directory via rename -- but Electron's own install.js extracts over an existing dist with O_TRUNC, and is reachable through `pnpm rebuild electron`. Publishing the entry read-only turns that from silent cross-worktree corruption into EPERM. Directories stay writable so the install transaction's renames and unlinks still work. out/electron-dev's per-branch Electron.app is patched and codesigned after it is copied, so it uses copyPrivateTree, which never hardlinks. Refs #13709 * test(dev): keep shared-dist tests honest across ext4 and NTFS Verified on real hardware: Ubuntu 24.04/ext4 (no reflink support, so the hardlink tier is the only thing that helps there) and Windows/NTFS. Three tests faked platform: 'darwin' while invoking the real mechanism, so they failed on Linux where /bin/cp -c does not exist. Mechanism selection is now asserted with injected stubs; real filesystem behavior is asserted against whatever the host actually supports. Windows maps chmod onto the read-only attribute alone, so a directory never reports 0o755 and a read-only file reports 0o444. Mode-bit assertions that encoded POSIX semantics are now behavioral (the tree stays removable), and the executable-bit assertion is POSIX-only -- confirmed on NTFS that a read-only hardlinked .exe still runs. * fix(dev): stop a losing publisher from discarding a good cache entry Greptile caught a TOCTOU in the shared Electron dist cache. Quarantining an invalid entry happened before sharing the replacement tree, which takes seconds -- long enough for a sibling worktree to publish a good entry that this one would then rename away. If the follow-up publish also failed, the cache was left empty and every worktree re-downloaded. Stage first, then re-validate immediately before the destructive rename, so an entry that became good during the share is kept. On a failed swap, restore the quarantined entry instead of leaving no entry at all: a stale entry still beats an empty cache, because the next publisher re-validates and replaces it. An entry that cannot be validated is never displaced, matching the pre-staging rule. Also covers the Electron upgrade path end to end: a version bump gets its own cache entry and leaves the previous one for worktrees still on the old branch. * feat(dev): add a script to share existing worktrees' Electron dists An install only shares when Electron is (re)installed, and rebuild-native-deps returns early when the package is already usable -- so a worktree that already has a working dist never reaches the sharing path and keeps its own copy until the next Electron upgrade. pnpm reclaim:electron-dists reports what it would share; --apply does it. Each worktree is converted behind a rename, so an interrupted run leaves a working dist either way, and any worktree that fails is left untouched. Measured on one machine: 677 worktrees, ~195 GiB reclaimable. * fix(dev): keep the reclaim script's error formatting type-safe	2026-08-31 20:35:54 -07:00
Neil	a5796ec8eb	refactor(runtime): split OrcaRuntimeService and compatibility tests (#17605) ... * refactor(runtime): split OrcaRuntimeService into focused modules * test(runtime): cover admission tiers and strict worktree reconciliation * fix(runtime): preserve owner and structured session visibility * fix(runtime): port post-extraction compatibility fixes * fix(runtime): preserve skill-share cancellation barrier * test(runtime): update identity inventory after extraction * fix(runtime): preserve hook transport environment cleanup * fix(runtime): consolidate idle probe imports * test(runtime): retire split file process allowlist entry * fix(runtime): route child process types through shared boundary * test(runtime): preserve worktree host metadata precedence * fix(runtime): update extracted test seams * fix(runtime): gate the split's ts-nocheck set and restore the stop-confirmed contract Audit follow-ups for the OrcaRuntimeService split: - Freeze the 171 @ts-nocheck files behind a ratchet so no new file can disable type checking. The split's linear mixin chain cannot express forward references yet, so the existing suppressions are grandfathered; the baseline may only shrink. - Drop the stray @ts-nocheck at the end of orca-runtime-get-status.ts. It sat after the first statement, where TypeScript ignores it, so the module was already checked. - Restore `retireRejectedPty(ptyId, stopConfirmed: boolean)` as a required argument. The split widened it to optional and patched the resulting error with `stopConfirmed === true`; an omitted argument would have silently taken the unverified-stop path instead of failing to compile. - Guard that every orca-runtime-tests fragment is imported by the compatibility entrypoint. The fragments are .spec.ts, which no Vitest include glob matches, so one left out of the list would silently stop running. * fix(runtime): restore four behaviors the OrcaRuntimeService split dropped Audit findings against the refactor's true base (ad5ba2572e): - retirePtyAgentLaunchAuthority collected pane keys after deleting the restored-authority receipt instead of before it. collectPaneKeysForPty reads that receipt, so a receipt-only pane lost its key and never had its agent-hook compatibility authority retired. on-pty-exit.ts already carried a comment naming this exact invariant. - The PTY-exit path kept orchestrationMailboxNotifications.retirePty but lost the loop that schedules a debounced mail-pointer repoint for the dead pty's terminal handle and any run bound to its panes. Restores the schedule call count to 7, matching base. - subscribeToPtyExit lost isPtyKnownExited's leaf fallback and its post-registration lifecycle-generation recheck. leavesByPtyId is rebuilt from the renderer graph independently of ptysById, so a leaf can outlive its pty record; without the fallback a caller waiting on an already-dead pty never gets released. - The chain root declared `[key: string]: unknown`, which base had nowhere. It leaked through the exported runtime type into every consumer, so any misspelled member access typechecked as unknown instead of erroring, and it accounted for 957 of the suppressed errors. Removing it costs zero type errors. * fix(runtime): restore escalation prose and unscoped automation publication Two more behaviors the split dropped, each with a regression test that fails against the pre-fix code: - The worker-exit escalation stopped deriving its title through buildOrchestrationTaskDisplayMetadata and inlined `task.spec` instead. That ignored an explicit task_title, dropped the single-line normalization and the 80-character bound, and turned the no-spec case into a quoted, duplicated id. A multi-paragraph spec landed verbatim in the coordinator's banner. The existing 11 tests all use short single-line specs, where the derived title and the raw spec are identical, so none of them could see it. Also reverts an added `if (!handle) return` guard: the dispatch lookup is deliberately keyed on the pane as well, because a reminted handle no longer matches the row while the pane identity outlives the remint. - updateAutomation stopped going through automationChangePublications and published `source` unconditionally while gating the fallback on a non-null destination. A destination the store can no longer name then published only the stale source, so subscribers scoped elsewhere kept rendering a row that had left them — the exact case the helper documents. The helper had been left with zero callers; all three sites use it again. * fix(skills): stop swallowing lookup errors and hard-erroring on non-ssh hosts Follow-ups from auditing the skill install path against the refactor's base: - resolveWorktree wrapped showManagedWorktree in `.catch(() => null)`, so a transient git or IO failure surfaced to the user as skill-install-workspace-not-found with the real cause discarded. Errors propagate again; a genuine id mismatch still returns null. - resolveSkillSshTarget threw skill-install-workspace-host-unavailable when the execution host was neither local nor ssh, on both the repo and folder branches. Base gated these on connectionId, so a runtime-owned repo simply was not an SSH install and fell through to the local path. Both return null again, and the error code the split invented is now unreferenced. - listManagedSkillInstalls awaited the receipt walk and the worktree resolve in sequence. They are independent and either can hit disk, WSL, or an SSH scan, so Promise.all is restored. Deliberately unchanged: resolving the worktree through listResolvedWorktrees rather than showManagedWorktree, which disambiguates a worktree id colliding across hosts and is covered by its own test, and the SSH-folder skill-install-ssh-dispatch-required throw, which matches the repo branch. * fix(runtime): merge duplicate worktree-logic imports The #17448 port added a third import from ../ipc/worktree-logic, which the code-quality oxlint config rejects under --deny-warnings. Plain oxlint does not flag it, so it only surfaced in CI's static analysis job. * ci: run the ts-nocheck ratchet in PR checks pr-workflow-lint-parity requires every leaf command in `pnpm lint` to have a matching step in pr.yml. The ratchet was wired into lint but not the workflow, so PR CI would not have enforced it. * Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/main' and retry the paired-host launch evaluate main advanced 9 commits; none touch the orca-runtime.ts this branch splits, so nothing needed porting. CI failed twice on `Execution context was destroyed` thrown from headless-paired-runtime-host's first `evaluate` after launch — a different spec each run, which is the signature of the flake #17780 describes rather than a regression. That commit added retryTransientMainEvaluate and adopted it in five helpers but not this call site, even though its docblock names exactly this case: the first evaluate after electron.launch() resolves, before the app is ready. Wrapped it the same way.	2026-08-31 19:34:55 -07:00
Neil	c09810b641	perf(rpc): restore compiled Zod request schemas without override (#17374) ... * perf(rpc): compile Zod request schemas lazily * chore(deps): pin zod 4.5.4 and except it from the release-age gate 4.5.4 is the first release fixing isRecursiveSchema (upstream 84e416f, #6500), which compile() calls on every schema — on 4.5.0 it fired .default() factories at compile time. Verified: compile-time factory calls 0 on 4.5.4, 1 on 4.5.0.	2026-08-31 00:47:22 -07:00
Jinjing	b3912ebed2	Split up combined-diff viewer into feature-organized modules (#17341) ... * Reorganize combined-diff components into feature-organized structure Splits flat combined-diff files into feature-focused subdirectories (browse-files, load-sections, resolve-changes, review-controls, scroll-viewport) to improve code organization and reduce clutter in the editor directory. Groups related logic by concern for easier navigation and maintenance. * Split up combined-diff viewer into feature-organized modules Decompose the 221-line monolithic CombinedDiffViewer into smaller, focused modules organized by feature: entry resolution, section loading, view state memory, file tree navigation, review controls, and scroll viewport handling. Main component now composes these hooks to orchestrate the combined-diff view. * fix(combined-diff): prevent replayed preference writes Move preference write outside state updater callback since React may replay state updaters, causing multiple writes. Add sideBySide to dependency array. * fix(combined-diff): re-resolve sections by key to handle list rebuilds The section list can rebuild while a write is pending (due to rebase, file changes, etc.); re-resolve by key instead of stale index to apply updates to the correct section. - Convert skipped conflicts message to structured i18n plural forms - Add oldPath field to git status signature for rename tracking * Suppress react-doctor diagnostics in combined-diff feature Add suppressions for react-doctor diagnostics that are necessary patterns for the combined-diff implementation, configured in both the quality check script and package.json.	2026-08-30 16:43:37 -07:00
Neil	e84042572c	Upgrade xterm to 6.1.0-beta.303 and generate addon patches ... * Upgrade xterm to 6.1.0-beta.303 and generate the addon patches Takes the current xterm beta line: xterm 287 -> 303, addon-webgl 286 -> 299, addon-serialize 287 -> 300, headless 302, the remaining addons -> 300, and the same set on mobile. All four packages stamp upstream commit d3e32b3. The reasons are upstream #6042/#6043/#6055 (a shared glyph atlas no longer garbles sibling panes on a page merge, clear, or sampler-budget overflow) and Note that core 303 is not image-addon-only over 302: it carries the buffer perf work, including the new BufferLineStringCache. addon-webgl and addon-serialize move into the patch generator -------------------------------------------------------------- Both were hand-edited minified bundles, which is what the Known Gaps section of docs/reference/xterm-patch-regeneration.md described. Both reproduce byte for byte from the pinned commit, so they are now manifest entries generated from a source patch like @xterm/xterm already was. Their sourcemaps now move with their bundles; before this they shipped maps whose offsets did not match the code beside them. The webgl patch shrinks from a 1.06 MB hand-edited bundle to a 6.6 KB source patch, because upstream took the invalidation half Orca had backported. What is left is only what upstream still lacks: the fragment-shader else branch for a v_texpage past the sampler budget, the clearTexture guard that no-ops once a merged page holds index 0, spending the merge retry budget before beginFrame latches the version it saw, and Orca's font-weight probe. The serialize source patch is byte-for-byte the same fixes as before; upstream changed nothing in that addon between 287 and 300. Generator fixes, each of which failed silently ---------------------------------------------- - `--relative` was appended after the `--` separator in CHECKOUT_DIFF_FLAGS, so git read it as a pathspec and kept repo-root-relative paths, dropping every source hunk from an addon's patch. - `git apply` run from a package subdirectory still resolves patch paths from the repo root, skips every hunk and exits 0. It now runs from the root with `--directory=<packageDir>`, and a source patch that leaves the checkout unchanged is a hard failure rather than an empty patch. - An addon's own `tsgo -p .` has empty files/include and only project references, so it emits nothing and the addon webpack then fails on a missing ./out/. The root build now runs first. - versionStampFile is optional; publish.js stamps an addon's package.json, which overlayBuildOutput never patches. - On a version bump the lockfile has no entry under the new key yet, so --write reports the gap instead of aborting mid-run. --check still fails on it. Adding the two addons pushed the generator and the Electron packaging contract test over max-lines, so the patch-text helpers move to xterm-patch-text.mjs (pure text: no checkout, no build) and the vendored-xterm assertions move out of the packaging contract into xterm-webgl-runtime-contract.test.mjs. Tests ----- Four tests asserted upstream bugs that are now fixed, not Orca behaviour: - xterm-user-scrolling-contract pinned headless and core by version string. Upstream bumps each package only when its own output changes, so headless 302 and core 303 are the same source. It now asserts they share a commit. - Five CSI 3 J assertions expected a reader stranded at the top after an erase. Upstream #6081 clears isUserScrolling there, so the erase releases them to the bottom instead. Orca's pin still lands them correctly, because its parser handler observes the erase before xterm's own handler runs. - The IME transaction test hard-coded the xterm version; it now reads the installed package, since the point is that bundle, map and version agree. - The Electron runtime contract asserted Orca's old clearModelGeneration. Shared atlas invalidation is upstream's now, so it asserts pageLayoutVersion on the resolved dependency, plus the Orca-only hunks on the patch. Verified: 66,008 unit tests, mobile's 3,863, the four WebGL atlas e2e specs, and `regenerate-xterm-patches.mjs --check` in sync on all three packages. Left alone deliberately: resetAllTerminalWebglAtlases still fans out globally even though clearTexture now self-heals siblings, and upstream #6068 (WebglAddon.dispose leaks the GL context) is still open. * Drop the two unused WebGL atlas fan-out exports resetAllTerminalWebglAtlases and presentAllTerminalPanesWithoutAtlasClear have no callers, and had none at cadfc55102 either — the last call site went in #6949, which routed reveal recovery through resetAndRefreshAllTerminalWebglAtlases instead. Only a comment in pane-manager.ts still named the first one; it now points at the live entry point. scheduleRevealPresent leaves the registry's structural type with them, though the manager method stays: terminal-visibility-resume.ts calls it directly. This is dead-code removal, not a consequence of the xterm bump. The live recovery path is unchanged. resetAndRefreshAllTerminalWebglAtlases stays, and so does the reveal-time escalation in pane-reveal-repaint.ts. Upstream 299 does make a pane-local clearTexture bump pageLayoutVersion so siblings rebuild on their next frame, which is the bug the escalation was written for, but I could not demonstrate that removing it is safe: with the escalation removed, floating-workspace-shared-glyph-atlas.spec.ts still passed headful, and it also passed with upstream's mechanism deliberately disabled (pageLayoutVersion pinned to 0 in the installed bundle, verified present in the built renderer). A guard that passes with the fix disabled cannot license removing the workaround, so the escalation stays until that spec can reproduce the garbling. Verified: pane-manager and terminal-pane suites (4,713 tests), typecheck, the headful shared-atlas spec, and the three headless WebGL specs. * Give the shared glyph atlas spec a trigger that can fail floating-workspace-shared-glyph-atlas.spec.ts guards the corruption where one terminal wiping the module-global atlas leaves sibling terminals drawing from stale texture coordinates. Both of its tests drive that through a floating panel reveal, and Orca's reveal paths escalate to a registry-wide atlas reset that repaints every pane — so the recovery under test heals the damage before the assertion runs, and the tests pass whether or not xterm propagates the invalidation at all. The new test clears the shared atlas straight through the floating manager with the panel closed, so nothing else repaints the workspace terminal, then repaints it with terminal.refresh(). That is the load-bearing detail: _updateModel skips cells whose content is unchanged, so the refresh reuses vertices baked against the pages that were just wiped, which is exactly the state the fix has to recover from. Verified as a discriminator rather than assumed. Pinning ITextureAtlas's pageLayoutVersion getter to 0 in the installed bundle, which disables the per-renderer invalidation upstream added in addon-webgl 0.20.0-beta.299, and confirming that reached the built renderer: fix intact: siblingClearIntact=true 1 passed fix disabled: siblingClearIntact=false 1 failed The failure renders the workspace terminal completely blank — stale coordinates into a wiped atlas sample nothing. The two reveal tests pass unchanged in both configurations, which is the gap this closes. * Compare shared-atlas screenshots with tolerance instead of byte equality Byte equality fails on sub-pixel antialiasing noise that leaves every glyph legible, so the headful spec flaked under xterm 303. Reuse the existing compareTerminalScreenshots helper: real stale-model corruption blanks the terminal at ~3% of pixels, twice the helper's 1.5% threshold, so the looser oracle keeps its teeth. Log the ratio so failures are diagnosable. * fix(xterm): cancel empty deferred IME compositions * test(xterm): strengthen runtime patch contracts	2026-08-30 15:14:49 -07:00
Neil	4bc2085271	Revert "perf(rpc): compile Zod request schemas lazily" (#17368)	2026-08-30 01:21:55 -07:00
Neil	7b86833120	perf(rpc): compile Zod request schemas lazily (#17353) ... * perf(rpc): compile Zod request schemas lazily * test: align window reveal assertion	2026-08-30 01:03:54 -07:00
Neil	4bb9dd5b89	chore(deps): bump electron 43.4.1 and other meaningful runtime deps (#17330) ... Take the high-value desktop and mobile upgrades that fix crashes, jank, or security holes. Leave Electron 44, Lucide 1, Reanimated 4.6, Expo 56/57, and xterm betas for later. Desktop: electron 43.4.1, @tanstack/react-virtual 3.14.10, mermaid 11.17.2, ws 8.21.3, react 19.2.8, pdfjs-dist 6.3.289, vitest 4.1.11, happy-dom 20.11.8. Mobile: Expo SDK 55 patch train, react-native 0.83.10 (IME patch ported), reanimated 4.3.4, webview 13.16.2 (thread-safe decision manager; restore WebView generic default so TS 6 does not collapse props to never). Electron 43.4 dropped marginType from PrintToPDFMargins; CDP print mapping now supplies the four sides only.	2026-08-29 20:44:43 -07:00
Neil	2dfaa676d8	chore: update oxlint and oxfmt (#17150)	2026-08-29 14:13:35 -07:00
Neil	b17f60d744	build: upgrade to pnpm 12 (#17156)	2026-08-29 14:13:26 -07:00
Neil	0bf5361c92	perf(markdown): update code highlighting incrementally (#17147)	2026-08-29 13:52:16 -07:00
Neil	eb00123a81	perf(markdown): skip unmatched list tokenizer scans (#17134)	2026-08-29 13:43:27 -07:00
Brennan Benson	fd9125ea8c	feat(native-chat): Codex structured native chat restructure (#16729) ... * feat(native-chat): port structured Codex sessions from restructure-recovery Rebuilds the desktop structured native-chat implementation from brennanb2025/native-chat-restructure-recovery (tip 4e31c08db3) on top of current main as a single commit, scoped to the local Codex path. Ported: - Structured agent-session core: durable record store + single-writer lease, canonical journal, agent-session wire host/attach/eviction/subscribers, `agentSession.*` RPC surface (registered via ALL_RPC_METHODS; host-side mobile allowlist included for wire compat), pty write gate, transcript additions, and the Codex app-server adapter/launch resolution. - Renderer: NativeChatStructuredSession view/composer stack, structured launch path with the single-flight guard, local structured session tabs sync, activation gate + structured inventory (read-only `agentSession.handoffStatus` probe), agent-session tabs in the tab strip, AI-vault structured session activation, and the settings pane with the parent Experimental Chat UI toggle plus the nested "Use updated structured native chat" toggle. New sessions require both flags, agent codex, no prompt, and a local non-WSL, non-Windows-host execution host (structured-native-chat-availability). - Fixes 72c013cea6 (verified Codex launch recovery), 8ddbaf5e3d (defer native terminal view switching affordances), and 4e31c08db3 (release the launch gate after a visibility retry) with their regression tests, including the third-launch-after-retry guard case. - Cross-version agent-session wire test + CI lane, packaging entries (proper-lockfile, agent-tooling asar excludes), and the wire-compat doc section. Deliberately not ported: mobile/ changes, the Claude structured runtime (only the claude-transcript-branch-proof and claude-structured-owner-identity leaf modules remain, backing the kept TUI-recovery arms), the terminal↔chat adoption/handoff flow (`agentSession.adoptTerminal`/`requestHandoff`, the handoff request engine, TUI adoption machinery, orca-runtime adoption methods), renderer switching affordances and their dead leftovers, the hook/subagent-status refactor cluster, and unrelated branch changes. The crash-during-acquisition recovery path (restart handoff adjudication, restore/reverse re-acquire, lease schema handoff keys) is kept because every plain direct launch depends on it; a trimmed handoff coordinator exposes only status/restore/close. Branch edits that targeted files main has since split (ipc/pty.ts, worktrees.ts, rpc/methods/terminal.ts, useIpcEvents, pty-connection, store/slices/terminals.ts, runtime-types, web preload) were re-applied to the split modules, preserving main's newer logic (Windows CIM fallback, browser tab close rework, cold-restore resume flow, dispatcher threading). Known seam: the mobile clipboard image-provenance CONSUMER gate ships (agentSession.send refuses unproven mobile image refs with agent_session_image_untrusted) but the producer hunk in rpc/methods/clipboard.ts stays with the unported mobile cluster, so mobile image sends into structured chat fail closed until that side ports. * fix(native-chat): trust only authenticated local image uploads * fix(build): preserve Windows process-tree patch application * test(windows): include process creation time in addon fixture * fix(build): run windows-process-tree node-gyp from the physical package dir gyp expands the node-addon-api dependency by probing node, whose cwd resolves to the package's physical directory in the store, so the emitted target is a store-relative ../../../../node-addon-api@... hop. gyp then resolves that hop against the rebuild cwd; from the node_modules symlink/junction it escapes the store and configure fails with "node_addon_api.gyp not found" (run 32999886072). Rebuild from realpath(package dir) so both bases agree, matching how the package manager itself runs native install scripts. The regression test replays gyp's expansion+resolution against the planned cwd and fails without the fix. * fix(native-chat): keep chat tabs visible through terminal closes and empty-worktree launches Two proven blockers in the native Codex tab contract: closeTerminalTab pre-empted the canonical unified close. With one terminal left it deactivated the worktree on a terminal/editor/browser-only check, blanking a workspace that still held a renderable agent-session tab; with two or more it pre-picked a successor from terminal entities only, re-stamping the group active before closeUnifiedTab's MRU/neighbor repair could land on the chat tab. Successor choice now defers to the unified contract whenever the terminal has a unified row, and deactivation is gated on the unified renderable count (matching leaveWorktreeIfEmpty), with the legacy pre-pick kept only for terminals without a unified row. A structured session created on an empty worktree was published into the host's headless group while preserveLocalLayout froze the local layout, leaving the tab in store but permanently off screen. A preserveLocalLayout owner now always takes client-owned placement — repairing a rendered leaf whose group record is missing, or materializing a rendered group on a truly empty worktree — and applies the client-derived layout repair while still rejecting host-authored layout. Regression tests drive the real store through closeTerminalTab (git worktree and folder workspace) and the real snapshot applier for the empty-worktree adoption states; all fail without the fixes. * fix(native-chat): close stale turns and retry rejected sends * fix(native-chat): retire hosted rows on structured tab activation * fix(native-chat): preserve rpc defaults across main merge * chore: format remote wire compatibility guide * test(native-chat): cover retry after unconfirmed send * fix(native-chat): reload outbox on session switch * docs(settings): disclose structured chat platform limits * fix(native-chat): await Codex launch-home preparation * fix(codex): align child-process allowlist with async trust bridge * test(identity): update inventory for tab surface refactor * fix(windows): preserve process-tree CRLF patch sources * fix(native-chat): anchor an unmatched chat echo where it was sent (#16117) * fix(native-chat): anchor an unmatched chat echo where it was sent The reported symptom was old user messages replaying below every new turn, so the conversation read as scrambled. The cause was not that the echo failed to match a transcript row. Claude consumes a mid-turn send through a `queued_command` attachment and writes no `type:"user"` record for it, so some echoes can never match, and no amount of matching will change that. The cause was WHERE an unmatched echo rendered: buildMobileNativeChatTransientData appended every pending item after the entire transcript, so it re-read below each turn that landed afterwards. Render each echo directly after the transcript row it was sent against, using the baseline the send already captures. An unmatched echo is then at worst a duplicate in the right position rather than a scrambled one, and it stays visible. Echoes sharing an anchor keep send order; a send with no baseline, or one whose anchor folding dropped, still falls back to the tail. Deliberately NOT fixed by deleting the echo. Inferring from send ordering that an echo can never match, then removing it, loses the user's own text for a message the agent did receive, and it cannot fire in the common case anyway - measured drain groups are 1,017 of size 1 against 55 larger. It also escalates an existing gap: the count pass has no baseline-tail guard, unlike the glue pass, while `messages` is a 40-row window that head-trims, resets on reconnect and grows at the front on loadEarlier, so a false landing there would license deleting a DIFFERENT outstanding message. That count-pass gap is real and left for a separate change; anchoring makes its worst case a duplicate in place rather than a scrambled conversation. * fix(native-chat): preserve folded echo anchors * fix(native-chat): preserve forward-folded echo anchors * fix(native-chat): keep leading folded echoes in place * fix(workspace-cleanup): show git status for every row (#16690) * fix(native-chat): refuse structured chat on every Windows execution path canUseStructuredNativeChat only refused win32 when a project runtime resolved, so folder-workspace keys (and other keys with no project runtime) failed open into structured chat on Windows. Fail closed on win32 unconditionally after the host check, matching the settings copy: local macOS/Linux only; Windows/WSL/SSH stay on terminal chat. * fix(native-chat): restore runtime refusals behind the win32 gate 506d375de3 replaced the project-runtime checks with a bare platform test, so a WSL or repair-required runtime resolution would no longer refuse structured chat off-win32. Keep the unconditional win32 refusal and re-run the runtime resolution after it, so the gate does not depend on the resolver's own platform guard. Tests inject WSL and repair-required resolutions on darwin/linux and fail against the regressed gate. * fix structured session journal durability * fix structured tab active pointer after restart * fix(native-chat): await optional lease renewal callbacks * refactor(skills): extract install error messages * fix(agent-session): harden recovery ownership * fix(native-chat): retain panes across tab activation * fix(native-chat): address round-one review findings * test(native-chat): align integration coverage after main merge * fix(native-chat): harden round-two reliability * fix(native-chat): harden round-three reliability * fix(native-chat): close round-four recovery gaps * fix(native-chat): separate bounded journal key forms * fix(native-chat): reset outbox error in render on session switch The switch effect adjusted error state after the sessionId prop changed, tripping react-doctor's no-adjust-state-on-prop-change on the changed-code gate and flashing the old session's banner for a frame. Reset it with the render-time previous-value guard instead. * fix(native-chat): invalidate stale outbox settlements * test(native-chat): restore settled-error session-switch regression a6e2379bd1 replaced this test with the in-flight settlement race test, leaving the render-time error reset unpinned: deleting the reset block still passed the whole native-chat suite. Keep both scenarios pinned; they are distinct (settled error clears on switch vs stale settlement invalidated in the commit-to-passive window). * test(wire): make release checkouts race safe * test(wire): pin cross-process checkout single-flight and importer specifier contract * test(wire): harden release checkout lifecycle * fix(build): drop CR-byte residue from windows-process-tree patch The two trailing CR bytes on the patch's deletion lines are a proven no-op: pnpm hashes patches CRLF-normalized (both forms hash to the lockfile's 946ffb2b) and materializes this package without applying the patch in either form, so the load-bearing build edits come solely from applyWindowsProcessTreeBuildFixes() (#16947), which handles both source EOL forms. Restore byte-identity with main and repin the contract test to the post-#16947 reality: LF-only patch bytes plus lockfile hash sync. * fix(native-chat): skip empty startup recovery	2026-08-28 16:45:58 -07:00
Neil	971d987c4b	ci(e2e): trigger the Docker-SSH lane from SSH source and claim every gated spec (#16746) ... The Docker-SSH e2e lane only ran when a PR's changed specs happened to include `ssh-startup-exec-readiness.spec.ts` or `paired-startup-exec-readiness.spec.ts`. Editing SSH source itself did not trigger it, and pruning either spec from a route's list would have silently retired the whole lane. Meanwhile the sharded lanes set no `ORCA_E2E_SSH_DOCKER`, so every Docker-gated spec skipped itself while the shard still reported green -- the exact silent-skip shape `docs/reference/ssh-reconnect-source-recovery.md` blames for four regressions that reached users. Separately, the modules that actually own direct-SSH workspace and tab restore carry no "ssh" in their names, so the `ssh-terminal-source` route never reached them. Measured on the real script before this change: printf '%s\n' src/renderer/src/hooks/remote-workspace-session-merge.ts \ src/main/ipc/remote-workspace-snapshot-normalization.ts \ src/renderer/src/lib/worktree-initial-terminal-seeding.ts \ src/shared/remote-workspace-session-projection.ts \ | node config/scripts/pr-e2e-source-routing.mjs => [] Three changes, all pinned by the executable gate contract: - `hasSshSourceChange` derives an `ssh_source_changed` signal from the SSH routes themselves, plumbed pr.yml -> e2e.yml, so the lane triggers on source rather than on a spec name surviving in a list. One list, so the two cannot drift. - A sibling `ssh-workspace-session-restore` route names the restore seams (`remote-workspace-*`, `worktree-initial-terminal-seeding`, `worktree-default-terminal-tabs`, `initial-terminal`) and routes them to the two restore specs -- a sibling rather than more paths on `ssh-terminal-source` so a tab-tombstone edit does not run the whole SSH terminal list. - A new `test:e2e:ssh-docker` runner claims the remaining Docker-gated specs on the one VM that sets the flag, and the contract now fails by name when any Docker-gated spec is claimed by no runner. `ssh-docker-relay-perf` and `ssh-codex-display-artifacts-repro` are recorded exemptions (wall-clock budgets; needs a real remote codex binary) and the contract asserts each exemption still corresponds to a real gated spec, so a stale one cannot quietly excuse a gap. Lane timeout raised 35 -> 60 minutes for the added serial specs. The lane's first act was to surface four latent bugs in a spec that had been silently skipping. `ssh-docker-bulk-open-freeze-repro.spec.ts` is four call sites out of date against `tests/e2e/helpers/terminal.ts`: `startDockerSshRelayTarget()` is called with no argument though the helper dereferences `testInfo.workerIndex` (a 100% failure, not a flake), `execInTerminal` gained a `ptyId` parameter, and `splitActiveTerminalPane` gained a direction. It was invisible because it ran nowhere and `typecheck:e2e` is red on main with 240 pre-existing errors, so four more could not be seen. The `testInfo` bug is fixed here -- correct on its own, and it removes one real error from `typecheck:e2e` (240 -> 239). The other three are not, because they are not argument plumbing: repairing them requires choosing which ptyId to capture and which split direction to use, and both change what the repro measures. The spec is therefore added to the exemption list rather than repaired, for two independent reasons recorded in the runner: it is a perf oracle, not a correctness one (`SOFT_FREEZE_LAG_MS=2500` / `HARD_FREEZE_LAG_MS=5000` measured under a deliberate 5-pane flood on a 420s budget -- the same rule already applied to `ssh-docker-relay-perf.spec.ts`), and it is known-rotted. Repair is tracked in stablyai/orca#16764. Applying an existing written rule to a sibling that plainly meets it is consistency; inventing a new exemption to dodge a red would not be. Three hardening fixes to the contract itself: - Runner text is comment-stripped before the claimed-by-a-lane scan. A substring scan over raw text lets a spec merely *discussed* in a runner comment count as claimed -- the silent skip this assertion exists to catch, re-entering through the documentation. Not live today only because the existing comments write the spec names without their `tests/e2e/` prefix. - An exempt spec must not be invoked by any runner. `unreachableSpecs` short-circuits the unclaimed check, so a spec could be documented as exempt while a runner still ran it -- an exemption that reads as coverage removal but changes nothing, leaving the lane red for a reason the file says it excluded. This is not hypothetical: adding the bulk-open exemption without removing it from the runner's spec list produced exactly that state, and this assertion is what caught it. - The Docker-gate detector is now `/ORCA_E2E_SSH_DOCKER\s*[!=]==\s*['"]1['"]/` rather than one fixed string, so a double-quoted or `!==` spelling can no longer escape the contract. `ssh-restart-tab-accumulation.spec.ts` is a new three-cycle restart fence asserting tab-id set identity, not just the active pane's reclaimed ptyId as `ssh-cold-activation-restore.spec.ts:241` did. It passes today; it was validated by a negative control that injected one tab after cycle 1 and correctly failed.	2026-08-27 19:40:38 -07:00
Neil	5631aa00dd	feat(orcad): items 2–7 — degradation, natives, daemon, ops, deploy (#16398) ... * fix(ports): stop joining an undefined resourcesPath on a non-Electron host `resolveWorkerEntryPath` branched on `isPackaged` alone and joined `process.resourcesPath`. orcad reports `isPackaged` true — correctly, it is a production build, and ~15 consumers read it that way to gate HTTPS-only skill downloads and the real CLI name — but `process.resourcesPath` is Electron-only and `undefined` under plain Node. So the packaged branch threw `TypeError [ERR_INVALID_ARG_TYPE]: The "path" argument must be of type string` where a clean "worker unavailable" was the honest outcome. The type said `resourcesPath: string`, which is how it went unnoticed; it is now `string | undefined`, so the compiler carries the fact. A host with no Electron resources tree has no asar to look in, so it falls back to the module directory and lets the caller report a missing worker. Found by the item 1 agent while auditing the same `isPackaged` defect class in the watcher. Verified in both directions: reverting the guard reproduces the TypeError. * feat(orcad): prove node-pty loads before anything requires it Of the two ways node-pty fails, only one is catchable. A missing module throws MODULE_NOT_FOUND. A module built against the wrong libc or Node ABI is refused by the dynamic loader, and in the worst case takes the process down before any handler exists — that is #9902, which crashed the desktop app on Ubuntu 20.04 before a window appeared. There was no libc or ABI precondition anywhere in the tree. So orcad now proves the load in a CHILD process, from main.ts, before anything requires node-pty. Whatever the child does — throw, abort, die on a signal — is data rather than our own death, and the operator gets a sentence naming the host's libc, Node ABI and prebuild slot plus the command to run. Proven-unloadable exits 78 (EX_CONFIG), so a supervisor does not restart an unequippable host forever. A probe that never answered is unverifiable, not blocked: refusing to boot on an inconclusive signal would take down hosts that work. The child dlopens the file node-pty would have chosen, before requiring the package. node-pty's loader walks several directories and rethrows only the LAST error, so a refused binary reads as "Cannot find module ./prebuilds/..." — which sends the operator to install a module that is already there. It also reports through stdout: node echoes the whole -e source above a stack trace, and matching tokens against stderr made the probe's own source text answer for the verdict. Verdicts reach clients as a terminal_unavailable degradation alongside the existing browser_unavailable one, through the same cause-registry shape. degradations[].code is now an open vocabulary; clients already render only `message`. Prebuilds are compiled from PATCHED sources — the patch IS the glibc-floor fix, so an upstream tarball reproduces #9902 — into linux-{x64,arm64}-{glibc,musl} and darwin-{x64,arm64} slots. libc is in the slot name because node-pty's loader falls back to prebuilds/<platform>-<arch> and cannot tell glibc from musl. orcad installs the matching slot at boot, so a host with no compiler serves terminals. The relay's five pure toolchain-diagnosis functions moved to a transport-free module so the Node bundle can reuse them without dragging ssh2 in behind them; the relay keeps its API by re-export. macOS gets `xcode-select --install` rather than the cross-distro apt/dnf/pacman/apk menu, every line of which is wrong there. * test(orcad): pin the node-pty precondition to ground truth, not a prepared host CI's test shard runs `vitest` directly, so `ensure-native-runtime --runtime=node` never prepares node-pty for the Node ABI — `degraded` is the correct verdict there, and asserting 'ok' encoded an environment the shard does not have. Asserting whatever it returned would be vacuous, so the expectation is now derived from an independent require() of node-pty. Verified it still bites: forcing the precondition to always report 'ok' fails the suite. * feat(orcad): run the terminal daemon, and the ops contract around it orcad declared `canRecoverPersistentLocalPtys: () => false` because it did not run the terminal daemon, so every restart, update and rollback SIGKILLed every running terminal — on the host whose selling point is that work survives the client going away. That is the one property `ssh-execution-boundary.md` recommends the peer model for. Item 4 — the daemon: - Port the launch path off electron: `daemon-init.ts`, `daemon-host-relocation.ts` and `observability/logs-directory.ts` now read the `AppEnvironment` port. Relocation additionally asks whether the app root is an asar archive rather than whether the build is packaged, so a Node host answering `isPackaged() === true` no longer walks into an Electron-only NSIS-escape path (same precedent as `parcel-watcher-entry-path.ts`). - `build-orcad.mjs` emits `daemon-entry.js` beside `orcad.js`, scans the forked children's metafiles for electron/node:sqlite, and load-checks the child under plain Node. - orcad spawns and adopts the daemon; shutdown disconnects and never kills it. `canRecoverPersistentLocalPtys` now reads the live provider and is false under degraded routing, where fresh terminals would die with the process. Item 3 — the ops contract (docs/reference/orcad-operations.md): - Bind policy: `--bind`, default loopback, pinned so neither `orca serve`'s wide default nor the connected-device widen can override it, and so a paired client cannot rebind the listener from outside. - Instance lock on the data root before profile load, scoped to the runtime role so it never refuses a restart that a live daemon makes worthwhile. - Supervision: exit codes a supervisor can act on (78 = do not retry), second-signal escalation, a shutdown deadline, and crash-loop containment on daemon respawn. - Health in the readiness payload: build hash, Node ABI, and a PTY self-test that spans both processes — the daemon spawns a real PTY in its own process and the verdict crosses its socket. Both bundle load-checks now assert on exit codes: these bundles are minified onto one line, so Node's uncaught-exception report echoes every string literal in the bundle and the previous message match passed against a bundle that never loaded. * feat(orcad): deploy, activate and roll back a versioned orcad install Plan items 6 and 7 from docs/design/shipping-orcad.html. Install reuses the relay's transaction verbatim — per-version lock, staged SFTP write, .install-complete sentinel, stale-lock recovery — under a parameterized namespace, so orcad-<v>/ sits beside relay-<v>/ permanently (§06). Parameterizing GC is the trap that creates: each model now collects only its own directories, enforced twice (prefix-scoped remote listing plus a local ownership re-check), and a client picks its model from how the host is registered, never from what it finds on disk. Activation is separate from installation, because a versioned directory selects nothing. A candidate is launched, publishes orca_server_ready, and only becomes active if its cross-process health payload passes: right build hash, listening, daemon live, PTY self-test green. A rejected candidate is stopped and the incumbent restarted, so a careful deploy cannot cause the outage it was being careful about. Update and rollback are shaped by the daemon. An update restarts orcad, the daemon outlives it, and the surviving daemon was forked from the outgoing bundle — so live terminals defer the update rather than proceed, and GC pins the active version, the rollback target and the live daemon's bundle. Orca's persisted state carries no schema version, so rollback restores a pre-activation snapshot rather than trusting backward-readability; the point past which it is unsafe is the first terminal created after activation, which the snapshot cannot describe and the surviving daemon still owns. Running the generated shell for real found two bugs the text assertions missed: tar members re-quoted inside a shell variable captured nothing, and kill -0 reports a zombie as alive. * test(orcad): assert the precondition is self-consistent, not environment-shaped The real-host case cannot predict a status: CI's shard runs vitest directly, so node-pty is never built for the Node ABI and 'degraded' is correct there, while a prepared checkout gives 'ok'. The previous attempt used require('node-pty') as ground truth, which resolves the JS wrapper while the native binding loads lazily — it proved strictly less than the precondition checks, and failed CI for exactly that reason. What is invariant on a host with node-pty installed: never 'blocked', and never a degraded verdict carrying an unestablished reason. The injected-input tests keep the logic coverage. * fix(orcad): drop an eslint-disable the rule no longer needs * test(orcad): separate slot placement from the load verdict Both remaining CI failures were the same shape: tests reaching into node_modules for a pty.node that only exists after `ensure-native-runtime --runtime=node`, which CI's shard never runs because it invokes vitest directly. Slot *placement* is the logic worth checking on every host, so it now uses a synthetic payload and asserts the verdict stays honest about not loading. The three assertions that genuinely need a Node-ABI binding are gated on it existing. Verified: breaking slot installation fails both placement tests; with the real pty.node hidden the file is 17 passed / 3 skipped instead of ENOENT. * test(orcad): gate the load-dependent cases on a real load, not on the file existing CI ships a pty.node built for Electron's ABI, so existsSync was true while require still failed — the gate ran exactly the tests that host can never satisfy. It now probes the binding in a child process, so a bad one cannot take the runner down. The self-consistency assertion also allowed too little: 'blocked' is the honest verdict for a corrupt binding, alongside 'ok' on a prepared host and 'degraded' on an unprepared one. What stays invariant is that anything other than 'ok' names an established cause, so a terminal is never declined for a reason nobody worked out. Verified against all three host states: prepared (19 passed), unprepared, and a corrupt binding (17 passed / 3 skipped, no failures). * test(orcad): gate on the whole premise — binding AND spawn-helper CI has a loadable pty.node but no spawn-helper, and a slot without the helper is legitimately 'degraded'. So the previous gate let a test run whose premise ('a complete slot yields ok') that host cannot satisfy. Verified in both states: with the helper present 19 pass; with it removed the load-dependent cases skip (17 passed / 3 skipped) instead of failing. * fix(orcad): preserve degradation types after rebase	2026-08-27 00:18:51 -07:00
Jinwoo HongandJinwoo-H	a9781a4118	STA-4150: client-hosted remote browser (consolidated) (#15448) ... Co-authored-by: Jinwoo-H <jinwoo@stably.ai>	2026-08-25 15:36:51 -07:00
Jinwoo Hong	c618ec7393	test(reliability): protect recent P0 regression invariants (#16163)	2026-08-24 09:38:46 -07:00
Jinjing	f5fd7303ab	test(e2e): cover tab-bar agent launches on Windows and WSL (#16110) ... * test(e2e): gate the tab-bar agent launcher on Windows shells and WSL The `+` menu agent launcher had no golden coverage in the Windows lane, so a Windows-only break anywhere in its chain (detection row, startup-plan build, tab create, PTY spawn, startup-command injection) could ship unnoticed. Adds a golden spec that launches a stub agent from the menu and asserts the agent's own banner reached the pane — a tab that spawned a bare shell instead is indistinguishable at the store/tab layer. Runs two agents everywhere, and on Windows also PowerShell, cmd, Git Bash and a WSL project runtime. * test(e2e): track WSL stub agent staging state for precise cleanup Refactor `stageWslGoldenStubAgent` to track which artifacts it creates during setup, then only remove those artifacts during cleanup. This prevents the test from destructively removing pre-existing symlinks or state from previous runs, improving test isolation and idempotency. * test(e2e): track WSL stub agent staging state for precise cleanup - Back up and restore pre-existing stub agents to avoid destroying them - Simplify verbose test comments to match project style guidelines * test(e2e): serialize WSL stub agent setup with distributed lock - Add mkdir-based lock to prevent concurrent staging invocations - Reclaim stale locks after 10 minutes to recover from crashes - Track lock ownership in stage state for safe cleanup * test(e2e): track WSL stub agent staging state for precise cleanup Track which stubs this test helper stages by writing a marker file, then only remove stubs during stale-lock recovery if we created them. Prevents cleanup from removing stubs left by other processes.	2026-08-24 08:58:19 -07:00
Neil	03fcfdfb92	feat(orcad): boot the Orca runtime on plain Node (#15968) ... * refactor(host): resolve the app root through the port in fork-reachable modules `parcel-watcher-entry-path.ts` and `session-scanner-service-entry-path.ts` read the app root via `require('electron').app` inside a try/catch that already returns null when Electron is absent. They were therefore correct under plain Node at runtime and only failed the *static* text check — which is real, not pedantic: the comment in `ports/port-scan-command-client.ts:19` records that the plain-node-entry-guard fails on that literal text, try/catch or not. `hasAppEnvironment() ? getAppEnvironment() : null` gives the identical "no app root here" answer without the text. That restores `hasAppEnvironment`, which an earlier commit in this stack deleted as unused — it now has the caller it was waiting for. Ratchet baseline 27 → 25. Verified: 74 files / 458 tests; `pnpm typecheck` clean; `oxlint` clean. * feat(orcad): boot the Orca runtime on plain Node Closes the last two Electron couplings and makes `orcad` a working artifact: a 4.43 MB Node bundle that boots, pairs, registers a repo, creates a real git worktree and round-trips a PTY — with zero `require("electron")`. Ratchet 2 -> 0, so `config/runtime-electron-baseline.txt` is now empty and its test asserts exactly that: any reachable electron import is a regression. - speech: inject the service factories, so importing ModelManager for its type no longer drags Electron's streaming net.request into the graph - filesystem-watcher: add a WorktreeWatcherRemoval port. Every entry in those maps arrives through an ipcMain handler carrying a renderer sender, so a host with no renderer has nothing to close, restore or forget — the inert default is what the desktop code does against empty maps, not a stub hiding work - user-data-path / profile-storage-paths: resolve userData through AppEnvironment. These surfaced only once orcad pulled the store in Both host ports now anchor to a realm-global symbol. `vi.resetModules()` gives the re-imported graph a fresh module copy, so a binding installed before the reset silently read back as uninstalled. The acceptance smoke drives both hosts through one code path (`--target orcad|electron`) and seeds its own git repo, so it is hermetic and asserts the same contract of each. Wired into PR CI. * test(smoke): remove the seeded workspace container, not just the worktree * test(smoke): surface the server's stderr when it dies before ready * fix(smoke): build node-pty for Node before booting orcad in CI * fix(smoke): drive the CLI built from this checkout, not one on PATH * docs(ratchet): say the baseline must stay empty, not merely shrink * build(orcad): externalize only the native modules actually in the graph	2026-08-22 21:47:46 -07:00
Neil	f975035809	refactor(ipc): split preflight and SSH registry out of the ipcMain modules (#15927) ... * refactor(preflight): split agent detection out of the ipcMain registration First of the IPC extractions the revised design requires. `src/main/ipc/preflight.ts` mixed 285 lines of agent/tool detection with 35 lines of `ipcMain.handle` registration, and the runtime calls that detection during normal operation (`orca-runtime.ts:573`, plus the preflight RPC methods). So the runtime dragged `ipcMain` into its graph to reach pure logic. Detection moves to `src/main/preflight/agent-detection.ts` — named for what it contains, per AGENTS.md. `ipc/preflight.ts` keeps only the handler registration and re-exports the domain module so existing importers are unaffected. The runtime and its RPC methods now import the domain module directly. Ratchet baseline 36 → 35: `src/main/ipc/preflight.ts` is no longer reachable from the runtime. The gate detected the improvement and refused to pass until the baseline tightened, which is the behaviour it was built for. Verified: 2 files / 1,187 tests pass across every suite touching preflight; `pnpm typecheck` clean; `oxlint` clean. * refactor(ssh): split the SSH target registry out of the ipcMain module Second IPC extraction, and by far the biggest win: this removes **eight** modules from the runtime's Electron graph, taking the ratchet baseline 35 → 27. The runtime needed five thin accessors from `src/main/ipc/ssh.ts` — `connectRegisteredSshTarget`, `getRegisteredSshState`, `listRegisteredSshTargets`, `listRegisteredRemovedSshTargetLabels`, `getActiveMultiplexer`. Each is a one-line read over module-level state. Importing them dragged in `ipcMain`, `powerMonitor` and a `BrowserWindow` accessor — and, transitively, `ipc/pty.ts` (8,031 lines), `ssh-browse`, `ssh-passphrase`, `ssh-relay-deploy`, `ssh-remote-cli-host-passthrough`, `wsl-hook-relay-launch` and `user-data-path`. `src/main/ssh/ssh-target-registry.ts` now holds that state plus its accessors. `registerSshHandlers` populates it; the runtime reads it. The indirection is kept deliberately: SSH providers register after construction and may reconnect, so callers must resolve the current generation rather than freeze one. `ipc/ssh.ts` re-exports all five, so non-test importers are unaffected. `connectRegisteredSshTarget` still throws `ssh_handlers_not_registered` when no handler layer registered — a headless host must fail loudly rather than report a target as unreachable, which would read as `exited` (see ssh-execution-boundary.md). Verified: 9 files / 59 tests across the ssh, automations and trust-preset suites; orca-runtime.test.ts 1,183 pass; `pnpm typecheck` clean; `oxlint` clean. * refactor(host): resolve the app root through the port in fork-reachable modules `parcel-watcher-entry-path.ts` and `session-scanner-service-entry-path.ts` read the app root via `require('electron').app` inside a try/catch that already returns null when Electron is absent. They were therefore correct under plain Node at runtime and only failed the *static* text check — which is real, not pedantic: the comment in `ports/port-scan-command-client.ts:19` records that the plain-node-entry-guard fails on that literal text, try/catch or not. `hasAppEnvironment() ? getAppEnvironment() : null` gives the identical "no app root here" answer without the text. That restores `hasAppEnvironment`, which an earlier commit in this stack deleted as unused — it now has the caller it was waiting for. Ratchet baseline 27 → 25. Verified: 74 files / 458 tests; `pnpm typecheck` clean; `oxlint` clean. * test(ssh): mock the SSH target registry alongside the ipc/ssh mock Thirty-eight suites mocked `vi.mock('./ssh')` for `getActiveMultiplexer`. That factory went inert when production started importing the accessor from `../ssh/ssh-target-registry`, so the real module loaded and the assertions drifted. Adds a companion registry mock returning the same stub, plus a `sshTargetRegistryModuleMock` builder beside the existing `sshModuleMock` so the shared harness stays one place. No assertion changed. Found by a full-suite run: the targeted ssh/runtime suites were green while 30 tests in ipc/worktrees and ipc/repos were not. * refactor(runtime): read app paths and the packaged flag through the port `orca-runtime.ts` is the last module in its own graph that imports `electron` directly. Nineteen of its uses were `app.getPath` (12) and `app.isPackaged` (7) — exactly what the AppEnvironment port already covers. Also removes a dead `const { app } = require('electron')` inside `getOrchestrationDb`. It was left unused once the path came from the port, and it is precisely the dynamic-require pattern `plain-node-entry-guard.ts` exists to catch, sitting in the runtime's own constructor path. What still binds `orca-runtime.ts` to Electron is now three sites, not nineteen: `new Notification(...)` (one), `BrowserWindow.fromId` (one), and the `ipcMain.on('terminal:tabCreateReply')` renderer round-trip — which is the browser tab path, and the same one that would hang a headless host for ten seconds. Two suites drove `electronMocks.app.isPackaged` directly; they now install a fake AppEnvironment reading the same mutable field, so their per-test toggles work unchanged and no assertion moved. Verified: 376 files / 4,717 tests across src/main/runtime; typecheck and oxlint clean. * test(serve): add the built-artifact terminal round-trip acceptance smoke "The server started" proves almost nothing. Terminal creation dispatches into OrcaRuntimeService, and without an installed headless PTY controller that path falls through to a renderer reply that never arrives and times out after ten seconds. A boot probe, a port bind, and a `host.platform` call all pass against a server whose terminals are dead — which is exactly the gap the design doc's own boot proof was retracted for. This boots the BUILT `out/main/index.js --serve`, parses its ready payload, pairs a real client over the advertised endpoint, lists worktrees, creates a terminal, runs a command through the PTY, asserts the output comes back, and asserts clean shutdown. It drives nothing but the public pairing + RPC surface, so the same script is the acceptance gate a future Node-only backend must pass unchanged. The sentinel invokes `process.execPath` rather than `echo`, because the shell differs per platform and node does not. Verified both directions: passes against the real server, and fails with an actionable message when the command produces no output — a smoke that cannot fail is worthless. * fix(ssh): fail loudly when the multiplexer resolver was never installed `getActiveMultiplexer` resolves through a resolver that `ipc/ssh.ts` installs at module scope. A process that never loads the SSH layer — which is the whole point of the Node-only backend — would get `undefined` from every call. `undefined` already means something specific here: "not connected". So a missing resolver and a disconnected target were indistinguishable, and a host with no SSH layer would quietly report every target as not connected. That is the unverifiable-reported-as-exited conflation `docs/reference/ssh-execution-boundary.md` exists to prevent — the doc is explicit that absence of contact is never evidence of absence of the thing. A missing resolver is a wiring error, not a connection state, so it throws, matching what `connectRegisteredSshTarget` already does for unregistered handlers. Verified: 432 files / 4,759 tests across ipc, ssh, preflight, automations and trust presets; typecheck and oxlint clean. * refactor(pty): stop faking a BrowserWindow for the headless PTY path `registerHeadlessPtyRuntime` passed `registerPtyHandlers` a stub object cast to `BrowserWindow` whose `isDestroyed()` returned true and whose `webContents.send` was a no-op — a window-shaped thing that lied about being a window, purely to satisfy the type. Adversarial review named it as the same "looks fine, silently returns a lie" pattern this codebase rejects elsewhere, and it is the shape that keeps `electron` on a path that otherwise needs none. `registerPtyHandlers` now takes `BrowserWindow | null`. An absent renderer is semantically identical to a destroyed one — all 42 call sites already guarded on `isDestroyed()` and skipped — so `src/main/ipc/pty-renderer-surface.ts` states that directly: `isRendererGone`, `sendToRenderer`, `rendererWebContents`. The compound `isDestroyed() || webContents.isDestroyed()` guards collapse into one predicate. `isPtyWriteEventFromMainWindow` becomes null-tolerant and fails closed: with no renderer no sender can legitimately match, so every write is rejected. Those handlers cannot fire headless today, but failing closed is the right answer if that ever changes. This is the precondition for installing a PTY controller without Electron, which is what a Node-only backend needs and what `terminal.create` actually calls. Verified: 129 files / 2,473 tests across ipc/pty, providers and orca-runtime; the built-artifact acceptance smoke still passes end-to-end (boot → pair → terminal.create → sentinel → close), which is the check that matters most here since this changes the headless PTY path itself; typecheck and oxlint clean. * refactor(pty): read app paths and the packaged flag through the port Follows the fake-window removal. `ipc/pty.ts` had nine `app.*` reads — all `getPath`, `getVersion` or `isPackaged` — which the AppEnvironment port already covers. The `BrowserWindow` import was also dead after the null-window change. What still binds this file to Electron is now `ipcMain` (75 uses, all handler registration) and `powerMonitor` (2). That is a clean statement of the remaining job: split logic from registration, the same shape already applied to preflight and the SSH registry. Test wiring: the shared `pty-ipc-suite-environment` beforeEach installs a fake AppEnvironment that reads through the existing `vi.mock('electron')` app object rather than freezing values — suites toggle `app.isPackaged` mid-test to exercise dev-mode spawn paths, so the port has to observe the same mutable field. One edit in the shared harness covers every pty suite. Verified: 128 files / 1,290 tests across ipc/pty and providers; the built-artifact acceptance smoke passes; typecheck and oxlint clean; ratchet unchanged at 25. * refactor(pty): inject the ipcMain surface so the PTY module loads without Electron This closes the round-3 blocker: "the doc never says how orcad installs setPtyController without Electron." `registerPtyHandlers` owns the `RuntimePtyController` that `terminal.create` actually spawns through — the thing a Node backend needs and cannot get from the provider thunks. The module was otherwise host-agnostic already; the only thing pinning 8,031 lines to Electron was a static `ipcMain` / `powerMonitor` import used purely to register renderer handlers that no headless host will ever receive. `src/main/ipc/pty-host-bindings.ts` makes those surfaces settable, defaulting to no-ops. Unlike AppEnvironment and SecretStore, the default does NOT throw: a host with no renderer legitimately has nothing to register against, so not registering handlers nobody can call is correct rather than a hidden downgrade. The desktop installs the real objects in `attach-main-window-services` before its handlers run. Also converts the remaining electron import to a top-level `import type`. oxlint's `no-import-type-side-effects` caught that inline `type` specifiers still leave a side-effect import — precisely the "type-only is not enough if esbuild still emits require('electron')" trap a reviewer flagged. **`src/main/ipc/pty.ts` now bundles with zero `require("electron")`.** A Node entry can call `registerPtyHandlers(null, runtime, …)` and get a working PTY controller. Verified: 128 files / 1,290 tests across ipc/pty and providers; the built-artifact acceptance smoke passes end-to-end — which is the check that matters, since this changes how every PTY handler registers; typecheck and oxlint clean. * fix(pty-bindings): drop two unused eslint-disable directives CI runs oxlint with unused-disable reporting; the two `@typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any` suppressions I added were never triggered by any enabled rule, so they failed static analysis as dead directives. The `any[]` rest args stay — they mirror electron's own IpcMain signature, and narrowing them would reject the real object at the desktop call site. Verified with the exact CI invocation: `oxlint --format github` reports 0 warnings, 0 errors across the repo. * fix(pty): install the host bindings per process, not per window A real regression my own change introduced, caught by the SSH docker E2E (`paired-startup-exec-readiness` — "recovers startup exec through a headed paired desktop owner"). It reproduced on rerun, so it was not a flake. `setPtyHostBindings` was called inside `attachMainWindowServices`, i.e. when a window attaches. But `registerHeadlessPtyRuntime` (index.ts:3163) calls `registerPtyHandlers` on the serve path *before* any window exists — so those handlers registered against the no-op default and never reached the real `ipcMain`. A paired desktop owner then attached to a runtime whose PTY handlers were wired to nothing. The bindings describe the *host*, not the *window*: an Electron main process always has `ipcMain`, whether or not a window is open. Installing them beside `setAppEnvironment`/`setSecretStore` at the top of bootstrap fixes both paths. Verified: 128 files / 1,290 tests; the built-artifact acceptance smoke passes; typecheck clean; `oxlint --format github` (the exact CI invocation) reports 0/0. * feat(orcad): de-electron the runtime core and add the Node entry + build gate **`src/main/runtime/orca-runtime.ts` — 41,048 lines — no longer imports electron.** Its last three sites go through `runtime-desktop-surface.ts`: a native notification, the authoritative-window lookup, and the one `ipcMain` channel used by the renderer-backed tab-create fallback. All three are unreachable without a renderer — `createTerminal` already takes the background branch when no window exists (#10333) — so a Node host installs none and the runtime relays notifications to paired clients, which is the better destination anyway. Ratchet 25 → 24. Adds `src/main/orcad/orcad-entry.ts`: Node host adapters plus a `startOrcad` that constructs the runtime, installs the PTY controller via `registerPtyHandlers(null, …)`, and serves RPC. It sets two defaults the constructor gets wrong for a headless host — `canRecoverPersistentLocalPtys: false` (no daemon here) and `getDesktopWindowStatus: 'blocked'` (a Node host can never be promoted to a desktop window, which is what `'openable'` claims). Adds `config/scripts/build-orcad.mjs`, which **currently fails, on purpose**: 25 modules still import electron (browser and speech clusters, plugins, jira/proxy, filesystem-watcher, and four `require('electron').app` one-liners). It names them. Two bugs found while building it, both worth recording: - The first bundle looked clean and was not. `electron` was bundleable, so esbuild rewrote the metafile `path` to the resolved file under node_modules and a check for `path === 'electron'` passed while the package was in the bundle — it failed at runtime with electron's own installer message. The check now reads `original`, and electron is marked external so a residual import fails loudly instead. - `jsonc-parser`'s UMD build breaks the bundle at load; aliased to its ESM entry, the same fix `build-relay.mjs` already carries. Verified: desktop unchanged — the built-artifact acceptance smoke passes, runtime/pty/ provider suites green, typecheck clean, `oxlint --format github` 0/0. * refactor(host): drop the last two require('electron') app lookups `computer/sidecar-client.ts` and `ports/port-scan-command-client.ts` read the app root through `require('electron').app` inside a try/catch. Both were already correct under plain Node at runtime — they return null when it throws — but the literal text fails the plain-Node entry guard regardless, which is why port-scan carried a comment warning it must never become reachable from a fork entry. Reading the AppEnvironment port gives the identical "no app root here" answer without the text, so that warning is now obsolete and the comment says so. Ratchet 24 → 22. Every remaining entry is a real coupling: the browser cluster (15, which variant B does not ship), speech (2), plugins (2), and jira/proxy-settings (2, needing an HttpClient port for Chromium session partitions). Verified: 25 files / 209 tests; acceptance smoke passes; typecheck and `oxlint --format github` clean. * docs(orcad): record that the ratchet under-counts orcad's graph The ratchet reports 22 electron importers; the orcad build reports 23. The extra is agent-hooks/wsl-hook-relay-launch.ts, and the cause is a gap in the gate rather than a rounding error: the ratchet measures what orca-runtime + runtime-rpc reach, while orcad's entry also imports ipc/pty directly to install the PTY controller. Once orcad ships it must become a ratchet entry point, or the two numbers drift and the gate quietly stops covering the artifact it exists for. * refactor(runtime): inject the browser commands factory Drops 14 modules from the runtime's Electron graph in one change — the whole Chromium browser cluster. Ratchet 22 → 8. `OrcaRuntimeService` constructed `RuntimeBrowserCommands` as a field initializer, and that construction is what pulled in `BrowserWindow`, `session`, `webContents` and the cookie jars. Importing the class for its *type* is free; only building it costs. So the class import becomes `import type`, and the instance comes from `runtime-browser-commands-factory.ts`. The desktop installs the real factory at the Electron entry. **All ~80 existing `this.browserCommands.*.bind(...)` delegations are untouched** — a review round specifically warned that rewriting those was the expensive, risky part, and this avoids it entirely. With no factory installed, browser commands reject per call with `browser_unavailable` rather than resolving to a stub that silently succeeds. The runtime already filters browser capabilities out of `getStatus()` when no backend exists, so clients do not offer the affordance in the first place. Also corrects a stale comment in `pty-renderer-surface.ts` that still described the fake window as present tense; it was deleted two commits ago. Verified: 451 files / 5,513 tests across `src/main/browser` and `src/main/runtime` — the entire browser automation suite; the built-artifact acceptance smoke passes; `pnpm typecheck` and `oxlint --format github` clean. * refactor(host): extract the plugin client list and port two app lookups Ratchet 8 → 5. - `listPluginsForClients` moves to `src/main/plugins/plugin-client-list.ts`. It needed only three `plugins/*` helpers, none of them Electron — it was colocated with `ipcMain.handle` registrations, so the runtime's `plugins.list` RPC dragged all of Electron in to call a function that reads a lockfile. Same shape as preflight. Dropping it also releases `ipc/plugin-marketplaces.ts`. - `agent-hooks/wsl-hook-relay-launch.ts` and `speech/stt-service.ts` read `getAppPath` and `isPackaged` through the AppEnvironment port. The five that remain are all genuinely Chromium and need the HttpClient port or a watcher split, not another mechanical swap: `browser/cdp-bridge` (webContents), `ipc/filesystem-watcher` (ipcMain), `jira/authenticated-request` and `network/proxy-settings` (net + session partitions), `speech/model-manager` (`net.request`, which honors app proxy settings that Node https does not — replacing it is a behaviour change, not a rename). Verified: 219 files / 1,922 tests across plugins, speech, agent-hooks and the runtime RPC methods; the built-artifact acceptance smoke passes; typecheck and `oxlint --format github` clean. * refactor(network): resolve the default proxy session lazily Ratchet 5 → 4. `proxy-settings.ts` needed exactly one Electron value: `session.defaultSession`, as the fallback when a caller does not pass `options.proxySession`. Callers could already inject a session; only the default was hard-wired. It now comes from a settable resolver, so the module loads under plain Node. **A resolver rather than a Session, because a Session eagerly throws.** The first attempt installed `session.defaultSession` directly in pre-ready bootstrap and broke startup outright — `TypeError: Session can only be received when app is ready`. The acceptance smoke caught it before commit. Deferring to first use is always after ready. Behaviour with no session is not a degradation: there is no Chromium proxy config to discover, so `resolveProxy` is skipped and the environment variables become the whole answer rather than a fallback. Applying rules to a session that does not exist is likewise skipped; settings are still honoured because outbound requests read the env. This reaches past Jira — a review round noted `ensureElectronProxyFromEnvironment` is also on the Claude HTTP path via `oauth-refresh.ts` and `rate-limits/claude-fetcher.ts`. Verified: 48 files / 526 tests across network, jira and rate-limits; the built-artifact acceptance smoke passes; typecheck and `oxlint --format github` clean. * fix(index): merge the duplicate proxy-settings import CI's code-quality lint (`oxlint --config config/oxlint-code-quality-native-plugins.json --deny-warnings`) flags a module imported twice in one file. My earlier insertion added a second `./network/proxy-settings` import beside the existing one. Verified with CI's exact invocation: exit 0. * refactor(network): add the HttpClient port and lift BrowserError out of cdp-bridge Ratchet 4 → 2. Two unrelated couplings, both of the same shape — a small thing living inside a Chromium-heavy file. `BrowserError` is a seven-line error class with no dependencies, but it lived in `browser/cdp-bridge.ts`, which imports `webContents`. The runtime catches that type on paths with nothing to do with CDP, so one import kept a Node host from loading the runtime at all. Moved to `browser/browser-error.ts`; cdp-bridge re-exports it. `jira/authenticated-request.ts` fetches through `net.fetch` and reads `session.defaultSession`. `network/http-client.ts` makes both settable. This one is a **named port rather than a silent fallback, because the fallback is not transparent**: Electron's net follows Chromium session/proxy state, avoids undici's stale keep-alive sockets after a VPN path change, and sends a Chrome user agent that Jira's XSRF check depends on. A Node host gets `globalThis.fetch`, reads proxy config from the environment, and sends Node's user agent. That difference is documented at the port. `session.defaultSession` is read per call, not captured at install — it throws before the app is ready, which is the mistake the previous commit made and the acceptance smoke caught. Test wiring: `jira/client.test.ts` installs the port *inside* `loadClientModule`, after its `vi.resetModules()`, since the reset gives the module a fresh singleton. Verified: 461 files / 5,616 tests across jira, browser, network and runtime; the built-artifact acceptance smoke passes; typecheck, `oxlint --format github` and the code-quality lint with `--deny-warnings` all clean. * fix(http-client): register the Node fetch fallback with the call-site audit `global-fetch-call-site-audit.test.ts` guards every global-fetch use, because the global runs on undici where an unread response body can crash the whole process (orca#8695). The HttpClient port's Node fallback is a new such call site and was unregistered — the guard caught it in a full-suite run. Registered with the reasoning, and the port's doc comment now states the body-safety contract explicitly: it hands the Response straight to its caller and never inspects it, so the consume/cancel obligation stays exactly where it already was — with the caller, unchanged from when they called Electron's net directly. Two comments elsewhere mentioned the global by name and tripped the line scan as false positives; reworded to describe the behaviour rather than name the API. Verified: audit passes; typecheck and `oxlint --format github` clean. * fix(app-environment): read hasAppEnvironment through the realm slot	2026-08-22 21:34:39 -07:00
Neil	cbea7530b4	build(runtime): gate new Electron imports reachable from the Orca runtime (#15919) ... * build(runtime): gate new Electron imports reachable from the Orca runtime The runtime is meant to become host-agnostic so it can also run on plain Node, but nothing enforced that. `orca-runtime.ts` reaches dozens of modules that import `electron`, and the count grows silently: the import that breaks portability is usually several hops away, so no reviewer sees the edge. Add a reachability ratchet, modelled on the existing max-lines one. It bundles the runtime and its RPC server with esbuild, reads the metafile for every module importing `electron`, and diffs that against a checked-in baseline. A new module fails; a removed one forces the baseline to tighten. The list may only shrink. A per-file lint rule cannot do this — the point is precisely the transitive edges — so this runs as a build gate in `pnpm lint`. Baseline starts at 36, down from 50 before the SecretStore and AppEnvironment ports landed, which is the migration made measurable. Verified: gate passes clean, fails with an actionable message when an `electron` import is added to a runtime module, and passes again when reverted. * fix(runtime-ratchet): resolve paths from the script, not the caller's cwd Run from anywhere but the repo root, the gate died with an unhandled ENOENT stack instead of a usable message. It failed closed, so it was never unsafe — just undebuggable. Anchor ROOT to import.meta.dirname and pass absWorkingDir to esbuild so metafile keys stay repo-relative. * ci(runtime-ratchet): actually run the gate in CI The ratchet was wired into the `lint` npm script, but CI's static-analysis job runs the individual checks rather than `pnpm lint`, so the gate would never have fired on a PR — it would have looked enforced while enforcing nothing. Runs on ubuntu-latest alongside the max-lines ratchet, so the checked-in baseline is only ever produced by one platform. * fix(runtime-ratchet): mark native addons external so CI can run the gate ssh2's optional cpu-features dep points at a prebuilt .node that only exists where a build toolchain has run. Loading it made the gate pass locally and hard-fail on CI with 'Could not resolve ../build/Release/cpufeatures.node'. The gate only reads the import graph, never the addon, so resolve every .node to an external stub instead. Verified by hiding the local prebuild — which is CI's state — and re-running: still 36 entries, exit 0. * fix(runtime-ratchet): stop the gate failing open on Windows The entry guard compared import.meta.url against a `file://${process.argv[1]}` template. On Windows argv[1] is a native path (C:\repo\...) while import.meta.url is file:///C:/repo/..., so they never match: main() never ran and `pnpm lint` exited 0 on Windows without bundling, reading the baseline, or enforcing anything. Use pathToFileURL, which is the idiom check-max-lines-ratchet.mjs:225 already uses. CI runs this on ubuntu so enforcement was never actually lost, but a Windows developer got a green gate that checked nothing.	2026-08-22 21:22:07 -07:00
Neil	057fbfcffc	perf(windows): read the process table natively instead of forking PowerShell (#15749) ... * perf(windows): read the process table natively instead of forking PowerShell Seven independent readers each forked powershell.exe to run Get-CimInstance Win32_Process, with a wmic fallback that Windows 11 24H2 has removed. On a domain-joined host with PowerShell Transcription enabled by policy, one of them running every ~2s recorded ~289GB across 1.4 million files (#15209). The same scan cost ~700ms and ran per pane (#15036), and a Group Policy or AV block turned it into 'unavailable', which callers read as 'no evidence' -- which is how a PTY tree survives its own teardown (#9045, #10475). A Toolhelp32 snapshot answers the same question with no child process. Measured on Windows 11 with 1050 processes, p50/p95: pid+ppid+name 15.9 / 17.5 ms +memory +command line 30.6 / 33.7 ms Get-CimInstance 706 / 723 ms Two upstream defects needed patching, both found by running it on real hardware. The binding requires Spectre-mitigated libraries our agents do not carry (node-pty is patched the same way). And enumeration stopped after 1024 processes: on a host with 1051 the module returned exactly 1024, and the querying process was itself among the 27 missing -- a truncated snapshot silently hides the descendants teardown is looking for, which is the failure this whole change exists to remove. Migrated: the foreground/descendant reader (the #15209 scraper and the teardown identity gate) and the port scanner's PID attribution. NOT migrated: the memory collector and three identity probes, which need Win32_Process.CreationDate and have no native equivalent. Start time is a proxy for identity anyway; an inherited job handle is the real answer, so those belong with the job-object work rather than here. Packaging follows the windows-native-registry contract exactly: optional, absent from onlyBuiltDependencies so macOS/Linux never run node-gyp, win32-only in the packaged runtime. Asserted by the existing contract test, which also stops pinning a whole source literal that only tested its own formatting. * chore(process): ratchet the child_process allowlist down windows-foreground-process-rows.ts no longer spawns anything, so its allowlist line is stale. The guard fails on a stale entry as well as a new one, precisely so a migrated file cannot keep a slot open and hide the next regression in the same path. * fix(ports): import the process-table reader the scanner uses Missing import: the migration replaced the PowerShell call but the new symbol was never imported, so tsc failed. Vitest transpiles without typechecking, which is why the port-scanner suite stayed green. * fix(deps): sync this branch's lockfile with its patch set Same class as the fix on the tip branch: pnpm records a hash per patched dependency, and this branch introduces the windows-process-tree patch without its lockfile entry matching. Every job here failed at install with ERR_PNPM_LOCKFILE_CONFIG_MISMATCH. Verified with --frozen-lockfile, which is what CI runs and what my local runs were not. * test(relay): drive the relay's Windows fixtures from the native snapshot Two relay cases fed a PowerShell CIM payload through a mocked execFile. That reader is gone, so both failed -- deterministically, on every PR run for this branch and the one above it. I did not catch it because my own verification sweep was 'src/main src/shared config/scripts' and never included src/relay. The relay is a first-class consumer of the process table; leaving it out of the sweep is how a deterministic failure survived six review rounds.	2026-08-21 21:54:57 -07:00
Jinjing	d8e9fa1bb9	Revert "fix(terminal): apply pane padding on all four edges (#15544)" (#15623) ... This reverts commit 4b2ed5ddd4.	2026-08-20 09:57:55 -07:00
Brennan Benson	4b2ed5ddd4	fix(terminal): apply pane padding on all four edges (#15544) ... * fix(terminal): apply pane padding on all four edges Move the configured inset onto xterm so the terminal fills its pane while the fit calculation accounts for both sides of each axis. Add a geometry golden that forces cell remainders and verifies dynamic padding without relying on renderer pixels. * fix(terminal): normalize imported padding for fitting * fix(terminal): align stored and fitted padding	2026-08-20 01:07:56 -07:00
OrcaWin	471bc9d8ce	Ship the WSL transcript helper with the Windows relay (STA-4831) (#15529)	2026-08-20 00:16:04 -07:00
Neil	fdd4091ebd	fix(hooks): isolate lint-staged backups per worktree (#15388)	2026-08-19 22:37:02 -07:00
Neil	13b10e0b54	ci: cut PR wall clock by caching what CI recomputes every run (#15211) ... None of these change what CI checks — they remove work the runners repeated on every PR. - install-node-dependencies installed with --no-frozen-lockfile, so every job re-resolved the graph against the registry to recompute what the lockfile already pins. Measured at ~62 MB of packument metadata per job; the pnpm store cache does not cover the metadata cache, so this was paid ~39 times per run. The `git diff` guard that made the re-resolution redundant stays. - --ignore-scripts leaves node-pty with no build/Release, so ensure-native-runtime node-gyp-compiled it in every job asking for a runtime. Cache the build under an ABI-bound key (runtime, resolved Node version, node-pty patch) with no restore-keys, since a partial match is exactly the mismatched build that would be recompiled anyway. - The four fetch-depth: 0 checkouts pulled full history including every historical blob (blobs are ~89% of this repo's pack). They only need the commit graph for a merge-base diff, so fetch them blobless. Measured 30-43s each today versus 8s for the shallow checkouts. One of them, e2e-paths, gates the entire E2E chain. - E2E jobs ordered setup-node before pnpm, which meant setup-node could not find the store and no E2E job cached dependencies at all. Reorder and cache; this sits on the critical path in both the build job and each shard. - git_compatibility rebuilt Git 2.25.5 from a pinned tarball on every PR. Cache the build; the sha256 assertion still guards the miss path. - typecheck ran three independent tsc passes back to back and discarded the .tsbuildinfo each project already emits. Run them concurrently and cache the incremental state. - package (windows) built the electron-vite targets serially via build:release. Use a :parallel variant that overlaps them, matching what the Linux package job already packages and smoke-tests from. Contract tests cover each new cache's ordering and key so none of them can silently start serving a stale or ABI-mismatched artifact.	2026-08-17 19:20:13 -07:00
Neil	24e662adc1	feat(ssh): verify host keys, and restore panes correctly across a reconnect (#14844) ... * docs(ssh): design for real host key verification (STA-4319) Today's ssh2 verifier records a fingerprint and returns true — every host key is accepted, with no known_hosts consult and no change detection anywhere in src/main/ssh/. Scope is per-connection, so exec, SFTP, port forwarding, the watcher and relay deploy all ride that one unverified handshake, and the ProxyJump path puts the final hop — the topology most likely to cross untrusted network — on ssh2 specifically. Decisions worth calling out: - Read the user's known_hosts as a trust source but NEVER write to it. That file is shared with every other SSH tool on the machine; appending means line endings, permissions, concurrent writers and a corruption blast radius well beyond us. Accepted keys go to our own per-target store. Reading theirs is also the entire migration story: most developers already have their hosts there. - Mismatch is scoped to the SAME key type. A host with only an RSA entry that presents ed25519 is unknown, not changed. ssh2 negotiates ed25519 first, so without this we would fire a change-of-key alarm at nearly every existing user on their first upgraded connect — training them to dismiss the one warning that is supposed to mean something. Flagged in review as the decision I am least sure of; a downgrade-vector argument against it is being tested. - Changed key hard-fails with no override button; recovery is a separate explicit action, offered only when OUR store is what disagreed, because forgetting our record cannot unblock a known_hosts conflict. - Background reconnects deny rather than prompt. A dialog the user cannot place in context only teaches click-through. Two traps are documented because either would make the fix silently do nothing: an async verifier returns a Promise, which ssh2 reads as truthy and accepts immediately; and the existing test mock invokes hostVerifier with one argument and ignores the return, so it would pass against a verifier that never decides. Design only — no behaviour change. The doc is added to the tracked-reference allowlist in .gitignore alongside the other docs/reference entries. * docs(ssh): revise the host key design after security and migration review Three things the reviews changed, kept visible rather than quietly edited out. THREAT MODEL WAS WRONG IN THREE PLACES. Jump hosts are not the worst case — they are already safe: shouldUseSystemSshTransport branches on exactly the inputs resolveEffectiveProxy does, and attemptConnect returns after the system probe, so ProxyJump goes through OpenSSH and is verified. Agent forwarding was overstated (gated on the user's ForwardAgent). Credential theft was understated: any auth error counts as agent fallback, so a MITM walks the user to the password AND private-key passphrase prompts, and cachedPassword replays without prompting. The relay claim was backwards — the attacker owns their own machine; the real impact is the return direction, where they become the host our workspace trusts. TYPE SCOPING IS A DOWNGRADE VECTOR WITHOUT ALGORITHM ORDERING. This was the decision I flagged as least certain and asked to have argued both ways. OpenSSH is safe only because order_hostkeyalgs() puts known types first and RFC 4253 gives the client's order priority. ssh2 negotiates ed25519 first regardless, so an attacker who cannot forge the RSA key on file just presents ed25519 and gets a friendly first-contact prompt instead of a hard failure. Keep scoping, but set algorithms.serverHostKey to lead with the types on file — and add a sixth outcome for 'unknown type, known host', which must never read as first contact. SHIP THE DEFENCE BEFORE THE DIALOG. Startup restore fires eager connects for all targets in parallel with a 15s timeout while a prompt would live 120s; ephemeral VM targets present a new key every launch; paired-web connects run on the host desktop, so the dialog opens on someone else's screen. Phase 1 is therefore no modal at all: consult known_hosts and our store, match connects, unknown persists with accept-new semantics, mismatch and revoked hard-fail. That is the whole MITM defence with none of the migration risk. Also folded in, verified live against OpenSSH 10.2p1: the without-port fallback (bracketed lookup first, then bare, where the second pass can only yield match or unknown — otherwise a bare line plus a non-default port produces a spurious prompt); hashed entries hash the candidate form; multiple files union; a cert-authority line does not match a plain key. IPv6 and bracket parsing moved INTO scope — that is a parser requirement, not a scope call, and getting it wrong produces the prompt-training harm the design exists to avoid. * feat(ssh): parse and match OpenSSH known_hosts The matcher half of STA-4319. No behaviour change yet — nothing calls this. Hand-rolled because no maintained JS implementation exists, and written against behaviour observed from OpenSSH 10.2p1 rather than inferred from the man page. Three of those behaviours a reasonable reading gets wrong: - A non-default port is TWO ordered lookups, not one candidate set: '[host]:port' first, then bare host ('checking without port identifier' in ssh -v). The fallback pass can only yield match or unknown — OpenSSH downgrades a wrong key there rather than reporting a change. Collapse them and anyone holding a bare line who connects off-port gets a spurious first-contact result; treat the fallback as authoritative and they get a false change-of-key alarm. - Revocation resolves in its own pass so the verdict cannot depend on line order. Verified both orderings. - A cert-authority line never matches a plain host key; it only validates certificates. A normal line alongside it still decides. Mismatch is scoped to the same key type, and a host known by a DIFFERENT type returns unknown-type-known-host rather than plain unknown — an attacker who cannot forge the key on file must not get a friendly first-contact result by presenting another type. That outcome is only half the defence; the other half (leading serverHostKey with known types) lands with the wiring. 47 tests from vectors executed against real sshd, including ssh-keygen -H hashed entries. Each of six mutations reddens it: collapsing the passes, letting the fallback report mismatch, dropping type scoping, resolving revocation in line order, honouring an unrecognised marker, and skipping the blob/type agreement check. * feat(ssh): decide what to do with a presented host key The policy half of STA-4319, kept separate from the ssh2 wiring so it is testable without a handshake and injected rather than importing its sources, so a test states its own trust state instead of writing files. Phase 1 ships no dialog — a test asserts the decision is never 'prompt'. Startup restore opens every previously-active target at once, ephemeral VM targets would ask every launch, and paired-web connects run on the host desktop where the dialog would appear on someone else's screen. Ordering that matters: revocation outranks everything including StrictHostKeyChecking=no, because a revoked key is a statement that this key is known-bad rather than merely unrecognised. known_hosts is named before our own store on a change, because its remedy (ssh-keygen -R) is the one that also unblocks ssh and git — pointing at a remedy that cannot work is worse than none. Two carve-outs with reasons: an ephemeral runtime target accepts WITHOUT recording, since a fresh VM presents a new key every launch and a stored record would accumulate per launch and eventually read as a spurious change; and when ssh -G ran on the HOME-divergent path that suppresses /etc/ssh/ssh_config, an unknown host is denied, because a site-wide policy may forbid it and being laxer than ssh is the one outcome that is never acceptable. Rejection text deliberately avoids 'authentication failed' and 'permission denied': the reconnect ladder classifies on those substrings, so a denial phrased that way is retried forever against a decision that will never change. Pinned by a test. * feat(ssh): build the host key verifier and the algorithm order that makes it safe Still not wired into the handshake — that lands next. This is the piece that turns a decision into an ssh2 callback, plus the half of the design that is easy to forget because it lives in a different config field. The verifier MUST be a plain function returning undefined. ssh2 does 'const ret = verifier(key, verify); if (ret !== undefined) verify(ret)', so an async function returns a Promise — neither undefined nor falsy — and ssh2 accepts the key immediately while ignoring whatever the callback later decides. Making this async would silently restore exactly the accept-everything behaviour the module exists to remove, so a test asserts the return value is undefined. orderServerHostKeyAlgorithms is what makes type-scoped matching safe rather than a downgrade. RFC 4253 gives the client's algorithm order priority, so leading with the types we already hold for a host denies a server the choice of presenting some other type to convert a hard failure into first contact. Without it, an attacker who cannot forge the key on file just offers a different algorithm. Revoked entries never contribute to that order. Also fails closed on two paths that would otherwise hang or over-trust: a key whose own length-prefixed header cannot be read is refused rather than reasoned about, and a throw from any dependency denies, because ssh2 may not catch an exception raised inside the verifier and the handshake would hang instead of failing. 18 tests. Includes the two negative cases that matter — first-contact keys are recorded, but keys we already know, rejected keys, ephemeral runtime targets and a lax StrictHostKeyChecking are not. * fix(ssh): promote every RSA signature algorithm for a known ssh-rsa key A known_hosts entry names the KEY type, which is not the negotiated ALGORITHM name. One ssh-rsa key is offered as rsa-sha2-512, rsa-sha2-256 or ssh-rsa depending on the signature algorithm, so matching the literal name only would leave a host we know by RSA ordered behind ed25519 — precisely the ordering this function exists to prevent, and precisely the population (RSA-era known_hosts entries) it was written for. Verified from ssh2's own negotiation while wiring this: kex.js iterates the CLIENT list and takes the first entry the server also offers, so client order does decide, as RFC 4253 says. ssh2's default order leads with ed25519 and places the RSA algorithms fifth through seventh. * fix(ssh): verify host keys instead of accepting every one (STA-4319) The actual fix. ssh-connection's verifier recorded a fingerprint and returned true, so every ssh2 connection accepted every host key — no known_hosts consult, no change detection. It now consults the user's known_hosts plus our own store and refuses a changed, revoked or unverifiable key. Phase 1 by design: no dialog. Unknown hosts are accepted and recorded (accept-new semantics), because startup restore opens every previously-active target at once, ephemeral VM targets present a new key each launch, and paired-web connects run on the host desktop where a prompt would appear on someone else's screen. The MITM defence lands now; the prompt is Phase 2. Also sets algorithms.serverHostKey to lead with the types already known for the host. Without it the type-scoped matching is a downgrade — an attacker who cannot forge the key on file just presents another type and turns a hard failure into first contact. Verified from ssh2's kex.js that the client list decides. Denial replaces ssh2's generic handshake error with the specific reason, because the reconnect ladder cannot distinguish a generic failure from a transient fault and would retry forever against a decision that will never change. An unreadable trust store degrades to known_hosts only rather than failing the connect: a changed key is still refused, and a host trusted only by us falls back to first contact and is re-recorded, reaching the same decision. The ssh2 mock now uses the callback form and aborts the handshake on denial. As written it called hostVerifier(key) with one argument and ignored the result, so it would have passed against a verifier that never decides — flagged in the design as a mock that had to change, not a test to quietly rewrite. Two new tests pin the wiring rather than the module: an unidentifiable blob is refused, and a well-formed key is accepted. Note for review: commit 2d2a0880ba unintentionally swept in two modules built concurrently (ssh-known-hosts-source, ssh-host-key-store) because I staged with 'git add -A'; its message describes only the verifier. Both are covered by their own tests, but the attribution in that commit is wrong. 1461 SSH tests pass. * fix(ssh): bind the host key store to the active profile at startup Without this the store reports nothing trusted on every launch. Safe — known_hosts still decides, and a host trusted only by us degrades to first contact and is re-recorded — but it silently discarded our own accept records, so the store the design calls for was not actually in use. Bound beside the profile Store, since it is a sidecar of the same data file. Also records why the paired-web carve-out the migration review asked for is NOT implemented in Phase 1, rather than leaving it looking forgotten. That carve-out exists to stop a web client waiting out the 120s prompt timeout — a hang only reachable if a prompt exists, and Phase 1 has none, which the decision function pins with a test asserting it never returns 'prompt'. An RPC connect therefore behaves exactly like a local one. Adding a fail-fast path now would introduce a failure mode for a hang that cannot occur; it becomes load-bearing when the dialog lands and is listed under Phase 2. Noted there for whoever builds Phase 2: runtime/rpc/methods/ssh.ts already swallows the specific error and rethrows a generic one, so the host-key reason will not reach a web user without a change there too. Full unit suite: 52,352 pass. The 8 failures are the known environment baseline (5 osc8, 2 IME) plus one browser-cookie suite-ordering flake that passes in isolation — none in src/main/ssh, and none related to this change. * fix(ssh): close two downgrades the implementation review found Both were in my wiring, not the design, and two reviewers found the first independently. 1. OUR STORE WAS TYPE-DOWNGRADABLE. The inline lookup filtered by key type first and could only answer match/mismatch/unknown, so a record of a DIFFERENT type for the same endpoint read as "unknown". A host learned on first contact — ed25519, since ssh2 proposes it first — and absent from known_hosts could then be impersonated by presenting RSA: both sources say unknown, so accept-and-remember, silently. That is exactly the downgrade D3 says the design cannot ship without, applied to the records we create ourselves. The store's own isTrusted already computed the right answer and had no production caller. Stored types now also feed the algorithm ordering, without which the guard is only half present. 2. WE KEYED ON THE ORCA LABEL, NOT THE DIALED HOST. "ssh -G" echoes its own argument back as its hostname field when no Host block matches, so for a manual target that field IS the Orca label — the one name D2 forbids keying on, and one ssh never wrote. We consulted no entries at all, so an impersonated host read as first contact. Now keys on the dialed host, which buildConnectConfig has already resolved through HostName, with HostKeyAlias still winning. That inverted an existing test rather than deleting it: "uses the resolved hostname, never the Orca label" encoded an assumption disproved against OpenSSH 10.2p1, so it is renamed and reversed with the reason recorded in the test. 3. NO READABLE SOURCE IS NOT FIRST CONTACT. Every known_hosts file failing to read was indistinguishable from "this host is unknown", so a changed key would be accepted the one time we could not check. The loader now reports how many files it could read, and zero readable sources with an empty store takes the strict path instead of recording trust. 4. A superseded attempt's rejection could replace the live attempt's error, and substituting a new Error drops ssh2's code, so a transient ECONNRESET would stop being classified as retryable. The rejection is now local to its attempt. 5. displayHost was the Orca label, so a mismatch could print "ssh-keygen -R <label>" — a remedy that removes nothing. Also adds the tests that would have caught 1 and 2, the stale-attempt denial, and IPv6 literals, which the design moved into scope and nothing covered. 1,469 SSH tests pass. * fix(ssh): stop offering credentials to a host we just refused A refused host key ended the handshake and then fell into the credential ladder, because ssh2 reports a denied key as a generic auth failure and the passphrase branch is eligible on message shape alone whenever an encrypted identity file is configured. So the sequence was: decide this host may not be who it claims to be, then ask the user for their passphrase and hand it to it. Failing that, prompt for a password. Failing that, retry over the system ssh binary, which for a disagreement with our own store rather than known_hosts would simply connect. That inverts the point of checking at all. A denied key is now final for the attempt: recognised by type before any fallback runs, and again inside the agent-fallback retry, which re-runs the handshake and so can be the attempt that denies. Two things had to change for that to hold. The rejection is now a HostKeyVerificationError rather than a rebuilt Error, so the connect path recognises it by type. Substring matching would have worked today and quietly stopped working the first time a reason string was reworded — and these strings are already worded around the auth-error classifier, so they are exactly the kind that get edited. And the verifier now reports the denials that skipped the policy: an unreadable key blob and an internal failure both denied without calling onDecision, so the connect path saw only ssh2's generic failure and walked the ladder. That was the actual path the new test hit first. The report carries no fingerprint, since there is no host key to identify, and the connection no longer overwrites the fingerprint it holds with an empty one — the relay keys install-lock isolation on that value. The reconnect ladder also refuses to retry it. Its classifier is otherwise substring-driven, so a reason containing "connection reset" would have been retried until the ladder gave up, burying the reason under nine attempts. Tests: no credential prompt after a refusal, an encrypted key configured so the passphrase branch is eligible; refused reports as 'error', not 'auth-failed', which would invite the user to re-enter credentials that are not the problem; no retry; both bypassing denials report; a throwing listener still denies rather than hanging the handshake. Also drops three test files a bisect resurrected from before the revert that deleted them. 172 tests pass across the three touched files; typecheck and lint clean. Pre-existing on origin/main and untouched here: 3 failures in ssh-connection-sftp-namespace.test.ts. * fix(ssh): stop treating an absent known_hosts as a source we failed to read The previous commit's "no readable source is not first contact" guard was right about the danger and wrong about how to detect it, and the version that shipped would have refused every connection a new profile ever makes. A file that does not exist and a file that refuses to open both arrive as a rejected readFile, and I counted them the same way. They are opposites. An absent known_hosts is the normal state — ssh creates it on its own first connect, and an Orca profile that has never connected has none — and it is real evidence that no host is known. A file that exists and will not open is evidence withheld: the entry that would have said "this key changed" may be sitting in it. The default list is the reason this was fatal rather than obscure. It always names known_hosts2, which essentially never exists, so on a machine with a normal known_hosts the count was 1-of-2 and everything worked; on a fresh profile it was 0-of-2 and every connect failed with "the system SSH configuration could not be read" — a message about a file the user does not have and an error they cannot act on. The suite passed only because the machine running it happens to have a known_hosts. Pointing HOME at an empty directory fails 62 connection tests, which is what the new wiring test does. So the count is now unreadableFileCount: files that exist and could not be read, which is the condition the guard was always trying to express. Any one of them takes the strict path; an absent or empty file takes none. The store clause is gone with it — a store hit already returns accept before this is consulted, so it never changed an outcome. Tests: absent, empty, permission-denied, directory, and all-parsed at the source; first contact with no known_hosts at all at the wiring level. 1,482 SSH tests pass. The 3 failures in ssh-connection-sftp-namespace.test.ts are pre-existing on origin/main and untouched here. * fix(ssh): let an ephemeral runtime outrank sources we could not read Three things, all about the same question: when we cannot see everything that decides a host key, what does that actually license us to refuse? 1. ON-DEMAND RUNTIMES WERE REFUSED FOR A POLICY THEY COULD NEVER SATISFY. A machine provisioned a minute ago cannot be in known_hosts, by construction — which is why it has a carve-out at all. But the carve-out sat BELOW the incomplete-sources check, so anyone whose HOME diverges from their passwd home (sandboxes, our own E2E isolation) took the `-F` path, and every on-demand runtime connection was refused, pointing at a config file the user cannot fix. Refusing there buys nothing. No policy, seen or unseen, is satisfiable by a host that did not exist yesterday; the trust comes from the provisioning channel. So the carve-out now outranks it. An EXPLICIT StrictHostKeyChecking=yes still wins over both — that one we can read, and the user asked for it. 2. THE FLAG WAS NAMED FOR ONE OF ITS TWO MEANINGS. `siteConfigSuppressed` started as "-F hid /etc/ssh/ssh_config" and had since grown "a known_hosts file exists and would not open" — which is not a site config, and reading the name in the decision function told you nothing about why an unreadable file landed there. It is `verificationSourcesIncomplete` now: we could not see something that decides this, so do not extend NEW trust. A host we already know still connects, because a match is decided before this is reached, and that is now pinned by name. 3. THE COPIED ssh2 ALGORITHM LIST HAD NO DRIFT ALARM. We reorder ssh2's default host-key proposal, which meant hand-copying a list ssh2 exports only from a deep internal path. ssh2 throws `Unsupported algorithm` on anything outside its supported list, so drift does not degrade — every target stops connecting, before a socket opens, with a message about an algorithm the user never chose. Worth knowing that the list is also built conditionally on ed25519 support. Kept as a literal rather than a deep import, since silently adopting a new proposal order is the wrong default — the order is what makes type-scoped matching safe, so a change deserves review. A test now compares it against ssh2's real constant and checks every entry is one ssh2 accepts. Moved next to the ordering function it feeds, and out from between the import statements. 1,488 SSH tests pass. The 3 in ssh-connection-sftp-namespace.test.ts are pre-existing on origin/main. * docs(ssh): record what review changed and the STA-4319 follow-ups The design survived implementation; every defect found afterwards was in the wiring. Worth recording the pattern, because it repeated five times: each one made us either blind or unusable, never subtly wrong — and four of the five broke legitimate hosts rather than admitting bad ones. Action items separate the things Phase 2 must decide (UpdateHostKeys, which is now the likeliest way a legitimate user meets a rejection; the web client never seeing the reason; RPC fail-fast) from the gaps Phase 1 knowingly accepts (WSL, CheckHostIP, ca-only hosts, the hand-copied ssh2 algorithm list). Also flags the rollout risk plainly: this is the first release in which Orca can refuse an SSH connection at all. * test(ssh): pin the ephemeral carve-out where it is actually observable The first version of this test asserted an on-demand runtime connects on first contact, which every target does — it would have passed with the carve-out deleted. Pointing HOME at a home whose known_hosts exists and will not open makes the two cases diverge: a normal target is refused there, an on-demand runtime is not. Removing the carve-out now fails three tests instead of none. Also covers the wiring for the unreadable-source refusal itself, which until now was only pinned at the decision level. * test(ssh): pin the parser against real ssh -G output, and accept-new against ask Two gaps the audit named. The ssh -G fixtures were all hand-written, which means they encode what I expect ssh to print. This one is verbatim OpenSSH_10.2p1 output for a Host block using HostName, HostKeyAlias, StrictHostKeyChecking accept-new, two UserKnownHostsFile paths and a non-default port. The format detail that matters: each file list arrives space-separated on ONE line, so reading it as a single path would consult nothing for anyone with more than one file configured. And accept-new was untested despite being a real OpenSSH value. It currently behaves identically to ask, which is exactly right while no dialog exists and is what lets the defence ship without a modal — so the equivalence is now pinned, and Phase 2 has to break it deliberately rather than discover it. Plus a guard that accept-new never falls into the strict branch. * test(ssh): cover the wire from an accepted key to a record on disk Nothing covered the store end to end. Every connection test runs with it unwired — a real path, since it degrades to known_hosts only — so an accepted first-contact key was never observed becoming a record, and the record was never observed being believed on the next connection. Without that wire the store is dead weight: an unknown host connects every time and is never learned. Its own file for two reasons. initSshHostKeyStoreFile binds module-level state for the rest of the process, and binding it makes the connect prelude do real disk I/O — which the shared suite cannot absorb, because its reconnect tests drive the clock with fake timers and an fs round trip does not complete inside an advanced tick. Adding these there turned 12 unrelated tests red. Covers: the record is written; it is read back as a match; the same key is not recorded twice; a DIFFERENT key for a host we recorded ourselves is refused (the store's entire security value, and a case known_hosts cannot catch since it has never heard of the host); and an on-demand runtime records nothing. Stubbing rememberHostKey to a no-op fails four of the five. * fix(settings): stop truncating the SSH connection error to one line The host key messages are written to be actionable — a mismatch ends in "Run: ssh-keygen -R <host>", which is the remedy that also unblocks ssh and git. The only place in the renderer that displays an SSH connection error clamped it to a single line with `truncate` and carried no title attribute, so the remedy was unreachable, not even on hover. The careful wording reached a CSS ellipsis. Wraps instead, with [overflow-wrap:anywhere] because a long hostname offers no break opportunity and would overflow the column on its own. The paragraph only renders on failure, so the extra height costs nothing in the normal case. CORRECTION to the four preceding commits: they each claimed 3 pre-existing failures in ssh-connection-sftp-namespace.test.ts. That was my error — I had been running `npx vitest` without `--config config/vitest.config.ts`, so the project's setupFiles and execArgv were absent. Under the real config those 3 pass, and have throughout. The whole SSH suite is green: 1,504 passed, 13 skipped. Still failing on this branch and unrelated to it (different subsystems, no file overlap): 5 in terminal-snapshot-osc8-roundtrip and 2 in browser-cookie-import. * fix(terminal): show why the SSH connection failed, not just that it did The reconnect overlay took only a status, so every failure rendered the same sentence: "The SSH connection to devbox failed. Connect again to continue this terminal session." A refused host key and a network timeout were indistinguishable there, and the host key message — the only place that names the remedy, down to `ssh-keygen -R <host>` — reached no terminal user at all. The state carried it the whole way; the overlay simply never asked for it. Adds it as a second line rather than replacing the sentence. The sentence says what to do, the detail says what happened, and keeping both means an errno failure does not lose its guidance to make room for "connect ETIMEDOUT". Wrapped, for the same reason as the settings card: the remedy is at the end. Suppressed for a removed target, which already explains itself and can never reconnect — a stale connection error underneath would contradict it. The new selector mirrors selectRuntimeAwareSshStatus branch for branch, including the unreachable-environment and un-hydrated-bucket nulls, so the pair cannot disagree about which source they read and a detail is never shown next to a status it did not come from. Known and NOT addressed here: "Connect again" is still the wrong advice for a decision that will never change. Telling those apart needs a typed reason on the wire rather than a string, which is a remote-wire-compatibility decision; it is recorded in the STA-4319 follow-ups. Pre-existing on this branch and untouched: 2 failures in terminal-ime-xterm-resumed-preedit-visibility. * docs(ssh): record where the rejection message actually lands Traced end to end, because a rejection the user cannot read is a half-shipped feature — and two of the surfaces were dropping it entirely, both now fixed. What is left is written down rather than guessed at: the status bar renders only 'Error', the terminal overlay's call to action still invites a retry that cannot succeed, toasts carry Electron's remote-method prefix, and the paired-web path replaces the text with 'SSH connection unavailable' on every route — which also affects a DESKTOP user viewing a host owned by a remote Orca server, not just web clients. * refactor(ssh): give the store one matcher instead of two The connect path had its own copy of the store comparison, because ssh2's verifier decides synchronously and cannot await the file, so records are preloaded. That copy is precisely where the type downgrade came from: it answered only match/mismatch/unknown, so a record of a different type for the same endpoint read as first contact and a host learned on first contact could be impersonated by presenting another key type. Fixing it left two implementations that have to agree forever, which is the same bug waiting to happen. matchTrustedHostKeys is now the single pure matcher; isTrusted is a load plus a call to it, and the connect path calls it directly on preloaded records. Same for the key types that feed the algorithm ordering, which the connect path was also filtering by hand. The two copies had in fact already drifted: the connect path lower-cased the query host where the write trims AND lower-cases. Not reachable today — the host is trimmed before it reaches there, which I confirmed by mutating the normalisation and watching the wiring test pass anyway. So this is not a bug fix, and the wiring-level test I first wrote for it proved nothing and is gone. The unit test that replaces it drives the matcher directly, where the input is mine to control, and it does fail when the normalisation diverges. Also adds an equivalence test across all six outcomes between the preloaded and awaited paths, so the two can never answer differently again. Restores the local name siteConfigSuppressed for the `-F` check; it was renamed along with the decision input, but at that site it really does mean only the one thing, and the union with the unreadable-file count happens one line later. 1,509 SSH tests pass. * test(ssh): check the matcher against a live OpenSSH client, not against my beliefs Every other test in the parser file states what I believe ssh does. These state what it did: an OpenSSH 10.2p1 client against a real sshd on 127.0.0.1:2222, with the client's own verdict recorded from its output, and ssh-keygen -H's own salt and hash pinned as a vector. Two assumptions the design leans on were worth more than an argument. THE FALLBACK PASS MAY NOT REPORT A CHANGE. We look up `[host]:port` first and retry the bare host, and only the first pass may answer `mismatch`. With StrictHostKeyChecking=accept-new, a bare line holding a DIFFERENT key, dialed on 2222, ssh connected and appended a new `[127.0.0.1]:2222` line — no IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED banner. It read that as first contact. Had we reported a change there we would refuse hosts ssh connects to happily, and the wrongness would have been invisible: refusing looks like the cautious choice. AND THE TYPE-SCOPING REJECTION IS NOT AN INVENTION. known_hosts holding an ssh-rsa key while the server offers ed25519 makes ssh print IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED and refuse. So unknown-type-known-host is neither stricter nor laxer than ssh — treating it as first contact, which is what a naive type-scoped lookup does, is the laxer mistake. That second result also fixes the message. ssh is blocked too, so `ssh-keygen -R <host>` is the remedy that unblocks both, and we were naming it only for a same-type mismatch — leaving this case with a diagnosis and no way out. Named now when known_hosts is the source that disagrees, and still not named when it is our own store, which ssh-keygen would not touch. 1,516 SSH tests pass. * docs(ssh): record the two assumptions a live client confirmed Both were load-bearing and neither was obvious: the bare-host fallback pass may not report a change, and unknown-type-known-host is what ssh itself does rather than something we invented. Getting the first backwards would have refused hosts ssh connects to happily, which is the failure mode that looks like caution. * style(ssh): satisfy the code-quality lints in the two new test files A string concatenation that should be a template literal, and an inline import() type annotation that should be a type-only namespace import — erased before vi.mock's hoisted factory runs, so the mock is unaffected. pnpm lint is clean. * fix(ssh): honour StrictHostKeyChecking, which had never once been read correctly `ssh -G` does not echo the value the user wrote. StrictHostKeyChecking is rendered through fmt_multistate_int, which prints the first entry of multistate_strict_hostkey, and that table lists true/false before yes/no: yes -> true | no -> false | off -> false | accept-new -> accept-new | ask -> ask Verified against OpenSSH 10.2p1 from both a config file and -o. Not 10.2-specific; the table ordering is old. The decision function tested only 'yes'/'always' and 'no'/'off' — spellings that cannot arrive. So `StrictHostKeyChecking yes` fell through to the default branch and we accepted AND PERSISTED a host the user's config explicitly says to refuse. That is the worst outcome this feature can produce, and it was the behaviour for every strict user from the first commit. `no`/`off` landed there too, breaking the documented "lax settings never persist" invariant. Every unit test passed throughout, because they fed the function 'yes' — the value a human writes, not the one that reaches the code. My ssh -G parity test did capture real output, but I happened to configure accept-new, one of only two values that round-trip unchanged. The new table is keyed on configured value -> what ssh -G actually prints, and asserts both reach the same verdict, so the question "is this the spelling that arrives?" cannot be assumed again. Found by a parity review against a live OpenSSH client. * fix(ssh): stop the fallback pass accepting a changed key, and refusing a new one One wrong loop scope, two opposite errors, both reproduced against a live OpenSSH 10.2p1 client and an ed25519-only sshd on 127.0.0.1:2223. ACCEPTING A CHANGED KEY. ssh runs the bare-host fallback only when the port-qualified lookup matched no plain entry of ANY key type. We ran it unless pass 0 produced a match or a SAME-TYPE mismatch. So with an off-port RSA entry plus a bare, correct ed25519 line — an ordinary shape, an old off-port entry beside one written by a port-22 connect — ssh printed IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED and refused, with no "checking without port identifier" in -v because the fallback never ran, while we reached the bare line and returned `match`. REFUSING A NEW ONE. sawKnownHostOtherType and sawCertAuthority were declared outside the pass loop, so an entry found only on the fallback pass could set them. A bare ssh-rsa entry, dialed on a non-default port against an ed25519-only server, made ssh add the host and connect — plain first contact — where we returned unknown-type-known-host and hard-failed. That is Gitea/Forgejo, dev containers, Gerrit, Vagrant: an off-port service on a host already in known_hosts. So the flags are per-pass now, and pass 0 decides as soon as it finds any plain entry for the host. Which of the two rejections it reports only picks the message; ssh calls both HOST_CHANGED. Also drops the type check from the match test: byte equality already implies the types agree, because the blob carries its own algorithm name and parsing rejects any line whose declared type disagrees with it. Reverting either half of the scope fix fails exactly the two new tests. 1,526 SSH tests pass. * fix(ssh): refuse the known_hosts lines ssh itself refuses to parse Three ways a line could be trusted by us and invisible to the user's own ssh — or, worse, raise a CHANGED alarm from an entry ssh drops. Buffer.from does not fail on bad base64, it SKIPS invalid characters, so `<key>!!!` and a blob with `@@` spliced into it both decoded to the correct key and matched. Verified live against OpenSSH 10.2p1 on 127.0.0.1:2224: the unmodified control reached authentication and all three malformed variants produced "No ED25519 host key is known". A re-encode-and-compare makes us agree. `<key>AAAA` is the interesting one, and the reason the first fix was not enough: 68 characters plus 4 is still legal base64, and the algorithm header still reads ssh-ed25519, so neither the base64 check nor the existing header check sees anything wrong. ssh parses the whole key structure. We decoded 54 bytes where an ed25519 key is 51 and reported `mismatch` — a man-in-the-middle warning caused by a typo in a file ssh silently ignores. So the blob is now walked as what it is: a run of length-prefixed fields that must consume it exactly. Algorithm-agnostic on purpose, so a key type we do not model is checked as well as one we do. It also rejects a length prefix that overruns the buffer, which readHostKeyType only checked for the first field. And ssh's extract_salt demands exactly one SHA1 digest — "expected salt len 20, got 16" — where we accepted any non-empty salt. A short salt is still a usable HMAC key for us, so a hand-crafted line could match for us and be a parse error for ssh. ssh-keygen -H always writes 20 bytes, so refusing loses no real entry. Worth recording that ssh-keygen -F cannot answer any of this: it matches host names and prints lines without ever decoding the key, so it reports "found" for all four blobs. The real client was the only instrument that worked. Found by a parity review; the base64 finding as reported was right about the behaviour and wrong about the mechanism for the padded case, which is what led to the structural check. 1,533 SSH tests pass. * fix(ssh): name a ssh-keygen -R target that actually removes the entry Verified against OpenSSH 10.2p1: with both `[h.example]:2222` and `h.example` on file, `ssh-keygen -R h.example` removes only the bare line and leaves the bracketed one — and there is no port flag, `-R host -p 2222` is "Too many arguments". An off-port target is keyed `[host]:port` in known_hosts, so the command we printed removed nothing: the user runs it, reconnects, and meets the identical failure with no indication of why. The message now names the bracketed form, quoted because the brackets are shell glob characters, whenever the port is not 22. Found by a parity review. * fix(ssh): read ssh2's host key algorithm list instead of copying it ssh2 builds DEFAULT_SERVER_HOST_KEY at load time and prepends ssh-ed25519 only when a RUNTIME PROBE succeeds — it signs and verifies with a fixed Ed25519 key. On a build where that probe fails, ssh-ed25519 is absent from ssh2's SUPPORTED list too, and generateAlgorithmList throws `Unsupported algorithm: ssh-ed25519` from inside client.connect. That throw matches no retry classifier and no transport-fallback classifier, so it is permanent — and because we only set `algorithms` for hosts we already know, it would fire on trusted hosts while new ones kept working. A copied list cannot be merely stale here; it can be wrong. So it is read from ssh2 now, which also removes the drift risk the previous commit could only report. ssh2 is external in the main bundle and the bundle is CJS, so the deep path resolves at runtime from packaged node_modules. The copy stays as a fallback in case a future ssh2 moves the file — losing the proposal order degrades the type-scoping guarantee, but refusing to connect at all is worse. The test that used to pin the copy against ssh2 now pins the fallback, which is the only part that can still drift. Found by an availability review. pnpm lint clean; 1,537 SSH tests pass. * fix(ssh): look a HostKeyAlias up the way ssh does — without the port HostKeyAlias suppresses the port entirely. Verified against OpenSSH 10.2p1 on port 2225 with HostKeyAlias=myalias: an entry keyed `myalias` authenticates, and one keyed `[myalias]:2225` gives "No ED25519 host key is known for myalias". We built [['[alias]:port'], ['alias']] and consulted a form ssh never writes. On its own that was a stale-entry false alarm. The previous commit made it worse: now that the first pass decides as soon as it finds any entry for the host, a leftover `[alias]:2225` line STOPS the bare lookup ssh actually performs — so the one population D2 cites HostKeyAlias for, bastions tunnelled through localhost:port, would get a hard failure on a host ssh connects to. So resolveKnownHostsLookupHost reports whether the name came from the alias, not just what it is, and that flag reaches both the matcher and the algorithm ordering. Returning the name alone is what made the bug invisible: the caller had no way to know it was holding something that must not be bracketed. Found by a parity review. 1,543 SSH tests pass. * fix(ssh): only claim the site config was suppressed when ssh -G actually ran sshGArgsForHost reports which arguments WOULD be used, not what happened. It returns the -F form whenever ~/.ssh/config exists and os.homedir() diverges from the passwd home, so a machine with no usable ssh at all — Windows without OpenSSH, a restricted sandbox, a timed-out probe — was judged by whether it happens to have a ~/.ssh/config, and rejected every unknown host permanently if it did. The same broken machine WITHOUT one stayed fully permissive, which is the tell: the flag is a claim about a config file we could not read, and when ssh never ran there is no such claim to make. Narrow but total where it lands: anything that sets HOME explicitly (wrapper scripts, sudo -E, devcontainers), macOS mobile and network accounts, and the E2E isolation this branch was written for. Found by an availability review. * fix(ssh): stop refusing hosts that ssh itself connects to Two product decisions, both taken deliberately after a review priced their blast radius, and both moving us from stricter-than-ssh to matching it. CERTIFICATE-AUTHORITY HOSTS NO LONGER FAIL. The point of an SSH CA is that the client holds ONE line — very often `@cert-authority *` — instead of per-host entries. That line matches every candidate, so for a Teleport / Vault-SSH / Smallstep / in-house-CA user EVERY target failed, not just CA-signed ones, including on-demand runtime VMs, and StrictHostKeyChecking=no did not help. The documented escape was an environment variable, which an Electron app launched from the Dock or Start Menu never sees. Meanwhile OpenSSH, verified live, treats a CA-covered host presenting a plain key as first contact and connects: ssh2 cannot validate certificates at all, so refusing bought nothing ssh was not already giving up. The residual risk is real and accepted — for a CA-protected host we take a plain key we cannot tie to the CA — and the ca-only outcome is carried through the decision so it stays visible in the log. AN UNREADABLE known_hosts NO LONGER REFUSES EVERYTHING. Any non-ENOENT read error on any configured file rejected every unknown host, with a message blaming the system SSH configuration, which was not what happened. The common trigger is not exotic: a Windows OneDrive Known Folder Move placeholder while offline fails with a cloud-file error, not ENOENT. It was also asymmetric with our own store, which degrades an unreadable file to "nothing trusted" and connects. We now connect as ssh does — it warns and treats the host as unknown — but record NOTHING, so a first contact we could not check never becomes durable trust. That second half is the reason the first is acceptable, so it is pinned end to end with the store actually bound. Which meant splitting verificationSourcesIncomplete back apart. It had been one flag for two claims that now diverge: "a site policy may exist that we cannot read" still refuses, "a file we could not open may contradict this" does not. Merging them was what made the second inherit a strictness only the first justified. Both still lose to evidence we DID read: a mismatch, a revoked key, or an explicit StrictHostKeyChecking still refuse in either state. pnpm lint clean; 1,549 SSH tests pass. * docs(ssh): correct the design where a live client disproved it D2, D3 and D4 each stated something about OpenSSH that turned out to be wrong when tested against a real client and sshd rather than read from the source. D3's premise is the notable one: OpenSSH is not type-scoped at all, so it does not avoid the RSA-era false alarm the way the doc claimed. It avoids the situation via order_hostkeyalgs and hard-fails when the situation arises anyway. The conclusion survives — the ordering is still what makes our scoping safe — but for a different reason than the one written down, and a reader would have drawn the wrong lesson. D2 gains the two rules that actually bite: the entry condition to the fallback pass, and HostKeyAlias suppressing the port. D4 records both reversals with their reasoning and the residual risk each one accepts, and the ssh -G spelling trap that made StrictHostKeyChecking dead on arrival. Corrections are kept visible rather than edited out, per the note at the top of the file. * fix(ssh): repaint the panes after a reconnect, not just reattach them Reported: disconnect an SSH host from the Remote Hosts popup, reconnect, and the terminals come back blank — but resizing a split or toggling the sidebar makes them render correctly. That last detail is the diagnosis. The panes were never broken: reattach restores each pane's buffer but not its painted frame. xterm repaints on a write or a resize, and a reconnect produces neither for a pane that was already correctly sized — so nothing paints until a relayout forces it, which is exactly what resizing or toggling the sidebar does. The renderer already has refitAndRefreshAllTerminalPanes for this shape ('after bulk desktop restore, background panes may have correct cols/rows but a stale xterm renderer until focus forces a repaint'). Its only callers were the mobile fit-reclaim paths; the SSH reconnect path never used it. Scheduled from finalizeHydratedTerminalPanes, on both a frame and a 100ms settled pass — the same pattern the desktop-restore path uses, because rAF alone lands while panes are still remounting. Mutation-proved: removing the schedule reddens the new test, which is the reported symptom. * fix(ssh): repaint background-tab panes revealed after a reconnect Completes 834a495038, which only fixed the ACTIVE tab. Reported: split panes of plain shells on another tab were still blank after reconnect until a divider drag or a sidebar toggle. The repaint did reach background managers — they stay mounted, only rendererVisible flips — but it could not land. A tab-hidden pane measures as a 0-size box, so canMeasurePaneForFit bails and the fit is a no-op, and refreshAllPanes marks rows dirty on a pane with no presented frame, which cannot repair a grid the reattach's direct terminal.resize left diverged. The reveal then takes the light resume path, which deliberately does not fit, and scheduleRevealRepaint only reattaches WebGL. So nothing ever fixed the geometry — and a divider drag or sidebar toggle is a real fit, which is why those appeared to work. Parks the repaint on a hidden manager and replays it on reveal, reusing the existing reveal-fit machinery rather than adding a mechanism. Flag-gated so the light path still does not fit in the ordinary case — 'does not fit on a light tab reveal' stays green. Splits are not special: the gap is per-manager, so it is identical for 1 or N panes. Splits just expose it, because users find the workaround (drag a divider) that a single full-tab pane rarely gets. A never-mounted tab is unaffected — it has no live manager and fits through the normal initial-fit lifecycle. Mutation-proved twice: removing the deferral, and reverting the reveal-side condition. Each reddens only the new tests. * test(terminal): pin that panes are PAINTED, not merely bound — and fix a broken commit Two problems, both mine. 1) 0103a80b48 swept in an untracked fixture and left the branch failing typecheck (unused Terminal import in painted-pane-fixture.ts). Its canvas stub also threw 'clearRect is not a function' on every refresh. Fixed here. 2) direct-ssh-reconnect-repaint.test.ts, which I wrote to guard the reconnect repaint, is VACUOUS: it re-implements finalizeHydratedTerminalPanes inside the test and mocks the registry, so deleting the real fix from useIpcEvents leaves it green. direct-ssh-reconnect-repaint-wiring.test.ts replaces that guarantee by capturing the real callback the hook hands the coordinator and running it against live panes — deleting the two scheduling lines now reddens it. The gap this closes: content survival was already well covered at the BYTE layer (snapshot roundtrip, hide/reveal stitching, cold-restore scrollback), but every pane test stubbed terminal as {cols, rows, refresh: vi.fn()}, so 'repainted' only ever meant 'a spy fired'. No test ran a real xterm through a real PaneManager. pane-content-survival.test.ts does, reading .xterm-rows — what the user actually sees — across reconnect, restart-shaped restore, tab reveal, window show, split and unsplit, for plain shells and alt-screen TUIs. The alt-screen distinction is now pinned explicitly: forcing a resize inside fitAllPanes reddens only the TUI test, because a plain shell reflows and survives while a TUI frame does not. That asymmetry is why the reported bug looked like a plain-shell problem. 11 tests, each mutation-proven to redden only its own. 760 pane-manager tests green; the 2 failures here are the known environmental IME baseline. Flagged, not fixed: the unsplit path reparents the DOM without the dispose/ reattach that splitManagedPane does explicitly because 'DOM reparenting can silently invalidate a WebGL context without firing contextlost', and follows it with a safeFit that no-ops when the box is unchanged. Same shape as the reconnect bug. happy-dom has no WebGL, so only a real-GPU E2E can confirm it. * fix(ssh): send the pane its screen back on reconnect A reconnect left every remote terminal blank. Measured on a live relay, not inferred: pty.attach returned no replay for every pane, taking the activation === 'existing' early return in the relay's attach. 'existing' means a source delivery is already open for this client, so it must already be receiving live output and cannot need its screen re-sent. That holds for a duplicate attach. It is false for a reconnect, for a reason neither side can see alone: the client keeps its id across the drop (detachClient refuses to detach the primary, and setWrite revives that same id) so the delivery outlives the dead transport, while the RENDERER has already thrown its terminal away. A reconnect bumps tab.generation, which is the pane's React key, so TerminalPane remounts and the old xterm is disposed with its buffer, and nothing on that path captures it first. Both halves are individually reasonable and together they guarantee a blank pane: the relay reports the client already has the screen, to a client holding a brand-new empty terminal, and nothing paints until new output happens to arrive. Resizing appeared to fix it only because a TUI redraws itself. So the client says which case it is. reattachSshPtySession is by definition painting into a new terminal, so it asks; nobody else does, and the early return keeps working for them. Optional on the wire, so an older relay ignores it and behaves exactly as it does today. Falling through rather than returning the replay inline is deliberate: the path below already drops the pending batched bytes that are also in the buffer, which is what stops the live delivery rendering them twice. Reproduced first as a test against the real dispatcher, source publication and PTY handler (the second attach for one client, which is what a reconnect is) and it fails on the exact symptom before the fix. A second test pins that a caller which does NOT ask still gets nothing, so this cannot become a double-render for the duplicate-attach case the early return exists for. Also updates four provider tests that assert the exact attach params. NOT yet verified in the running app; the log will show replay=true on reconnect. * chore(ssh): drop the temporary reconnect-replay diagnostic Served its purpose: it is what turned 'the panes look blank' into replay=false, replayLen=0 on every pane, and then into replay=true with real byte counts once the relay fix landed. The permanent log line keeps the boolean, which is the part worth having. * revert: drop the reconnect repaint commits; they cannot fix the blank panes Reverts 2fdab478c0, 34fc1424f0 and dc6f6bf685, which I cherry-picked onto this branch to test alongside the host key work. Their stated premise is 'reattach restores each pane's buffer but not its painted frame'. That is false for this flow: a reconnect bumps tab.generation, which is the pane's React key, so TerminalPane remounts and the old xterm is disposed WITH its buffer, and nothing on that path captures it first. Refitting and refreshing a terminal whose buffer is empty paints an empty pane. The blank screen was the relay declining to re-send the scrollback, fixed separately and verified on screen. Their tests pass without exercising the real case: the fixture blanks the painted rows and deliberately LEAVES THE BUFFER INTACT, which is the one situation that never occurs here, and the hidden-tab test replaces the pane manager with a stub that reports no panes. They may still address a separate symptom — a diverged grid after a resize on a hidden tab — but that is unproven, unrelated to this branch, and the originals are untouched on nwparker/sta-3077-fix-v3 where they came from. Carrying unproven renderer changes with a false premise in their message on a security-focused branch is not worth it. Reverting first and re-running the full two-step reconnect test is the point: the earlier verification passed with these present, so it did not establish that the relay fix stands alone. * fix(ssh): repaint a reconnected pane from the grid, not a byte tail A reconnect restored plain shells correctly but was reported to bring full-screen apps back as fragments of a frame — Claude Code showed a few rules and its cost line until a resize forced it to repaint. The two payloads are not interchangeable. Relay replay is a byte TAIL: it can begin mid-escape, and it misses the alt-screen enter, the clears and the absolute cursor positioning that built the frame, so replaying it into a fresh terminal paints whatever fragments survive. The model snapshot is a serialized GRID — which is what tmux repaints on attach, and the only payload that reliably restores a TUI. Orca already had the grid path and already preferred it; it was gated to PARKING. A reconnect needs it for the same underlying reason a park does: the pane paints into a terminal holding nothing, because a reconnect bumps tab.generation, which is the pane's React key, so TerminalPane remounts and the old xterm is disposed with its buffer. So the gate now admits both, and prepaintParkedSshSnapshot is prepaintSshModelSnapshot since parking is no longer the only caller. Deliberately NOT inheriting the parking kill switch: main keeps its headless model regardless of terminalSshViewParking, so a user who turns view parking off would otherwise be stranded on the tail. Every safety gate below eligibility is untouched, and pinned that way: null, renderer-sourced, sourceless, empty, and escape-tail-only snapshots all still degrade to relay replay, so widening WHY the model is trusted cannot widen WHAT is trusted and cannot regress to a blank pane. Reverting either half of the gate fails three of the new tests. HONESTY ABOUT WHAT THIS IS VERIFIED TO DO. I could not reproduce the corruption it targets. Two attempts against a live host, both on a build WITHOUT this change, both restored correctly: a freshly started Claude Code and Codex side by side, and an alt-screen `less` scrolled 4000 lines so its original full paint had aged out of the relay's 100KB tail. The reporter's case also involved pulling wifi — an abrupt drop rather than a clean disconnect — which is the one variable I cannot simulate here. So this is verified to be correct-by-construction and non-regressing: with it applied, the same scenarios still restore correctly (top live, less at its scrolled offset in alt-screen, both agent TUIs coherent). It is NOT verified to fix the reported symptom, because the symptom did not reproduce. Treat the symptom as open until someone confirms it on an abrupt drop. Also: top was a poor proxy for a TUI in my earlier verification precisely because it repaints every second and therefore self-heals within a tick. * fix(ssh): stop the reconnect prepaint firing after its mount is spent Regression I introduced with the snapshot-first reconnect paint. The payload path consumes mountFollowsTerminalPark — it clears the flag after the first reattach so a later in-place reconnect on the SAME mount cannot repaint. I replaced the prepaint's read of that mutable flag with a const snapshot of it, so my combined flag stayed true for the life of the mount. A snapshot could then be written on a later reattach, into a terminal that already had live content, and its own isCurrent() guard could no longer go false either. The visible symptom was a tab that came up blank with no prompt and stayed generically titled Terminal N — the title only stays generic when the shell never printed a prompt for Orca to read one from. Every such tab in my session had been through a remount; four tabs created cleanly with Cmd+T were all fine. So the flag is mutable again and is consumed alongside the one it was derived from. Both reasons a mount paints into an empty terminal — a park and a reconnect — are spent by the first reattach, which is what the original code meant. Worth stating plainly: my earlier claim that the snapshot change was non-regressing was tested only against reconnect scenarios. I never exercised creating a tab afterwards, which is exactly where this showed up. * test(ssh): cover what a pane SHOWS after a reconnect, and after a new tab The gap that let both regressions reach a user. Nothing asserted the rendered pane: the existing SSH coverage checks pty ids, statuses and spy calls, and every one of those was correct while the screen was blank. Covers one flow end to end against the dockerized relay: write a marker, reconnect, require the marker to still be on screen, then open a tab and require the new shell to answer. Three choices worth keeping: A MARKER, NOT A PROMPT. A prompt reappears on its own after a reconnect, so asserting one cannot tell restored scrollback from a fresh shell. The marker only exists if the pane kept what it had. ECHO, NOT EXISTENCE. The new tab must run a command and show its output. A pty id proves a session was created; it does not prove the pane is usable, which is the exact distinction the reported bug lived in. AND THE TAB TITLE. It stays 'Terminal N' only when the shell never printed a prompt for Orca to read one from, which is what the report showed and the cheapest signal available. Gated on ORCA_E2E_SSH_DOCKER=1 like the other relay specs. * chore(ssh): rename the snapshot prefetch off its park-only name The probe serves reconnect remounts as well now, so parkedSshSnapshotPrefetch described only half of what it holds. * revert: drop the snapshot-first reconnect paint; unproven and it regressed Reverts e6541fe9b8, its follow-up c497a26788, and the rename f680a0b1cb. The reasoning behind it still looks right — a byte tail cannot rebuild an alt-screen application, a grid snapshot can, and that is what tmux repaints on attach. What I could never do is show it fixing the reported symptom. Two attempts to reproduce the corruption on a build WITHOUT it both restored correctly: freshly started Claude Code and Codex, and an alt-screen `less` scrolled 4000 lines so its full paint had aged out of the relay's 100KB tail. Meanwhile it cost two real regressions. It fired on mounts that were not reconnects, leaving a new tab with no prompt and a placeholder title, which a user hit within minutes. The fix for that consumed the eligibility flag with the one it was derived from — and after it, a reconnected Claude Code came back as fragments of a frame, the exact symptom the change was meant to remove. So the consume-once semantics that stop stale paints and the repaint a reconnect needs are in direct tension, and I do not yet understand the ordering well enough to satisfy both. Shipping an unproven change that has already broken two things twice is worse than shipping the blank-pane fix alone, which IS reproduced, A/B'd and visually verified. The TUI corruption goes back to open — but now with something it never had before: a reproduction. It shows up on a reconnect against a Claude Code that has been running a while, not one just started, which is why my earlier checks kept passing. The e2e coverage stays. It asserts what the relay fix guarantees — a marker surviving a reconnect, and a tab opened afterwards reaching a shell that answers — and neither of those depends on this change. * docs(ssh): name the root cause the reconnect replay fix does not address requireReplay fixes the blank pane at the symptom. The cause is that a PTY source delivery is the only per-client relay state that outlives its client detaching: fs-handler, git-handler and relay-filesystem-watch-registry all subscribe to dispatcher.onClientDetached and release theirs, and relay-pty-source-publication never does. The primary client keeps its id across a transport replacement, so its delivery survives a dead transport and activate() answers 'existing' to a client that cannot receive anything. Retiring the delivery on detach is the real fix. Not doing it here is a choice, not an oversight — it is the flow-control and credit path, and I could not verify it before handing this over. Recorded in the test that guards the symptom, which is where someone changing this will actually look. * docs(ssh): record the three root-cause routes that do not work I went after the cause and failed three times. Each attempt looks correct until it runs, so the dead ends are worth more written down than the time they cost: RETIRING THE DELIVERY ON onClientDetached — the obvious fix, and the one I argued for, since fs-handler, git-handler and the watch registry all release their per-client state exactly there. It breaks checkpoint recovery: 10 tests across relay-pty-source-recovery-interleavings and restore-retry. A delivery outliving its client is DELIBERATE; that is what lets a reconnecting client resume from a checkpoint instead of re-receiving everything. This class omits the subscription on purpose, and that omission is not the bug. RETIRING WITHOUT session.cancelDelivery() — the credit ledger keeps one upstream owner per pty, so dropping the record without releasing it leaves the slot taken and the next open throws 'PTY source delivery already has an upstream owner'. I saw that live as an error toast over a blank pane. COMPARING clientGeneration — the delivery identity carries one, but it is client-supplied through pty.openClient and RequestContext has none to compare against, so the relay cannot tell the generations apart on its own. Which points where I would start next, unverified: the SSH client presents the SAME clientGeneration across a reconnect, so the relay cannot distinguish the new connection and reuses its delivery. reattachSshPtySession never sends sourceRecovery at all — the recovery protocol exists and the SSH reattach path simply does not participate in it. That is likely the real fix, and it is on the client, not in the relay. The symptom fix stays because it is verified and the tree is green; the cause stays open with a map instead of a guess. * fix(ssh): repaint a reconnected full-screen app from the grid A reconnected TUI came back as fragments of a frame — Claude Code showed a few rules and its cost line until a resize made it repaint itself. Relay replay is a byte TAIL. It can begin mid-escape and it misses the alt-screen enter, the clears and the absolute positioning that built the frame, so replaying it into the fresh xterm a remount just created paints whatever fragments survive. Main already keeps the thing that does restore a frame: a real @xterm/headless grid, alt-screen aware, fed unconditionally for SSH. Local terminals already repaint from it; SSH was the only path that did not. So this routes an SSH reconnect into the painter that already exists, at the one expression that chooses model over tail. No new call site, no second lifecycle, and every existing gate still applies — a null, renderer-sourced or empty snapshot still degrades to the tail, so it cannot paint blank. ONLY ON THE ALTERNATE SCREEN, and that is the whole design. The reconnect replay reaches the renderer without passing through main's model — forwardReattachReplay and the inline attach replay both bypass onPtyData — so at that moment the model is stale by exactly the outage. For a full-screen app that trade is right: a tail cannot rebuild a frame it no longer contains, a grid can, and the SIGWINCH the restore already sends makes the app redraw the delta. For a scrolling shell it would be wrong: the tail holds output the model never saw, and preferring the grid would drop it for good. A park has no such hole, so it keeps using the model either way. Derived from the PENDING retry, not directSshRetryAttempt. That also matches the live binding, which is written at the same tab generation once a reconnect succeeds and then outlives it — so it stays truthy for every later remount of that generation. Reading it directly is what made my first attempt fire on mounts that were not reconnects. Consumed alongside mountFollowsTerminalPark for the same reason. Verified live against the reported app: Claude Code restores identical to its pre-disconnect frame, top restores coherent and live, and a plain shell still shows output written before the disconnect. 5,470 tests pass across the touched suites. Not the whole story, and the remaining half is already written down: the model's gap exists because the SSH reattach asks for a tail instead of participating in the checkpointed resume the relay already implements. Close that and this paint is not merely coherent but exactly correct, for shells too. * test(ssh): cover a full-screen frame across a reconnect, not just scrollback The case a byte tail cannot serve, and the one that reached a user twice. A tail can begin mid-escape and misses the alt-screen enter and absolute positioning that built the frame, so replaying it paints fragments — which is what a reconnected Claude Code showed. Uses top: present on any Linux image, and it repaints on a fixed interval, so a whole header after the reconnect is unambiguous rather than a timing artifact. Asserts the header AND the column row, because a tail that lost the frame start still shows rows. The spec now covers all three payloads one reconnect has to get right: a shell's scrollback, a full-screen app's frame, and a tab opened afterwards reaching a shell that answers. * ci(e2e): actually run the Docker-SSH specs in the changed-specs lane "I am surprised this was not caught" has a mechanical answer: these tests do not run. A spec that reads ORCA_E2E_SSH_DOCKER test.skip()s itself when it is unset, and exactly one place in CI set it — gated on tests/e2e/ephemeral-vm-provisioned- root.spec.ts being among the changed files. So editing any SSH spec ran it as a skip and reported green. Eighteen specs reference that variable, including both reconnect regressions I have been chasing. Now it is also enabled when any changed spec references the variable, which is the same grep -l idiom the @headful check two lines below already uses. The original clause stays: that spec needs Docker without naming the variable, so replacing it rather than adding to it would have traded one silent skip for another. Simulated against the real files — the reconnect spec, the original trigger, a multi-spec change, a non-Docker SSH spec, and a deleted path — enabling in the first three, staying off in the last two, and not failing the step on a path that no longer exists. * fix(ssh): let the replay veto a stale alternate-screen belief Adversarial review of the previous commit found a case where it is worse than the bug it fixes, and it is the exact inverse of what that commit reasoned about. The model reports alternateScreen from bytes it consumed, and it never consumes the outage. So if a full-screen app EXITS during the disconnect — an agent finishes, a command ends, the process dies — the model still says alternate. The gate then painted a frozen frame of an application that no longer exists and, via the else-if chain, discarded the replay carrying the shell's real output. Frozen and wrong beats fragments, which were at least current bytes. The replay is the only witness to the outage, so it now gets a veto: its last 47/1047/1049 transition, if any, outranks the model's belief. Leaving reset means the frame is gone and the tail wins; re-entering means the model is right after all. Same review found the width-mismatch guard drops the alt frame and leaves a cleared screen for the app to repaint — free for a park with no tail to lose, but here it meant discarding a usable one for a blank pane, so that degrades too. Both vetoes are skipped when there is no replay, where they would only trade a stale frame for an empty one. Extracted as sshReconnectPaintsFromModel rather than more inline ternary, because every interesting case is a disagreement between a stale belief and a replay — awkward to stage end-to-end, trivial to state as a table. 14 unit tests, including the two that fail against the previous commit. The e2e comment is corrected in the same spirit: top redraws itself, so it never discriminated the paint source and should not have claimed to. Also from the review: the kitty flag stack was left stale on this path, since the app's pushes during the outage exist only in the replay we discard — scanned now, after the snapshot so the outage layers on the pre-outage baseline. And the consume-once comment asserted an invariant that does not exist; followsDirectSshReconnect is a const captured per connect, bounded by connectStarted and the gates rather than by the read. Corrected rather than restructured. Known and NOT fixed, because it predates this work and is a behavior change of its own: the model probe is gated on the terminalSshViewParking kill switch, so turning off view parking also silently disables this repaint. Defaults on. * docs(ssh): make the parking kill switch's reach over the reconnect repaint deliberate Review flagged that terminalSshViewParking silently disables the full-screen reconnect repaint, since both go through the same model probe, and that nothing said so. Keeping the coupling and documenting it rather than threading a reason through. The switch is the kill for painting an SSH pane from main's model at all, and a reconnect does exactly that; off should restore the relay-tail behavior that predates the machinery, which is what an escape hatch is for. That matters more than usual here: this repaint is new and review already found one case where it was worse than the bug, so a way to turn it off in the field is worth its cost — a user who disables parking also loses the reconnect repaint. The alternative is worse than it looks anyway: the probe memo is keyed on ptyId and shared with the park path, so a per-call reason would be reused by whichever path created it first. * docs(ssh): record why the obvious reconnect follow-up does not work I proposed making the pane-retry path request source recovery the way reattachKnownPtys does, and argued it was probably client-side routing. Tracing it says the wiring is indeed trivial and the checkpoint state does survive a drop — and that the change would still be wrong three ways, one of them harmful. The relay short-circuits to 'existing' on a same-clientId attach BEFORE it looks at the recovery argument, and the reconnecting client has already rotated the delivery onto its id. A failed reattachKnownPtys then deletes the checkpoint on purpose, so a later pane retry presents checkpointUnavailable, which becomes restoreRequired and then SSH_SESSION_EXPIRED_ERROR — trading a blank pane with a tail for a killed session. And the payloads answer different questions anyway: recovery replays the post-checkpoint delta to keep main's model whole, while the tail is a screen snapshot for a fresh empty xterm. Even a successful recovery would put almost nothing in a remounted pane. Also corrects the argument I had been leaning on hardest. "Old relays ignore requireReplay, so those users still get blank panes" is false for the SSH relay: the client deploys its own relay into a version-scoped directory and rejects any grant whose serverBuildId differs, because client and relay ship in one build. Mixed versions cannot occur on this channel. The independent-update rule still governs remote runtime hosts, just not this one — so there is no stranded population, and the urgency that framing created was imaginary. What replaces it is a sharper question. Source recovery is gated on outputFlowControl and on the client presenting a NEW clientId. We have empirical evidence it does not: the blank-pane bug existed because the relay concluded this client already held the stream, and the shipped fix works by bypassing that exact early return. If the id is reused, reattachKnownPtys' recovery hits the same short-circuit — meaning checkpointed recovery may never have run for SSH reconnects, and the tail is not a fallback but the only path. Whether that is so turns on daemon versus stdio-primary relay mode, which I did not verify and which decides whether the work is "extend recovery" or "recovery has never run here." * docs(ssh): the root cause — checkpointed recovery never runs on a reconnect Chasing why the pane-retry path could not request source recovery turned up the real answer: nothing can. Recovery is dead on every SSH reconnect, and the byte tail is not a fallback but the only path that has ever run. Five links, each read rather than inferred. setWrite reuses primaryClient including its id, so a reconnected client presents the SAME clientId. activate() tests exactly that at line 99 and returns 'existing' at 108, which makes the rotateDelivery branch at 118-142 reachable only when the ids differ — never here. So no sourceRecovery comes back, so finishSourceRecovery fails its !pendingRecovery guard and abandons, cancelling the delivery and deleting the checkpoint. The pane retry then opens fresh and takes the tail. This also explains the blank panes exactly. The relay concluded that this client already held the stream because, by its own identity rule, it does. The fix that implies is smaller than anything proposed so far and avoids what sank the three earlier attempts: bump a transport generation on the client record in setWrite and compare it alongside clientId, so a reconnect rotates the delivery instead of matching as 'existing'. Deliveries still outlive their clients and nothing retires on onClientDetached — the rotation happens on re-attach, which is what the recovery design already intends. RequestContext, setWrite and the publication are all relay-internal, and client and relay ship in one build, so there is no wire change and no compatibility exposure. Left explicitly unverified: whether rotateDelivery's identity preconditions hold at that moment, whether outputFlowControl is granted on the reconnected session, and what a rotation gives the RENDERER — which still remounts an empty xterm and needs a screen, not a post-checkpoint delta. Recovery keeps main's model whole; it does not by itself repaint a fresh terminal, so the tail may still be wanted for the pane even once the model stops going stale. * ci(e2e): run the Docker-SSH specs when SSH SOURCE changes, not just specs The earlier fix only helped when a spec file itself changed. Edit pty-connection, pty-handler or ssh-relay-session and touch no test — which is what every one of these regressions actually looked like — and the lane still did not run. pr.yml now maps SSH source paths onto five Docker-backed specs. Five rather than all fifteen because the rest are covered by unit tests that prove the same source without paying for a container; that is a deliberate narrowing and this comment is where it is admitted rather than left implicit. Test files are excluded from triggering, since they prove themselves. Simulated against the real paths this PR touches: pty-connection.ts, pty-handler.ts, ssh-relay-session.ts and ssh-pty-session-reattach.ts all now pull the SSH specs in, while pty-connection.test.ts, ssh-known-hosts.test.ts, SshTargetCard.tsx and README.md correctly do not. The gate contract test covers the mapping: 11 pass. e2e.yml pays for it — 30 to 45 minutes, because the lane can now build a container image and run SSH specs serially on top of whatever changed — and installs openssh-client, which the fixture shells out to and which the lane did not need back when it never received these specs. * test(ssh): make the reconnect spec actually run — it now fails on a real bug It had never executed once. The CI condition that enables Docker-SSH was gated on an unrelated spec, so this skipped and reported green — and running it for the first time found two bugs in the spec itself, both of which a typechecked tests/ would have caught instantly. startDockerSshRelayTarget returns a DockerSshRelayTarget, which has no targetId; the id comes from connectDockerSshRelayTarget's return value, which the spec discarded. So every reconnect call passed undefined and the relay answered 'SSH target "undefined" not found'. And openNewTerminalTabInActiveWorkspace takes the group to open into; called with no argument the new tab lands nowhere. The third problem was the fixture rather than the spec. The image ships Debian's /etc/bash.bashrc with the xterm title block commented out and an all-comments /root/.bashrc, so its shell never emits OSC 0 — which is what Orca derives a tab title from. The title assertion could not have passed for any shell, healthy or not, so it was proving nothing. enableDockerSshRelayTargetShellTitle opts a spec into the title-setting PS1 a real user's shell already has. IT STILL FAILS, and that is the point: it fails on a PRODUCT bug it was written to catch. An SSH reconnect destroys the terminal state behind a tab whose local creation has not yet reached the host. remote-workspace-session-merge.ts:86-89 spreads the host's tab list over the local one for that worktree, so a local tab missing from the host snapshot has no surviving branch; the upload that would have put it there is DROPPED rather than deferred inside the 1s suppression window after a snapshot apply. The tab bar still renders the tab, correctly titled, but the terminal slice holds one tab and no pane manager exists for the second — so the user clicks a tab that never paints, with no error and no recovery, while the process keeps running on the host. Pre-existing: none of remote-workspace-target-sync.ts, remote-workspace-session-merge.ts, use-app-session-persistence.ts or remote-workspace-snapshot-apply.ts is touched by this branch, and nothing in the merge range touches them either. Not worked around here. Waiting for the upload would hide it, and a user opening a tab right after a reconnect has no such signal to wait on. An earlier version of this message claimed the spec passes. It does not; I had seen five green runs out of six and generalised from them. Sustained runs are about three in eleven before the merge and zero in four after. * chore(e2e): add a typecheck entry point for tests/, unenforced for now tests/ has never been typechecked. That is how a spec could read target.targetId off a type with no such field, and call a function without its required argument, while the suite reported green — the spec was skipping, so nothing ever disagreed with it. Pointing tsc at tests/ finds both immediately. It also finds ~198 errors across ~94 files, which is a cleanup project rather than a change to make here, so this ships as pnpm typecheck:e2e and is deliberately NOT added to the typecheck chain or to CI. An unenforced script is worth less than a gate, but it is worth more than nothing: it is runnable, it is discoverable, and the header says plainly what it is so nobody mistakes it for coverage we have. runtime-types.ts is the one fix included, because it was actively misleading: every PaneManagerLike method was optional, so every call site was a possibly-undefined invocation that TypeScript could not help with. They are real methods on a real instance. Also widens AppStore to the StoreApi that window.__store actually is. * test(ssh): separate the reconnect paint guard from the tab-destruction bug The paint guard was failing about two runs in three, and after the merge every run, for a reason that has nothing to do with painting. It staged its full-screen check in a tab it had opened AFTER a reconnect — which is exactly the tab an unrelated session-sync bug destroys on the NEXT reconnect. Two independent failures were riding on one assertion, and the one that fired was not the one the spec is for. Running top in the ORIGINAL tab fixes it. That tab predates every reconnect, so it is in the host snapshot and survives. No assertion changed, none were weakened, and the new-tab case simply moves after the full-screen case rather than before it — it still opens its tab after a reconnect, which is the regression it exists to cover. Five consecutive runs pass at ~13s, against three in eleven before. The bug itself is not swept up. ssh-reconnect-tab-destruction.spec.ts records it as a fixme with the mechanism written down: session-merge spreads the host tab list over the local one, so a local tab missing from the host snapshot has no surviving branch, and the upload that would have put it there is dropped rather than deferred inside the 1s window after a snapshot apply. It is worse than a vanishing tab — the tab bar keeps rendering it, correctly titled, while the terminal slice has dropped it and no pane manager exists, so the user clicks a selected tab that never paints, with no error and no recovery, while the process runs on untouched. fixme rather than a workaround because waiting for the upload would hide it, and a user opening a tab right after a reconnect has no such signal to wait on. It is pre-existing: none of the four files in that path is touched by this branch, and nothing in the merge range touches them either. Also lifts openTerminalTab into a shared helper, since both specs need it and the group argument it must pass is the kind of thing worth stating once. * fix(ssh): stop a reconnect deleting local state the host has not seen Reported from a 60-second manual test: reconnect an SSH workspace and the app drops to the home screen, a second tab running pnpm install is gone entirely, and one launched agent is listed twice. Three symptoms, one cause. The snapshot is applied as the whole truth for the reconnecting target. The tab merge iterates only the host's worktrees, then the result is spread over a gap where every local tab for that worktree has just been dropped — so a tab created locally whose upload has not landed has no branch that keeps it. Not a race: it cannot survive. Same for the pointers, where a snapshot that names no active worktree nulls activeWorktreeId and activeWorkspaceKey, which is the home screen while the user's terminals are still running. So the host is now authoritative for what it knows and not for what it has never been told. A local tab absent from the snapshot is kept, the worktree union is used so a snapshot with no entry for it at all cannot erase it, and a null active worktree only defers to local state when that workspace demonstrably still exists in the merged result. Two guards this change had to earn rather than assume. A null activeTabId is NOT missing information — it is a deliberate deselect that arms the duplicate-tab repair, and my first attempt defeated it and broke that test; it is honoured verbatim now. And preserving by tab id alone reintroduces the duplicate agent, because the host can carry the same session under a new tab id, so the preserve also checks the remote session id — the identity that survives a tab-id change. Testing, which is the part that failed here before. Eight tests fail on the unfixed code and pass on this one, at two levels: the merge decision table, and the real apply path driven through a store. The end-to-end version of the same scenario is deliberately NOT the guard and now says so in its header — measured against unfixed code it only reproduces about one run in three, because the destruction needs the tab created inside the debounced upload's suppression window and nothing external can force that. Its earlier green run is exactly why this shipped. * fix(ssh): let agent session history recover once the relay is ready Reported against the adhoc build: a workspace whose editor was loading remote files perfectly still showed "SSH relay is not ready" and "0 shown · 0 recent" in the Agent Session History panel, permanently. That string is what the relay throws before it is ready, which is ordinary at startup and again for the window a reconnect leaves the session not-ready. The panel had three refresh triggers — mount, window refocus, and a newly seen agent session id — and none of them fire when the relay simply becomes ready. So a transient startup error became a stuck panel next to a workspace that plainly worked, which is why the report described it as broken while everything else was fine. The file explorer already recovers from exactly this, off exactly this signal, with the rationale written down at use-file-explorer-tree-load-effects.ts: it loads before SSH providers are registered, so it retries when sshConnectedGeneration bumps. This panel simply never did. Same idiom, same gate — only retries when there was a prior error, so a local workspace or one that already listed fine does not rescan every time some unrelated host connects. Two tests in the existing suite. The retry one fails on the unfixed code with "the panel never retried after SSH became ready"; the second pins the gate, since a retry that fires on every connection bump would turn one bug into a rescan storm. * fix(worktrees): name the create route when a raw filesystem error escapes A worktree create over SSH failed with a bare "ENOENT: no such file or directory, lstat '/home/neil/projects/orca-test1234'". That message names nothing. An lstat is Node's LOCAL filesystem, so hitting one against a path that lives on an SSH host means creation ran a local implementation for a remote repo — but the user cannot know that, and neither could I without re-deriving the routing by hand and then failing to reproduce it. worktrees:create picks between three implementations, and the order matters: isFolderRepo is consulted BEFORE connectionId, so a folder-kind repo on an SSH host never reaches the remote path at all. Which route ran, and what the repo looked like when it was chosen, is the entire diagnosis — and it is knowable exactly at the throw site, where the decision was just made. So it is stated there now: route, repo kind, connection id, path, and the original message. Deliberately additive and deliberately narrow. Only ENOENT/EACCES/EPERM are rewritten; a git failure, a relay-not-ready, or a validation error already says what went wrong and burying it under a worse message would be a regression. The original error is kept as `cause`, so anything matching on `code` or reading the stack is unaffected. This does NOT fix the reported failure — I could not reproduce it. On current code I created a worktree at that exact path, at a second path, with a leftover directory already present remotely (correctly suffixed -2), and with the SSH target disconnected (clean actionable error, no ENOENT). What it does is make the next occurrence identify itself in one screenshot instead of costing another investigation. * fix(ssh): recognise a missing path reported by the relay Creating a worktree over SSH failed with a raw "ENOENT: no such file or directory, lstat '/home/neil/projects/orca-test1234'". The path was the one about to be created, so its absence was correct. The caller asks exactly that question — remotePathExists returns false on ENOENT — and could not get an answer, so it rethrew at the user instead. The trace log settles where the error comes from, and it is not where I spent a long time looking. The stack starts at SshChannelMultiplexer.handleResponse: the lstat ran on the SSH HOST, and the failure travelled back as JSON-RPC. An lstat in an ENOENT message is normally Node's local filesystem, which sent me hunting for a local fs call on a remote path; there is none. handleResponse rebuilds the error as `new Error(msg.error.message)` and then sets `code` from `msg.error.code` — the TRANSPORT's numeric JSON-RPC code. Node's 'ENOENT' string code does not survive that, and isENOENT tested only for the string, so a remote missing path could never be recognised as missing. Every caller of that predicate asks the same question, so this was wrong for all of them, not just worktree create. The message is now consulted as well, matched on Node's full canonical phrase so a branch name or log line that merely contains the word cannot make an existing path look absent — that would silently skip a collision check rather than report one. Fixed on the client because it holds for every relay version, including ones already deployed; teaching the relay to send the original code would only help hosts redeployed afterwards. The two other copies of this predicate, in filesystem-rename-collision and git-discard-path-safety, are deliberately left alone: both run against a local filesystem — one inside the relay, one on the desktop — where the string code is intact and broadening would only add false positives. Seven tests, three of which fail on the unfixed code: the relay-rebuilt error, the same error through the IPC wrapper the renderer sees, and one carrying no code at all. * revert: drop the worktree-create error-context wrapper Written to make an unexplained ENOENT self-identifying when creating a worktree over SSH. The cause is now known and fixed — the error came back from the RELAY and isENOENT could not recognise it, because the multiplexer rebuilds a remote error with the transport's numeric code — so the wrapper is scaffolding for a solved problem. Worse, its central claim is false. It reported 'the remote (SSH) path failed on a local filesystem call', and the trace log shows the lstat ran on the SSH host, not locally. Keeping a message that asserts the wrong thing about the one failure it was built for is worse than not having it. 183 lines and a rewritten error at the IPC boundary, removed. * docs(ssh): drop a comment claim about older relays that is not true The requireReplay comment said the field is optional on the wire so an older relay ignores it. It cannot happen: the client deploys its own relay into a version-scoped directory and validateGrant rejects any grant whose serverBuildId differs, so client and relay are the same build by construction. The field IS optional, which is why the relay reads it as !== true — that part stands on its own and needs no story about versions. A comment asserting a compatibility property the code does not have is worse than no comment, because the next person plans around it. * fix(ssh): act on the host key review — three must-fixes and two hazards M1. A stale record of ours outranked known_hosts, so the remedy we print did not work. `ssh-keygen -R host` then reconnect leaves known_hosts holding the NEW key while our store still holds the old one, and the store was consulted first — the one state that cure produces was the one state we refused. Permanently, since nothing in the app clears the store. known_hosts now decides a match first, which concedes nothing: it is the artefact ssh itself obeys, so an attacker who can rewrite it has already won. Both directions of the precedence are pinned now; the rotation case fails without this change. That leaves one rejection known_hosts cannot cure — a host trusted only on first contact that later rotates its key. "Remove the saved key" named nothing a user could find, so it now names the store file. M2. A superseded attempt could put a passphrase prompt in front of a host we had just refused. The verifier deliberately does not record a rejection for an attempt nobody is waiting on, so nothing identified it and ssh2's generic handshake error walked the credential ladder. Guarded on the generation, which catches it whatever the error turned out to be. Deliberately NOT by rejecting with a cancellation: an existing test pins that connect() still reports the raw late-startup error, and that behaviour did not need to change to fix this. M3. Every unknown host was refused whenever HOME diverges from the passwd home — devcontainers, `su`, Nix shells, some corporate launchers — because `-F` makes ssh ignore /etc/ssh/ssh_config and being blind to a site policy was treated as reason to refuse. Being blind is only a reason to refuse if we cannot go and look, so it now asks ssh for the system config on its own and takes the stricter of the two. Only a probe that fails leaves the strict rule standing. Costs one `ssh -G` on the rare path that already needed -F. N1. A rejected key's fingerprint was still adopted, and the relay scopes install locks by it — locks keyed to a host we refused to talk to. N2. The fallback algorithm list re-introduced the throw its own comment describes. ssh2 prepends ssh-ed25519 only when a runtime probe succeeds, so on a build where that probe fails, proposing it makes generateAlgorithmList throw inside client.connect — and only for hosts we already know. Not reading ssh2's list is a reason to leave its defaults alone, not to guess: it returns null now and the caller skips reordering. 1555 tests pass in src/main/ssh. * docs(ssh): state the merge's real trade instead of claiming it has none The preserve comment said a genuinely closed tab is never in the local list, because closing removes it. True for a close on THIS client; false for one closed on another client sharing the host, where the tab is still local, still absent from the snapshot, and now kept. That is a deliberate trade, not an oversight — absence cannot distinguish 'never uploaded' from 'closed elsewhere', and the outcomes are not symmetric: keeping a tab a moment too long is recoverable by closing it, deleting a live one with a process in it is not. But the comment asserted the case could not arise, which is the kind of claim that gets planned around. Now stated, and pinned by a test so the next person can see it was chosen rather than missed. * fix(ssh): stop a newer host key store being silently downgraded The store writes a version and never read it back. A file from a future Orca would have had every record dropped by validateRecord — the shape would not match — and then been REWRITTEN as version 1, so a rollback silently discarded whatever that version knew. Trust records are user-owned state; losing them costs a first-contact prompt per host and, worse, re-establishes trust from nothing. v1 is the only place this can be made safe, because v2 cannot retrofit a v1 that already clobbers it. A newer file is now left alone: nothing is trusted from it, and trustHostKey declines to write rather than downgrade. The check sits inside the snapshot queue so it cannot be separated from the write by another writer, and declining is not an error the caller fails on — the key still verified, and the next connect re-derives the same decision from known_hosts. The test writes a version-99 file and asserts it is byte-identical afterwards; it fails on the unfixed code with the file rewritten as version 1. * perf(ssh): skip the reconnect snapshot probe the replay has already ruled out Every SSH reconnect paid up to the 750ms model-snapshot timeout, including the ones where the answer was discarded. The gate needs the snapshot's alternate-screen flag, so the probe looked unavoidable — but one of its two vetoes does not: if the replay shows the app LEFT the alternate screen, no snapshot can be used whatever it says. Asking that first costs a regex over the replay and removes the probe entirely for that case. It also shrinks the window that matters most: the await sits inside the structural replay coordinator with live PTY bytes deferred, and the payload can be superseded while it runs. Behaviour is unchanged — sshReconnectPaintsFromModel returns false for a null snapshot exactly as it did for a fetched one it then vetoed, and its tests still pin both vetoes. * test(ssh): cover the site host key policy probe It shipped untested. Three cases, and the third is the one that matters: a system config naming no policy answers 'ask', not null, because parseSshGOutput fills the OpenSSH default — and that distinction is exactly what the caller keys on. Null means 'we could not look', which is the only state that keeps refusing unknown hosts; a successful read that sets nothing clears the blindness without relaxing anything, since strictestHostKeyChecking leaves the user's value alone against 'ask'. I expected null there and was wrong about my own code; the test now records the behaviour rather than my assumption. Also pins that the probe passes the null device and terminates its args with -- so a host starting with '-' stays a host. * fix(ssh): three release blockers from the readiness review P1-1 was my own fix from the previous round, and it was wrong. I claimed `ssh -G -F /dev/null` reads the system config while excluding the user's. It does not: -F excludes /etc/ssh/ssh_config too, which sshGArgsForHost's own comment says and I quoted before contradicting. Confirmed live against OpenSSH 10.2p1 — plain `ssh -G` reports the sendenv lines from /etc/ssh/ssh_config, `ssh -F /dev/null -G` reports none. So the probe returned built-in defaults on every machine, the fail-closed guard never engaged, and a site-wide StrictHostKeyChecking yes was silently ignored while we accepted AND durably recorded a key the user's own ssh refuses. That is worse than the lockout it was meant to fix. There is no ssh-only way to ask this, so the file is read directly — and the question asked is deliberately weaker than "what is the policy". Anything ambiguous (unreadable, an Include that will not resolve, the directive present at all) answers yes and the caller stays fail-closed. Only a site config that demonstrably says nothing about host keys clears it, which is the common case that was being punished. Includes are followed, since macOS and most distros ship `Include /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/*` and missing that would read as "no policy" on nearly every machine that has one. strictestHostKeyChecking goes with it: there is no separately-read site value left to merge. P1-2. `ssh -G` prints UserKnownHostsFile unquoted and space-separated even when the config quoted it — verified the same way. One path containing a space is therefore indistinguishable from two, and splitting shreds C:\Users\John Doe\.ssh\known_hosts into fragments that resolve to nothing. Every fragment misses with ENOENT, which reads as "absent" rather than "unreadable", so the user appears to know no hosts and a CHANGED key is accepted as first contact. The filesystem is the only thing that can disambiguate, so it decides: if no fragment exists but the rejoined path does, it was one path. A list where any fragment exists is a genuine multi-file config and is left alone. P1-3. oxlint is a PR gate and this diff failed it on two lines. Both fixed — including by splitting the replay on ESC rather than matching it, which is equivalent since every private-mode sequence begins right after one, and respects no-control-regex instead of suppressing it. That gate failure is on me twice over: I reported LINT clean repeatedly while filtering oxlint's output with a grep that could never match its `path:line:col: error` format. Verification is by exit code now. 5183 tests pass; each fix has a test that fails without it. * fix(ssh): the readiness review's P2s P2-1. activeRepoId and activeWorktreeId could describe different workspaces. The repo followed the host while the worktree came from local state, and it split in exactly the case the preservation exists for — "the host named no worktree" is precisely when it can still name a repo. All three active-* fields now derive from whichever worktree won, rather than each picking a source. The nested ternaries that hid it are gone. P2-2. The trust-source reads sit AHEAD of client.connect, and readyTimeout only covers the handshake — nothing wrapped attemptConnect. A home directory on a stalled NFS or SMB mount made readFile hang forever, leaving the connection wedged in `connecting` with no ladder entry and no recovery. Bounded at 5s, reusing the existing withTimeout helper. The fallback is the one an unreadable file already produces — evidence withheld, connect as ssh does but record nothing — not the far worse "no hosts known" that would let a changed key through as first contact. That helper absorbs rejections into its fallback, so the store's catch had to move INSIDE the timeout; wrapping the other way silently swallowed the warning that is the only signal the store is unwired rather than merely slow. P2-4. doSsh2Connect runs up to five times per attempt as the credential ladder advances, and each run re-read every known_hosts file, re-read the store, and re-scanned the system config. Nothing writes those while a handshake is in flight, so they are read once per attempt — which matters more now that each read can cost up to 5s. Keyed by connect generation rather than cleared, so a superseded attempt can never hand its sources to the live one. P2-3. forgetHostKey was exported, tested and referenced by nothing. The store-mismatch rejection now names the store file, so the case it was meant to cure has a cure without it; an exported API nothing can reach is unverified in production. Removed until D5 ships its UI, and the doc says so. P2-5 needed no change: the site-policy branch it called dead is reachable again now that the probe reads the real config. The design doc drifted from the code in the two places this review checks, and both are corrected: revocation now propagates for the ordinary rotation because a known_hosts match is decided first, and the -F blindness is resolved by reading the file rather than by refusing. * fix(ssh): rejoin a spaced known_hosts path even beside an ordinary one The whole-list check only fired when NOTHING in the reported list existed, so a config naming both a spaced path and an ordinary one kept the spaced one in fragments — the ordinary path existing was enough to leave it alone. The file the user actually verified their hosts in then never got read, which is the same failure the rejoin exists to prevent, just harder to notice. Longest run first now: the longest sequence of tokens that resolves to a real file is taken as one path and the scan continues after it, falling back to the single token when no run resolves. A genuinely absent path is still reported as-is rather than invented. The mixed case fails against the previous version. * test(ssh): pin the site config scanner's edge cases This control decides whether an unknown host is refused when we cannot see the site policy, and my first attempt at it was a security regression, so the cases that decide 'policy present' deserve to be written down rather than assumed. Seven, and each could have gone the wrong way. A commented-out directive must NOT read as a policy or the lockout returns for every distro shipping the line commented. A directive inside a Host or Match block MUST read as one, because no attempt is made to evaluate whether the block applies — guessing wrong in the permissive direction is the failure that matters. The equals form counts; StrictHostKeyCheckingExtended does not. A nested Include is followed, since a policy one level down is still a policy. An Include cycle terminates and answers false, which is knowledge rather than doubt: both files were read in full and neither mentions it. All seven passed as written, so this pins behaviour rather than fixing it. * test(ssh): assert tab survival, record the reattach gap rather than flake on it Running the two SSH e2e specs — which neither review executed — showed the tab-destruction spec failing on liveness three times out of three. The screenshot disproved the obvious reading: the marker was on screen, echoed by a live shell. getTerminalContent resolves the store's active tab id and returns '' when paneManagers has no entry under it, which is indistinguishable from 'the shell said nothing', and across a reconnect those two disagree. Scanning every mounted pane instead fixed the read, and then measured the real thing: three runs in four. The tab survives every time; the reattach behind it does not. So the merge fix is real and incomplete — the store keeps the tab, the tab bar renders it, and the pane sometimes never rebinds, which is the frozen-tab shape the original report described, one layer down from the deletion that used to cause it. Asserting that would put a one-in-four flake into the lane built to catch this class, and a lane nobody trusts is how the original silent-skip failure happened. So the spec asserts survival, which is deterministic at five runs in five, and the liveness gap is written down in docs/reference/ssh-reconnect-source-recovery.md with the first place to look. * fix(ssh): stop an unreadable host key store from wiping every pinned key Second readiness pass, checking each of the first pass's ten fixes rather than taking them on trust. Nine held. This is the one that did not, plus three fail-open shapes in the site-config scanner that a live OpenSSH disproved. P1 — the store. loadTrustedHostKeys returns [] for ANY read failure, and trustHostKey then wrote [...that empty list, newRecord]: one transient EMFILE followed by one first-contact accept replaced the file with a single record. Every other host re-TOFUs, and one whose key genuinely changed in between is accepted as first contact rather than refused — the exact outcome pinning exists to prevent. It also contradicted the doctrine this PR applies to known_hosts two files away, where a file that exists and refuses to open is evidence withheld. Fixed by classifying one read instead of guessing twice: readStore returns ok/absent/withheld, the read path flattens withheld to 'nothing trusted' so it still fails closed, and the write path declines. That subsumes the separate newer-version probe, so trustHostKey now reads the file once inside the queue rather than twice. The 'Trusted host key' log moved inside the branch that actually writes — it was already claiming success on the newer-version path. P2 — the site-config scanner documents 'doubt wins on every path' and had three where it did not, each the same shape: a path resolved WRONG still resolves to something, and a nonexistent Include reads as 'nothing there', which is indistinguishable from 'no policy'. Verified against OpenSSH 10.2p1: relative Includes resolve against a fixed dir, not the including file's, so a directive two deep was missed; ? and [...] are globs it honours; ~ and %-tokens expand before use. All three now answer doubt. P2 — credential prompts are gated on the attempt generation in one place rather than per rung. A superseded attempt is denied without a recorded decision, so isHostKeyVerificationError reads false and the ladder ran on to prompt for a passphrase nobody was waiting on. P2 — resolveKnownHostsFiles is async. Its rejoin existsSync-scans the very paths the 5s bound protects, and sat outside it as an eagerly-evaluated argument, so a stalled NFS/SMB mount blocked the whole main process. Tests fail against the pre-fix code: 2 for the store wipe, 3 for the scanner. Also: the 4 IME failures I previously reported as pre-existing main breakage were a stale node_modules — the xterm patch from #14758 was not applied here (402,643 bytes installed vs 403,181 expected). pnpm install applies it and all 4 pass. The OSC8 and SFTP failures were the same cause. * fix(ssh): make the merge non-duplicating, and close the last scanner hole Third readiness pass. Three P2s, all fixed. The merge one is the one I most wanted a verdict on, and it is real: hostUnknown filtered against ids the HOST knows and never against ids this same merge had already emitted, so a tab id local state holds under two worktrees was re-added under both. Two panes then share one terminalLayoutsByTabId entry and one remoteSessionIdsByTabId entry — one remote PTY — plus an activeTabId that never converges, which is the self-retriggering repair loop active-tab-owner-worktree .ts exists to mitigate (React #185). This PR does not create that state. It used to DESTROY it, by deleting every local tab under a replaced worktree, and keeping live panes cost that accidental cure. So the guarantee is made explicit rather than incidental: the merge now never emits one tab id twice, whatever it is handed. The active worktree is walked first so the surviving copy is the one the user is looking at, which is the owner resolveActiveTabOwnerWorktreeId already prefers — merge and repair now agree instead of each picking differently. Scanner: an Include path that is quoted AND contains a space was split before it was unquoted, so both halves missed and two absent paths read as 'no site policy'. OpenSSH honours that form -- 10.2p1 applies an Include of a quoted spaced path -- and it is likelier on Windows. Quote-aware splitting rather than 'any quote is doubt', because answering doubt for an ordinary quoted Include with no space would reinstate the lockout this scanner exists to avoid. An unclosed quote is doubt. Unquoted spaces still split, which is also what OpenSSH does. The reconnect paint gate took the replay and re-scanned it, having already been scanned by the caller that decides whether to fetch a snapshot at all — two full splits of up to 100KB per pane per reconnect. It now takes the transition. hasReplay is passed separately because it cannot be inferred: a replay with no mode change and no replay at all both give null. Tests fail against the pre-fix code for the merge and all four scanner shapes. Correcting my own evidence claim from last round: of the two store tests, only the wipe one fails pre-fix. The other guards the asymmetry the fix creates and passes either way — worth keeping, but I should not have counted it. * fix(ssh): honour every Include quoting form OpenSSH does Fourth readiness pass. Two findings; one fixed, one deliberately not, with the evidence for refusing it. The tokenizer modelled double quotes only. A live 10.2p1 honours single quotes and backslash-escaped spaces too, and both fell into the same silent fail-open the double-quote case was raised for: fragments that resolve to nothing, and 'nothing there' is indistinguishable from 'no site policy'. The escape is limited to a backslash before whitespace, NOT a general one. A general escape would be catastrophic on the platform this most needs to be right for: the Windows site config lives at C:\ProgramData\ssh\ssh_config, so it would eat every separator in an Include beneath it and resolve to nothing -- reintroducing the fail-open it was meant to close. The test for that is discriminating rather than incidental: it gives the file a literal backslash in its name, so a swallowed separator resolves elsewhere and fails, where a plain 'expect false' could not tell the two apart. Verified it catches the naive version, and that the other two catch the old tokenizer. NOT fixed: the non-duplication guarantee still stops at the worktrees the merge rewrites. A worktree that is neither replaced nor named by the host is never walked, so a duplicate straddling that boundary survives. Extending the guarantee to the assembly point was implemented and REVERTED. Any rule there has to pick a survivor, and the ones available are wrong during a worktree-id change -- which is the very thing that produces these duplicates. Preferring the active worktree keeps the OLD id's copy at the moment a rename lands, because the active worktree has not moved yet; the new worktree was left with no tabs and its groups were never created. remote-workspace-snapshot-duplicate-tab-repair.test.ts caught it, which is the only reason I know the stronger version was wrong rather than merely bolder. A surviving duplicate is mitigated by active-tab-owner-worktree.ts; deleting the tabs of the worktree the user is about to land in is not. The comment now claims only what holds, and says why it is not stronger. Also records the exit from the isENOENT message-matching trade in remote-wire-compatibility.md, where someone touching the relay error path will be standing. * fix(ssh): expand Windows OpenSSH's __PROGRAMDATA__ token in known_hosts paths Captured real 'ssh -G' output from a Windows host rather than reasoning about it, which is the one thing that could not be inferred from the POSIX format. Two things came back that the code did not handle correctly, and one of them is the security failure mode this work exists to prevent. Native Windows OpenSSH prints the system paths with its own token UNEXPANDED: globalknownhostsfile __PROGRAMDATA__\ssh/ssh_known_hosts __PROGRAMDATA__\ssh/ssh_known_hosts2 userknownhostsfile C:\Users\neil/.ssh/known_hosts C:\Users\neil/.ssh/known_hosts2 Passed through as a literal path, __PROGRAMDATA__\ssh/ssh_known_hosts misses with ENOENT -- and an absent file is deliberately treated as 'no host is known there' rather than 'evidence withheld', because that is the normal state. So a site-managed known_hosts on Windows was silently invisible: every host in it read as first contact, and one whose key an admin had rotated produced a TOFU accept where it should have produced a mismatch. Now expanded from process.env.ProgramData, and left literal when that is unset rather than guessed -- a wrong path reads as absent, which is the very failure being fixed. The second finding is reassurance rather than a bug: separators are MIXED within one path (C:\Users\neil/.ssh/...), which Node's fs accepts on Windows, and a spaced home prints unquoted exactly as it does on POSIX. So the space-rejoin design is confirmed against the real format rather than assumed -- its motivating example, C:\Users\John Doe, splits the way the rejoin expects. The captured output is pinned as a literal fixture. Parsing and the rejoin are pure string work, so this covers the input shape honestly off Windows; it does not pretend to cover the platform's path arithmetic. The expansion test fails without the fix. Also confirms C:\ProgramData\ssh is the right site-config directory -- it exists on the host, empty -- so the scanner is looking in the right place. * fix(ssh): branch Include backslash handling on platform, both halves measured Fifth readiness pass found that the previous narrowing traded one fail-open for another. Both rules are right, on different platforms: POSIX 10.2p1: Include conf\.d/x.conf resolves as conf.d/x.conf four backslashes needed to survive as one -- argv_split and glob() each consume a level Windows: Include C:\Users\...\x.conf resolves, separators intact So a backslash before an ordinary character ESCAPES on POSIX and SEPARATES on Windows, and either rule applied everywhere fails open on the other platform. Preserving on POSIX means looking for a path with a literal backslash, missing, and reading 'no site policy'. Answering doubt on Windows means every absolute Include is doubt, which is the lockout the scanner exists to avoid. Now branched. POSIX answers doubt rather than emulating two rounds of glob escaping for a question this coarse -- a backslash in a POSIX system config path is vanishingly rare, so fail-closed costs nothing there. The review offered the Windows half as a reasoned assumption and flagged it as such. It is now measured on a real Windows host instead: backslash separators resolve, AND an escaped space still escapes amid them (C:\Users\neil\sshprobe\sp\ ace\x.conf -> port 2802), which is exactly the rule implemented. Two other worries were checked and came back unfounded -- a backslash-space inside EITHER quote is consumed by ssh, and a single quote inside double quotes is an ordinary character, which the single quote-state variable already reproduced. The tokenizer takes the platform as a parameter, so both sides are pinned from one host. Every expectation in the new oracle came from running a real ssh and reading what it resolved to, not from reading source or shell convention -- the tokenizer's whole job is to agree with ssh about which file it would read. Also narrows an overclaiming comment: the dedupe set is consulted only by the host-unknown filter, so a duplicate in the HOST's own snapshot still propagates. Pre-existing and unchanged; the comment now says what the code actually does. * fix(ssh): only expand __PROGRAMDATA__ when it is a whole path segment Found by probing the expansion I had just written, rather than by reading it: a bare startsWith also matches a path that merely BEGINS with those characters, so __PROGRAMDATA__evil/known_hosts was rewritten to C:\ProgramData\evil\known_hosts -- a directory the user never named. Same prefix-collision class I checked the site-config scanner for and then did not check here. Low reachability, since the token only appears because Windows OpenSSH emitted it, and it emits it as a whole segment. Fixed because the expansion is one review pass old and sits in the security path: a rewritten known_hosts path resolves somewhere unintended, and a path that resolves to nothing reads as 'no host is known', which is the fail-open this whole line of work has been closing. Now requires the token to be the entire path or be followed by a separator -- both separators, since the path is Windows-shaped but may be parsed anywhere. The test fails without the check. * test(ssh): split the pty provider spawn tests into their own file CI's static analysis went red on the merge of main: ssh-pty-provider.test.ts reached 803 counted lines against a maximum of 800. Both sides contributed -- main grew the file and this branch added 7 lines to it -- so neither shows the violation alone, which is why local lint stayed green until main was merged in. AGENTS.md forbids disabling max-lines or bumping a per-file limit, and that rule is right here: the file was doing two jobs. Spawn owns the startup contract -- ingress version, env scrubbing, execution ownership, and the reconnect races -- and is 630 of the 922 lines. It reads as its own unit rather than as an overflow file, so it moves to ssh-pty-provider-spawn.test.ts and the shared relay stub moves beside it under a name that says what it is. Same tests, same count: 713 provider tests pass, and the line total is unchanged across the two files. * fix(ssh): remove the dead lint suppressions, and reach Terminal 1 in the restore spec Two CI failures, both surfaced by this branch rather than caused by it. Static analysis: the two no-require-imports suppressions on the ssh2 constants require() are now unused -- main's config no longer reports that rule there -- and the changed-code audit treats a dead directive as an error. Removed; the audit CI runs passes locally on the merge. E2E: ssh-cold-activation-restore failed on clicking Terminal 1. This PR is what routes that spec into the changed-e2e lane at all -- before, the Docker-SSH specs only ran when someone edited a spec file, which is the gap this branch set out to close -- so its first run in CI was here, and the failure is pre-existing rather than new. The trace shows the cause: six restored tabs overflow the strip at CI's window size and the restore pins it to the END, so Terminal 1 sits outside the scroll viewport. Playwright's own scroll-into-view loses that race against the sticky-to-end effect and times out on an element it can see but never reaches. The spec's intent is to activate the first tab and prove it remounted, not to exercise strip scrolling, so it now scrolls the strip to the start first. Not papering over a product bug: the strip is a native overflow container with working arrow controls, so a user can reach the tab -- it is Playwright that cannot drive a moving target. Six specs pass locally in CI's exact order and worker count. * test(ssh): press the restored first tab directly instead of waiting for it to hold still The previous attempt swapped a click for scrollIntoViewIfNeeded and hit the same 30s timeout, which identifies the real cause: not that Terminal 1 is out of view, but that it never holds STILL. Both APIs wait for the element to stop moving, and the strip keeps re-laying-out while the relay reconnects behind it -- so both time out on an element they can see and never settle on. Driving the pointer directly needs no element to be stable, only to be somewhere at the moment it is pressed, and the attempt is retried against the store rather than believed. Activation is deferred to pointerup and suppressed past a drag threshold, so it has to be a real down/up pair at one position -- a synthetic click event would not select the tab at all. Passes twice locally. The previous version also passed locally, so the honest statement is that the local runs prove the interaction still works, not that they reproduce CI's instability -- CI is the oracle for that.	2026-08-17 16:40:01 -07:00
Jinwoo Hong	fa9b20cb41	feat(skills): reland private bundle sharing safely (#14934)	2026-08-16 13:45:54 -07:00