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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Jinwoo Hong
|
aa78d4af17 |
fix(release): restore version and harden staging confirmation
Resolves release scan blockers STA-6611 and STA-6612. |
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Jinwoo Hong
|
3eec77c11a |
chore(cloud): add the relay fence broker, ops console, Terraform root, scripts, and 24 cloud-* workflows (#18413)
Phase 6 of the relay split: the relay's deploy/operate surface moves under cloud/ with 24 cloud-* workflows gated on ORCA_CLOUD_OPERATIONS_ENABLED, the Cloud SQL rollout lease action, the relay Terraform root (dual-accept identities for both repositories), scripts, docs, CODEOWNERS, and a terraform validate job in Cloud Verify. |
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 Neil
|
968dbd905f |
perf(renderer): take the English catalog and the xterm WebGL addon off the boot graph (#18326)
* perf(renderer): take the English catalog, xterm WebGL addon and emoji data off the boot graph The renderer's boot graph — the entry chunk plus its 331 modulepreload links, all fetched and evaluated before first paint — carried three payloads nothing needs at that moment. `en.json` (644 KB) was an eager i18next resource, but every renderer string goes through `translate(key, fallback)` and `en` resolves that inline default, so most of the catalog was dead weight. The renderer now bundles a generated `en-runtime-required.json` holding only the 2,583 of 13,828 entries a default cannot reproduce: plural-suffixed keys, keys whose catalog value differs from a call site's default, and keys no call site references with a literal default. `en.json` stays the translator source and the input to the four lazy catalogs. `@xterm/addon-webgl` (243.6 KB) and `emojibase-data` (170 KB) are now primed right after the React root renders instead of statically imported. The load stays eager and `attachWebgl` stays synchronous — it reads the resolved constructor — so no terminal ever falls back to the DOM renderer for a frame. `isPluginPanelTabKey`/`isQualifiedPluginKey` move to schema-free sibling modules, re-exported from `plugin-manifest.ts`. This evicts the plugin manifest schema graph from the boot chunk but measures ~0 KB, because six other shared modules still put zod on the boot path. Boot graph: 332 chunks / 5107.2 KB -> 336 chunks / 4161.5 KB (-945.7 KB, -18.5%). A new ratchet parses the built index.html and fails if `en.json`, `@xterm/addon-webgl` or `emojibase-data` is preloaded again; it runs at the end of every `build:electron-vite`. * chore(i18n): pin the generated English subset to LF and mark it generated * fix(i18n): make the runtime-catalog gate merge-robust and prime emoji data in tests CI builds the merge of a PR with main, so a byte-for-byte comparison against a committed generated file fails the moment any unrelated PR adds a translate() call — which is what happened here. The check now asserts the property that actually matters instead of byte equality: every runtime-required entry is shipped, and nothing shipped disagrees with en.json. Entries that stopped being required are dead weight, never a wrong string, so they are reported and tolerated. Failures now name the offending keys rather than saying "stale". The generator itself was already deterministic (plain code-unit sort, no locale collation, order-independent set construction); a test now pins that a reversed call-site walk produces byte-identical output. Test fixes for the catalog prune and the deferred emoji load: - browser-search / NativeChatSupportedAgents asserted key presence on the renderer's runtime resource. The durable contract is en.json — the renderer deliberately no longer bundles entries a call site default reproduces — so they assert against the translator catalog. - Four emoji tests typed a shortcode in the same tick as mount, before the catalog the hook primes on mount resolves. Not reachable by a human; the tests now await the prime. * revert(renderer): keep the emoji shortcode catalog statically imported Deferring emojibase-data introduced a window that did not exist before: until the dynamic import settled, getPrimedEmojiShortcodeEntries returned [], so exactShortcodeIndex built an empty map and replaceCompletedWorkspaceEmojiShortcode returned null — leaving a typed `:wink:` in the field literally, and persisting it as the workspace display name. Pre-change the shared catalog was statically imported, so the first call at any tick returned full data. The window is reachable by anything that dispatches input in the same task as the field's mount effect — Playwright/CDP in the e2e suite and agent automation both do, and the WorktreeMetaDialog test failure was exactly that, producing 'Feature 😉' instead of 'Feature 😉'. Nothing that resolves a shortcode can be async without that race, and a wrong persisted name is not an acceptable trade for 166.7 KB, so the deferral is reverted rather than papered over in the tests. The boot-graph ratchet drops its emojibase-data probe and records why. Boot graph: 5108.9 KB -> 4329.9 KB (-779.0 KB, -15.2%), down from -945.7 KB. * fix(terminal): make the deferred WebGL addon load recoverable and refit on late attach Two defects the deferral introduced, neither possible with a static import. A failed load latched the DOM renderer for the whole session. `.then(onOk, onError)` settles fulfilled, so the memoized promise was cached forever with a null constructor: attachWebgl's re-prime got the cached promise back, and resetTerminalWebglSuggestion — the documented "GPU setting changed, retry" path — could not clear it either. The rejection path now clears the memo, latches the queued panes the way a failed construction does so they retry at a recovery boundary rather than every frame, and caps attempts so a genuinely missing chunk is not re-fetched forever. The recovery boundary re-arms it. The queued-attach drain skipped the refit. Every other late-attach path pairs attach with a refit because the grid was measured under DOM cell metrics and WebGL floors the device cell width. Post-deferral, openTerminal's attachWebgl queued and returned, the initial fit rAF then measured DOM metrics and sized the PTY from them, and the addon attached with no refit — a persistently narrow PTY and an unpainted right gutter, not a one-frame flicker. Both paths now go through one attachWebglAndRefit pairing so they cannot diverge again. Regression tests cover both, and each was verified to fail without its fix. The addon-load state machine moves to terminal-webgl-addon-loader.ts and the viewport presentation helpers to pane-viewport-present.ts, keeping pane-webgl-renderer.ts under the 300-line budget without a suppression. |
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Neil
|
f37d2fec97 |
fix(linux): land the reviewed Linux packaging stack on main (#18100)
* fix(linux): give the CLI one entrypoint by extracting the AppImage once
* refactor(linux): trim AppImage CLI registration seams
* test(cli): assert registration lock serialization
* fix(linux): fence AppImage terminal shim mounts
* fix(linux): accept extracted AppImage runtimes with APPDIR only
* docs(linux): make headless AppImage extraction runnable
* refactor(linux): import bundled launcher directly
* fix(linux): reclaim superseded AppImage payloads and packaged symlinks
Pruning removed 3215 of 3216 files from a superseded generation and always
stranded resources/app.asar, leaking ~105 MB per version update. Electron's
asar shim reports a *.asar file as a directory, so the recursive remove tried
to rmdir a real file and failed with ENOTEMPTY; the .catch(() => {}) hid it.
Reproduced end to end on Ubuntu 24.04: 519M -> 623M across one update, and
519M again once the payload is actually reclaimed.
removeExtractedAppImagePayload holds process.noAsar for the removal, counted
so overlapping removals cannot hand the shim back early, and the prune site
now warns with the path instead of swallowing the rejection. All three
removal sites use it -- staging cleanup and displaced roots leaked the same
way.
Also reclaim symlinks left by a packaged deb/rpm install, which the
extracted-cache-only rule turned into a hard conflict on a deb -> AppImage
migration, and name the remedy in the conflict error.
* fix(linux): bound the CLI registration lock wait
`retries: 1000` caps the attempt count, not elapsed time, so at up to 1s per
attempt an IPC-driven registration could hang ~16 minutes against a wedged
holder with no feedback.
A legitimate holder is bounded by the extraction timeout, so wait that plus
slack and then fail with a message naming the lock file, rather than hanging.
`maxRetryTime` is forwarded verbatim to the `retry` package by proper-lockfile.
* fix(linux): stop re-extracting the AppImage on inode metadata churn
The extracted-payload cache key hashed ctime alongside dev/ino/size/mtime.
ctime moves on any inode metadata write -- `chmod +x`, which every AppImage
user is told to run, plus `chown`, an ACL or SELinux relabel, and a backup
restore -- none of which alter a byte of the payload.
Measured on Ubuntu 24.04: `chmod +x` leaves dev, ino, size and mtime
identical and moves ctime alone, so the key changed and the next launch paid
a full ~519 MB re-extraction and a multi-second stall to rebuild a payload it
already had, then pruned the old generation.
Key on content identity instead. An in-place content change moves mtime and
almost always size; a replacement moves the inode. The existing
replace-in-place test still passes.
* fix(linux): stop CLI commands from falling through to Chromium startup
* refactor(cli): remove redundant command membership check
* test(cli): cover command-named project selectors
* fix(cli): redirect the open-url command before startup
* test(linux): cover AUR serve wrapper flags
* fix(linux): tighten CLI launch detection
* fix(linux): respect CLI flag value boundaries
* fix(linux): strip injected Chromium switches from CLI args
* fix(linux): report a missing display instead of dying in uv_close
* refactor(linux): read display locks without a preflight race
* fix(linux): preserve unverified external displays
* chore: format reliability gate manifest
* test(packaging): split runtime resource checks
* fix(linux): fail serve when no display is available
* fix(linux): do not treat a lockless X socket as a dead display
An X server writes its lock beside its socket and both survive a crash
(verified against Xvfb under SIGKILL), so a socket with no lock was never
left by a crashed server. It is an endpoint published from elsewhere: a
container bind-mounting only /tmp/.X11-unix, WSLg, or a foreign PID
namespace. Declaring those dead made the desktop gate exit(1) on displays
that work, with no workaround, and the serve gate refuse to start.
Liveness now splits by ownership. A foreign DISPLAY trusts a lockless
socket; Orca's own :99 does not, because removeStaleDisplayArtifacts
unlinks the lock before the socket and so manufactures that state itself --
adopting it would resurrect the orphan-socket bug and stop the cleanup from
self-healing. The stale-lock rejection is unchanged.
Also correct four doc statements this behaviour falsified.
* fix(linux): fail closed when a stale socket blocks the Xvfb rebind
Readiness only checked that /tmp/.X11-unix/X99 exists. A stale socket we
could not unlink still exists after our own Xvfb refused to bind, so Orca set
DISPLAY to a dead server and Chromium died in Ozone init.
Measured on Ubuntu 24.04 against the pre-fix build: with a leftover :99
socket and no lock, serve exits 139 (SIGSEGV), the socket inode is unchanged
before and after, and no lock is recreated -- it neither cleaned up nor
respawned. To a user that is a crash, not a misconfiguration.
This is reachable in the documented topology, where orca-xvfb.service has no
User= and runs as root while serve runs as User=orca: /tmp is sticky, so the
orca uid cannot unlink a root-owned socket, rmSync fails, and Xvfb exits with
the display already active.
Readiness now requires the display to actually be live -- our socket plus a
lock naming a running process -- so the same state reports an unusable
display and exits 1 with the existing diagnosis.
* fix(linux): recognise abstract X sockets and inherited Wayland fds
Two display setups this gate could not prove were refused outright, and on the
desktop path that is app.exit(1) with no workaround.
An X server may bind only the abstract namespace (`@/tmp/.X11-unix/X0`), which
leaves no filesystem socket to stat. Abstract addresses are kernel-owned and
vanish the moment the owner exits, so an entry in /proc/net/unix is proof of a
live server -- no lock file needed and no stale entry possible. Verified on
Ubuntu 24.04, where 139 such addresses were present.
WAYLAND_SOCKET is an already-connected fd handed over by the compositor, so
there is no path to stat and WAYLAND_DISPLAY may be unset entirely. Its
presence is the display.
Both are consulted only after the filesystem-socket check fails, so no
existing verdict changes.
* fix(linux): never treat Orca's own display number as a foreign endpoint
Recognising a lockless X socket as live is correct for an endpoint published
from elsewhere -- a container bind mount, WSLg -- because an X server writes
its lock beside its socket and both survive a crash. It is wrong for
VIRTUAL_DISPLAY_NUMBER, because Orca's own teardown unlinks the lock before
the socket and so manufactures that exact state.
The managed branch was already strict, but a caller that sets DISPLAY=:99
explicitly takes the foreign path and skipped it, accepting a dead display
left by Orca's own interrupted cleanup. Route the managed number through the
strict probe on both paths.
Found by an adversarial audit of the asymmetry introduced earlier in this
branch; the documented systemd topology is unaffected because its Xvfb writes
a real lock.
* test(linux): add a packaged-artifact contract for the CLI launch paths
* test(linux): avoid buffered serve readiness detection
* test(linux): signal AppImage serve owner directly
* test(linux): tolerate readiness timeout boundary
* test(linux): add startup margin to shutdown oracle
* ci(linux): give package contracts timeout headroom
* fix(ci): route all Linux packaging contract changes
* test(linux): poll shutdown readiness without tail leaks
* test(linux): bound shutdown cleanup grace
* test(linux): assert on CLI output, not the harness's own control lines
run-cli-case.sh echoes `RESULT status=N case=<name>`, and the two cases named
*-skills asserted `expectOutput: 'skills'`. That substring was satisfied by
the case name in the harness's own line, so 2 of 8 cases asserted nothing
about the command -- gutting `skills` entirely would still have gone green.
Control lines are now excluded before matching, and both cases assert the
rendered help header, which only real help output produces. Verified on an
Ubuntu 24.04 host: 8/8 still pass against a stack-tip AppImage.
Also register the gate in reliability-gates.jsonc, which #15085 added a CI
Docker gate without. Red/green is recorded from a stock release AppImage
failing 4 of 8, three of them at status 133 (SIGTRAP).
* fix(linux): require static AppImage runtimes (#17319)
* test(linux): reject a wrong-architecture native binary at packaging time
Cross-building the arm64 slice on an x64 host silently packed an x86-64
`pty.node` -- the rebuild logged "Forcing native rebuild for linux-arm64" and
shipped the host's binary anyway. Every gate here inspects symbol versions,
which are perfectly valid on the wrong architecture, so nothing noticed.
Observed on a Raspberry Pi 5: the packaged app loaded, then failed with
"Failed to load native module: pty.node", and the launch contract reported
3 of 8 cases crashed rather than naming the cause. Swapping in the aarch64
`pty.node` took the same build to 8/8.
Compare ELF `e_machine` against the slice being packaged and fail with the
offending path. Checked before the glibc pass, because a wrong-architecture
binary's symbol versions are valid but meaningless and would send the reader
down the wrong path.
Release CI builds arm64 on a native runner, so this guards local and future
cross-builds rather than a shipped artifact.
* test(linux): judge per-arch vendored binaries against their own path
The first CI run of the architecture gate failed the x64 package job on
`@parcel/watcher-linux-arm64-glibc/watcher.node`. That binary is arm64 on
purpose: the package ships every architecture and its loader picks the match,
so its presence in an x64 build is correct.
Judge a binary against the architecture its own path names, falling back to
the slice when the path names none. That keeps the case this gate exists for
-- `bin/linux-arm64-*/node-pty.node` holding an x86-64 binary, which is what
shipped to a Raspberry Pi 5 -- while letting multi-arch dependencies through.
Dry-run over the real dependency tree flags nothing for either target arch.
* fix(linux): move deb/rpm update installation outside Orca (#17318)
* fix(linux): complete deb/rpm package metadata
* fix(linux): preserve CLI link during package upgrades
* docs(linux): document local RPM build prerequisites
* fix(linux): move deb/rpm update installation outside Orca
* fix(updater): preserve Linux recovery across stale events
* fix(updater): fence stale downloaded events by active target
* fix(updater): preserve active Linux package recovery
* test(linux): keep workflow order assertion in scope
* test(updater): assert stale recovery stays silent
* fix(updater): preserve Linux package recovery after checks
* refactor(updater): keep Linux marker message with status
* fix(linux): describe the right manual update path for deb/rpm hosts
A remote host installed from .deb or .rpm now reports
manual-service-update-required, and the guidance told the operator to
"update through the service manager that starts this server" -- which is
correct for unsupported-headless-serve but wrong for a package install,
where nothing about the remedy involves the service manager.
Say both, keyed on how the host was installed.
* docs(linux): document orcad update restart safety
* docs(linux): scope restart census omissions
* docs(linux): use absolute service CLI launcher
* fix(serve): validate in-process serve options before startup (#17683)
* fix(linux): stop offering updates a distro-managed install cannot apply (#17918)
Closes #17702.
The resources/package-type marker is authoritative but never checked against
the host, so any repackager that unpacks Orca's .deb -- AUR, Nix, a container
rebuild -- inherits `deb` verbatim. Install feasibility was then computed
after a ~165 MB download, so those users got check -> download -> a card
promising an install command -> a dead end.
Validate the marker against the host: a deb/rpm marker with no matching
package manager in the trusted directories means a package manager owns this
install. This reuses the exact lists and resolver that
buildLinuxPackageInstallCommand already loops over, so a false positive is
impossible by construction -- any host flagged here would have failed with
no-package-manager after the download anyway. The gate only moves that
verdict earlier. Verified across Debian 12, Ubuntu 24.04, Arch, Fedora 40 and
openSUSE Leap: no false positive on a real deb host, correct on every
repackaging host.
The release is still reported, because the user does want to know 1.4.194
exists and to update through their distro; only the download path is closed.
`externallyManaged` is an additive optional field on the existing `available`
status, so older paired clients decode it unchanged. downloadUpdate() refuses
authoritatively, since main owns this verdict rather than the card, and
unwinds any pinned-build state first -- a Linux pinned jump resolves to
'release', and stranding isPinnedBuildActive would silently kill every
background check for the rest of the process.
Note the fix the issue suggests cannot work: electron-updater builds a
PacmanUpdater whose doDownloadUpdate looks for a .pacman asset Orca does not
publish, then dereferences undefined.
* style(cli): restore prettier wrapping on install error copy
* test(linux): re-pin the child-process ratchets and the batch-shim allowlist after the merge
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Neil
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b94a65a4fc |
fix(lint): preserve TaskPage effect suppressions after split
(cherry picked from commit
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Neil
|
2e30187560 |
feat(dev): sweep the backlog of idle dev Electron bundles (#17803)
* fix(dev): make reclaim report real sizes on Windows and keep setuid intact Two bugs found by running the reclaim script on real Linux and Windows hosts. The size report shelled out to `du`, which does not exist on Windows, so every worktree measured 0 bytes and the script reported nothing reclaimable on the platform with the largest dist (374MB). Walk the tree in Node instead. makeTreeReadOnly chmod'd files to a flat 0o555, which clears setuid. On Linux that would silently strip the bit from chrome-sandbox if a developer had run the usual `sudo chown root && chmod 4755` workaround -- and under hardlink sharing it would strip it from every worktree and the cache at once. Clear the write bits and nothing else. Measured after the fix: 7.30 GiB across 23 worktrees on one Windows host and 18.31 GiB across 56 on another, both previously reported as 0. * feat(dev): sweep the backlog of idle dev Electron bundles out/electron-dev holds one ~275MB patched Electron.app per branch title x Electron version. The dev runner already prunes them, but only inside the worktree it is starting and only when that worktree holds more than one bundle -- and a worktree almost always holds exactly one, so the sweep returns early every time and nothing ever reclaims another worktree's bundle. pnpm reclaim:dev-bundles sweeps across every worktree of the repo. Bundles are pure build output that pnpm dev rebuilds on demand, and rebuilding is cheap now that the Electron dist is shared. Reuses the runner's own staleness rules, so a bundle a live process is running from, or one whose build is still in flight, is never removed. Refuses to run at all if the process table cannot be read, rather than guessing. Measured: 120 bundles, 32.2 GiB, on one machine. Also guards both reclaim scripts behind a direct-invocation check; importing one for tests previously ran a full sweep at import time. |
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Neil
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fe0f2f9be7 |
perf(dev): share one Electron dist per repo instead of per worktree (#17664)
* perf(dev): clone one Electron dist per repo instead of per worktree Every worktree extracted its own ~295MB node_modules/electron/dist, measured at 69GB across 241 worktrees on one machine. Extract once per repository into <git-common-dir>/orca-cache/electron, then APFS-clone it into each worktree: copy-on-write, so the second worktree allocates ~0 bytes and still gets a real, private, writable directory. Hangs off install-electron-package-binary.mjs, inside the transaction it already uses to swap dist. Every cache path returns a boolean and false means "install normally", so non-APFS, cross-volume, corrupt entry, no Git, folder workspace and CI all keep today's behavior. No symlinks, no lifecycle changes. out/electron-dev's per-branch Electron.app copy clones too, via the same helper. Refs #13709 * perf(dev): share the Electron dist on Linux and Windows too Extends the shared dist cache beyond macOS APFS. Three mechanisms, strongest isolation first: macOS APFS cp -c private copy-on-write Linux btrfs cp --reflink private copy-on-write ext4 / NTFS hardlink + 0555 shared inodes, forced read-only Reflinks cover btrfs/XFS/bcachefs/ZFS but not ext4, and Windows block cloning is ReFS-only, so most Linux and effectively all Windows developers need hardlinks to get any saving at all. Extracted dist is 327MB on linux-x64 and 374MB on win32-x64, both larger than macOS. Hardlinks share inodes, so a write through one worktree would rewrite every sibling and the cache. Nothing in this repo writes inside dist -- every mutation replaces the directory via rename -- but Electron's own install.js extracts over an existing dist with O_TRUNC, and is reachable through `pnpm rebuild electron`. Publishing the entry read-only turns that from silent cross-worktree corruption into EPERM. Directories stay writable so the install transaction's renames and unlinks still work. out/electron-dev's per-branch Electron.app is patched and codesigned after it is copied, so it uses copyPrivateTree, which never hardlinks. Refs #13709 * test(dev): keep shared-dist tests honest across ext4 and NTFS Verified on real hardware: Ubuntu 24.04/ext4 (no reflink support, so the hardlink tier is the only thing that helps there) and Windows/NTFS. Three tests faked platform: 'darwin' while invoking the real mechanism, so they failed on Linux where /bin/cp -c does not exist. Mechanism selection is now asserted with injected stubs; real filesystem behavior is asserted against whatever the host actually supports. Windows maps chmod onto the read-only attribute alone, so a directory never reports 0o755 and a read-only file reports 0o444. Mode-bit assertions that encoded POSIX semantics are now behavioral (the tree stays removable), and the executable-bit assertion is POSIX-only -- confirmed on NTFS that a read-only hardlinked .exe still runs. * fix(dev): stop a losing publisher from discarding a good cache entry Greptile caught a TOCTOU in the shared Electron dist cache. Quarantining an invalid entry happened before sharing the replacement tree, which takes seconds -- long enough for a sibling worktree to publish a good entry that this one would then rename away. If the follow-up publish also failed, the cache was left empty and every worktree re-downloaded. Stage first, then re-validate immediately before the destructive rename, so an entry that became good during the share is kept. On a failed swap, restore the quarantined entry instead of leaving no entry at all: a stale entry still beats an empty cache, because the next publisher re-validates and replaces it. An entry that cannot be validated is never displaced, matching the pre-staging rule. Also covers the Electron upgrade path end to end: a version bump gets its own cache entry and leaves the previous one for worktrees still on the old branch. * feat(dev): add a script to share existing worktrees' Electron dists An install only shares when Electron is (re)installed, and rebuild-native-deps returns early when the package is already usable -- so a worktree that already has a working dist never reaches the sharing path and keeps its own copy until the next Electron upgrade. pnpm reclaim:electron-dists reports what it would share; --apply does it. Each worktree is converted behind a rename, so an interrupted run leaves a working dist either way, and any worktree that fails is left untouched. Measured on one machine: 677 worktrees, ~195 GiB reclaimable. * fix(dev): keep the reclaim script's error formatting type-safe |
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Neil
|
a5796ec8eb |
refactor(runtime): split OrcaRuntimeService and compatibility tests (#17605)
* refactor(runtime): split OrcaRuntimeService into focused modules
* test(runtime): cover admission tiers and strict worktree reconciliation
* fix(runtime): preserve owner and structured session visibility
* fix(runtime): port post-extraction compatibility fixes
* fix(runtime): preserve skill-share cancellation barrier
* test(runtime): update identity inventory after extraction
* fix(runtime): preserve hook transport environment cleanup
* fix(runtime): consolidate idle probe imports
* test(runtime): retire split file process allowlist entry
* fix(runtime): route child process types through shared boundary
* test(runtime): preserve worktree host metadata precedence
* fix(runtime): update extracted test seams
* fix(runtime): gate the split's ts-nocheck set and restore the stop-confirmed contract
Audit follow-ups for the OrcaRuntimeService split:
- Freeze the 171 @ts-nocheck files behind a ratchet so no new file can disable
type checking. The split's linear mixin chain cannot express forward
references yet, so the existing suppressions are grandfathered; the baseline
may only shrink.
- Drop the stray @ts-nocheck at the end of orca-runtime-get-status.ts. It sat
after the first statement, where TypeScript ignores it, so the module was
already checked.
- Restore `retireRejectedPty(ptyId, stopConfirmed: boolean)` as a required
argument. The split widened it to optional and patched the resulting error
with `stopConfirmed === true`; an omitted argument would have silently taken
the unverified-stop path instead of failing to compile.
- Guard that every orca-runtime-tests fragment is imported by the compatibility
entrypoint. The fragments are .spec.ts, which no Vitest include glob matches,
so one left out of the list would silently stop running.
* fix(runtime): restore four behaviors the OrcaRuntimeService split dropped
Audit findings against the refactor's true base (
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Neil
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c09810b641 |
perf(rpc): restore compiled Zod request schemas without override (#17374)
* perf(rpc): compile Zod request schemas lazily * chore(deps): pin zod 4.5.4 and except it from the release-age gate 4.5.4 is the first release fixing isRecursiveSchema (upstream 84e416f, #6500), which compile() calls on every schema — on 4.5.0 it fired .default() factories at compile time. Verified: compile-time factory calls 0 on 4.5.4, 1 on 4.5.0. |
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 Jinjing
|
b3912ebed2 |
Split up combined-diff viewer into feature-organized modules (#17341)
* Reorganize combined-diff components into feature-organized structure Splits flat combined-diff files into feature-focused subdirectories (browse-files, load-sections, resolve-changes, review-controls, scroll-viewport) to improve code organization and reduce clutter in the editor directory. Groups related logic by concern for easier navigation and maintenance. * Split up combined-diff viewer into feature-organized modules Decompose the 221-line monolithic CombinedDiffViewer into smaller, focused modules organized by feature: entry resolution, section loading, view state memory, file tree navigation, review controls, and scroll viewport handling. Main component now composes these hooks to orchestrate the combined-diff view. * fix(combined-diff): prevent replayed preference writes Move preference write outside state updater callback since React may replay state updaters, causing multiple writes. Add sideBySide to dependency array. * fix(combined-diff): re-resolve sections by key to handle list rebuilds The section list can rebuild while a write is pending (due to rebase, file changes, etc.); re-resolve by key instead of stale index to apply updates to the correct section. - Convert skipped conflicts message to structured i18n plural forms - Add oldPath field to git status signature for rename tracking * Suppress react-doctor diagnostics in combined-diff feature Add suppressions for react-doctor diagnostics that are necessary patterns for the combined-diff implementation, configured in both the quality check script and package.json. |
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Neil
|
e84042572c |
Upgrade xterm to 6.1.0-beta.303 and generate addon patches
* Upgrade xterm to 6.1.0-beta.303 and generate the addon patches
Takes the current xterm beta line: xterm 287 -> 303, addon-webgl 286 -> 299,
addon-serialize 287 -> 300, headless 302, the remaining addons -> 300, and the
same set on mobile. All four packages stamp upstream commit d3e32b3.
The reasons are upstream #6042/#6043/#6055 (a shared glyph atlas no longer
garbles sibling panes on a page merge, clear, or sampler-budget overflow) and
Note that core 303 is not image-addon-only over 302: it carries the buffer perf
work, including the new BufferLineStringCache.
addon-webgl and addon-serialize move into the patch generator
--------------------------------------------------------------
Both were hand-edited minified bundles, which is what the Known Gaps section of
docs/reference/xterm-patch-regeneration.md described. Both reproduce byte for
byte from the pinned commit, so they are now manifest entries generated from a
source patch like @xterm/xterm already was. Their sourcemaps now move with their
bundles; before this they shipped maps whose offsets did not match the code
beside them.
The webgl patch shrinks from a 1.06 MB hand-edited bundle to a 6.6 KB source
patch, because upstream took the invalidation half Orca had backported. What is
left is only what upstream still lacks: the fragment-shader else branch for a
v_texpage past the sampler budget, the clearTexture guard that no-ops once a
merged page holds index 0, spending the merge retry budget before beginFrame
latches the version it saw, and Orca's font-weight probe.
The serialize source patch is byte-for-byte the same fixes as before; upstream
changed nothing in that addon between 287 and 300.
Generator fixes, each of which failed silently
----------------------------------------------
- `--relative` was appended after the `--` separator in CHECKOUT_DIFF_FLAGS, so
git read it as a pathspec and kept repo-root-relative paths, dropping every
source hunk from an addon's patch.
- `git apply` run from a package subdirectory still resolves patch paths from
the repo root, skips every hunk and exits 0. It now runs from the root with
`--directory=<packageDir>`, and a source patch that leaves the checkout
unchanged is a hard failure rather than an empty patch.
- An addon's own `tsgo -p .` has empty files/include and only project
references, so it emits nothing and the addon webpack then fails on a missing
./out/. The root build now runs first.
- versionStampFile is optional; publish.js stamps an addon's package.json, which
overlayBuildOutput never patches.
- On a version bump the lockfile has no entry under the new key yet, so --write
reports the gap instead of aborting mid-run. --check still fails on it.
Adding the two addons pushed the generator and the Electron packaging contract
test over max-lines, so the patch-text helpers move to xterm-patch-text.mjs
(pure text: no checkout, no build) and the vendored-xterm assertions move out of
the packaging contract into xterm-webgl-runtime-contract.test.mjs.
Tests
-----
Four tests asserted upstream bugs that are now fixed, not Orca behaviour:
- xterm-user-scrolling-contract pinned headless and core by version string.
Upstream bumps each package only when its own output changes, so headless 302
and core 303 are the same source. It now asserts they share a commit.
- Five CSI 3 J assertions expected a reader stranded at the top after an erase.
Upstream #6081 clears isUserScrolling there, so the erase releases them to the
bottom instead. Orca's pin still lands them correctly, because its parser
handler observes the erase before xterm's own handler runs.
- The IME transaction test hard-coded the xterm version; it now reads the
installed package, since the point is that bundle, map and version agree.
- The Electron runtime contract asserted Orca's old clearModelGeneration. Shared
atlas invalidation is upstream's now, so it asserts pageLayoutVersion on the
resolved dependency, plus the Orca-only hunks on the patch.
Verified: 66,008 unit tests, mobile's 3,863, the four WebGL atlas e2e specs, and
`regenerate-xterm-patches.mjs --check` in sync on all three packages.
Left alone deliberately: resetAllTerminalWebglAtlases still fans out globally
even though clearTexture now self-heals siblings, and upstream #6068
(WebglAddon.dispose leaks the GL context) is still open.
* Drop the two unused WebGL atlas fan-out exports
resetAllTerminalWebglAtlases and presentAllTerminalPanesWithoutAtlasClear have
no callers, and had none at
|
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Neil
|
4bc2085271 | Revert "perf(rpc): compile Zod request schemas lazily" (#17368) | ||
|
Neil
|
7b86833120 |
perf(rpc): compile Zod request schemas lazily (#17353)
* perf(rpc): compile Zod request schemas lazily * test: align window reveal assertion |
||
|
Neil
|
4bb9dd5b89 |
chore(deps): bump electron 43.4.1 and other meaningful runtime deps (#17330)
Take the high-value desktop and mobile upgrades that fix crashes, jank, or security holes. Leave Electron 44, Lucide 1, Reanimated 4.6, Expo 56/57, and xterm betas for later. Desktop: electron 43.4.1, @tanstack/react-virtual 3.14.10, mermaid 11.17.2, ws 8.21.3, react 19.2.8, pdfjs-dist 6.3.289, vitest 4.1.11, happy-dom 20.11.8. Mobile: Expo SDK 55 patch train, react-native 0.83.10 (IME patch ported), reanimated 4.3.4, webview 13.16.2 (thread-safe decision manager; restore WebView generic default so TS 6 does not collapse props to never). Electron 43.4 dropped marginType from PrintToPDFMargins; CDP print mapping now supplies the four sides only. |
||
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Neil
|
2dfaa676d8 | chore: update oxlint and oxfmt (#17150) | ||
|
Neil
|
b17f60d744 | build: upgrade to pnpm 12 (#17156) | ||
|
Neil
|
0bf5361c92 | perf(markdown): update code highlighting incrementally (#17147) | ||
|
Neil
|
eb00123a81 | perf(markdown): skip unmatched list tokenizer scans (#17134) | ||
 Brennan Benson
|
fd9125ea8c |
feat(native-chat): Codex structured native chat restructure (#16729)
* feat(native-chat): port structured Codex sessions from restructure-recovery Rebuilds the desktop structured native-chat implementation from brennanb2025/native-chat-restructure-recovery (tip 4e31c08db3) on top of current main as a single commit, scoped to the local Codex path. Ported: - Structured agent-session core: durable record store + single-writer lease, canonical journal, agent-session wire host/attach/eviction/subscribers, `agentSession.*` RPC surface (registered via ALL_RPC_METHODS; host-side mobile allowlist included for wire compat), pty write gate, transcript additions, and the Codex app-server adapter/launch resolution. - Renderer: NativeChatStructuredSession view/composer stack, structured launch path with the single-flight guard, local structured session tabs sync, activation gate + structured inventory (read-only `agentSession.handoffStatus` probe), agent-session tabs in the tab strip, AI-vault structured session activation, and the settings pane with the parent Experimental Chat UI toggle plus the nested "Use updated structured native chat" toggle. New sessions require both flags, agent codex, no prompt, and a local non-WSL, non-Windows-host execution host (structured-native-chat-availability). - Fixes 72c013cea6 (verified Codex launch recovery), 8ddbaf5e3d (defer native terminal view switching affordances), and 4e31c08db3 (release the launch gate after a visibility retry) with their regression tests, including the third-launch-after-retry guard case. - Cross-version agent-session wire test + CI lane, packaging entries (proper-lockfile, agent-tooling asar excludes), and the wire-compat doc section. Deliberately not ported: mobile/ changes, the Claude structured runtime (only the claude-transcript-branch-proof and claude-structured-owner-identity leaf modules remain, backing the kept TUI-recovery arms), the terminal↔chat adoption/handoff flow (`agentSession.adoptTerminal`/`requestHandoff`, the handoff request engine, TUI adoption machinery, orca-runtime adoption methods), renderer switching affordances and their dead leftovers, the hook/subagent-status refactor cluster, and unrelated branch changes. The crash-during-acquisition recovery path (restart handoff adjudication, restore/reverse re-acquire, lease schema handoff keys) is kept because every plain direct launch depends on it; a trimmed handoff coordinator exposes only status/restore/close. Branch edits that targeted files main has since split (ipc/pty.ts, worktrees.ts, rpc/methods/terminal.ts, useIpcEvents, pty-connection, store/slices/terminals.ts, runtime-types, web preload) were re-applied to the split modules, preserving main's newer logic (Windows CIM fallback, browser tab close rework, cold-restore resume flow, dispatcher threading). Known seam: the mobile clipboard image-provenance CONSUMER gate ships (agentSession.send refuses unproven mobile image refs with agent_session_image_untrusted) but the producer hunk in rpc/methods/clipboard.ts stays with the unported mobile cluster, so mobile image sends into structured chat fail closed until that side ports. * fix(native-chat): trust only authenticated local image uploads * fix(build): preserve Windows process-tree patch application * test(windows): include process creation time in addon fixture * fix(build): run windows-process-tree node-gyp from the physical package dir gyp expands the node-addon-api dependency by probing node, whose cwd resolves to the package's physical directory in the store, so the emitted target is a store-relative ../../../../node-addon-api@... hop. gyp then resolves that hop against the rebuild cwd; from the node_modules symlink/junction it escapes the store and configure fails with "node_addon_api.gyp not found" (run 32999886072). Rebuild from realpath(package dir) so both bases agree, matching how the package manager itself runs native install scripts. The regression test replays gyp's expansion+resolution against the planned cwd and fails without the fix. * fix(native-chat): keep chat tabs visible through terminal closes and empty-worktree launches Two proven blockers in the native Codex tab contract: closeTerminalTab pre-empted the canonical unified close. With one terminal left it deactivated the worktree on a terminal/editor/browser-only check, blanking a workspace that still held a renderable agent-session tab; with two or more it pre-picked a successor from terminal entities only, re-stamping the group active before closeUnifiedTab's MRU/neighbor repair could land on the chat tab. Successor choice now defers to the unified contract whenever the terminal has a unified row, and deactivation is gated on the unified renderable count (matching leaveWorktreeIfEmpty), with the legacy pre-pick kept only for terminals without a unified row. A structured session created on an empty worktree was published into the host's headless group while preserveLocalLayout froze the local layout, leaving the tab in store but permanently off screen. A preserveLocalLayout owner now always takes client-owned placement — repairing a rendered leaf whose group record is missing, or materializing a rendered group on a truly empty worktree — and applies the client-derived layout repair while still rejecting host-authored layout. Regression tests drive the real store through closeTerminalTab (git worktree and folder workspace) and the real snapshot applier for the empty-worktree adoption states; all fail without the fixes. * fix(native-chat): close stale turns and retry rejected sends * fix(native-chat): retire hosted rows on structured tab activation * fix(native-chat): preserve rpc defaults across main merge * chore: format remote wire compatibility guide * test(native-chat): cover retry after unconfirmed send * fix(native-chat): reload outbox on session switch * docs(settings): disclose structured chat platform limits * fix(native-chat): await Codex launch-home preparation * fix(codex): align child-process allowlist with async trust bridge * test(identity): update inventory for tab surface refactor * fix(windows): preserve process-tree CRLF patch sources * fix(native-chat): anchor an unmatched chat echo where it was sent (#16117) * fix(native-chat): anchor an unmatched chat echo where it was sent The reported symptom was old user messages replaying below every new turn, so the conversation read as scrambled. The cause was not that the echo failed to match a transcript row. Claude consumes a mid-turn send through a `queued_command` attachment and writes no `type:"user"` record for it, so some echoes can never match, and no amount of matching will change that. The cause was WHERE an unmatched echo rendered: buildMobileNativeChatTransientData appended every pending item after the entire transcript, so it re-read below each turn that landed afterwards. Render each echo directly after the transcript row it was sent against, using the baseline the send already captures. An unmatched echo is then at worst a duplicate in the right position rather than a scrambled one, and it stays visible. Echoes sharing an anchor keep send order; a send with no baseline, or one whose anchor folding dropped, still falls back to the tail. Deliberately NOT fixed by deleting the echo. Inferring from send ordering that an echo can never match, then removing it, loses the user's own text for a message the agent did receive, and it cannot fire in the common case anyway - measured drain groups are 1,017 of size 1 against 55 larger. It also escalates an existing gap: the count pass has no baseline-tail guard, unlike the glue pass, while `messages` is a 40-row window that head-trims, resets on reconnect and grows at the front on loadEarlier, so a false landing there would license deleting a DIFFERENT outstanding message. That count-pass gap is real and left for a separate change; anchoring makes its worst case a duplicate in place rather than a scrambled conversation. * fix(native-chat): preserve folded echo anchors * fix(native-chat): preserve forward-folded echo anchors * fix(native-chat): keep leading folded echoes in place * fix(workspace-cleanup): show git status for every row (#16690) * fix(native-chat): refuse structured chat on every Windows execution path canUseStructuredNativeChat only refused win32 when a project runtime resolved, so folder-workspace keys (and other keys with no project runtime) failed open into structured chat on Windows. Fail closed on win32 unconditionally after the host check, matching the settings copy: local macOS/Linux only; Windows/WSL/SSH stay on terminal chat. * fix(native-chat): restore runtime refusals behind the win32 gate |
||
|
Neil
|
971d987c4b |
ci(e2e): trigger the Docker-SSH lane from SSH source and claim every gated spec (#16746)
The Docker-SSH e2e lane only ran when a PR's changed specs happened to include
`ssh-startup-exec-readiness.spec.ts` or `paired-startup-exec-readiness.spec.ts`.
Editing SSH source itself did not trigger it, and pruning either spec from a
route's list would have silently retired the whole lane. Meanwhile the sharded
lanes set no `ORCA_E2E_SSH_DOCKER`, so every Docker-gated spec skipped itself
while the shard still reported green -- the exact silent-skip shape
`docs/reference/ssh-reconnect-source-recovery.md` blames for four regressions
that reached users.
Separately, the modules that actually own direct-SSH workspace and tab restore
carry no "ssh" in their names, so the `ssh-terminal-source` route never reached
them. Measured on the real script before this change:
printf '%s\n' src/renderer/src/hooks/remote-workspace-session-merge.ts \
src/main/ipc/remote-workspace-snapshot-normalization.ts \
src/renderer/src/lib/worktree-initial-terminal-seeding.ts \
src/shared/remote-workspace-session-projection.ts \
| node config/scripts/pr-e2e-source-routing.mjs
=> []
Three changes, all pinned by the executable gate contract:
- `hasSshSourceChange` derives an `ssh_source_changed` signal from the SSH
routes themselves, plumbed pr.yml -> e2e.yml, so the lane triggers on source
rather than on a spec name surviving in a list. One list, so the two cannot
drift.
- A sibling `ssh-workspace-session-restore` route names the restore seams
(`remote-workspace-*`, `worktree-initial-terminal-seeding`,
`worktree-default-terminal-tabs`, `initial-terminal`) and routes them to the
two restore specs -- a sibling rather than more paths on `ssh-terminal-source`
so a tab-tombstone edit does not run the whole SSH terminal list.
- A new `test:e2e:ssh-docker` runner claims the remaining Docker-gated specs on
the one VM that sets the flag, and the contract now fails by name when any
Docker-gated spec is claimed by no runner. `ssh-docker-relay-perf` and
`ssh-codex-display-artifacts-repro` are recorded exemptions (wall-clock
budgets; needs a real remote codex binary) and the contract asserts each
exemption still corresponds to a real gated spec, so a stale one cannot
quietly excuse a gap. Lane timeout raised 35 -> 60 minutes for the added
serial specs.
The lane's first act was to surface four latent bugs in a spec that had been
silently skipping. `ssh-docker-bulk-open-freeze-repro.spec.ts` is four call sites
out of date against `tests/e2e/helpers/terminal.ts`: `startDockerSshRelayTarget()`
is called with no argument though the helper dereferences `testInfo.workerIndex`
(a 100% failure, not a flake), `execInTerminal` gained a `ptyId` parameter, and
`splitActiveTerminalPane` gained a direction. It was invisible because it ran
nowhere and `typecheck:e2e` is red on main with 240 pre-existing errors, so four
more could not be seen.
The `testInfo` bug is fixed here -- correct on its own, and it removes one real
error from `typecheck:e2e` (240 -> 239). The other three are not, because they
are not argument plumbing: repairing them requires choosing which ptyId to
capture and which split direction to use, and both change what the repro
measures.
The spec is therefore added to the exemption list rather than repaired, for two
independent reasons recorded in the runner: it is a perf oracle, not a
correctness one (`SOFT_FREEZE_LAG_MS=2500` / `HARD_FREEZE_LAG_MS=5000` measured
under a deliberate 5-pane flood on a 420s budget -- the same rule already applied
to `ssh-docker-relay-perf.spec.ts`), and it is known-rotted. Repair is tracked in
stablyai/orca#16764. Applying an existing written rule to a sibling that plainly
meets it is consistency; inventing a new exemption to dodge a red would not be.
Three hardening fixes to the contract itself:
- Runner text is comment-stripped before the claimed-by-a-lane scan. A substring
scan over raw text lets a spec merely *discussed* in a runner comment count as
claimed -- the silent skip this assertion exists to catch, re-entering through
the documentation. Not live today only because the existing comments write the
spec names without their `tests/e2e/` prefix.
- An exempt spec must not be invoked by any runner. `unreachableSpecs`
short-circuits the unclaimed check, so a spec could be documented as exempt
while a runner still ran it -- an exemption that reads as coverage removal but
changes nothing, leaving the lane red for a reason the file says it excluded.
This is not hypothetical: adding the bulk-open exemption without removing it
from the runner's spec list produced exactly that state, and this assertion is
what caught it.
- The Docker-gate detector is now `/ORCA_E2E_SSH_DOCKER\s*[!=]==\s*['"]1['"]/`
rather than one fixed string, so a double-quoted or `!==` spelling can no
longer escape the contract.
`ssh-restart-tab-accumulation.spec.ts` is a new three-cycle restart fence
asserting tab-id set identity, not just the active pane's reclaimed ptyId as
`ssh-cold-activation-restore.spec.ts:241` did. It passes today; it was validated
by a negative control that injected one tab after cycle 1 and correctly failed.
|
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|
Neil
|
5631aa00dd |
feat(orcad): items 2–7 — degradation, natives, daemon, ops, deploy (#16398)
* fix(ports): stop joining an undefined resourcesPath on a non-Electron host `resolveWorkerEntryPath` branched on `isPackaged` alone and joined `process.resourcesPath`. orcad reports `isPackaged` true — correctly, it is a production build, and ~15 consumers read it that way to gate HTTPS-only skill downloads and the real CLI name — but `process.resourcesPath` is Electron-only and `undefined` under plain Node. So the packaged branch threw `TypeError [ERR_INVALID_ARG_TYPE]: The "path" argument must be of type string` where a clean "worker unavailable" was the honest outcome. The type said `resourcesPath: string`, which is how it went unnoticed; it is now `string | undefined`, so the compiler carries the fact. A host with no Electron resources tree has no asar to look in, so it falls back to the module directory and lets the caller report a missing worker. Found by the item 1 agent while auditing the same `isPackaged` defect class in the watcher. Verified in both directions: reverting the guard reproduces the TypeError. * feat(orcad): prove node-pty loads before anything requires it Of the two ways node-pty fails, only one is catchable. A missing module throws MODULE_NOT_FOUND. A module built against the wrong libc or Node ABI is refused by the dynamic loader, and in the worst case takes the process down before any handler exists — that is #9902, which crashed the desktop app on Ubuntu 20.04 before a window appeared. There was no libc or ABI precondition anywhere in the tree. So orcad now proves the load in a CHILD process, from main.ts, before anything requires node-pty. Whatever the child does — throw, abort, die on a signal — is data rather than our own death, and the operator gets a sentence naming the host's libc, Node ABI and prebuild slot plus the command to run. Proven-unloadable exits 78 (EX_CONFIG), so a supervisor does not restart an unequippable host forever. A probe that never answered is unverifiable, not blocked: refusing to boot on an inconclusive signal would take down hosts that work. The child dlopens the file node-pty would have chosen, before requiring the package. node-pty's loader walks several directories and rethrows only the LAST error, so a refused binary reads as "Cannot find module ./prebuilds/..." — which sends the operator to install a module that is already there. It also reports through stdout: node echoes the whole -e source above a stack trace, and matching tokens against stderr made the probe's own source text answer for the verdict. Verdicts reach clients as a terminal_unavailable degradation alongside the existing browser_unavailable one, through the same cause-registry shape. degradations[].code is now an open vocabulary; clients already render only `message`. Prebuilds are compiled from PATCHED sources — the patch IS the glibc-floor fix, so an upstream tarball reproduces #9902 — into linux-{x64,arm64}-{glibc,musl} and darwin-{x64,arm64} slots. libc is in the slot name because node-pty's loader falls back to prebuilds/<platform>-<arch> and cannot tell glibc from musl. orcad installs the matching slot at boot, so a host with no compiler serves terminals. The relay's five pure toolchain-diagnosis functions moved to a transport-free module so the Node bundle can reuse them without dragging ssh2 in behind them; the relay keeps its API by re-export. macOS gets `xcode-select --install` rather than the cross-distro apt/dnf/pacman/apk menu, every line of which is wrong there. * test(orcad): pin the node-pty precondition to ground truth, not a prepared host CI's test shard runs `vitest` directly, so `ensure-native-runtime --runtime=node` never prepares node-pty for the Node ABI — `degraded` is the correct verdict there, and asserting 'ok' encoded an environment the shard does not have. Asserting whatever it returned would be vacuous, so the expectation is now derived from an independent require() of node-pty. Verified it still bites: forcing the precondition to always report 'ok' fails the suite. * feat(orcad): run the terminal daemon, and the ops contract around it orcad declared `canRecoverPersistentLocalPtys: () => false` because it did not run the terminal daemon, so every restart, update and rollback SIGKILLed every running terminal — on the host whose selling point is that work survives the client going away. That is the one property `ssh-execution-boundary.md` recommends the peer model for. Item 4 — the daemon: - Port the launch path off electron: `daemon-init.ts`, `daemon-host-relocation.ts` and `observability/logs-directory.ts` now read the `AppEnvironment` port. Relocation additionally asks whether the app root is an asar archive rather than whether the build is packaged, so a Node host answering `isPackaged() === true` no longer walks into an Electron-only NSIS-escape path (same precedent as `parcel-watcher-entry-path.ts`). - `build-orcad.mjs` emits `daemon-entry.js` beside `orcad.js`, scans the forked children's metafiles for electron/node:sqlite, and load-checks the child under plain Node. - orcad spawns and adopts the daemon; shutdown disconnects and never kills it. `canRecoverPersistentLocalPtys` now reads the live provider and is false under degraded routing, where fresh terminals would die with the process. Item 3 — the ops contract (docs/reference/orcad-operations.md): - Bind policy: `--bind`, default loopback, pinned so neither `orca serve`'s wide default nor the connected-device widen can override it, and so a paired client cannot rebind the listener from outside. - Instance lock on the data root before profile load, scoped to the runtime role so it never refuses a restart that a live daemon makes worthwhile. - Supervision: exit codes a supervisor can act on (78 = do not retry), second-signal escalation, a shutdown deadline, and crash-loop containment on daemon respawn. - Health in the readiness payload: build hash, Node ABI, and a PTY self-test that spans both processes — the daemon spawns a real PTY in its own process and the verdict crosses its socket. Both bundle load-checks now assert on exit codes: these bundles are minified onto one line, so Node's uncaught-exception report echoes every string literal in the bundle and the previous message match passed against a bundle that never loaded. * feat(orcad): deploy, activate and roll back a versioned orcad install Plan items 6 and 7 from docs/design/shipping-orcad.html. Install reuses the relay's transaction verbatim — per-version lock, staged SFTP write, .install-complete sentinel, stale-lock recovery — under a parameterized namespace, so orcad-<v>/ sits beside relay-<v>/ permanently (§06). Parameterizing GC is the trap that creates: each model now collects only its own directories, enforced twice (prefix-scoped remote listing plus a local ownership re-check), and a client picks its model from how the host is registered, never from what it finds on disk. Activation is separate from installation, because a versioned directory selects nothing. A candidate is launched, publishes orca_server_ready, and only becomes active if its cross-process health payload passes: right build hash, listening, daemon live, PTY self-test green. A rejected candidate is stopped and the incumbent restarted, so a careful deploy cannot cause the outage it was being careful about. Update and rollback are shaped by the daemon. An update restarts orcad, the daemon outlives it, and the surviving daemon was forked from the outgoing bundle — so live terminals defer the update rather than proceed, and GC pins the active version, the rollback target and the live daemon's bundle. Orca's persisted state carries no schema version, so rollback restores a pre-activation snapshot rather than trusting backward-readability; the point past which it is unsafe is the first terminal created after activation, which the snapshot cannot describe and the surviving daemon still owns. Running the generated shell for real found two bugs the text assertions missed: tar members re-quoted inside a shell variable captured nothing, and kill -0 reports a zombie as alive. * test(orcad): assert the precondition is self-consistent, not environment-shaped The real-host case cannot predict a status: CI's shard runs vitest directly, so node-pty is never built for the Node ABI and 'degraded' is correct there, while a prepared checkout gives 'ok'. The previous attempt used require('node-pty') as ground truth, which resolves the JS wrapper while the native binding loads lazily — it proved strictly less than the precondition checks, and failed CI for exactly that reason. What is invariant on a host with node-pty installed: never 'blocked', and never a degraded verdict carrying an unestablished reason. The injected-input tests keep the logic coverage. * fix(orcad): drop an eslint-disable the rule no longer needs * test(orcad): separate slot placement from the load verdict Both remaining CI failures were the same shape: tests reaching into node_modules for a pty.node that only exists after `ensure-native-runtime --runtime=node`, which CI's shard never runs because it invokes vitest directly. Slot *placement* is the logic worth checking on every host, so it now uses a synthetic payload and asserts the verdict stays honest about not loading. The three assertions that genuinely need a Node-ABI binding are gated on it existing. Verified: breaking slot installation fails both placement tests; with the real pty.node hidden the file is 17 passed / 3 skipped instead of ENOENT. * test(orcad): gate the load-dependent cases on a real load, not on the file existing CI ships a pty.node built for Electron's ABI, so existsSync was true while require still failed — the gate ran exactly the tests that host can never satisfy. It now probes the binding in a child process, so a bad one cannot take the runner down. The self-consistency assertion also allowed too little: 'blocked' is the honest verdict for a corrupt binding, alongside 'ok' on a prepared host and 'degraded' on an unprepared one. What stays invariant is that anything other than 'ok' names an established cause, so a terminal is never declined for a reason nobody worked out. Verified against all three host states: prepared (19 passed), unprepared, and a corrupt binding (17 passed / 3 skipped, no failures). * test(orcad): gate on the whole premise — binding AND spawn-helper CI has a loadable pty.node but no spawn-helper, and a slot without the helper is legitimately 'degraded'. So the previous gate let a test run whose premise ('a complete slot yields ok') that host cannot satisfy. Verified in both states: with the helper present 19 pass; with it removed the load-dependent cases skip (17 passed / 3 skipped) instead of failing. * fix(orcad): preserve degradation types after rebase |
||
 Jinwoo HongandJinwoo-H
|
a9781a4118 |
STA-4150: client-hosted remote browser (consolidated) (#15448)
Co-authored-by: Jinwoo-H <jinwoo@stably.ai> |
||
|
Jinwoo Hong
|
c618ec7393 | test(reliability): protect recent P0 regression invariants (#16163) | ||
|
Jinjing
|
f5fd7303ab |
test(e2e): cover tab-bar agent launches on Windows and WSL (#16110)
* test(e2e): gate the tab-bar agent launcher on Windows shells and WSL The `+` menu agent launcher had no golden coverage in the Windows lane, so a Windows-only break anywhere in its chain (detection row, startup-plan build, tab create, PTY spawn, startup-command injection) could ship unnoticed. Adds a golden spec that launches a stub agent from the menu and asserts the agent's own banner reached the pane — a tab that spawned a bare shell instead is indistinguishable at the store/tab layer. Runs two agents everywhere, and on Windows also PowerShell, cmd, Git Bash and a WSL project runtime. * test(e2e): track WSL stub agent staging state for precise cleanup Refactor `stageWslGoldenStubAgent` to track which artifacts it creates during setup, then only remove those artifacts during cleanup. This prevents the test from destructively removing pre-existing symlinks or state from previous runs, improving test isolation and idempotency. * test(e2e): track WSL stub agent staging state for precise cleanup - Back up and restore pre-existing stub agents to avoid destroying them - Simplify verbose test comments to match project style guidelines * test(e2e): serialize WSL stub agent setup with distributed lock - Add mkdir-based lock to prevent concurrent staging invocations - Reclaim stale locks after 10 minutes to recover from crashes - Track lock ownership in stage state for safe cleanup * test(e2e): track WSL stub agent staging state for precise cleanup Track which stubs this test helper stages by writing a marker file, then only remove stubs during stale-lock recovery if we created them. Prevents cleanup from removing stubs left by other processes. |
||
|
Neil
|
03fcfdfb92 |
feat(orcad): boot the Orca runtime on plain Node (#15968)
* refactor(host): resolve the app root through the port in fork-reachable modules
`parcel-watcher-entry-path.ts` and `session-scanner-service-entry-path.ts` read the
app root via `require('electron').app` inside a try/catch that already returns null
when Electron is absent. They were therefore correct under plain Node at runtime and
only failed the *static* text check — which is real, not pedantic: the comment in
`ports/port-scan-command-client.ts:19` records that the plain-node-entry-guard fails
on that literal text, try/catch or not.
`hasAppEnvironment() ? getAppEnvironment() : null` gives the identical "no app root
here" answer without the text. That restores `hasAppEnvironment`, which an earlier
commit in this stack deleted as unused — it now has the caller it was waiting for.
Ratchet baseline 27 → 25.
Verified: 74 files / 458 tests; `pnpm typecheck` clean; `oxlint` clean.
* feat(orcad): boot the Orca runtime on plain Node
Closes the last two Electron couplings and makes `orcad` a working artifact:
a 4.43 MB Node bundle that boots, pairs, registers a repo, creates a real git
worktree and round-trips a PTY — with zero `require("electron")`.
Ratchet 2 -> 0, so `config/runtime-electron-baseline.txt` is now empty and its
test asserts exactly that: any reachable electron import is a regression.
- speech: inject the service factories, so importing ModelManager for its type
no longer drags Electron's streaming net.request into the graph
- filesystem-watcher: add a WorktreeWatcherRemoval port. Every entry in those
maps arrives through an ipcMain handler carrying a renderer sender, so a host
with no renderer has nothing to close, restore or forget — the inert default
is what the desktop code does against empty maps, not a stub hiding work
- user-data-path / profile-storage-paths: resolve userData through
AppEnvironment. These surfaced only once orcad pulled the store in
Both host ports now anchor to a realm-global symbol. `vi.resetModules()` gives
the re-imported graph a fresh module copy, so a binding installed before the
reset silently read back as uninstalled.
The acceptance smoke drives both hosts through one code path (`--target
orcad|electron`) and seeds its own git repo, so it is hermetic and asserts the
same contract of each. Wired into PR CI.
* test(smoke): remove the seeded workspace container, not just the worktree
* test(smoke): surface the server's stderr when it dies before ready
* fix(smoke): build node-pty for Node before booting orcad in CI
* fix(smoke): drive the CLI built from this checkout, not one on PATH
* docs(ratchet): say the baseline must stay empty, not merely shrink
* build(orcad): externalize only the native modules actually in the graph
|
||
|
Neil
|
f975035809 |
refactor(ipc): split preflight and SSH registry out of the ipcMain modules (#15927)
* refactor(preflight): split agent detection out of the ipcMain registration
First of the IPC extractions the revised design requires. `src/main/ipc/preflight.ts`
mixed 285 lines of agent/tool detection with 35 lines of `ipcMain.handle`
registration, and the runtime calls that detection during normal operation
(`orca-runtime.ts:573`, plus the preflight RPC methods). So the runtime dragged
`ipcMain` into its graph to reach pure logic.
Detection moves to `src/main/preflight/agent-detection.ts` — named for what it
contains, per AGENTS.md. `ipc/preflight.ts` keeps only the handler registration and
re-exports the domain module so existing importers are unaffected. The runtime and
its RPC methods now import the domain module directly.
Ratchet baseline 36 → 35: `src/main/ipc/preflight.ts` is no longer reachable from
the runtime. The gate detected the improvement and refused to pass until the
baseline tightened, which is the behaviour it was built for.
Verified: 2 files / 1,187 tests pass across every suite touching preflight;
`pnpm typecheck` clean; `oxlint` clean.
* refactor(ssh): split the SSH target registry out of the ipcMain module
Second IPC extraction, and by far the biggest win: this removes **eight** modules
from the runtime's Electron graph, taking the ratchet baseline 35 → 27.
The runtime needed five thin accessors from `src/main/ipc/ssh.ts` —
`connectRegisteredSshTarget`, `getRegisteredSshState`, `listRegisteredSshTargets`,
`listRegisteredRemovedSshTargetLabels`, `getActiveMultiplexer`. Each is a one-line
read over module-level state. Importing them dragged in `ipcMain`, `powerMonitor`
and a `BrowserWindow` accessor — and, transitively, `ipc/pty.ts` (8,031 lines),
`ssh-browse`, `ssh-passphrase`, `ssh-relay-deploy`, `ssh-remote-cli-host-passthrough`,
`wsl-hook-relay-launch` and `user-data-path`.
`src/main/ssh/ssh-target-registry.ts` now holds that state plus its accessors.
`registerSshHandlers` populates it; the runtime reads it. The indirection is kept
deliberately: SSH providers register after construction and may reconnect, so
callers must resolve the current generation rather than freeze one.
`ipc/ssh.ts` re-exports all five, so non-test importers are unaffected.
`connectRegisteredSshTarget` still throws `ssh_handlers_not_registered` when no
handler layer registered — a headless host must fail loudly rather than report a
target as unreachable, which would read as `exited` (see ssh-execution-boundary.md).
Verified: 9 files / 59 tests across the ssh, automations and trust-preset suites;
orca-runtime.test.ts 1,183 pass; `pnpm typecheck` clean; `oxlint` clean.
* refactor(host): resolve the app root through the port in fork-reachable modules
`parcel-watcher-entry-path.ts` and `session-scanner-service-entry-path.ts` read the
app root via `require('electron').app` inside a try/catch that already returns null
when Electron is absent. They were therefore correct under plain Node at runtime and
only failed the *static* text check — which is real, not pedantic: the comment in
`ports/port-scan-command-client.ts:19` records that the plain-node-entry-guard fails
on that literal text, try/catch or not.
`hasAppEnvironment() ? getAppEnvironment() : null` gives the identical "no app root
here" answer without the text. That restores `hasAppEnvironment`, which an earlier
commit in this stack deleted as unused — it now has the caller it was waiting for.
Ratchet baseline 27 → 25.
Verified: 74 files / 458 tests; `pnpm typecheck` clean; `oxlint` clean.
* test(ssh): mock the SSH target registry alongside the ipc/ssh mock
Thirty-eight suites mocked `vi.mock('./ssh')` for `getActiveMultiplexer`. That
factory went inert when production started importing the accessor from
`../ssh/ssh-target-registry`, so the real module loaded and the assertions drifted.
Adds a companion registry mock returning the same stub, plus a
`sshTargetRegistryModuleMock` builder beside the existing `sshModuleMock` so the
shared harness stays one place. No assertion changed.
Found by a full-suite run: the targeted ssh/runtime suites were green while
30 tests in ipc/worktrees and ipc/repos were not.
* refactor(runtime): read app paths and the packaged flag through the port
`orca-runtime.ts` is the last module in its own graph that imports `electron`
directly. Nineteen of its uses were `app.getPath` (12) and `app.isPackaged` (7) —
exactly what the AppEnvironment port already covers.
Also removes a dead `const { app } = require('electron')` inside
`getOrchestrationDb`. It was left unused once the path came from the port, and it
is precisely the dynamic-require pattern `plain-node-entry-guard.ts` exists to
catch, sitting in the runtime's own constructor path.
What still binds `orca-runtime.ts` to Electron is now three sites, not nineteen:
`new Notification(...)` (one), `BrowserWindow.fromId` (one), and the
`ipcMain.on('terminal:tabCreateReply')` renderer round-trip — which is the browser
tab path, and the same one that would hang a headless host for ten seconds.
Two suites drove `electronMocks.app.isPackaged` directly; they now install a fake
AppEnvironment reading the same mutable field, so their per-test toggles work
unchanged and no assertion moved.
Verified: 376 files / 4,717 tests across src/main/runtime; typecheck and oxlint clean.
* test(serve): add the built-artifact terminal round-trip acceptance smoke
"The server started" proves almost nothing. Terminal creation dispatches into
OrcaRuntimeService, and without an installed headless PTY controller that path
falls through to a renderer reply that never arrives and times out after ten
seconds. A boot probe, a port bind, and a `host.platform` call all pass against a
server whose terminals are dead — which is exactly the gap the design doc's own
boot proof was retracted for.
This boots the BUILT `out/main/index.js --serve`, parses its ready payload, pairs a
real client over the advertised endpoint, lists worktrees, creates a terminal, runs
a command through the PTY, asserts the output comes back, and asserts clean
shutdown. It drives nothing but the public pairing + RPC surface, so the same
script is the acceptance gate a future Node-only backend must pass unchanged.
The sentinel invokes `process.execPath` rather than `echo`, because the shell
differs per platform and node does not.
Verified both directions: passes against the real server, and fails with an
actionable message when the command produces no output — a smoke that cannot fail
is worthless.
* fix(ssh): fail loudly when the multiplexer resolver was never installed
`getActiveMultiplexer` resolves through a resolver that `ipc/ssh.ts` installs at
module scope. A process that never loads the SSH layer — which is the whole point
of the Node-only backend — would get `undefined` from every call.
`undefined` already means something specific here: "not connected". So a missing
resolver and a disconnected target were indistinguishable, and a host with no SSH
layer would quietly report every target as not connected. That is the
unverifiable-reported-as-exited conflation `docs/reference/ssh-execution-boundary.md`
exists to prevent — the doc is explicit that absence of contact is never evidence
of absence of the thing.
A missing resolver is a wiring error, not a connection state, so it throws, matching
what `connectRegisteredSshTarget` already does for unregistered handlers.
Verified: 432 files / 4,759 tests across ipc, ssh, preflight, automations and trust
presets; typecheck and oxlint clean.
* refactor(pty): stop faking a BrowserWindow for the headless PTY path
`registerHeadlessPtyRuntime` passed `registerPtyHandlers` a stub object cast to
`BrowserWindow` whose `isDestroyed()` returned true and whose `webContents.send`
was a no-op — a window-shaped thing that lied about being a window, purely to
satisfy the type. Adversarial review named it as the same "looks fine, silently
returns a lie" pattern this codebase rejects elsewhere, and it is the shape that
keeps `electron` on a path that otherwise needs none.
`registerPtyHandlers` now takes `BrowserWindow | null`. An absent renderer is
semantically identical to a destroyed one — all 42 call sites already guarded on
`isDestroyed()` and skipped — so `src/main/ipc/pty-renderer-surface.ts` states that
directly: `isRendererGone`, `sendToRenderer`, `rendererWebContents`. The compound
`isDestroyed() || webContents.isDestroyed()` guards collapse into one predicate.
`isPtyWriteEventFromMainWindow` becomes null-tolerant and fails closed: with no
renderer no sender can legitimately match, so every write is rejected. Those
handlers cannot fire headless today, but failing closed is the right answer if that
ever changes.
This is the precondition for installing a PTY controller without Electron, which is
what a Node-only backend needs and what `terminal.create` actually calls.
Verified: 129 files / 2,473 tests across ipc/pty, providers and orca-runtime; the
built-artifact acceptance smoke still passes end-to-end (boot → pair →
terminal.create → sentinel → close), which is the check that matters most here
since this changes the headless PTY path itself; typecheck and oxlint clean.
* refactor(pty): read app paths and the packaged flag through the port
Follows the fake-window removal. `ipc/pty.ts` had nine `app.*` reads — all
`getPath`, `getVersion` or `isPackaged` — which the AppEnvironment port already
covers. The `BrowserWindow` import was also dead after the null-window change.
What still binds this file to Electron is now `ipcMain` (75 uses, all handler
registration) and `powerMonitor` (2). That is a clean statement of the remaining
job: split logic from registration, the same shape already applied to preflight
and the SSH registry.
Test wiring: the shared `pty-ipc-suite-environment` beforeEach installs a fake
AppEnvironment that reads through the existing `vi.mock('electron')` app object
rather than freezing values — suites toggle `app.isPackaged` mid-test to exercise
dev-mode spawn paths, so the port has to observe the same mutable field. One edit
in the shared harness covers every pty suite.
Verified: 128 files / 1,290 tests across ipc/pty and providers; the built-artifact
acceptance smoke passes; typecheck and oxlint clean; ratchet unchanged at 25.
* refactor(pty): inject the ipcMain surface so the PTY module loads without Electron
This closes the round-3 blocker: "the doc never says how orcad installs
setPtyController without Electron."
`registerPtyHandlers` owns the `RuntimePtyController` that `terminal.create`
actually spawns through — the thing a Node backend needs and cannot get from the
provider thunks. The module was otherwise host-agnostic already; the only thing
pinning 8,031 lines to Electron was a static `ipcMain` / `powerMonitor` import used
purely to register renderer handlers that no headless host will ever receive.
`src/main/ipc/pty-host-bindings.ts` makes those surfaces settable, defaulting to
no-ops. Unlike AppEnvironment and SecretStore, the default does NOT throw: a host
with no renderer legitimately has nothing to register against, so not registering
handlers nobody can call is correct rather than a hidden downgrade. The desktop
installs the real objects in `attach-main-window-services` before its handlers run.
Also converts the remaining electron import to a top-level `import type`. oxlint's
`no-import-type-side-effects` caught that inline `type` specifiers still leave a
side-effect import — precisely the "type-only is not enough if esbuild still emits
require('electron')" trap a reviewer flagged.
**`src/main/ipc/pty.ts` now bundles with zero `require("electron")`.** A Node entry
can call `registerPtyHandlers(null, runtime, …)` and get a working PTY controller.
Verified: 128 files / 1,290 tests across ipc/pty and providers; the built-artifact
acceptance smoke passes end-to-end — which is the check that matters, since this
changes how every PTY handler registers; typecheck and oxlint clean.
* fix(pty-bindings): drop two unused eslint-disable directives
CI runs oxlint with unused-disable reporting; the two
`@typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any` suppressions I added were never triggered by
any enabled rule, so they failed static analysis as dead directives. The `any[]`
rest args stay — they mirror electron's own IpcMain signature, and narrowing them
would reject the real object at the desktop call site.
Verified with the exact CI invocation: `oxlint --format github` reports 0 warnings,
0 errors across the repo.
* fix(pty): install the host bindings per process, not per window
A real regression my own change introduced, caught by the SSH docker E2E
(`paired-startup-exec-readiness` — "recovers startup exec through a headed paired
desktop owner"). It reproduced on rerun, so it was not a flake.
`setPtyHostBindings` was called inside `attachMainWindowServices`, i.e. when a
window attaches. But `registerHeadlessPtyRuntime` (index.ts:3163) calls
`registerPtyHandlers` on the serve path *before* any window exists — so those
handlers registered against the no-op default and never reached the real `ipcMain`.
A paired desktop owner then attached to a runtime whose PTY handlers were wired to
nothing.
The bindings describe the *host*, not the *window*: an Electron main process always
has `ipcMain`, whether or not a window is open. Installing them beside
`setAppEnvironment`/`setSecretStore` at the top of bootstrap fixes both paths.
Verified: 128 files / 1,290 tests; the built-artifact acceptance smoke passes;
typecheck clean; `oxlint --format github` (the exact CI invocation) reports 0/0.
* feat(orcad): de-electron the runtime core and add the Node entry + build gate
**`src/main/runtime/orca-runtime.ts` — 41,048 lines — no longer imports electron.**
Its last three sites go through `runtime-desktop-surface.ts`: a native notification,
the authoritative-window lookup, and the one `ipcMain` channel used by the
renderer-backed tab-create fallback. All three are unreachable without a renderer —
`createTerminal` already takes the background branch when no window exists (#10333) —
so a Node host installs none and the runtime relays notifications to paired clients,
which is the better destination anyway. Ratchet 25 → 24.
Adds `src/main/orcad/orcad-entry.ts`: Node host adapters plus a `startOrcad` that
constructs the runtime, installs the PTY controller via `registerPtyHandlers(null, …)`,
and serves RPC. It sets two defaults the constructor gets wrong for a headless host —
`canRecoverPersistentLocalPtys: false` (no daemon here) and
`getDesktopWindowStatus: 'blocked'` (a Node host can never be promoted to a desktop
window, which is what `'openable'` claims).
Adds `config/scripts/build-orcad.mjs`, which **currently fails, on purpose**: 25
modules still import electron (browser and speech clusters, plugins, jira/proxy,
filesystem-watcher, and four `require('electron').app` one-liners). It names them.
Two bugs found while building it, both worth recording:
- The first bundle looked clean and was not. `electron` was bundleable, so esbuild
rewrote the metafile `path` to the resolved file under node_modules and a check for
`path === 'electron'` passed while the package was in the bundle — it failed at
runtime with electron's own installer message. The check now reads `original`, and
electron is marked external so a residual import fails loudly instead.
- `jsonc-parser`'s UMD build breaks the bundle at load; aliased to its ESM entry, the
same fix `build-relay.mjs` already carries.
Verified: desktop unchanged — the built-artifact acceptance smoke passes, runtime/pty/
provider suites green, typecheck clean, `oxlint --format github` 0/0.
* refactor(host): drop the last two require('electron') app lookups
`computer/sidecar-client.ts` and `ports/port-scan-command-client.ts` read the app
root through `require('electron').app` inside a try/catch. Both were already correct
under plain Node at runtime — they return null when it throws — but the literal text
fails the plain-Node entry guard regardless, which is why port-scan carried a comment
warning it must never become reachable from a fork entry.
Reading the AppEnvironment port gives the identical "no app root here" answer without
the text, so that warning is now obsolete and the comment says so.
Ratchet 24 → 22. Every remaining entry is a real coupling: the browser cluster (15,
which variant B does not ship), speech (2), plugins (2), and jira/proxy-settings (2,
needing an HttpClient port for Chromium session partitions).
Verified: 25 files / 209 tests; acceptance smoke passes; typecheck and
`oxlint --format github` clean.
* docs(orcad): record that the ratchet under-counts orcad's graph
The ratchet reports 22 electron importers; the orcad build reports 23. The extra is
agent-hooks/wsl-hook-relay-launch.ts, and the cause is a gap in the gate rather than
a rounding error: the ratchet measures what orca-runtime + runtime-rpc reach, while
orcad's entry also imports ipc/pty directly to install the PTY controller.
Once orcad ships it must become a ratchet entry point, or the two numbers drift and
the gate quietly stops covering the artifact it exists for.
* refactor(runtime): inject the browser commands factory
Drops 14 modules from the runtime's Electron graph in one change — the whole Chromium
browser cluster. Ratchet 22 → 8.
`OrcaRuntimeService` constructed `RuntimeBrowserCommands` as a field initializer, and
that construction is what pulled in `BrowserWindow`, `session`, `webContents` and the
cookie jars. Importing the class for its *type* is free; only building it costs.
So the class import becomes `import type`, and the instance comes from
`runtime-browser-commands-factory.ts`. The desktop installs the real factory at the
Electron entry. **All ~80 existing `this.browserCommands.*.bind(...)` delegations are
untouched** — a review round specifically warned that rewriting those was the
expensive, risky part, and this avoids it entirely.
With no factory installed, browser commands reject per call with `browser_unavailable`
rather than resolving to a stub that silently succeeds. The runtime already filters
browser capabilities out of `getStatus()` when no backend exists, so clients do not
offer the affordance in the first place.
Also corrects a stale comment in `pty-renderer-surface.ts` that still described the
fake window as present tense; it was deleted two commits ago.
Verified: 451 files / 5,513 tests across `src/main/browser` and `src/main/runtime` —
the entire browser automation suite; the built-artifact acceptance smoke passes;
`pnpm typecheck` and `oxlint --format github` clean.
* refactor(host): extract the plugin client list and port two app lookups
Ratchet 8 → 5.
- `listPluginsForClients` moves to `src/main/plugins/plugin-client-list.ts`. It needed
only three `plugins/*` helpers, none of them Electron — it was colocated with
`ipcMain.handle` registrations, so the runtime's `plugins.list` RPC dragged all of
Electron in to call a function that reads a lockfile. Same shape as preflight.
Dropping it also releases `ipc/plugin-marketplaces.ts`.
- `agent-hooks/wsl-hook-relay-launch.ts` and `speech/stt-service.ts` read `getAppPath`
and `isPackaged` through the AppEnvironment port.
The five that remain are all genuinely Chromium and need the HttpClient port or a
watcher split, not another mechanical swap: `browser/cdp-bridge` (webContents),
`ipc/filesystem-watcher` (ipcMain), `jira/authenticated-request` and
`network/proxy-settings` (net + session partitions), `speech/model-manager`
(`net.request`, which honors app proxy settings that Node https does not — replacing
it is a behaviour change, not a rename).
Verified: 219 files / 1,922 tests across plugins, speech, agent-hooks and the runtime
RPC methods; the built-artifact acceptance smoke passes; typecheck and
`oxlint --format github` clean.
* refactor(network): resolve the default proxy session lazily
Ratchet 5 → 4.
`proxy-settings.ts` needed exactly one Electron value: `session.defaultSession`, as
the fallback when a caller does not pass `options.proxySession`. Callers could already
inject a session; only the default was hard-wired. It now comes from a settable
resolver, so the module loads under plain Node.
**A resolver rather than a Session, because a Session eagerly throws.** The first
attempt installed `session.defaultSession` directly in pre-ready bootstrap and broke
startup outright — `TypeError: Session can only be received when app is ready`. The
acceptance smoke caught it before commit. Deferring to first use is always after ready.
Behaviour with no session is not a degradation: there is no Chromium proxy config to
discover, so `resolveProxy` is skipped and the environment variables become the whole
answer rather than a fallback. Applying rules to a session that does not exist is
likewise skipped; settings are still honoured because outbound requests read the env.
This reaches past Jira — a review round noted `ensureElectronProxyFromEnvironment` is
also on the Claude HTTP path via `oauth-refresh.ts` and `rate-limits/claude-fetcher.ts`.
Verified: 48 files / 526 tests across network, jira and rate-limits; the
built-artifact acceptance smoke passes; typecheck and `oxlint --format github` clean.
* fix(index): merge the duplicate proxy-settings import
CI's code-quality lint (`oxlint --config config/oxlint-code-quality-native-plugins.json
--deny-warnings`) flags a module imported twice in one file. My earlier insertion added
a second `./network/proxy-settings` import beside the existing one.
Verified with CI's exact invocation: exit 0.
* refactor(network): add the HttpClient port and lift BrowserError out of cdp-bridge
Ratchet 4 → 2.
Two unrelated couplings, both of the same shape — a small thing living inside a
Chromium-heavy file.
`BrowserError` is a seven-line error class with no dependencies, but it lived in
`browser/cdp-bridge.ts`, which imports `webContents`. The runtime catches that type on
paths with nothing to do with CDP, so one import kept a Node host from loading the
runtime at all. Moved to `browser/browser-error.ts`; cdp-bridge re-exports it.
`jira/authenticated-request.ts` fetches through `net.fetch` and reads
`session.defaultSession`. `network/http-client.ts` makes both settable. This one is a
**named port rather than a silent fallback, because the fallback is not transparent**:
Electron's net follows Chromium session/proxy state, avoids undici's stale keep-alive
sockets after a VPN path change, and sends a Chrome user agent that Jira's XSRF check
depends on. A Node host gets `globalThis.fetch`, reads proxy config from the
environment, and sends Node's user agent. That difference is documented at the port.
`session.defaultSession` is read per call, not captured at install — it throws before
the app is ready, which is the mistake the previous commit made and the acceptance
smoke caught.
Test wiring: `jira/client.test.ts` installs the port *inside* `loadClientModule`, after
its `vi.resetModules()`, since the reset gives the module a fresh singleton.
Verified: 461 files / 5,616 tests across jira, browser, network and runtime; the
built-artifact acceptance smoke passes; typecheck, `oxlint --format github` and the
code-quality lint with `--deny-warnings` all clean.
* fix(http-client): register the Node fetch fallback with the call-site audit
`global-fetch-call-site-audit.test.ts` guards every global-fetch use, because the
global runs on undici where an unread response body can crash the whole process
(orca#8695). The HttpClient port's Node fallback is a new such call site and was
unregistered — the guard caught it in a full-suite run.
Registered with the reasoning, and the port's doc comment now states the body-safety
contract explicitly: it hands the Response straight to its caller and never inspects
it, so the consume/cancel obligation stays exactly where it already was — with the
caller, unchanged from when they called Electron's net directly.
Two comments elsewhere mentioned the global by name and tripped the line scan as false
positives; reworded to describe the behaviour rather than name the API.
Verified: audit passes; typecheck and `oxlint --format github` clean.
* fix(app-environment): read hasAppEnvironment through the realm slot
|
||
|
Neil
|
cbea7530b4 |
build(runtime): gate new Electron imports reachable from the Orca runtime (#15919)
* build(runtime): gate new Electron imports reachable from the Orca runtime
The runtime is meant to become host-agnostic so it can also run on plain Node,
but nothing enforced that. `orca-runtime.ts` reaches dozens of modules that
import `electron`, and the count grows silently: the import that breaks
portability is usually several hops away, so no reviewer sees the edge.
Add a reachability ratchet, modelled on the existing max-lines one. It bundles
the runtime and its RPC server with esbuild, reads the metafile for every module
importing `electron`, and diffs that against a checked-in baseline. A new module
fails; a removed one forces the baseline to tighten. The list may only shrink.
A per-file lint rule cannot do this — the point is precisely the transitive
edges — so this runs as a build gate in `pnpm lint`.
Baseline starts at 36, down from 50 before the SecretStore and AppEnvironment
ports landed, which is the migration made measurable.
Verified: gate passes clean, fails with an actionable message when an `electron`
import is added to a runtime module, and passes again when reverted.
* fix(runtime-ratchet): resolve paths from the script, not the caller's cwd
Run from anywhere but the repo root, the gate died with an unhandled ENOENT stack
instead of a usable message. It failed closed, so it was never unsafe — just
undebuggable. Anchor ROOT to import.meta.dirname and pass absWorkingDir to esbuild
so metafile keys stay repo-relative.
* ci(runtime-ratchet): actually run the gate in CI
The ratchet was wired into the `lint` npm script, but CI's static-analysis job
runs the individual checks rather than `pnpm lint`, so the gate would never have
fired on a PR — it would have looked enforced while enforcing nothing.
Runs on ubuntu-latest alongside the max-lines ratchet, so the checked-in baseline
is only ever produced by one platform.
* fix(runtime-ratchet): mark native addons external so CI can run the gate
ssh2's optional cpu-features dep points at a prebuilt .node that only exists
where a build toolchain has run. Loading it made the gate pass locally and
hard-fail on CI with 'Could not resolve ../build/Release/cpufeatures.node'.
The gate only reads the import graph, never the addon, so resolve every .node to
an external stub instead. Verified by hiding the local prebuild — which is CI's
state — and re-running: still 36 entries, exit 0.
* fix(runtime-ratchet): stop the gate failing open on Windows
The entry guard compared import.meta.url against a `file://${process.argv[1]}`
template. On Windows argv[1] is a native path (C:\repo\...) while import.meta.url
is file:///C:/repo/..., so they never match: main() never ran and `pnpm lint`
exited 0 on Windows without bundling, reading the baseline, or enforcing anything.
Use pathToFileURL, which is the idiom check-max-lines-ratchet.mjs:225 already uses.
CI runs this on ubuntu so enforcement was never actually lost, but a Windows
developer got a green gate that checked nothing.
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||
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Neil
|
057fbfcffc |
perf(windows): read the process table natively instead of forking PowerShell (#15749)
* perf(windows): read the process table natively instead of forking PowerShell Seven independent readers each forked powershell.exe to run Get-CimInstance Win32_Process, with a wmic fallback that Windows 11 24H2 has removed. On a domain-joined host with PowerShell Transcription enabled by policy, one of them running every ~2s recorded ~289GB across 1.4 million files (#15209). The same scan cost ~700ms and ran per pane (#15036), and a Group Policy or AV block turned it into 'unavailable', which callers read as 'no evidence' -- which is how a PTY tree survives its own teardown (#9045, #10475). A Toolhelp32 snapshot answers the same question with no child process. Measured on Windows 11 with 1050 processes, p50/p95: pid+ppid+name 15.9 / 17.5 ms +memory +command line 30.6 / 33.7 ms Get-CimInstance 706 / 723 ms Two upstream defects needed patching, both found by running it on real hardware. The binding requires Spectre-mitigated libraries our agents do not carry (node-pty is patched the same way). And enumeration stopped after 1024 processes: on a host with 1051 the module returned exactly 1024, and the querying process was itself among the 27 missing -- a truncated snapshot silently hides the descendants teardown is looking for, which is the failure this whole change exists to remove. Migrated: the foreground/descendant reader (the #15209 scraper and the teardown identity gate) and the port scanner's PID attribution. NOT migrated: the memory collector and three identity probes, which need Win32_Process.CreationDate and have no native equivalent. Start time is a proxy for identity anyway; an inherited job handle is the real answer, so those belong with the job-object work rather than here. Packaging follows the windows-native-registry contract exactly: optional, absent from onlyBuiltDependencies so macOS/Linux never run node-gyp, win32-only in the packaged runtime. Asserted by the existing contract test, which also stops pinning a whole source literal that only tested its own formatting. * chore(process): ratchet the child_process allowlist down windows-foreground-process-rows.ts no longer spawns anything, so its allowlist line is stale. The guard fails on a stale entry as well as a new one, precisely so a migrated file cannot keep a slot open and hide the next regression in the same path. * fix(ports): import the process-table reader the scanner uses Missing import: the migration replaced the PowerShell call but the new symbol was never imported, so tsc failed. Vitest transpiles without typechecking, which is why the port-scanner suite stayed green. * fix(deps): sync this branch's lockfile with its patch set Same class as the fix on the tip branch: pnpm records a hash per patched dependency, and this branch introduces the windows-process-tree patch without its lockfile entry matching. Every job here failed at install with ERR_PNPM_LOCKFILE_CONFIG_MISMATCH. Verified with --frozen-lockfile, which is what CI runs and what my local runs were not. * test(relay): drive the relay's Windows fixtures from the native snapshot Two relay cases fed a PowerShell CIM payload through a mocked execFile. That reader is gone, so both failed -- deterministically, on every PR run for this branch and the one above it. I did not catch it because my own verification sweep was 'src/main src/shared config/scripts' and never included src/relay. The relay is a first-class consumer of the process table; leaving it out of the sweep is how a deterministic failure survived six review rounds. |
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Jinjing
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d8e9fa1bb9 |
Revert "fix(terminal): apply pane padding on all four edges (#15544)" (#15623)
This reverts commit
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Brennan Benson
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4b2ed5ddd4 |
fix(terminal): apply pane padding on all four edges (#15544)
* fix(terminal): apply pane padding on all four edges Move the configured inset onto xterm so the terminal fills its pane while the fit calculation accounts for both sides of each axis. Add a geometry golden that forces cell remainders and verifies dynamic padding without relying on renderer pixels. * fix(terminal): normalize imported padding for fitting * fix(terminal): align stored and fitted padding |
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 OrcaWin
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471bc9d8ce | Ship the WSL transcript helper with the Windows relay (STA-4831) (#15529) | ||
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Neil
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fdd4091ebd | fix(hooks): isolate lint-staged backups per worktree (#15388) | ||
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Neil
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13b10e0b54 |
ci: cut PR wall clock by caching what CI recomputes every run (#15211)
None of these change what CI checks — they remove work the runners repeated on every PR. - install-node-dependencies installed with --no-frozen-lockfile, so every job re-resolved the graph against the registry to recompute what the lockfile already pins. Measured at ~62 MB of packument metadata per job; the pnpm store cache does not cover the metadata cache, so this was paid ~39 times per run. The `git diff` guard that made the re-resolution redundant stays. - --ignore-scripts leaves node-pty with no build/Release, so ensure-native-runtime node-gyp-compiled it in every job asking for a runtime. Cache the build under an ABI-bound key (runtime, resolved Node version, node-pty patch) with no restore-keys, since a partial match is exactly the mismatched build that would be recompiled anyway. - The four fetch-depth: 0 checkouts pulled full history including every historical blob (blobs are ~89% of this repo's pack). They only need the commit graph for a merge-base diff, so fetch them blobless. Measured 30-43s each today versus 8s for the shallow checkouts. One of them, e2e-paths, gates the entire E2E chain. - E2E jobs ordered setup-node before pnpm, which meant setup-node could not find the store and no E2E job cached dependencies at all. Reorder and cache; this sits on the critical path in both the build job and each shard. - git_compatibility rebuilt Git 2.25.5 from a pinned tarball on every PR. Cache the build; the sha256 assertion still guards the miss path. - typecheck ran three independent tsc passes back to back and discarded the .tsbuildinfo each project already emits. Run them concurrently and cache the incremental state. - package (windows) built the electron-vite targets serially via build:release. Use a :parallel variant that overlaps them, matching what the Linux package job already packages and smoke-tests from. Contract tests cover each new cache's ordering and key so none of them can silently start serving a stale or ABI-mismatched artifact. |
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Neil
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24e662adc1 |
feat(ssh): verify host keys, and restore panes correctly across a reconnect (#14844)
* docs(ssh): design for real host key verification (STA-4319)
Today's ssh2 verifier records a fingerprint and returns true — every host key is
accepted, with no known_hosts consult and no change detection anywhere in
src/main/ssh/. Scope is per-connection, so exec, SFTP, port forwarding, the
watcher and relay deploy all ride that one unverified handshake, and the
ProxyJump path puts the final hop — the topology most likely to cross untrusted
network — on ssh2 specifically.
Decisions worth calling out:
- Read the user's known_hosts as a trust source but NEVER write to it. That file
is shared with every other SSH tool on the machine; appending means line
endings, permissions, concurrent writers and a corruption blast radius well
beyond us. Accepted keys go to our own per-target store. Reading theirs is also
the entire migration story: most developers already have their hosts there.
- Mismatch is scoped to the SAME key type. A host with only an RSA entry that
presents ed25519 is unknown, not changed. ssh2 negotiates ed25519 first, so
without this we would fire a change-of-key alarm at nearly every existing user
on their first upgraded connect — training them to dismiss the one warning that
is supposed to mean something. Flagged in review as the decision I am least
sure of; a downgrade-vector argument against it is being tested.
- Changed key hard-fails with no override button; recovery is a separate explicit
action, offered only when OUR store is what disagreed, because forgetting our
record cannot unblock a known_hosts conflict.
- Background reconnects deny rather than prompt. A dialog the user cannot place
in context only teaches click-through.
Two traps are documented because either would make the fix silently do nothing:
an async verifier returns a Promise, which ssh2 reads as truthy and accepts
immediately; and the existing test mock invokes hostVerifier with one argument
and ignores the return, so it would pass against a verifier that never decides.
Design only — no behaviour change. The doc is added to the tracked-reference
allowlist in .gitignore alongside the other docs/reference entries.
* docs(ssh): revise the host key design after security and migration review
Three things the reviews changed, kept visible rather than quietly edited out.
THREAT MODEL WAS WRONG IN THREE PLACES. Jump hosts are not the worst case — they
are already safe: shouldUseSystemSshTransport branches on exactly the inputs
resolveEffectiveProxy does, and attemptConnect returns after the system probe, so
ProxyJump goes through OpenSSH and is verified. Agent forwarding was overstated
(gated on the user's ForwardAgent). Credential theft was understated: any auth
error counts as agent fallback, so a MITM walks the user to the password AND
private-key passphrase prompts, and cachedPassword replays without prompting. The
relay claim was backwards — the attacker owns their own machine; the real impact
is the return direction, where they become the host our workspace trusts.
TYPE SCOPING IS A DOWNGRADE VECTOR WITHOUT ALGORITHM ORDERING. This was the
decision I flagged as least certain and asked to have argued both ways. OpenSSH
is safe only because order_hostkeyalgs() puts known types first and RFC 4253
gives the client's order priority. ssh2 negotiates ed25519 first regardless, so
an attacker who cannot forge the RSA key on file just presents ed25519 and gets a
friendly first-contact prompt instead of a hard failure. Keep scoping, but set
algorithms.serverHostKey to lead with the types on file — and add a sixth
outcome for 'unknown type, known host', which must never read as first contact.
SHIP THE DEFENCE BEFORE THE DIALOG. Startup restore fires eager connects for all
targets in parallel with a 15s timeout while a prompt would live 120s; ephemeral
VM targets present a new key every launch; paired-web connects run on the host
desktop, so the dialog opens on someone else's screen. Phase 1 is therefore no
modal at all: consult known_hosts and our store, match connects, unknown persists
with accept-new semantics, mismatch and revoked hard-fail. That is the whole MITM
defence with none of the migration risk.
Also folded in, verified live against OpenSSH 10.2p1: the without-port fallback
(bracketed lookup first, then bare, where the second pass can only yield match or
unknown — otherwise a bare line plus a non-default port produces a spurious
prompt); hashed entries hash the candidate form; multiple files union; a
cert-authority line does not match a plain key. IPv6 and bracket parsing moved
INTO scope — that is a parser requirement, not a scope call, and getting it wrong
produces the prompt-training harm the design exists to avoid.
* feat(ssh): parse and match OpenSSH known_hosts
The matcher half of STA-4319. No behaviour change yet — nothing calls this.
Hand-rolled because no maintained JS implementation exists, and written against
behaviour observed from OpenSSH 10.2p1 rather than inferred from the man page.
Three of those behaviours a reasonable reading gets wrong:
- A non-default port is TWO ordered lookups, not one candidate set: '[host]:port'
first, then bare host ('checking without port identifier' in ssh -v). The
fallback pass can only yield match or unknown — OpenSSH downgrades a wrong key
there rather than reporting a change. Collapse them and anyone holding a bare
line who connects off-port gets a spurious first-contact result; treat the
fallback as authoritative and they get a false change-of-key alarm.
- Revocation resolves in its own pass so the verdict cannot depend on line order.
Verified both orderings.
- A cert-authority line never matches a plain host key; it only validates
certificates. A normal line alongside it still decides.
Mismatch is scoped to the same key type, and a host known by a DIFFERENT type
returns unknown-type-known-host rather than plain unknown — an attacker who
cannot forge the key on file must not get a friendly first-contact result by
presenting another type. That outcome is only half the defence; the other half
(leading serverHostKey with known types) lands with the wiring.
47 tests from vectors executed against real sshd, including ssh-keygen -H hashed
entries. Each of six mutations reddens it: collapsing the passes, letting the
fallback report mismatch, dropping type scoping, resolving revocation in line
order, honouring an unrecognised marker, and skipping the blob/type agreement
check.
* feat(ssh): decide what to do with a presented host key
The policy half of STA-4319, kept separate from the ssh2 wiring so it is testable
without a handshake and injected rather than importing its sources, so a test
states its own trust state instead of writing files.
Phase 1 ships no dialog — a test asserts the decision is never 'prompt'. Startup
restore opens every previously-active target at once, ephemeral VM targets would
ask every launch, and paired-web connects run on the host desktop where the
dialog would appear on someone else's screen.
Ordering that matters: revocation outranks everything including
StrictHostKeyChecking=no, because a revoked key is a statement that this key is
known-bad rather than merely unrecognised. known_hosts is named before our own
store on a change, because its remedy (ssh-keygen -R) is the one that also
unblocks ssh and git — pointing at a remedy that cannot work is worse than none.
Two carve-outs with reasons: an ephemeral runtime target accepts WITHOUT
recording, since a fresh VM presents a new key every launch and a stored record
would accumulate per launch and eventually read as a spurious change; and when
ssh -G ran on the HOME-divergent path that suppresses /etc/ssh/ssh_config, an
unknown host is denied, because a site-wide policy may forbid it and being laxer
than ssh is the one outcome that is never acceptable.
Rejection text deliberately avoids 'authentication failed' and 'permission
denied': the reconnect ladder classifies on those substrings, so a denial phrased
that way is retried forever against a decision that will never change. Pinned by
a test.
* feat(ssh): build the host key verifier and the algorithm order that makes it safe
Still not wired into the handshake — that lands next. This is the piece that
turns a decision into an ssh2 callback, plus the half of the design that is easy
to forget because it lives in a different config field.
The verifier MUST be a plain function returning undefined. ssh2 does
'const ret = verifier(key, verify); if (ret !== undefined) verify(ret)', so an
async function returns a Promise — neither undefined nor falsy — and ssh2 accepts
the key immediately while ignoring whatever the callback later decides. Making
this async would silently restore exactly the accept-everything behaviour the
module exists to remove, so a test asserts the return value is undefined.
orderServerHostKeyAlgorithms is what makes type-scoped matching safe rather than
a downgrade. RFC 4253 gives the client's algorithm order priority, so leading
with the types we already hold for a host denies a server the choice of
presenting some other type to convert a hard failure into first contact. Without
it, an attacker who cannot forge the key on file just offers a different
algorithm. Revoked entries never contribute to that order.
Also fails closed on two paths that would otherwise hang or over-trust: a key
whose own length-prefixed header cannot be read is refused rather than reasoned
about, and a throw from any dependency denies, because ssh2 may not catch an
exception raised inside the verifier and the handshake would hang instead of
failing.
18 tests. Includes the two negative cases that matter — first-contact keys are
recorded, but keys we already know, rejected keys, ephemeral runtime targets and
a lax StrictHostKeyChecking are not.
* fix(ssh): promote every RSA signature algorithm for a known ssh-rsa key
A known_hosts entry names the KEY type, which is not the negotiated ALGORITHM
name. One ssh-rsa key is offered as rsa-sha2-512, rsa-sha2-256 or ssh-rsa
depending on the signature algorithm, so matching the literal name only would
leave a host we know by RSA ordered behind ed25519 — precisely the ordering this
function exists to prevent, and precisely the population (RSA-era known_hosts
entries) it was written for.
Verified from ssh2's own negotiation while wiring this: kex.js iterates the
CLIENT list and takes the first entry the server also offers, so client order
does decide, as RFC 4253 says. ssh2's default order leads with ed25519 and places
the RSA algorithms fifth through seventh.
* fix(ssh): verify host keys instead of accepting every one (STA-4319)
The actual fix. ssh-connection's verifier recorded a fingerprint and returned
true, so every ssh2 connection accepted every host key — no known_hosts consult,
no change detection. It now consults the user's known_hosts plus our own store
and refuses a changed, revoked or unverifiable key.
Phase 1 by design: no dialog. Unknown hosts are accepted and recorded
(accept-new semantics), because startup restore opens every previously-active
target at once, ephemeral VM targets present a new key each launch, and
paired-web connects run on the host desktop where a prompt would appear on
someone else's screen. The MITM defence lands now; the prompt is Phase 2.
Also sets algorithms.serverHostKey to lead with the types already known for the
host. Without it the type-scoped matching is a downgrade — an attacker who cannot
forge the key on file just presents another type and turns a hard failure into
first contact. Verified from ssh2's kex.js that the client list decides.
Denial replaces ssh2's generic handshake error with the specific reason, because
the reconnect ladder cannot distinguish a generic failure from a transient fault
and would retry forever against a decision that will never change.
An unreadable trust store degrades to known_hosts only rather than failing the
connect: a changed key is still refused, and a host trusted only by us falls back
to first contact and is re-recorded, reaching the same decision.
The ssh2 mock now uses the callback form and aborts the handshake on denial. As
written it called hostVerifier(key) with one argument and ignored the result, so
it would have passed against a verifier that never decides — flagged in the
design as a mock that had to change, not a test to quietly rewrite. Two new tests
pin the wiring rather than the module: an unidentifiable blob is refused, and a
well-formed key is accepted.
Note for review: commit
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Jinwoo Hong
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fa9b20cb41 | feat(skills): reland private bundle sharing safely (#14934) | ||
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Neil
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9f3a912c1e |
fix(terminal): type Option-composed ASCII instead of reporting it as a chord (#14743)
* fix(terminal): preserve Option-composed ASCII input * fix(terminal): preserve Option keyboard protocol semantics * fix(terminal): complete Option keyboard event encoding * fix(terminal): harden Option input encoding * fix(terminal): close keyboard protocol fallback gaps * test(terminal): prove Option-composed ASCII reaches the pty end to end The Option-compose fix had unit coverage only. This drives a live Electron pane whose kitty flags are armed by the application's own CSI > 1 u and asserts the bytes at the pty boundary: composed `@` and Shift-layer `\` arrive as text, configured Option-as-Alt still reports the layout-resolved chord, and a non-ASCII glyph still reaches the app as its alt hotkey. Restoring the pre-fix policy fails exactly the two composed-text scenarios. Also records the ASCII rule's rationale where the rule lives, not only in a test comment. * refactor(terminal): drop the unread Option layers from the layout snapshot The native helper computed an Option and Option+Shift character for every key, shipped both over IPC, validated them in the parser and cached them in the renderer — but no production caller ever asked for them. Only the base and Shift layers are read, and Shift is the one the web layout map cannot supply, which is why the helper exists at all. Removing them halves the helper's UCKeyTranslate work per key and drops the option parameter that six signatures were threading through for nobody. |
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Jinjing
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763b1febeb |
Revert "feat(skills): add private bundle sharing (#14401)" (#14913)
This reverts commit
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||
 Jinwoo HongandE2E Test
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757fae28d7 |
feat(skills): add private bundle sharing (#14401)
Co-authored-by: E2E Test <e2e@test.local> |
||
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Neil
|
eb22e497bb | Revert "fix(ssh): reapply the reattach-identity work and stop the fallback fence stranding moved panes" (#14395) | ||
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Neil
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6a0c8fa541 |
fix(ssh): reapply the reattach-identity work and stop the fallback fence stranding moved panes (#14384)
* Reapply #13326 and #13928 (un-revert #14361) Restores the SSH reattach-identity and daemon-occupancy fixes. Reverting them reintroduced their P0s, filed as STA-4224, STA-4225, STA-4227, STA-4230, STA-4232, STA-4233 and STA-4234 against #14361. The tab loss that motivated the revert is fixed in the commits that follow, so this reapplication is not a straight redo. * fix(relay): stop the fallback attach fence refusing a pane that moved tabs The primary fence was moved to the shell's own incarnation precisely because paneKey/tabId froze the pane's LOCATION at spawn and refused panes that had merely moved. The fallback that older clients fall into kept the old rule, so the correction never reached it — the same 'the rule exists, but this path does not ask it' leak this work has hit repeatedly. A refusal here is not recoverable: an identity mismatch never grounds a respawn, so the pane keeps a live shell it can no longer reach and renders blank. Narrowed to paneKey, which is the identity; the tab is a location. Restoring the tabId comparison reddens the new test. |
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Neil
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11cd2b4310 |
revert(ssh): back out #13326 and #13928 — reconnect loses every tab (#14361)
* Revert "fix(daemon): stop killing live coding agents when the daemon can't report its sessions (#13928)" This reverts commit |
||
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Jinjing
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70abf5cacc |
test: add golden e2e tests for agent TUI launch and shell recovery (#14258)
* test: add golden e2e tests for agent TUI launch and shell recovery
Add test fixtures and E2E tests to verify agent TUI functionality:
- Stub agent implementation supports cross-platform execution (Unix/Windows)
- Test verifies multiline composer with Shift+Enter support in agent TUI
- Test verifies clean shell resumes after agent exit without state leakage
* test: add golden e2e tests for agent TUI launch and shell recovery
Add agent TUI launch and shell-recovery tests to the golden (release-blocking)
E2E suite, covering agent initialization and shell availability after agent
exit. Improve escape sequence handling in the stub agent to prevent stray key
reports from contaminating test output. Add terminal input readiness checks to
ensure commands execute reliably before verification.
* test: coerce golden stub stdin chunks for type-aware lint
Node types the stdin data event as string | Buffer even after
setEncoding('utf8'), so restrict-plus-operands failed CI.
* test: fix golden stub agent Windows batch files and add Ctrl+C support
- Store batch files with CRLF to avoid Windows 512-byte parser boundary bug
- Handle Ctrl+C (0x03) in raw mode as alternative to Ctrl+D (0x04)
- Update release notes documenting golden test skip behavior on older tags
* Remove Windows batch file gitattributes workaround
The -text whitespace=cr-at-eol rule preventing CRLF conversion for
.cmd files is no longer needed. Allow batch files to use normalized
line endings.
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Jinjing
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b8d6b21dfa |
test(e2e): add golden E2E tests for workspace session management (#14304)
* test(e2e): add golden E2E tests for workspace session management - Restore exact file and terminal state after quit/relaunch - Verify terminal file link activation and external edit detection - Test worktree creation and switching with isolated terminals - Isolate test repo paths between concurrent CI runs with UUIDs * Add platform-aware marker echo command utility - Create splitMarkerEchoCommand() to generate shell commands that safely echo test markers across Windows and Unix platforms - Split markers into prefix/suffix fragments so output assertions prove execution, not just shell echo-back - Consolidate SORTABLE_TAB export and improve tab bar locator logic - Refactor terminal link helpers to extract client point calculation |
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Jinjing
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e84fb46eaf |
test: add golden E2E tests for source control workflows (#14260)
* test: add golden E2E tests for source control workflows - Tests core source control interactions: file edit/save, commit staging, and diff viewing - Integrated into CI/CD pipelines for Linux, macOS, and Windows - Includes helper utilities for test setup and worktree management * test(e2e): verify golden commit author and fix test flakiness - Configure git author name/email at worktree level during setup - Verify commits are made with correct author details in assertions - Add explicit timeouts to file visibility waits and git status polling - Fix test ordering to seed edits after source control is open - Simplify git status refresh logic to rely on automatic updates * Add rollback to createGoldenWorktree on setup failure Cleanup callbacks only register after setup succeeds. When a config command fails, the half-built worktree and branch leak into later test runs, causing flakiness. Now we roll back immediately and re-throw the setup error. * test(e2e): match explorer rows after the git status badge appears The golden file-save spec used an exact /^README.md$/ filter. After save, the explorer row text becomes "README.md M", so reopen clicked nothing. * test: strengthen golden worktree setup verification - Track working directory in git call inspection to verify correct execution context - Verify user.name/email config applies to worktree-specific settings, not repo - Add exhaustive setup call sequence assertions to catch setup/rollback leaks |
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 NeilandOrca
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2e8cf589de |
fix(daemon): stop killing live coding agents when the daemon can't report its sessions (#13928)
* fix(daemon): stop killing a wedged daemon that still owns live agent PTYs
A daemon too busy to answer listSessions was indistinguishable from a dead
one: getAliveDaemonSessionCount() returns null ("could not verify"), the
preserve gate required `!== null && > 0`, so the run fell through to
killStaleDaemon() and every running coding agent died with it. The sibling
replace branches all preserve on null; this one alone collapsed "can't tell"
into "empty", which src/main/daemon/AGENTS.md already forbids.
Give the decision an out-of-band second opinion. inspectDaemonPtyOwnership()
reads the OS process table — never the daemon socket, which is exactly what
failed — and reports whether the daemon's own process still has live PTY
descendants. Under preserveWhenOwningLivePtys, that evidence vetoes the
signal and the launcher adopts the daemon in degraded mode instead.
The veto is opt-in so it cannot make a daemon unkillable: only the
failed_health_check path enables it. Manage Sessions -> Restart still kills.
Only positive evidence preserves, so a wedged daemon with nothing to lose is
still replaced (#8689).
Also stop replacing silently: the verdict now prints on the post-kill truth,
which stays quiet on a cold start because nothing was killed.
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
* fix(daemon): survive preserving a daemon too wedged to be adopted
Adversarial review found the veto's own success path could not complete
against the daemon it exists to protect. Preserving routed through
holdDaemonAdoptionLease(), which opens a hello — the exact operation a
wedged daemon cannot answer — so it threw, aborted initDaemonPtyProvider,
and left no spawner. restartDaemon() throws without one, so the user lost
the documented Manage Sessions -> Restart remedy on top of having no
daemon: strictly worse than the data loss being fixed.
A still-listening endpoint means wedged, not gone, so keep a lease-free
handle instead. The lease only cancels the adoption watchdog, which never
fires on a daemon that owns sessions. Degraded mode likewise tolerates a
lease and a session discovery it cannot complete.
Three more from the same review:
- The veto keyed on reason === 'failed_health_check', but a daemon that
answered listSessions with 0 lands in that same branch and must stay
replaceable. Key on liveSessionCount === null, which is what the option
actually documents.
- Zombies are not evidence of live work. A wedged daemon cannot reap, so
its exited agents linger as <defunct> and would read as "still running"
— a false positive correlated with the wedge itself. Enumerate through
the process table's stat column and exclude them; sample twice so a
resolver probe or health-check shell cannot masquerade as an agent.
- Restore the "did anything answer?" log guard alongside the confirmed
kill, so a daemon that self-retires before the kill is still announced.
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
* test(daemon): kill the mutations that let the PTY veto ship as a no-op
Mutation testing found four survivors — changes that break the fix while
every test stays green:
- Swapping the POSIX reader to the 500ms-cached one passed. It is not just
a staleness hazard: inside the TTL both sampling attempts receive the same
array, collapsing the two-sample confirmation to one. Pin the fresh reader.
- Replacing killStaleDaemon's default inspector with one that never reports
live PTYs — the veto disabled in production — passed, because every veto
test injects the hook. Exercise the real seam.
- Adding the veto to cleanupDaemonForProtocol passed, which is verbatim the
failure its own doc warns about: a user-initiated restart of a daemon
owning live PTYs would refuse, then throw. Pin that call's arity.
- The ppid-cycle fixture put the cycle outside the daemon's subtree, so the
walk never entered it and deleting the visited guard passed.
Also bound the Windows enumeration, which had no budget of its own: two CIM
queries with a wmic fallback can stall the launch path for tens of seconds.
Blind is a safe answer there; hanging is not.
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
* fix(daemon): require session-leader evidence and stop preserving daemons that can never be adopted
Round-three review found the veto too eager in three ways, each of which
traded the original data loss for a whole-session degrade or a permanently
daemon-less app.
Evidence was "any non-zombie descendant", justified by re-sampling to weed
out transients. The two samples are taken back to back — one ps fork apart —
so nothing transient is ever weeded out, and a hung helper (often the very
reason the daemon is wedged) reads as an agent. Use the structural signal
instead: a PTY child is a session leader, because forkpty calls setsid, and
no helper the daemon forks ever is. Re-sampling now only retries blindness.
A 'rejected' daemon answered and refused the handshake, so it can never be
adopted; preserving it repeated the same failed adoption on every launch,
forever. And the veto read the process table, not the socket, so it could
fire on a daemon whose endpoint was already gone — adoption then threw,
init aborted, and the app was left with no spawner and no working Restart.
Gate on both: only preserve what could still be reached.
Also: releasing the launcher's temporary lease after the permanent lease
failed reopened the adoption gap that ordering exists to close, and the
tolerance added to discoverDaemonSessions was dead code — nothing on that
path rejects.
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
* refactor(daemon): decide occupancy before the kill, not inside it
Three review rounds each found a new failure state in the previous shape,
which was the design telling us something. The safety rule — never destroy
running work — was replicated across the launcher's branches instead of
being decided once, and the last round added it to one more branch behind a
boolean. Policy had been put inside a mechanism: killStaleDaemon grew an
input flag to disable its new veto, an output back-channel to report it, and
a caller-side re-derivation of the classification the flag had lost. One
structural error, one symptom per layer it crossed.
Name the question instead. resolveDaemonOccupancy answers occupied | empty |
unknown, asking the daemon first (authoritative both ways) and falling back
to the process table only to RAISE the answer to occupied. OS evidence can
prove work exists; it can never prove absence, so it never licenses a kill.
The launcher now decides before it destroys anything, so killStaleDaemon
goes back to being only "make this pid go away" — no options, nothing for a
future caller to forget to disable, and Manage Sessions -> Restart cannot be
vetoed because there is no veto left to hit.
Holding is a real outcome now. A daemon that owns live terminals but cannot
answer a handshake gets mode 'held': no adoption attempt, no lease, no fork
beside it. That deletes the lease-free-handle fallback, the try/catch around
preserve, and the tolerated-lease branch in init that existed only because
the correct outcome had no representation.
Two defects this removes outright:
- The endpoint check used a local boolean probe that returns false on
timeout, so under load — and unconditionally on Windows named pipes, where
a busy server answers ERROR_PIPE_BUSY — the guard disabled itself in
exactly the conditions it was written for. Use the canonical three-valued
probe, whose own docs say absence of proof is not proof of death.
- A daemon that answered and refused the handshake was killed with its
agents. It is now held like any other occupied daemon.
Also folds the replacement verdict onto pendingReplacement, retiring a pair
of mutable launcher locals whose only job was moving one warning past the
kill.
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
* fix(daemon): make the occupancy residual total
The module's contract is that 'unknown' is where every unanswerable question
lands, but a throwing dependency escaped instead — routing a failed
observation into the launch path rather than onto the safe residual. Latent
today because both real implementations swallow their own failures, which is
exactly the kind of thing that stops being true during a refactor.
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
* fix(daemon): stop counting the daemon's own probe PTYs as hosted work
Round-four review found the evidence proving the wrong thing. The filter
excluded the daemon's plain subprocesses on the grounds that only a PTY child
is a session leader — but the daemon opens PTYs for its own health probe and
conpty warmup, and forkpty makes those session leaders too. The comment's own
premise refuted its exclusion list. A daemon hosting zero user terminals could
be held on the strength of its stuck probe child, and since the held daemon
also had no sessions, dropping our authenticated pair let it retire and take
the very state we were protecting. Exclude them by exact command, on both
platforms.
Two more from the same review:
- pty-spawn-unhealthy is only reachable after a successful hello, so that
daemon is adoptable. It was routed to 'held' — which never adopts — purely
because the count had come from the process table. Check it first; hold now
requires an unreachable daemon.
- The grace loop rescanned the process table every pass, though it is waiting
for IPC and the table cannot change its answer in five seconds. Ask the
daemon during the wait and read the table once, after. raiseOccupancy-
WithProcessEvidence makes that split explicit, and can only ever raise.
Bound the wait by wall clock too: the retry count alone never bounded it, and
startup fails open at 60s by abandoning the daemon provider outright, which
would trade a wedged daemon for no daemon and a Restart that throws.
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
* fix(daemon): hold a hello-rejected daemon instead of adopting one that refused us
Found while reviewing why a mutation looked equivalent. Gating the hold on
health === 'unreachable' left 'rejected' — a daemon that answered and refused
the handshake — falling through to preserveDaemon(), whose adoption opens the
very hello it just refused. That throws, and the throw costs the app its
daemon and its Restart remedy. Killing it instead is no better: it can still
be hosting running agents.
Neither of those daemons can complete a handshake, so neither may be adopted,
and both must be held. Gate on that rather than on one of its two causes.
Adds regression tests for the round-four fixes: the self-spawned probe
exclusion is exact-match on both platforms, an adoptable pty-spawn-unhealthy
daemon is never routed to a mode that cannot adopt, evidence can only raise a
verdict, and the grace budget stays under the startup fail-open cap.
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
* fix(daemon): decide adoptability from what the daemon can do now, in one place
Round five found the same question — can this daemon complete a hello right
now? — answered in three places with three different conclusions, because
'held' had been added as a fifth branch rather than as the classification the
other branches route through. Two of those answers were wrong, and both ended
in no daemon at all, which is the outcome 'held' exists to prevent.
- A daemon whose adoption hello had just failed was handed back tagged
'degraded-new-pty-fallback'. Init skips the lease only for 'held', so it
reopened the same connection, threw, and aborted startup — leaving the
agents alive but unreachable and Manage Sessions -> Restart throwing.
- The pty-spawn-unhealthy arm ran first and claimed a successful hello proved
adoptability, but that reading is from before the grace window. A daemon
that answered at t=0 and went silent through thirty seconds of retries took
that arm and threw the same way. Ask whether it is answering now, first.
The budget was a comment with a Date.now() beside it: one occupancy probe
could cost 50s, because the client's default is a 5s hello per connection
step plus a 30s request timeout. Bound the probe explicitly, start the clock
before the first one, and size the window so the whole path — health check,
pid verification, loop overshoot and process-table read — fits under the
startup fail-open with room to spare.
Also folds the four sibling branches onto the same occupancy resolution.
getAliveDaemonSessionCount was byte-identical to countLiveSessionsOverIpc, so
one concept had two implementations and only one of them had been fixed.
The Windows probe exclusions could never match: the warmup spawns COMSPEC, an
absolute path, against an exact-equality test on 'cmd.exe /c exit'. Compare
the program by basename and keep the argv tail exact.
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
* fix(daemon): stop the local fallback answering for sessions it does not own
Closing a held daemon's pane reported success while the agent kept running.
Unrouted ids resolve to the in-process fallback, whose shutdown returns
silently for an id it has never heard of and whose write and resize are
no-ops — and while a daemon is held nothing ever enumerates its sessions, so
every one of them is unrouted. The pane vanished, the orphan outlived the
app, and typing into a stuck terminal disappeared without a word.
Only attach was fenced against that route. Extend the same rule to the
operations that change or feed a session: route to the fallback only when it
genuinely owns the pty, and otherwise say the session cannot be reached.
The error type is load-bearing. pty:kill treats "Session not found" as proof
the pty is already gone and synthesizes an exit, so reusing that error would
have reproduced the lie one layer down. TerminalSessionOwnerUnverifiedError
means "still there, we cannot reach its host", which is reported as a failed
close and keeps ownership for a retry.
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
* test(daemon): pin that a held session cannot be closed by a provider that never had it
Covers the held-daemon routing fence, including the coupling that is
invisible from the routing file: the thrown error must not match pty:kill's
already-gone predicate, or the close is swallowed into a synthesized exit and
the orphan is hidden again. A rename would otherwise reintroduce the bug
silently.
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
* fix(daemon): bound the POSIX evidence read and re-verify the pid it describes
Round-six follow-ups, none destructive.
The process-table read had a deadline on Windows but not on POSIX, where the
shared reader's ps timeout does not cover queueing behind an in-flight scan —
so the one step that runs after the grace window could still outlast it.
The pid handed to that read was verified before the grace window, which is
long enough for the daemon to die and its pid to be recycled onto a shell
with children. Verify it where it is used instead, and only when there is
still something to raise: the common case now skips the identity probe
altogether, which also takes a few seconds off the worst-case launch.
Two renderer call sites killed PTYs without handling rejection. That was
harmless while an unreachable session was answered by a silent no-op; now
that it honestly rejects, pane teardown and repo removal would log an
unhandled rejection every time — exactly when the daemon is already sick.
Deliberately not taken from that review: giving the endpoint-occupied catch
the same held fallback as the failed-health path. That path arrives with
occupancy unknown or empty, so holding there would swallow a real launch
failure to protect nothing.
Splits the repro script, which had grown past the line limit, into the
sequence it proves and the two things it proves it with: process-table
inspection, and the static assertions on the launcher's hold decision.
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
* test(daemon): hold the classification budget to the whole path, not one term
The previous assertion compared the grace window to the fail-open cap, which
passed while the real path ran to roughly twice the cap — a single probe cost
50s against a 5s assumption, and the terms on either side of the loop were
never counted at all.
Sum the declared budgets instead: health check, grace window, the one probe
that always runs past a ceiling tested at loop entry, and the evidence read
on both platforms. Raising any of them now has to face this, and the spare
time the kill ladder and fork still need afterwards is stated rather than
assumed.
Lives outside the launcher's own spec because that file mocks daemon-health,
which would shadow the constants being held to account.
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
* fix(daemon): do not read a stranded login wrapper as a hosted terminal
Raised by a colleague's handoff on the same-day reports. macOS wraps every
terminal in /usr/bin/login for TCC attribution, and #13764 shows the wrapper
can outlive the shell it wrapped — leaving a session leader that hosts
nothing. One affected host had accumulated enough of them to reach swap
pressure.
That is exactly the evidence this change treats as proof of live work, so a
daemon whose sessions had all ended would have been held indefinitely on the
strength of the corpses, on precisely the hosts where the problem is worst.
Same class as the daemon's own probe PTYs: a session leader is necessary
evidence, not sufficient. A wrapper still doing its job has the shell it
exec'd beneath it.
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
* test(daemon): pin the daemon's PTY spawn sites so the exclusion list cannot silently rot
The ownership evidence discounts the PTYs the daemon opens for itself, and that
list is only safe while it is complete — a self-spawned PTY nobody excluded
reads as user work and holds a daemon that owns nothing. The list grew one
reviewer at a time, which is the wrong mechanism for a correctness invariant.
Pin the input rather than the list. The daemon has exactly three PTY spawn
sites: the user's terminal, the spawn health probe, and the Windows conpty
warmup. A fourth now fails this test until someone decides which side it
belongs on.
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
* fix(daemon): stop the evidence going blind on the host it exists to protect
Readiness review, section 04. Every agent pane already drives the shared
process-table reader on its own cadence, so the uncached read queues behind
them — and the host with the most agents to lose is the one likeliest to blow
the deadline on queueing alone. Both attempts return unknown and the daemon is
killed anyway, which is the original bug wearing the fix as a costume.
Fall back to the TTL-cached table, which on that host is always warm for
exactly the reason the uncached read is always queued. A table a few hundred
milliseconds old still answers whether this daemon has children, and the
failure directions are not symmetric: over-holding costs one degraded launch
that self-heals, under-counting ends running agents.
The same review found the launch budget still overran the 60s startup
fail-open — by ~7s on Windows — and that the test guarding it under-counted
the path it was written to bound, for the second time. It omitted the identity
probe before the evidence read and the endpoint check that ends the grace
loop. Both are now summed, the headroom requirement covers the kill ladder and
fork that follow a replace verdict, and the grace window and Windows probe
deadline are sized to fit.
Not taken from that review: reusing the verified pid inside killStaleDaemon to
drop the duplicate probe. That second verification is what fences the signal to
this incarnation, and a seconds-old result is exactly the pid-reuse hazard it
exists to prevent.
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
* fix(daemon): confirm emptiness before it authorizes a kill
Readiness review, sections 02/03/05/06 — no P0 or P1 in any of them. These are
the P2s worth taking.
The important one: on macOS a terminal contributes exactly one session leader,
the login wrapper, because the shell it forks is in the same session and shows
S+ rather than Ss. I had assumed the shell counted too. It does not — so a
wrapper that looks childless in a single snapshot makes its whole terminal
invisible, and that snapshot cannot tell a wrapper whose shell has gone from
one whose shell has not yet appeared. Emptiness is the answer that authorizes a
kill, so it now costs a second read; 'owns-live-ptys' still needs none. The
fixtures said Ss where a real shell says S+, which is why the tests never
noticed.
Also from that review: a fabricated row was cast to ProcessTableRow to reuse a
command-only predicate, which is sound only while that predicate reads nothing
else — narrowed to Pick<'command'> so the compiler keeps it honest. The
pty:signal listener relied on its provider staying async to convert a routing
refusal into a rejection; it is an ipcMain.on listener with nothing above it, so
it now catches synchronously too. And the repro's teardown signalled remembered
pids a minute after phase 1 waited for them to die — re-verify by tag first,
since signalling a recycled pid is the mistake the script exists to study.
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
* fix(daemon): stop guessing at Windows occupancy instead of guessing better
The readiness review found the Windows branch reading a wedged daemon's
orphaned conpty hosts as live terminals. ClosePseudoConsole only runs on the
daemon's own JS thread, so a daemon too wedged to answer is also too wedged to
reap them, and they accumulate exactly when this code runs. A wedged, empty
Windows daemon would then be held forever — #8689 re-opened, and a regression
from main rather than a missing protection.
The tempting fix is another exclusion. That would be the sixth revision to what
counts as a live PTY, each one added because a reviewer found something that
looks like a session and is not, and each one trading safety for availability
in a fix whose entire purpose is the opposite trade. The list is the problem.
POSIX has a real signal: forkpty makes a hosted terminal a session leader, which
nothing the daemon forks for itself ever is. Windows has no equivalent, so its
branch could only ever count descendants and subtract guesses. Delete it and
answer 'unknown' — Windows keeps exactly the behaviour it has on main, and the
protection is claimed only where it can be justified.
Also stops a blind confirming read from upgrading an unconfirmed emptiness into
a verdict. Emptiness is what authorizes a kill; a read that saw nothing
corroborates nothing.
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
* refactor(daemon): clear the debris the Windows removal left behind
Behaviour-preserving. Windows now abstains once at the entry point rather than
twice inside a retry loop that had nothing to retry, which also retires the
platform check further down that could no longer be false. The self-spawn
matcher kept backslash splitting and .exe stripping for a branch that no longer
exists, and the launcher's grace loop repeated its own IPC call and stacked two
explanations above the wrong statement.
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
* fix(daemon): stop the budget cut spending Windows' only protection
Round seven found the one thing this PR must never do: kill a session that main
would have kept.
Main's grace loop probed with a non-shared 5s connect budget, so a wedged
daemon got roughly a minute to come back. Bounding the probes and adding a
wall clock cut that to about twelve seconds — a good trade on POSIX, where a
daemon that outlasts the window is still protected by process-table evidence,
and a bad one on Windows, which has no such evidence and now has nothing else.
A Windows daemon wedged for half a minute while hosting agents was adopted by
main and is killed by this branch. The fail-open cannot rescue it either:
ensureRunning() is not abortable, so the launcher runs to completion.
Size the window per platform instead, against what each actually spends:
Windows pays no evidence read and no identity probe to feed one, so it can
afford far more grace, and grace is worth more where it is the only thing
there. Both numbers come from the budget test rather than taste.
Three more from the same review:
- The evidence read applied its deadline twice, once to the fresh table and
again to the cached fallback, so an attempt could cost double what the launch
budget was told. Share one deadline across both.
- Two tests described protection the code no longer delivers: one asserted ~60s
of grace the wall clock had already retired, the other passed only because its
mocked probes are free and would fail against real ones. Say what the code
actually promises, and freeze the clock where the point is retry depth.
- The self-spawned PTY inventory promised more than it inspects. It sees direct
node-pty calls in one directory; the macOS login-session probe reaches a PTY
through expect(1) and is caught by the stranded-wrapper filter instead. Scope
the claim, since that indirection is the shape the next escape will take.
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
* refactor(daemon): spend the launch budget against a clock instead of a sum
Round eight found the fourth term missing from the hand-written budget — the
launcher's own adoption connect, which runs before the health check on the
non-shared five-second path. The three before it were an identity probe, an
endpoint probe, and an evidence deadline applied twice. Every one of them
passed the test meant to catch exactly that, because the test could only check
the terms someone had remembered to add.
So stop summing. The classification now runs against a deadline and stops when
it expires, and the test asserts only that the deadline leaves room for the
kill ladder and the fork that follow it. A budget that has to be remembered is
a budget that will be wrong; this one cannot be, because nothing has to be
counted.
That also retires the platform-split grace window, which existed to hand
Windows more of a sum nobody could total correctly.
The same review found the regression it was compensating for was never the
window. main gave each probe up to fifty seconds — five per connection step,
thirty for the request — where this branch gave eight for both together. A
daemon whose handshake needs more than four seconds therefore answered none of
the probes, however many it got, and on Windows nothing else can speak for it.
Splitting the two budgets fixes the case the window never could: connecting
stays tight, because a daemon that cannot handshake is wedged and worth
re-asking cheaply, while a daemon that did handshake is demonstrably alive and
its count is worth waiting for.
Also stops a Date.now spy leaking out of a failed test and freezing the clock
for the rest of the file.
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
* fix(daemon): make the classification clock actually bound the work it names
The clock introduced in the previous commit gated the probes but not the two
steps after them. The identity re-check and the process-table read ran on their
own deadlines, outside the ceiling, so the launcher could still spend its whole
budget on probes and then take another ten seconds — the same overrun the sum
used to produce, arrived at from the other end.
Hold that time back from every probe instead. A probe is only started when the
clock can still fund a handshake after the reserve, and its budget is what
remains minus the reserve, so no probe can eat it however long the daemon takes
to answer. Worst case is now the ceiling by construction rather than by
addition.
The reserve has a test asserting it is large enough for what it covers, which
failed on its first run and caught that ten seconds was not.
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
* fix(daemon): ask the wedged daemon a question it can actually answer
Round nine found the re-verification was stricter than the check that triaged
the daemon onto this path. The launcher gets here because a three-second health
check — one socket, one hello — timed out. It then re-asked with two sockets
and two hellos inside four shared seconds, and repeated that identical question
up to twelve times. A daemon that consistently needs five seconds fails every
one of them, so the retries could only ever agree with the check that sent it
here. main re-asked with five seconds per connection step and thirty for the
answer, and kept the sessions this branch destroyed.
Retries and patience solve different problems. Keep the cheap probes, which
catch a daemon that recovers on its own, then spend what is left of the clock
on one tolerant ask — the only question that can disagree with the triage. It
is skipped when the endpoint is provably gone, since a cold start arrives here
too and has nothing to wait for.
Two more from the same review. The clock claimed to cover the launcher's own
adoption connect and started after it, so the fourth term that went missing
from the sum was still uncounted; it now starts above that connect and bounds
it. And Windows was holding back twelve seconds for an identity check and a
process-table read it never performs — the reserve is zero where the steps it
reserves for do not run.
Retuned the ceiling to leave the kill ladder and fork real margin rather than
half a second, with the packaged-Windows host copy named as what the margin is
for.
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
* fix(daemon): ask the tolerant question while the clock can still fund the answer
The launcher asked the cheap question first and the patient one last. That is
backwards. This path is only reached because a 3s health check timed out, so
every 4s probe re-asks on a stricter budget than the one that triaged the daemon
here — it can only ever agree. The one ask that could disagree ran last, by which
point the clock could fund its handshake but not its answer, and a daemon that
answered in 12s was read as dead and replaced along with its agents.
Three changes, one idea: never make an ask you cannot afford to hear out.
- The patient ask goes first, with every millisecond the answer does not need.
- Cheap retries follow it, and stop once the clock cannot fund both halves.
Funded to knock but not to listen is not an ask.
- The adoption connect is capped. It is not a classification step — it acquires
a lease preserveDaemon() re-establishes anyway — but on a daemon that accepts
the socket and never completes hello it would spend the entire classification
budget, leaving nothing for the probes that protect that daemon's sessions.
The test double now forwards the connect budget instead of dropping it, so what
the launcher was willing to wait for is observable at all.
* fix(daemon): stop three follow-ups rotting where review already found them
A truncated paste now says so. A routing throw partway through a paste was not a
PtyWriteUnavailableError, so no pty:writeUnavailable reached the renderer and the
pane never re-attached — the remaining chunks simply vanished with nothing to
attribute the gap to. It stays deliberately distinct from SessionNotFoundError,
which isPtyAlreadyGoneError matches and synthesizes into an exit the session never
had; a test now pins both directions so neither drifts.
The launch-budget spec no longer fails on Windows. The evidence reserve is zero
there by design — neither guarded step runs without a session-leader signal — but
the assertion demanded eleven seconds of it unconditionally, so `pnpm test` broke
on any Windows dev machine. PR CI never saw it: only the WSL boundary spec runs on
windows-2022. The identity ceiling it reserves against is imported now instead of
being a 3_000 someone would have to remember to change.
And the grace-retry comment described the design that preceded the clock: ~5s
probes, ~60s of grace, a number worth raising. The clock binds first and usually
permits far fewer, so raising it alone buys nothing.
* fix(daemon): stop killing a daemon we merely failed to observe
Ten review rounds each found a different band where this branch replaced a daemon
that origin/main would have kept, and every fix bought a new one. The reason is
arithmetic, not carelessness: matching the old tolerance for a single probe costs
about 25s, the classification clock has 15s to give, and funding the difference
puts startup past the 60s fail-open once the kill ladder and the fork are paid.
No assignment of those numbers is safe.
So the residual stops being lethal. daemon-occupancy.ts always said it — "'unknown'
is the residual, and it is not permission" — while daemon-init.ts fell through from
unknown to killStaleDaemon. That fall-through is what made every millisecond of
budget a correctness parameter. Now an unclassifiable daemon is held in degraded
mode: existing terminals keep working, fresh ones run locally, and being wrong
costs a degraded session instead of somebody's agent.
Two exclusions, both about never holding something unrecoverable. A proven-dead
endpoint is a cold start or a corpse, and holding one would hand every first launch
a provider pointed at no daemon. 'rejected' answered and refused, so it can never be
adopted and its sessions can never be reattached.
The cost is real and deliberate: a wedged-but-empty daemon is no longer replaced at
launch, so #8689 degrades to "restart it from Manage Sessions". Which only works if
the user knows — and degraded mode was computed, plumbed through preload, and read
by nothing. It now renders where the Restart button already lives, and says what it
actually costs: new terminals close when you quit, and restarting ends whatever the
host is still holding.
Rejected on the way here: a background reclassifier (a permanently wedged daemon
never answers, and recovery is already handled by degraded-daemon-fresh-spawn-
routing.ts), letting accumulated process-table reads license a kill (its errors are
systematic, so more samples agree rather than converge), and sidelining the daemon
onto a renamed socket (verified working at the syscall level, then abandoned: the
daemon's own endpoint-ownership watch reads the moved entry as lost and retires
itself, precisely when it recovers).
* test(daemon): pin the hold that no longer depends on a clock
The repro proved the launcher holds a daemon it can see is occupied. The protection
that now matters most is the one for a daemon it cannot see at all, and nothing
asserted it. Adds the unknown-hold to the static assertions: that it exists, that it
excludes 'rejected' and a proven-dead endpoint, and that every killStaleDaemon call
site in the file is downstream of it.
Verified by mutation — dropping either exclusion fails the assertion.
* fix(daemon): repair what round eleven found, including a fix that did nothing
The patient ask was not patient. With twelve seconds reserved for the evidence
read, `max(CONNECT, probeBudget - REQUEST)` resolved to exactly CONNECT — the
tolerant ask got the cheap ask's four seconds, and the grace loop's gate needed
19s of a budget that only ever held 11s, so it never ran at all. Both shipped
green because mocked probes consume no wall clock, so the budget never binds in
a test. Two arithmetic tests now compute against realistic elapsed time, which is
where the defect actually lived.
The reservation was backwards anyway. Evidence can only raise 'unknown' to an
uncounted 'occupied', and both now hold the daemon, so the read changes a log
line and nothing else — while starving the one probe whose counted answer still
reaches preserveDaemon() and full daemon mode. It is opportunistic now: if the
probes spent the clock, it is skipped and the verdict stays 'unknown', which
holds exactly as an evidence-raised 'occupied' would have.
Recovery was a one-way flip on a two-way condition. Once a health check promoted
fresh spawns back to the daemon, nothing ever demoted them, so a daemon that
wedged again cost a hello timeout plus a full launcher re-classification for
every new terminal, for the rest of the session. A failed spawn now routes back
and re-arms the cooldown. The class had no tests at all; it has six.
The notice was wrong twice. It claimed terminals already open keep working — in
held mode discovery runs over the same IPC the daemon is failing, so its sessions
are never routed and attach refuses rather than answering on its behalf. They are
running, but unreachable. And it named half the cost of Restart: runRestartDaemon
shuts down the local fallback sessions too, so the terminals it had just called
safe die as well. Also fixed: the amber-on-amber body text failed AA at 3.94:1,
the keys were in a namespace no sibling uses, and the scale did not match the
notice it renders beside.
The banner armed a destructive button with state that never refreshed. It now
refetches on focus, like the sibling notice that solved this first.
Also: the launch mode type in the test harness omitted 'held', so no test could
describe the launch the hold produces; held mode's routing through the degraded
provider was unpinned, and deleting it left every test green; and pty:signal kept
a try/catch for a synchronous throw that async routing cannot produce.
* fix(daemon): stop offering a remedy that cannot work, and say why two modules stay
The degraded warning told the user to restart the daemon. When something other
than an Orca daemon holds the endpoint, restarting clears nothing: killStaleDaemon
only kills a process whose identity matches the pid record, and a foreign holder
matches none, so the next launch is identical. The message now says the daemon is
unreachable rather than asserting what it owns, and names the second remedy. The
notice says "usually clears this" for the same reason.
That case is also now written down as a known residual: an endpoint that accepts
connections but never speaks the protocol reads as an incumbent on every launch,
so it stays degraded with no auto-recovery, where before it was replaced.
The rest is comments, because three separate deletion proposals landed on this
code in one review cycle and each was a regression. The evidence read is not
redundant with the unknown hold: the occupied branch has no proven-dead check and
the unknown hold does, so it is the only thing between a kill and a daemon whose
socket entry vanished while it still hosts agents. Its children scan is not
redundant with pid verification either — a verified-live pid alone would also hold
a childless daemon, which is the one #8689 case still safe to replace. And grace
retries are worth more since 'unknown' stopped killing, not less: a counted
'occupied' reaches full adoption where the alternative is a degraded hold.
Each now says which case dies if it is removed. Reviewers reaching for the delete
key three times in a row is the code failing to explain itself, not excess.
* docs(daemon): record what a budget raise would owe before it is safe
The classification budget serves two verdicts with opposite time-costs. Reaching
"don't kill" slowly is free — the daemon survives however long it took. Reaching
'empty' slowly is not, because the kill ladder and the fork still have to fit
before the fail-open. At 34s that case cannot arise; at 44s it can, and an overrun
there is the worst branch on offer: daemon killed, replacement forked then
discarded, no provider installed, Restart broken.
So the raise is not a number change, it is a number change plus a guard: hold
rather than replace when the headroom left cannot fund the ladder and the fork.
Safe precisely because that path has proven the daemon empty, so holding costs no
agents. Written down next to the warning against tuning the budget, because the
next person to want a bigger number will read that warning and need this one.
Also recorded: the launcher closure has no access to the startup abort signal, so
the cheap version of that guard is not available without threading it through the
spawner.
* fix(daemon): delete a retry loop that could never run, at any budget
Round twelve proved the loop unreachable by algebra rather than by tracing:
remaining = B - E - max(CONNECT, (B - E) - REQUEST) = REQUEST,
whenever B - E > CONNECT + REQUEST
The patient connect takes every millisecond the answer does not need, so what
survives it is always exactly OCCUPANCY_REQUEST_BUDGET_MS — and the gate wanted
CONNECT + REQUEST. That holds for every ceiling, which also settles the raise I
had been holding open: at 44s the remainder is still exactly the request budget,
so ten more seconds of worst-case startup would have funded zero retries. Funding
one honestly needs ~71s against a 60s fail-open.
So WEDGED_DAEMON_GRACE_RETRIES = 11 documented patience the launcher did not have,
and no number could give it. Deleted, with the derivation left where the loop was
so the next person does not re-derive it from scratch.
Little is lost. A 4s retry cannot reach a daemon needing longer than 4s to answer,
which is the entire wedge population, while the one patient ask waits ~12s. The
only case retries caught and this does not is a daemon recovering within seconds
of being asked — and DegradedDaemonFreshSpawnRouter.recover() already returns it to
full daemon service on the next spawn, off the startup clock.
The budget tests could not have caught any of this: they recompute the expression
from imported constants and never execute the launcher, so collapsing the patient
connect back to the cheap constant — the round-eleven defect exactly — left all
1475 green. There is now a test that watches the launcher spend it, verified by
mutation, and the arithmetic ones say plainly that they are not the guard.
Also corrected: the evidence-read comment claimed the read only affects a log line.
It decides the verdict wherever the unknown hold declines to — it has neither the
proven-dead check nor the rejected check — so it is what holds a daemon whose socket
vanished, and what holds a hello-rejected daemon still hosting agents.
* docs(daemon): cost the deferred guard honestly, and say why it is unreachable
Two corrections to the note, both of which change what it tells the next person.
The reason the guard's case cannot arise at 34s is structural, not a lucky
margin: an `empty` verdict means the daemon answered, so it resolved fast by
construction, and proven-dead means nothing is listening, so the probe and the
ladder both short-circuit. The path that actually spends the budget is the wedge
that never answers — and that one now ends in a hold, paying neither the ladder
nor the fork. Long path and expensive tail are disjoint. Raising the budget is
precisely what re-couples them, by extending how late an `empty` may arrive.
And the guard was costed as a signature change through DaemonSpawner, which is
wrong. createOutOfProcessLauncher is a factory called where `signal` is already in
scope; a third parameter closed over there leaves the launcher's call signature
untouched. Overstating the price invites skipping the guard rather than paying it.
Also recorded: two terms this budget does not bound at all — the healthy branch,
which never consults the clock and still ends in a cleanup and a fork, and the
unbounded daemon-host copy on packaged Windows.
* docs(daemon): correct an overstated claim about the deleted retry loop
The deletion was justified as "the loop could never run, at any budget." That is
true of three wedge shapes and false of a fourth: a connect that fails fast leaves
the budget nearly whole, and while refused and missing endpoints are caught by the
proven-dead guard, the EPERM/EMFILE class reads 'unknown' and would have passed
the gate.
The deletion still stands — retrying an fd-exhausted or permission-denied connect
fails identically the second time, and recover() restores full daemon service on
the next spawn once the condition clears — but a comment that overstates its own
reach is how the next person concludes the reasoning was never checked.
* test(daemon): restore two guards a range deletion swallowed
Deleting the obsolete grace-loop test took out the two tests either side of it —
the ones pinning that the hold declines a proven-dead endpoint and a rejected
daemon. Both exclusions went unpinned in the same commit that removed the loop,
and the suite stayed green, because nothing else covers either path.
Found by mutation rather than by reading: removing `health !== 'rejected'` from
the hold left all 1472 passing. The pre-existing rejected test does not cover it —
its second client answers listSessions, so occupancy resolves to 'empty' and the
replace path is reached without the exclusion ever being consulted. The restored
test keeps the daemon unreachable so the verdict stays 'unknown', which is the
only state where the exclusion decides anything.
Also pins the evidence gate, the other survivor: the threshold must cover an
identity ps plus two ownership probes, or a read started at the last moment the
gate allows finishes past the ceiling the kill ladder and fork are sized against.
Mutation results now: patient connect collapsed -> caught; evidence gate -> caught;
hold removed -> caught; proven-dead exclusion -> caught; rejected exclusion ->
caught; fresh-spawn revert -> caught.
* fix(settings): make the degraded copy the copy users actually see
Two user-facing fixes were no-ops. translate() resolves from en.json, and the
catalog only ever gained the string it was first synced with — the sync script adds
missing keys and never updates changed defaults, which the extraction gate reports
as "inline defaults differ" and then passes anyway. So editing the inline default
changed the source and nothing else. Caught by rendering the component and reading
what came out, not by reading the diff.
What was stale in the catalog, and is now corrected there:
The notice promised the panes reconnect on their own once the host recovers. They
do not. TerminalErrorToast already tells the user "Reopen this pane to retry",
because nothing re-attaches a pane whose owner could not be verified — the session
is left untouched, which is the point, but recovery is a user action. Third claim
of mine in this PR that was stronger than the code.
And "Restarting the host clears this" still overstated the foreign-endpoint case,
where killStaleDaemon matches no pid record and clears nothing.
Also removes the components.settings.DaemonDegradedNotice.* namespace, left behind
when the keys were renamed to the auto.* convention every sibling uses. It was dead
weight carrying the oldest copy of all three strings.
* docs(daemon): 'held' no longer means what its type said it meant
The mode was introduced for a daemon that demonstrably owns live terminals and
cannot answer a handshake. It is now also what an unclassifiable daemon gets, where
the whole point is that we could not establish what it owns. A type whose comment
asserts the one fact the branch could not determine is the same overclaim this PR
has been correcting elsewhere.
Also un-exports ENDPOINT_PROBE_TIMEOUT_MS: it was widened for a test that no longer
references it, and nothing outside the module reads it.
* fix(daemon): stop a lost spawn reply from shadowing a live agent
`!mapped` was standing in for "this is a fresh spawn," and it is not the same
question. The mapping is only recorded after a reply arrives, so a spawn that names
a session and then loses its reply — the daemon created it, the answer timed out —
is indistinguishable from a genuinely new one. Demoting there sent the retry to the
fallback, which answers with a fresh local shell under the same id while the agent
keeps running on the daemon. The pane binds to the shell; the agent is orphaned.
That is the symptom this PR exists to remove, arriving through a door the PR opened
itself. Reachability today looks nil — the only sessionId-bearing spawn in ipc/pty.ts
carries attachOnly, which routes elsewhere — but the guard was unsound rather than
merely unused, and "no caller does that yet" is not a property anyone maintains.
Now an identified session pins to the provider that may already own it, and only an
anonymous spawn moves the shared route. Anonymous spawns are what demotion was for:
nothing can shadow them, and they are the ones paying a hello timeout plus a full
re-classification per terminal.
Found by GPT-5.6-Sol reviewing this file in isolation. Two tests added; reverting to
the old guard fails one.
* docs(daemon): name the three paths that can still kill a daemon
Adversarial review found all three; none is a regression against the pre-hold
behaviour, and none should be closed by weakening the evidence rules.
'unknown' plus a proven-dead endpoint still kills when process evidence cannot
answer. The probe proves the directory entry is gone, not the process — a socket
entry can vanish while the daemon still hosts agents. Evidence covers that on POSIX
because it runs for any 'unknown' rather than only a live endpoint, so the gap is
the blind cases: clock spent, pid unverifiable, ps unreadable. It is not reachable
on Windows at all, where a named pipe vanishes with its process, so a dead endpoint
there implies no agents to lose.
'unknown' plus 'rejected' still kills, and the reviewer is right that inability to
adopt is not inability to preserve — those agents keep running, unreachable. Killing
stays the choice because a daemon that can never be adopted and is never replaced
leaves the app permanently degraded with no route back, but that is a judgement, not
a proof, and it is now written as one.
And the verdict is not atomic with the kill: an 'empty' answer can go stale if
another instance creates a session first. Pre-existing, and narrowed rather than
widened here — the window now opens only after the daemon has reported zero sessions
itself.
* docs(daemon): record the TOCTOU fix that was built, tested and reverted
shutdownIfIdle is the right instrument and the daemon already implements it
atomically: sole authenticated client, nothing in flight, zero sessions, listener
closed before the acknowledgement. Asking it immediately before the kill closes the
window that a re-read of listSessions can only move.
It is not landing here. Gating every empty-verdict replacement on a new round trip
means every failure of that round trip has to mean hold, which trades a rare race
for a common failure mode and makes #8689 worse whenever the call is merely slow.
It also flipped two endpoint-identity tests from rejecting to resolving, and an
unexplained behaviour change is not something to merge at commit forty-two of a
change whose whole subject is unintended consequences.
Written down with the mechanism intact so the next person starts from a working
design rather than rediscovering it.
* fix(repro): restore the 91 lines a bad deletion took out of the repro
Removing readSourceConstant matched a docblock far earlier in the file and deleted
everything between, taking the imports and three functions with it. The script
still parsed, still linted, and still passed `node --check` — it failed only when
run, with `existsSync is not defined`, which is why it went unnoticed for two
commits. The only end-to-end proof in this PR had been dead that whole time.
Restored from before the deletion and the intended edit re-applied by itself. Now
runs green: phase 1 kills a wedged daemon with real agents attached and confirms
they die; phase 2 puts the identical wedge through the decision and shows the
daemon unsignalled, both agents alive, and everything back with sessions intact on
SIGCONT; phase 3 asserts the launcher holds — now including the unknown-hold, which
is the branch this PR turns on.
Lesson worth keeping: a syntax check is not a test. Running it is.
* fix(daemon): stop the emptiness confirmation reading the same snapshot twice
The second sample exists because one snapshot cannot tell a login(1) wrapper whose
shell has not appeared yet from a wrapper whose shell has gone. But when the fresh
read misses its deadline — the busy host this evidence exists to protect — both
attempts fell through to the same TTL-cached table. Two agreeing samples, one
observation, and the window being excluded is shorter than the cache.
The confirming read is now denied the cached fallback. If it cannot get a fresh
table it answers 'unknown', which holds. The first sample keeps the fallback,
because there the cache protects the answer worth protecting: a stale table still
shows that a daemon has children, and going blind there is what got them killed.
Also records three limits of this evidence that review surfaced and that no code
change should paper over — a reparented orphan outside the descendant tree, the
Windows abstention, and an argv match that cannot establish executable identity.
Each only fails to raise a verdict, so each costs a hold not taken rather than a
kill licensed.
* fix(daemon): stop discarding Linux terminals to solve a macOS problem
The stranded-login(1) exclusion ran on every POSIX host. Orca only wraps terminals
in login(1) for TCC attribution on macOS, so off darwin the pattern can only match
a user's own login — and one still prompting for credentials has no child yet,
which is precisely the shape the exclusion throws away. A Linux daemon hosting that
terminal read as childless, and a childless daemon is one nothing protects from the
endpoint-dead path. Now scoped to darwin, where the problem it solves lives.
And a count that is not a count is no longer read as emptiness. `counted > 0` maps
NaN, -1 and 1.5 to 'empty', which is the single verdict that licenses a kill; the
listSessions dep is injectable, so reaching it never required asking a daemon
anything. Non-integers and negatives now resolve to 'unknown'.
Both mutation-verified. Noting for whoever runs the next mutation pass: the first
attempt at the login mutation silently failed to apply because the pattern had been
reflowed by the formatter, and a mutation that does not apply looks exactly like a
test suite that caught it. Assert the pattern matched.
* docs(daemon): bound what the degraded owner check actually covers
Review confirmed the five destructive operations are guarded and that the error
taxonomy holds — TerminalSessionOwnerUnverifiedError cannot be reclassified as a
gone session anywhere in production, so no fake exit is ever synthesized from it.
It also found six methods that still route raw, and they are worth naming rather
than leaving for the next reader to rediscover: flow control, background state,
buffer clear, startup authority and the per-session queries. For an unresolved
daemon id those reach the fallback silently. None can destroy a session, which is
why they are not being changed at this point in this branch, but a buffer clear
that reports success while the daemon's history survives is a real lie.
Recorded with the reason not to fix them casually: acknowledgeDataEvent is invoked
directly from an ipcMain.on listener and setPtyBackgrounded from a synchronous
callback, so a throwing owner check added there without changing the call sites
turns a silent misroute into an escaping exception.
* fix(daemon): restore the demotion my shadow fix made unreachable
The review is right. Gating demotion on the absence of a sessionId assumed fresh
spawns are anonymous, and they are not: every production fresh spawn mints an id
before reaching the provider (ipc/pty.ts assigns spawnOptions.sessionId on all
three paths). So the branch only ever ran in tests, and a daemon that recovered and
wedged again kept every later terminal pointed at itself — each paying a hello
timeout plus a full launcher re-classification, each failing anyway. That is the
cost the demotion existed to remove, reintroduced while fixing something else.
The mistake was treating one condition as two questions. Pinning protects THIS id,
which the daemon may already have created before losing the reply, so a retry must
never be answered locally under the same name. Demoting protects the NEXT terminal,
which is a different session and cannot be shadowed by this one. They are
independent, and both now happen.
`attachOnly` is the honest discriminator for the second: an attach that names a
session never reaches this router, so anything arriving here without it is a fresh
terminal whatever id it carries.
Both halves mutation-verified separately — restoring the sessionId guard fails
three tests, dropping the pin fails two — including a test shaped like what
ipc/pty.ts actually sends, which is what the old test suite never had.
* fix(repro): stop the script doing the exact thing it exists to warn about
Both findings are right, and the first is pointed: this script demonstrates that
signalling a pid you have not re-verified can kill someone else's work, and its own
teardown did that twice.
The staged daemon is killed on purpose in phase 1. Once Node reaps that child its
pid is free for reuse, and teardown signalled the remembered number anyway; it now
signals only while the child object still reports no exit.
The markers were half-verified. Each proves its own identity by tag before being
signalled, but its session leader was killed on a number remembered from staging a
minute earlier — and the leader is the one pid here that can be recycled while its
child lives on under a new parent. The leader is now re-read from the live marker
and signalled only when the marker still claims it.
Second finding: isRealUserDaemon matched a hardcoded macOS userData path, so on
Linux a real daemon could never be recognised — the assertion that this run harmed
nothing was inert on the platform where nobody would notice. Now matched per
platform, with a loose fallback rather than a silent false.
Repro re-run end to end: all three phases pass, pre-existing daemons still running,
real userData daemon untouched.
* fix(daemon): only demote and only pin when the failure earns it
Both guards in the fresh-spawn catch were too broad, and narrowing them is the one
thing worth keeping from the restart-ownership branch.
Demotion fired on any spawn failure. A rejected cwd or a bad profile says nothing
about whether the daemon is reachable, and costing the whole session its daemon
persistence over one of those degrades terminals the daemon would have served fine.
It now requires the failure to look like an unreachable daemon.
Pinning fired on any failure too. The pin exists for a request that was sent and
whose answer was lost — that is the only shape that can hide a session the daemon
already created. A failure that never reached it created nothing, so pinning that
id would strand later attempts on a host holding nothing of theirs. It now requires
an error that could have been dispatched.
The distinction is sharper than the code it replaces: a hello timeout demotes but
does not pin, because a handshake that never completed cannot have created a
session. The old code pinned it anyway.
Test doubles now raise DaemonProtocolError rather than plain Errors, which is what
the client actually produces and what these predicates are written against. Both
narrowings mutation-verified.
* test(daemon): prove the recovery the degraded notice promises
The readiness review flagged one claim it could neither confirm nor refute: the
notice tells the user "reopening a pane retries, and works once it does", and
nothing pinned that. It mattered because held mode is exactly the case where no
route was ever recorded — discovery ran over the same IPC the daemon was failing —
so recovery cannot come from a cached route. It has to come from the next attach
re-inventorying a provider whose failure cooldown has expired.
It does. While wedged the resolver refuses rather than letting the fallback answer
with a fresh shell, and once the daemon answers again the same attach reattaches
the original session. Verified by mutation: with the daemon left wedged, the test
fails.
Fourth user-facing claim in this branch checked against the code rather than
assumed. The previous three were wrong.
---------
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
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NeilandOrca
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3ab8b6a117 |
fix(ssh): stop SSH reconnect from multiplying terminals and resuming agents twice (STA-3077) (#13326)
* fix(ssh): stop reconnect from grafting panes and stacking remote leases Reconnecting an SSH-backed workspace added terminal panes the user never opened, and the remote host accumulated shells nobody was using — one report went from 2 to 19 to 20 relay PTYs across three reconnects (STA-3077). Two root causes, both in the store. Reattach could create UI. `persistPtyBinding` has four creating branches — mint a tab, mint a root leaf, split the root and graft a leaf, mint a layout. All four are load-bearing for `pty:spawn`, which can beat the renderer's debounced layout writer, but none of them is appropriate on reattach, where the pane either already exists or is gone for good. Add `mayCreate`, defaulting true so the spawn path is untouched; every creating branch already sets `terminalMembershipChanged`, so refusing is a check rather than a new code path. Lease identity had no pane key. `upsertSshRemotePtyLease` matched on `(targetId, ptyId)` alone, so a pane that re-leased under a new relay id left its predecessor live with nothing to retire it, and the next reattach fanned out over both. One pane now keeps at most one live lease. Superseded leases are marked `expired` rather than terminated: losing a lease is not proof the shell died, so the remote process is deliberately left running. Tests assert observable behavior rather than mechanism, so they stay valid under any implementation that fixes this. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * docs(terminal): record the terminal session behavior contract Properties stated as observable behavior rather than mechanism, so an oracle written against them survives a change of implementation. Records the weaker, correct form of the timer rule — a timer may never be the sole cause of a destructive action — because recovery budgets and scratch-file age gates are correct code that an absolute ban would condemn. Also notes which mechanisms are deliberately not required, so each has to earn its place rather than arrive with an architecture. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * fix(ssh): heal duplicate pane leases that predate pane-keyed supersession Pane-keyed supersession stops new duplicates, but it does nothing for installs that already carry the ones STA-3077 accumulated — the report behind this reached 20 live leases across a handful of panes, and every reconnect fanned out over all of them. Retire the stale duplicates once per reattach pass, keeping the newest lease for each pane under a total order so two hosts resolve a tie the same way. As with supersession, retired leases are marked `expired` rather than terminated: their remote shells are deliberately left running, because a lease we chose not to revive is not evidence the shell died. The relay-session store stubs gain the new method. Note the gap this leaves open: those shells keep running and are no longer reachable from the app, so the "accumulates unused shells" half of the report needs a visible recovery surface rather than a silent kill. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * fix(terminal): stop respawning a shell that is still running A pane that failed to reattach spawned a fresh shell. Because the restored session id came along, the replacement resumed the same agent session, and two processes appended to one transcript — reported repeatedly, up to five concurrent resumes of a single session. Two defects fed it. The relay reported a source that merely needed re-establishing as `SSH_SESSION_EXPIRED`. The shell was still running; only its output source was gone. Give that outcome its own error so it stops reading as "the session no longer exists". The reattach failure handler then treated every error as proof of death. It checked for expiry and, in the else branch, took the identical action — so the check bought nothing and a transport fault, a timed-out call, or a wedged relay all respawned. Respawn now requires proof: an explicit host expiry or a not-found PTY. Anything else, including an error we have never seen before, is unresolved, leaves the shell running, and keeps the binding for a later reattach. Two existing tests asserted the old behavior. One threw a bare error as scaffolding to reach the spawn-adoption door; it now throws proof, which is what it meant. The other pinned the expiry mapping itself, and now asserts the outcome fails closed *without* being reported as expiry. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * docs(terminal): record what makes a retention bound safe Shortening a grace period is the wrong lever. Measuring process time and gating reclamation on an independent observation are what make one safe, and they are what deployed systems actually do. Also records that lifecycle belongs in the attach reply rather than a delivered event — that is what removes the need for a durable per-consumer cursor to guarantee an exit is never lost. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * test(terminal): assert the empty-failure case without an empty Error A thrown empty value exercises the same property — a failure carrying no usable message is not proof the session is gone — and does not trip the empty-error-message lint. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * fix(ssh): let the durable pane binding outrank recency when retiring leases Choosing the newest lease for a pane is wrong whenever a newer lease exists that no pane is bound to: it retires the lease the pane is actually attached to, detaching a live terminal instead of healing it. Two changes. Arbitration now prefers the lease matching the pane's durable binding, across both the SSH-target and local partitions, falling back to recency only when no binding names either candidate. And supersession at upsert time now defers rather than expiring a bound predecessor. When a lease arrives for a pane that is still bound to a different PTY, the binding has not caught up yet, so both stay live and reattach arbitrates once the binding is available. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * fix(ssh): roll back a lease retirement whose durable write fails `flush()` logs and swallows write errors, so a failed write left these leases retired in memory while disk still called them attached — and the pane bindings scrubbed alongside them stayed scrubbed. Use `flushOrThrow` and restore both the lease states and the affected session partitions when it throws, reporting nothing retired. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * test(ssh): prove pane and remote PTY cardinality across reconnects Counts the shells the relay actually hosts, on the container, rather than inferring them from app state — that is the census the report was based on. Asserts the PIDs are unchanged, not merely the count, so a kill-and-respawn cannot pass. Every pane streams before the transport is severed: an idle pane sends no recovery checkpoint, so only a live source comes back needing re-establishment, which is the outcome that used to read as expiry. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * fix(ssh): actually pass mayCreate:false from the reattach binding write The `mayCreate` guard was correct and had no production caller, so the reattach path still went through the creating branches and grafted panes back. `restoreReattachedPtyRuntime` is that call site — RC3 in the original diagnosis — and it now refuses to create. Binding moves ahead of runtime registration, because registering first would surface a pane the user never opened before the refusal landed. A refusal leaves the remote shell running and reattachable; a *thrown* write stays unknown and still registers, so a failed disk write cannot detach a live pane. Adds an oracle over the call site itself. The store-level tests all passed while the fix was inert, because they called the store directly — only pinning the wiring catches that. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * fix(terminal): apply the respawn-requires-proof rule to both reattach paths connectPanePty has two near-verbatim reattach blocks — one keyed on the deferred SSH session, one on the restored session — and only the second was fixed. The first still checked for expiry and then respawned unconditionally anyway, so a transport fault there resumed the same agent session a second time. Also keep the wire token out of the pane. The main-process bridge only special-cases expiry, so a source-restore failure crossed IPC as raw `SSH_SOURCE_RESTORE_REQUIRED: <id>` text and surfaced to the user. It correctly does not respawn; it just should not read like that. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * test(ssh): state plainly that the reconnect spec is a forward guard It was run against an unfixed tree and passed, so it does not prove the STA-3077 fixes and should not be read as if it does. A clean severed transport does not reproduce the field conditions — accumulated duplicate leases, or a source returning needing re-establishment. It keeps its place as a forward guard: it counts the shells the relay actually hosts and pins their PIDs, so a later change that grafts a pane or respawns a shell fails here. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * docs(terminal): record that a guard must be pinned at its call site A refusal that exists and is never passed is indistinguishable from no refusal, and store-level tests cannot tell the difference — they call the store directly. Learned from `mayCreate`, which was correct and had no production caller for several commits. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * fix(ssh): park one PTY's exhausted delivery recovery instead of dropping the channel A per-PTY recovery budget running out disposed the whole relay channel, so one PTY that could not re-prove its delivery aborted every in-flight filesystem and git request on that host and stalled every sibling pane. A retry count is not proof of anything, and it certainly is not proof about the other sessions sharing the channel. Exhaustion now parks that PTY's delivery. The remote shell keeps running, its lease stands, and the next relay open reattaches it with a fresh delivery generation — the parked state is cleared on teardown and the generation changes on reconnect, so a reconnect recovers it. The consecutive-attempt ceiling goes away entirely; the per-generation one is what bounds the retry cost, and the second ceiling only existed to reach the channel drop sooner. Tradeoff worth stating: the failing pane used to self-heal within seconds because the forced reconnect wiped all rejection state, and it now stays frozen until the next relay open. That is a worse outcome for that one pane and a much better one for every other session on the host, and reconnecting is user-reachable. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * fix(pty): let liveness say unknown instead of forcing it to say dead `IPtyProvider.hasPty` returned a boolean, so a provider whose inventory was empty for reasons that have nothing to do with the session — socket down, cache never hydrated, provider generation just constructed — had no way to say so and answered "absent". Its own siblings already knew better: `probePtyLiveness` and the runtime's `PtyController.hasPty` were both already `boolean | null`, with consumers branching on null correctly. The lie was injected at exactly one interface. Now three-valued, and each provider answers unknown where it cannot prove absence: the daemon adapter off-socket, the SSH provider before a completed listing, the router when any adapter cannot answer, and the degraded provider rather than fabricating a verdict. `terminal_gone` requires unanimous proven absence. Also fixes a real cold-start bug this surfaced: `pty:hasPty` never awaited the daemon-swap startup promise, though the sibling `probePtyLiveness` bridge already did, so before the swap the local provider answered an authoritative false for every daemon-owned id. Net +27 production lines. The plan behind this predicted -92 on the strength of deleting the renderer's dead-session reconcile path; that code is live (`pty-connection.ts` imports it), so nothing was deleted. Expressing a third value where there were two costs lines, and a deletion that is not real is not worth manufacturing. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * docs(terminal): track the terminal-session correctness handoff package The package was untracked under a gitignored `docs/**`, with the un-ignore rules living only in an uncommitted .gitignore edit — a single `git clean -xdf` would have destroyed the authoritative plan. The 814-path construction snapshot is now pushed as `nwparker/react185-authority-snapshot` too; it had no remote ref. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * test(ssh): make the reconnect settle window actually wait The settle poll reused a matcher the assertion 15 lines above had already satisfied, and Playwright's poll engine probes immediately and returns as soon as the matcher passes — so it observed the same state twice and elapsed 0ms. A shell grafted a second or two after reattach reported ready slipped through into the next cycle. Reviewer was right on #13111. Test-only; no production change. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * test(ssh): census both durable session partitions on reconnect Adds a second reconnect scenario and a helper that reads pane records from the local partition as well as the ssh host partition. That split matters: the reattach binding call passes no hostId, so a grafted pane lands in the LOCAL partition and an oracle reading only the host partition passes whether or not the guard is present. Both tests remain forward guards. The second one was reported as discriminating and did not reproduce: with `mayCreate: false` removed from the call site and the app rebuilt, both still passed. Its induction races `pty:kill` against a severed transport, so when the kill lands the lease is cleaned up and there is nothing left to graft. The handoff README is corrected to say so rather than claim a journey. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * docs(terminal): record the user decision relaxing G6 G6 becomes minimise-and-justify rather than strictly net-negative. The deletion budget the plan assumed does not exist: an entrypoint-rooted import graph found 51 of 53 candidate files reachable and instantiated on live paths, leaving 263 deletable LOC against roughly +1,021 to offset. Correctness may still not be traded for line count. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * test(terminal): add discriminating oracles for restart, daemon, skew and namespaces Six parallel streams, each required to fail with its guard removed rather than merely pass. Local restart proves the OS process itself survives, by reading `ps -o lstart=` for the shell's own pid. That matters: with the quit path made destructive, the tab, leaf and pty ids all came back byte-identical while the shell underneath was a new process — every existing restart spec would have stayed green. Two separate guards were removed to redden it, and the second reddens only the stale-operation case. Daemon restart discriminates by reverting three-valued `hasPty`; version skew now covers publication semantics and confirms the new `SSH_SOURCE_RESTORE_REQUIRED` token mutates nothing on an old client; two-host isolation censuses both containers. Deletes `src/relay/pty-source-replay-index.ts` — 201 production lines with no importer outside its own test, verified against an entrypoint-rooted import graph rather than a name grep. Five namespace tests are skipped, not passing: they reproduce a defect still live on main where folder-workspace ids compare equal with the instance suffix stripped. PR #12474 fixes it; they are its oracle. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * test(ssh): induce the reattach graft deterministically instead of racing a kill The previous induction closed a pane while the transport was severed and relied on `pty:kill` FAILING so the lease outlived the pane record. It does not fail: with the provider already torn down, `pty:kill` takes its tombstone branch and marks the lease terminated, and `reattachKnownPtys` filters terminated leases out of the fan-out — so the reconnect never visited the PTY the test was about. It passed on both trees. Seed the precondition instead. Spawn a real remote PTY on a leaf that never becomes a pane, then roll the host partition back to its pre-spawn snapshot, leaving a live lease and a live remote shell that no durable pane owns. No failure races a success. Adds a vacuity guard that is independent of the tree under test: the lease's own `lastAttachedAt` must advance, proving the fan-out actually visited this lease before the pane census is trusted. Verified on this machine under an isolated TMPDIR, since the e2e harness keys its seeded-repo pointer on a machine-global tmpdir path: guard present passes, guard removed fails with the phantom leaf grafted into the local partition, guard restored passes. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * docs(terminal): propose one authoritative binding identity Every defect this program has touched is the same defect: identity compared with the wrong key, or not compared at all. Lease keyed without the pane, reattach using a creating write, folder-workspace ids compared with the instance suffix stripped, local mutating IPC carrying only an id, a live shell classified as expired, liveness unable to say unknown. Proposal: one branded binding type built from fields that already exist and are already persisted, constructible only from an authoritative source, carried by mutating operations, compared by one shared function. Makes a wrong-key comparison a type error rather than the next incident. Under adversarial review, including against the open issue corpus. Not accepted. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * fix(pty): refuse mutating operations aimed at a superseded PTY `pty:write`, `pty:writeAccepted` and `pty:resize` accepted any id. The renderer queues input, so a keystroke buffered before a reattach landed on whatever PTY had since taken the pane — and a resize reshaped the successor's shell. Main already tracks `ptyPaneKey` and `paneKeyPtyId` in lock-step, so their disagreement is proof the caller's id was superseded. No wire change, no renderer change, nothing added to the input payload. An id with no recorded pane stays permitted: unowned and orphaned PTYs are unknown, not stale, and unknown never authorizes refusing an explicit operation. That is also what keeps orphan cleanup working — those ids have no pane by construction. The tests pin the CALL SITES, not the predicate. A capability that exists and is never called is indistinguishable from no capability, which is exactly how `mayCreate` sat inert here for several commits with every test green. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * fix(pty): fence signals at a superseded PTY, and pin why kill is exempt A signal means "interrupt my pane", so delivering one to a PTY the pane has already replaced is a misdirected interrupt. Fence it with the same lock-step proof used for write and resize. `pty:kill` stays deliberately unfenced and a test now pins that: a superseded PTY is orphaned, and reclaiming it is exactly what the orphan-cleanup callers ask for. Refusing there would break the operation that reclaims leaked shells — the opposite of the intent. The fence sits at the IPC boundary, above `tryGetProviderForPty`, so it covers local, daemon and SSH rather than the local path alone. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * test(terminal): poll the pane binding read so a slower host cannot flake it `readPaneBinding` took a single unpolled read of a DOM dataset attribute immediately after a renderer reload, while its sibling helper polls the same data for 15s. On a native Linux host both tests failed every run with 'No bound terminal pane is mounted' while the app was demonstrably healthy — the screenshot showed the terminal restored with a live prompt and the boot PID echoed. The assertion is unchanged; it is only awaited. Nothing is weakened. Found by running this spec on native Linux rather than assuming macOS behaviour generalises. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * test(terminal): make the restart identity spec run on Windows too Both probes were POSIX-only and unconditional: `echo ...=\$\$` for the shell's own pid, and `ps -o lstart=` for its start time. Running the spec on a real Windows host proved it dies before reaching either guard, so Journey 1's Windows half was unprovable rather than merely unproven. PowerShell exposes the same two facts as `$PID` and `Get-Process` StartTime. The start time still matters on both platforms for the same reason: a PID alone cannot separate a survivor from a reused number. Still green on macOS. The Windows path is written from the host probe and has not itself been executed end to end — that is the next thing to run there, not a claim being made here. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * docs(terminal): record the fence's real gap and what peer designs taught Marks the client-constructed binding proposal as rejected with the three false claims that sank it, and records what shipped instead. States the shipped fence's actual limitation rather than leaving it implied: it compares a binding, not an incarnation, so a respawn under a reused ptyId passes. The obvious remedy is wrong here — the agent-create id is deterministic by design so a replayed create stays idempotent, and randomising it would trade this narrow gap for a duplicate-spawn bug. Also records the ranked lessons from four comparable agent IDEs, chiefly that a typed end-reason at end time is what stops a user quit from looking like a resume candidate. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * docs(terminal): promote Journey 1 to proven on all three platforms The oracle now runs natively on macOS, Linux and Windows, and its discrimination was watched on each: a mutation reddens it, a restore greens it. On Linux and Windows both mutations were run, and the second reddens only the stale-operation test — so the journey's two clauses are proved independently rather than jointly. Windows is the new evidence. The PowerShell branches added blind at ebffb85a848 executed correctly on their first run: `$PID` expanded to real integers, which also proves the pane shell there is PowerShell-family rather than Git Bash, and `Get-Process StartTime` returned kernel start times 5.4s apart — so a recycled pid could not have passed as a survivor. First journey promoted in this program. The other twelve are unchanged, and the residual limit on "every stale exact operation" is recorded rather than glossed. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * test(terminal): add discriminating oracles for the daemon, skew and multi-host journeys Daemon: replaces a spec that modelled only a client restart and never crossed the daemon boundary, whose successor generation owned nothing so "the live successor is neither killed nor replaced" was vacuous. The PTY leader is now a real login shell reporting `$$` back through the production write path, resolved to a kernel start time. Two mutations each redden exactly one of the three clauses, on macOS and Linux: reverting three-valued `hasPty` reddens only the unknown-not-dead clause; widening the sole-provider fallback reddens only the stale generation clause. Skew: reverting the restore-required publication to expiry reddens 4 of 5 new tests while the legacy control stays green — the regression this branch fixed is now caught if reintroduced. Multi-host: restoring `mux.dispose('connection_lost')` reddens sibling isolation on one host. It does NOT redden across hosts, and that is recorded rather than glossed: a mux belongs to one relay session per target, so its dispose cannot cross a host boundary. Journey 4's cross-host clause rests on isolation-by-construction, not on a mutation. No production code changes. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * docs(terminal): record journey evidence that falls short of promotion Four journeys now have discriminating oracles but none meets its full stated scope, and each shortfall is named rather than rounded up. Journey 2 is one WSL run from promotion. Journey 12's tests are in-process, so they do not close the live-skew gap the original ledger named. Journey 4's cross-host clause cannot be proven by mutation at all — a mux is per target, so its dispose cannot cross hosts, and the cross-host test stayed green under the mutation that reddens siblings. Journey 13 measured one dimension of ten, on lifted predicates rather than through real IPC. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * docs(terminal): promote Journey 2 to proven on macOS, Linux and physical WSL The oracle runs on every environment the journey names, and is clause-selective on all three: reverting three-valued `hasPty` reddens only the unknown-not-dead clause, and widening the sole-provider fallback reddens only the stale-generation clause. Selectivity in WSL was established rather than assumed. The spec runs serially, so a red first test reports the others as "did not run" — they were re-run alone under the same mutation and stayed green. Also records that an Orca WSL-mode terminal now starts on that host at all, which it could not before: the distro had no provisioned default Unix user, so every interactive launch blocked on first-run setup. One diagnosis from the WSL run is corrected here rather than repeated: the unrelated `local-pty-shell-ready` failure was attributed to bash 5.3.9, but macOS runs the same bash version and passes 67/67. The trigger is environmental to that distro, and the underlying defect is that the spec pins an absolute count of OSC markers it does not own. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * docs(terminal): correct the WSL provider-suite diagnosis The WSL run blamed bash 5.3.9 for the unrelated `local-pty-shell-ready` failure. macOS runs the same bash version and passes 67/67, so the version is not the cause — the trigger is environmental to that distro, and the underlying defect is that the spec asserts an absolute count of OSC markers it does not own. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * test(runtime): unskip the workspace-namespace oracles now their fix has merged These five reproduced a defect that was live on main: folder-workspace ids were compared with the instance suffix stripped, so two workspaces sharing a directory read as the same namespace. They were committed skipped, pointing at the PR that fixes it. That PR is merged, and they pass. Verified they still bite: restoring the suffix-stripping comparison reddens exactly these five and leaves the other four green. An oracle written before its fix, held skipped, and confirmed against the fix after the merge — rather than deleted and rewritten from the answer. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * test(ssh): add MaxSessions, lazy-discovery and paired-skew oracles Three journeys attempted; none promoted, and the reasons are recorded in the ledger rather than rounded up. MaxSessions=1 against real OpenSSH, with the cap read back from `sshd -T` rather than assumed, and remote pids read on the container two independent ways that must agree, each carrying its kernel start time. Two disjoint mutations discriminate — one reddens only the reconnect clause, the other only the two restart clauses. But the disconnect clause is a forward guard: four separate guard removals left it green, so nothing shipped is load-bearing for it. Lazy discovery samples sshd's own accept log and live session census across a 22s window with the in-use host as a positive control. No mutation reddens its third clause alone — the real cross-host lease scoping is load-bearing, but removing it breaks the sibling host during setup, so the failure carries no clause information. The paired-runtime skew spec pairs two real processes at different versions and refuses to run rather than degrade into a same-version pairing that would look green and prove nothing. No production code changes. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * docs(terminal): record why the duplicate-resume fix was not built I recommended adding a typed end-reason so a user quit stops looking like a resume candidate, then went to implement it and stopped. `SleepingAgentSessionRecord` already carries three fields that each exist to stop something resuming that should not have — `origin`, `restoreOnTabOpenOnly`, and `automaticResumeBlockedBy` — each traceable to its own incident, consulted at 22 non-test sites. A fourth predicate, however well typed, is the fifth containment cycle. The designs without this bug do not have a better flag; they resume only on an explicit action, into a new terminal id, and make two agents in one terminal unrepresentable in the schema. The first of those is a product decision about whether automatic resume stays a feature, so it is the user's call rather than mine. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * docs(terminal): reconcile G6 with the recorded decision and assess its clauses G6's body still demanded strictly-negative production LOC after the user relaxed it to minimise-and-justify, so the gate had two conflicting pass conditions and no single truth value. Its body now points at that decision. Assessed the remaining clauses against the branch rather than assuming. Two fail structurally: more than one identity comparison and mutation admission path still exist, and `terminal-input-quarantine.ts` is still reachable from two production files. Records why the quarantine is not subsumed by the superseded-PTY fence, which I had assumed and checked. The fence refuses writes aimed at a stale ptyId; the quarantine guards the user's next keystrokes landing on the successor under its current, correct id — a case the fence never sees. Removing it needs the recovery path to surface a different shell as unresolved, not a deletion. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * docs(terminal): the input quarantine is load-bearing, not superseded G6 lists "no superseded quarantine remains reachable" and this module was assumed to be one. Disabling its single call site reproduces the hazard it exists for — `cho hi; rm -rf x` reaching the shell — so deleting it without a replacement re-opens command execution. The replacement was costed by building it rather than estimated: +26 production LOC to thread the incarnation, ~+33 complete, and the cross-remount state it needs outlives the destroyed pane so it becomes a module about the size of the one deleted. Floor is roughly +140 to delete 88, and it would add a second identity comparison to a gate already failing for having more than one. The decisive part is that the route is not uniformly available: remote runtime results carry no incarnation, old hosts cannot be made to publish one, and mixed versions are the normal state. A paired client reads unknown, which this program's own rule says is not proof — so either every remote reattach surfaces unresolved, or a fallback is needed and the only correct fallback is this module. Whether to amend the clause or accept something weaker on remote hosts is a user decision, so the clause verdict is left as failing rather than quietly reclassified. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * refactor(runtime): collapse duplicate identity comparisons G6 requires one identity comparison; five implementations existed across two concepts. Worktree-namespace identity had two: `runtimeWorktreeIdsEqual` and `runtimeWorktreeIdentityKey` independently re-derived repoId plus normalized path. Equality now derives from the key, so the comparison and the sleep / mutation-queue keying cannot drift into two different rules — which is exactly how the suffix-stripping bug reached production once. Pane identity had three byte-identical leaf-UUID comparisons, in orchestration `db.ts`, `lifecycle-reconciliation.ts`, and `orchestration-legacy-process-identity.ts`. One copy moved to `stable-pane-id.ts`, which already owns `PaneKey`, `parsePaneKey` and `makePaneKey` and which all three already imported. No new module, no branded type, no parallel comparison. Net -14 production lines. The namespace oracle still bites: restoring the filesystem parser inside the identity key reddens exactly its five cases. The raw counts are not the actionable set, and the classification is worth recording: of 409 non-test `worktreeId` comparisons, 71 are typeof guards and 81 are sentinel tag checks. Most of the remainder are renderer predicates over store rows where both operands are the same main-minted id, so normalizing there would widen equality rather than correct it. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * refactor(terminal): finish a half-done fixture move and audit the rest `xterm-bypass-event-fixture.ts` and `__fixtures__/xterm-bypass-event.ts` were byte-identical apart from an import path. The `__fixtures__` copy had zero importers and the live copy compiled as production — someone started the move and left both. Dead copy deleted, live one moved, its three test importers updated. Audited the wider G6 clause by importer rather than filename: 32 test-only files, roughly 3,300 LOC, currently compile as production; 4 of the 36 candidates have real production importers and are correctly placed. The list is recorded in the goalposts. Those 32 are almost all older than this program and outside the terminal surface, so sweeping them belongs in its own change rather than inside a terminal PR. The clause stays failing, with the remaining files named. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * docs(terminal): the fixture clause already holds where it matters Checked what the build emits rather than reasoning from file paths. None of the 32 test-only fixtures appears in `out/` — Rollup drops them because no production entrypoint reaches them. On "compiles into the shipped product", this clause holds today. On the other reading it cannot be closed by moving files at all: both production tsconfigs use bare `include` globs with no `exclude`, so a `__tests__/` directory matches exactly like any other path, as does every `*.test.ts` in the repo. Relocating 32 fixtures would remove nothing from typecheck scope. A sweep was started and stopped once this was verified, rather than landing 32 moves across areas this program does not own for no gain. If the intent is that typecheck scope should exclude test code, that is a repo-wide tsconfig change with a different owner. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * docs(terminal): add plain-language design and test overviews Two reviewable documents with diagrams, written so someone with no prior context can follow what breaks, why, and what changed. The design overview explains the five things stacked behind one terminal rectangle, the 2 -> 19 -> 20 report, the three root causes, and the rule underneath all of them: unknown is not dead. The test overview explains why a green test proves nothing on its own, the four-step mutation proof we adopted, and — the part worth reviewing hardest — an honest account of what could not be proven and why, including the properties that are true by construction and therefore have no guard to remove. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * docs(terminal): add a self-contained visual report of the design and its evidence Pre-renders every diagram to inline SVG in both themes so the report opens offline and stays sharp when zoomed. States the gate/journey score and the retractions alongside the fixes, so the unproven half is as visible as the proven half. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * docs(terminal): record the finalized two-plane architecture decision Adopts the data-plane proposal and adds the control-plane track it does not cover: re-key ownership by pane, split orphan inventory out, then delete the compensating code. Records that the host-authority alternative was refuted and that the shipped keystroke fence is inert on the reattach path. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * docs(terminal): add the design brief the review counsel works from Separates verified code facts from unverified leads so reviewers attack the design rather than a reconstruction of it, and records which simpler alternatives were already refuted and why. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * docs(terminal): report the design counsel's outcome and the live respawn bug it found Three review rounds across two models replaced the two-record split with one leaf-keyed record, deleted attach-time pane identity, and made orphans a connect-time projection. Records that a shipped gesture still turns a healthy remote shell into a duplicate agent resume, and that the renderer classifier in that chain treats an error-message shape as proof of death. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * docs(terminal): correct the report — the respawn proof gate guards a minority path A final review traced every auto-respawn route. The primary one converts the reattach failure into a boolean before any classifier sees it, so the shipped proof gate never runs there. Records that two of the six shipped changes are narrower than claimed, and why their tests could not have caught it. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * docs(terminal): explain the landed design on its own terms One leaf-keyed ownership record, orphans computed at connect, and replacement shells only on positive proof — with the shipping order and the one product trade the design asks the owner to accept. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * docs(terminal): rewrite the design explainer in plain English The first version assumed the reader knew the codebase. Reframed around two bugs, two fixes and one decision, with the jargon replaced by pane / program / note / helper and a five-word glossary for what could not be avoided. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * fix(ssh): stop reading an identity mismatch as a dead shell The relay reports a pane-identity mismatch by saying the pty was not found, but it found it — comparing identity is how it noticed. Publishing that as expiry made the renderer clear the binding and cold-restore with agent resume, so a live shell gained a second agent on one transcript. Reachable today by detaching a pane into a new tab, which changes the tab the relay froze at spawn. Mismatch now carries its own token and the classifier refuses it as proof. Genuine absence still expires, so a shell that really went away is not stranded. The three failure tokens move to src/shared: main published them and the renderer decided respawn on them, from two copies that had drifted apart. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * fix(ssh): stop sending pane identity on reattach The relay froze pane identity at spawn, so moving a pane to another tab made it refuse a live shell — and refuse by saying 'not found'. The comparison is presence-guarded, so not sending the fields disarms it on every relay version including ones already installed on hosts: no wire change, no redeploy. Nothing is lost. It existed to catch a relay restart recycling pty-N for a new shell, and in exactly that case pane and tab both still match, so it accepted the wrong shell anyway. The incarnation the attach returns is what distinguishes those, and it already crosses the wire. Removes the whole client-side apparatus: the expected-identity type, its per-lease derivation, its map, and the parameter threaded through four layers. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * docs(terminal): add tracked goalposts for the new design Each goalpost is a behaviour with an oracle and the mutation that must redden it, so 'proven' cannot be claimed from a green test. Records the anti-inert rule as a first-class goalpost, since three guards in this program passed their tests while sitting off the route production takes. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * docs(terminal): record that the recovery grant is dead code, deleting a design step The lease stores a relay-native pty id and the caller passes the app form, with a raw equality comparison between them, so the 30s grant cannot fire for a real SSH pane. The death rule that existed to referee it is deleted rather than built, and the dead path itself becomes a removal. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * docs(terminal): keep the full design detail in the repo It only existed in an ephemeral job directory, so the plain-English explainer had no durable source for its specifics — record shape, death rule, reattach algorithm, migration order and the 25 oracles. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * docs(terminal): add a resume prompt for a clean session Points at the goalposts as the contract, names the three goalposts whose oracles are already written and red, and carries the process rules that were learned the expensive way — prove guards reachable, verify mutations land, commit per step, and never let a subagent write production files in a shared worktree. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * test(ssh): add the failing oracles for goalposts S3, S4 and S5 Intentionally RED: 14 clauses that fail against current behaviour and go green under the changes named in new-design-goalposts.md. The branch is held unmerged, so red here means unimplemented, not broken. Each was verified to fail for the right reason and to flip green under the identified fix, which was then reverted. Each pins the producer as well as the consumer, so no clause can pass vacuously if its route is ever severed — the failure mode that let three earlier guards ship inert. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * fix(ssh): stop fabricating an exit when a reattach fails A failed attach never proves the shell exited. The relay answers not-found for a pane-identity mismatch and for any id it merely cannot hand back, so treating it as death sent the pane a synthetic `pty:exit { code: -1 }`, cleared provider state, deleted ownership and expired the lease — four claims about a process we know nothing about, on a shell that is usually still running. Collapse every failure into the non-destructive branch that already existed a few lines above (`restoreRequired = 'reattachAttemptsExhausted'` + wakeRecovery). A branch collapse, not a new mechanism: goalpost S3. Two tests pinned the deleted premise and are INVERTED rather than patched, so the new intent stays covered: - ssh-relay-orphan-abandon-paths: "retires the lease without a kill when the relay proves the PTY is gone" -> "leaves the shell running when the relay only reports the PTY as not found". Its comment claimed attach verifies liveness before answering not-found; it does not. - ssh-relay-session: "invalidates and broadcasts remote PTYs that cannot reattach" -> "leaves an unreattachable remote PTY alone while its sibling reattaches". Also repairs two clauses left red by |
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Jinjing
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7c93aed6dc |
Fix fsync of read-only files on POSIX (#14235)
* fix(files): fsync read-only files on POSIX * test(e2e): add golden E2E tests for POSIX profile index fsync Validates that profile index files are properly persisted on POSIX systems, including with restrictive umask settings. These are release-blocking golden tests for Linux and macOS. * test(terminal): wait for fish child ownership before stdin write Fish 4.8 withdraws DECSET 2031 before spawning the child, so the shell-contracts harness could send hello into an intermediate prompt and hang waiting for CHILD-READ. Wait for the child's CHILD-READY marker and answer split DA1/CPR/OSC queries across chunk boundaries. * test(e2e): verify profile index persists to disk with restrictive umask Strengthen the POSIX fsync test to verify the rebuilt index is actually written to disk and has correct permissions under a restrictive umask, not just cached in memory. |
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 m4air
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b115f8d256 |
Add Windows golden E2E test for fresh-startup regression
Windows terminal rendering golden is flaky on CI runners. Re-enable Windows in the golden E2E gate with a scoped test for the fresh-profile startup regression from #14130. Terminal rendering continues on Linux and macOS; Windows runs fresh-startup only. |
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Neil
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991a3fe963 |
chore(lint): update oxlint to 1.77 and enable no-op cleanup rules (#13901)
Enable eleven oxlint rules that simplify code without changing behavior, and fix
every existing violation. Each candidate was gated on measured cost rather than
assumption, so rules that regressed runtime performance or type checking were
dropped instead of suppressed.
typescript/no-redundant-type-constituents is the largest addition: 113 sites, no
autofix. Dead constituents are deleted. Where the redundant literal existed to
document intent (`string | 'all'`), it is preserved as `(string & {})`, which
keeps the autocomplete hint the original code was reaching for instead of
flattening it away. The rule also caught a broken import —
remote-shared-control-retirement-probe.ts pulled RuntimeStatus from
src/shared/types, which does not export it, so the type silently degraded to
`any`; no tsconfig covers that file, so tsc never saw it.
oxlint stays at 1.77.0 rather than 1.78.0 because .npmrc sets
minimum-release-age=4320 and 1.78.0 is younger than that window.
Rules evaluated and rejected, with what disqualified each:
- prefer-string-raw: String.raw is a runtime call, not a literal (184x slower)
- prefer-string-replace-all: 26% slower
- text-encoding-identifier-case: ~5% slower, reproducible
- prefer-spread: [...str] is 110% slower than split('') and differs on surrogates
- no-implicit-coercion: `!!x` narrows types and `Boolean(x)` does not (22 tsc errors)
- prefer-arrow-callback: arrows are not constructible, breaking `new` on mocks
- object-shorthand: rewrites source text asserted by a tracked reliability gate
- switch-case-braces: pushes ten files past max-lines, which cannot be suppressed
- no-useless-switch-case: drops `case undefined:` that switch-exhaustiveness-check needs
- arrow-body-style: 115 violations have no fix, and it breaks max-lines
- newline-after-import: false-positives on the leading-semicolon ASI idiom
electron-vite-output-contract asserted on the literal
Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call text; retarget it to Object.hasOwn, which
rejects inherited keys identically.
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Brennan Benson
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d50adec2d2 |
feat(ai-vault): isolate scanning from terminal workloads (#13411)
* feat(ai-vault): isolate scanning in service processes * fix(ai-vault): retire idle service processes * fix(ai-vault): discard unverified cache processes * fix(ai-vault): clear relay sidecar cancel watchdog on acknowledgement A cancelled relay call is settled before its 2s cancel watchdog is armed, so the acknowledgement path bailed out of settle() before clearing the timer. The watchdog then faulted a healthy sidecar two seconds after every aborted scan, killing whatever request had since become active. * fix(ai-vault): clear the pending restart before scheduling another recordFault overwrote this.timer, stranding a restart that dispose() could no longer cancel. * refactor(ai-vault): drop the orphaned first-prompt IPC wrapper session-first-user-prompt-handler.ts now owns this entry point and routes through the service; the copy left in the read module had no callers. * fix(ai-vault): retry a faulted cold start before surfacing it A slow first start surfaced a raw 'did not become ready' error to the caller even though the supervisor was already respawning. Requeue an unsent call once onto the scheduled respawn instead. Also stop arming the cancellation watchdog for a call the child never received: no acknowledgement is coming, so it killed a healthy service and stalled the lane. Invalidation bookkeeping and ready-waiter construction move to the state module to stay under the max-lines cap. * fix(ai-vault): give relay title reads their own lane Before this branch the relay read title files directly, concurrently with scans. Routing both through one sidecar lane put title resolution behind a list scan that may run up to 130s, so SSH tab titles could lag minutes behind. Split cache and interactive lanes in both the relay client and the sidecar entry, mirroring the desktop service. Also: clear the ready deadline on fault, so a sidecar that dies before ready cannot fault its healthy replacement five seconds later; retry an unsent call once across a respawn; and skip the cancellation watchdog for a call the sidecar never received. Restart/circuit bookkeeping moves to its own module, mirroring the desktop policy, to stay under the max-lines cap. * fix(ai-vault): degrade relay title resolution on sidecar failure listSessions already returns a host issue when the sidecar is unavailable; titles propagated the raw RPC error instead. Return no titles so callers fall back to preview text, and keep cancellation propagating. * fix(ai-vault): scrub the service child environment The children are forked with a 384 MiB heap cap and no loader, but both spawn sites handed them the full parent environment, so an exported NODE_OPTIONS silently raised the cap or --require'd code into them. Allowlist both, following the plugin worker. The desktop child keeps the eleven agent-root overrides it resolves its own roots from; the relay sidecar takes remoteHome and hostPlatform from its init message and so needs none of them. Both children share one priority module while they share this one. * fix(ai-vault): soft-disable relay vault when the service is missing A missing service threw out of the constructor, so a Vault wiring bug would abort relay startup and take every PTY on the host with it. The unsupported-platform branch three lines above already treats a Vault failure as a soft disable; do the same here. Threading the service through the two handlers instead of a field also retires the definite-assignment assertion the throw was propping up. * fix(ai-vault): drain consumed cache invalidations invalidatedPaths was re-applied in every request's finally and never drained, so once N paths had been invalidated every later request paid N evictions for the life of the process; the 4096 cap only bounded how bad that got. The re-apply exists to cover a read that overlapped the invalidation, so drain once nothing is executing. Clearing unconditionally would drop the re-apply for a request still running on the other lane. * fix(ai-vault): keep a busy child through slow invalidation acks invalidate() reused the 5s ready budget as its acknowledgement deadline and killed the child on expiry, so a delete issued during a large scan could kill a healthy process mid-scan and burn a slot toward the restart circuit. Fault only when nothing is executing. Fork IPC ordering already puts the invalidation ahead of any later request, so a busy child owes no ack here, and the 130s/15s request deadlines still catch a wedged one. The start-retry predicate moves to the state module to stay under the line cap, matching the shape the relay client already uses. * fix(ai-vault): report a failed local scan as a host issue A local-scope scan let its error escape to the renderer, which paints it over the session list. Service supervision now produces those errors, so "AI Vault service restart circuit is open." replaced the list. Route local scope through the degradation the all-hosts leg and every SSH leg already use, so it lands as a retryable host issue row instead. Same result shape either way, so no IPC or wire contract changes. * test(ai-vault): cover the relay restart circuit transitions The relay policy shipped without tests. Pin both circuit edges, the aging-out case, the forced-refresh reopen the relay has and the desktop does not, and the backoff schedule. * fix(ai-vault): keep the OpenCode roots in the service child env The scrubbed allowlist dropped XDG_DATA_HOME and OPENCODE_DB, which the child reads to locate the OpenCode store and database. The pre-PR worker thread inherited them, so a user who sets either lost every OpenCode session. * test(ai-vault): anchor the service spawn env assertion |