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Commits
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67dda9affe |
fix(runtime): hold the session mirror through an unverifiable probe (#20085)
* fix(runtime): hold the session mirror through an unverifiable probe Two derivations read the same host state and reached opposite verdicts, and the destructive one won. When a status probe came back unverifiable over a still-ready transport, runtimeHostConnectionStateForEntry called the host 'runtime-unavailable' (connected) while getReachableRuntimeSessionMirrorTargets dropped it, tearing down and cold-rebuilding the session-tab mirror while the host's flows were still delivering. The root cause is that applyRuntimeHostStatusSnapshot nulls entry.status for any non-verified probe while the snapshot retains the runtime identity. The connection-state reader consults the snapshot; the mirror-target reader did not. Give both readers one answer: - lastVerifiedRuntimeStatus() in shared/runtime-host-status.ts is now the single definition of "the last identity the host answered with". runtime-status.ts already had this inline as previousVerifiedStatus and now calls it. - The mirror-target reader asks the shared connection verdict instead of entry.status, gated on isDisconnectedRuntimeHostState -- only the one exit verdict earns a destructive read, per docs/reference/ssh-execution-boundary.md. 'checking' and 'reconnecting' are unverifiable, not evidence of an exit. Holding the target through the outage would strand the mirror on its own: the subscription is installed by the effect in use-web-session-tabs-sync.ts keyed on useRuntimeSessionMirrorEnvironmentKey(), a stream 'end' frame is dropped without resubscribing, and the parking layer retries only a rejected subscribe call. The teardown was the recovery. So regaining contact now advances the connection epoch, giving recovery its own "the host is back" trigger rather than leaving the mirror to be restored as a side effect of having been destroyed. The connection epoch is not the runtime session: a same-runtime return fires no restart hook, no provider session bump, and no toast. * test(runtime): drop the redundant status casts the new casting gate rejects |
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779667c1e7 | refactor(runtime): declare the host-status entry once instead of per consumer (#20262) | ||
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e42f7c00bd |
feat(native-chat): render a proposed plan as a plan, not a generic approval (#21090)
* feat(native-chat): render a proposed plan as a plan, not a generic approval A finished plan arrives as an ExitPlanMode tool call. With no handling for it, the generic approval path serialized the tool input, so a plan appeared as thousands of characters of escaped JSON. A plan is content to read, not a privilege to grant. Classify the plan in the permission callback and carry it as a typed subject on the approval item, keeping the existing approval kind so the prompt still reaches every consumer. Mobile filters pending approvals on that kind, so introducing a new one would have made the prompt vanish there silently. Classification runs before registration, so a future permission-mode short-circuit cannot swallow a plan proposal. The assistant tool-use stream is a second ingress and is pinned by its own test, because neither path can be assumed to fire on its own. Rather than adding a second card, the plan renders inside the approval card's existing bounded content region. It inherits the height cap, the scrolling, the keyboard focus and the pinned action row that region already provides, and a typed plan replaces the raw detail instead of rendering both. Buttons read as plan decisions. Mobile renders the same subject through its own markdown component in the same region. * fix(native-chat): preserve plan review semantics * fix(native-chat): keep plan approval one-turn |
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68ea3b92e3 |
fix(native-chat): stop a collapsed run claiming success when a tool call failed (#21151)
* fix(native-chat): stop a collapsed run claiming success when a tool call failed A settled activity group drew its completion mark whenever no call in it was `running`. That is not a success test: a tool call is `running`, `completed` or `failed`, so a run whose call failed had nothing running, took the mark, and asserted success over a failure the reader could only find by expanding the run. Success is now stated rather than inferred. `nativeChatToolRunSucceeded` grants the mark only to a run that is settled, has nothing still running, and has no failed call — a call's own `failed` verdict or an error result, the same composite test the task-list, edit-card and ask-row readers already use. A call with no lifecycle state is neither, so legacy transcripts still settle. A collapsed run that did contain failures now says so in the header, as a quiet `N failed` in the header's own mono type with a spoken `Failed tool calls: N`. Text only: a tool error is routine work, so no destructive tint and no swapped glyph. The count is taken over every call in the run, not the latest. * fix(native-chat): count failed tool calls without result mispairing |
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5287c5cdbc |
fix(mobile): stop a created tab from jumping when the host snapshot lands (#20069)
* fix(mobile): stop a created tab from jumping when the host snapshot lands
Creating a tab from the mobile session strip painted the new tab at the end
of the strip and then visibly jumped it to a different slot a beat later.
The client asked the host to insert the tab after the active tab, but then
predicted a different placement for its own optimistic paint:
afterTabId: activeSessionTabId ?? undefined // host: splice(insertAfter + 1)
...
return [...prev, { ...created, isActive: true }] // client: append
Two independent placements that disagree, so the optimistic frame is wrong by
construction and the tab snaps to its real slot on the next published snapshot.
The disagreement dates to
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0e3b71f605 |
fix(session): give an SSH workspace one owning partition so its tabs stop round-tripping as deletions (#19572)
* fix(session): give an SSH workspace one owning partition so its tabs stop round-tripping as deletions `workspaceSessionPartitionHostId` answered differently depending on who asked: the renderer mapped an SSH worktree's session to the `local` blob, the main-process runtime read-modify-wrote `ssh:<targetId>`. One workspace's session lived in two stores and no reader reunited them, so whatever landed on the unread side did not read as unknown — it round-tripped as absence. The remote-workspace upload is a `replace-session` patch, which turned that absence into deletion on the host, and the next pull applied the deletion locally and re-poisoned the snapshot. Collapse the two answers into one: every non-'local' host owns its partition. Boot hydration and the export fallback now read the SSH partition, and rows a shipping build left in `local` are folded back in once, gap-filling only — an empty tab row is a gap, never proof that anything was closed. Folder workspaces deliberately keep their existing 'local' routing: boot discovers SSH partitions from the repo catalog, so an SSH target that owns only a folder workspace has no partition any reader enumerates. They are still adopted back out of an SSH partition when a repo does name the host. Fixes #12721 Supersedes #12722 Co-authored-by: Robert Nisipeanu <github@nisipeanu.com> Co-authored-by: Jinwoo-H <Jinwoo-H@users.noreply.github.com> * test(session): pin the old-client empty-publish skew direction * fix(session): adopt every workspace the host partition names, not only tabbed ones Review caught that gating adoption on `host.tabsByWorktree[key].length > 0` traded the #12721 deletion for a narrower one. The write path routes EVERY worktree-scoped field to the owning partition, so an SSH workspace with open editor files or browser tabs and no terminals had all of it dropped on every restart — and unlike terminal state it cannot be recovered from the host snapshot, which carries terminal fields only, so an unsaved `dirtyDraftContent` was destroyed outright. The defect was not a missing field. It was a hand-maintained field list deciding what the read recovers while the write used the ownership table, so the two could disagree. Adoption now walks `WORKSPACE_SESSION_FIELD_OWNERSHIP` with an exhaustive switch, and a new ownership kind is a compile-time decision rather than a silent omission. Session keys are normalized through the shared `normalizeWorkspaceSessionKeyToWorkspaceId` so host-qualified visit recency (`ssh:target|worktreeId`) reaches its workspace, and the regression is pinned by feeding the shipping split's own output back through the real boot read rather than a hand-built fixture. Co-authored-by: Robert Nisipeanu <github@nisipeanu.com> Co-authored-by: Jinwoo-H <Jinwoo-H@users.noreply.github.com> * fix(session): stop adoption overwriting rows it was never told about Three losses, one cause: the reader walks its own description of the partition layout while the writer walks another, so the two agree on which ownership kinds exist and not on what a kind means. - An empty host row replaced a populated base row, destroying an unsaved dirtyDraftContent the header comment says must never be destroyed. The host holding nothing is not evidence the base is wrong. - A contested bare id was adopted as if local and ssh:<target> were one workspace written twice, which is exactly the id where that premise is false. The read already reached that verdict and adoption could not ask for it, so it is passed in; contested keys are gap-filled, never replaced. mergeWorkspaceSessionsWithHostShadow now reports the real contested set, which primaryHostBySessionKey never was. - Tab-, pane- and file-keyed rows are adopted through the split's own indexes, so unified-only tabs come back and the pane key is parsed once. - A bare lastVisitedAtByWorktreeId key only fills a gap; the split has a dedicated branch for that field and the reader had none. * test(session): pin the tombstone/gap boundary the two readings meet at An explicit empty tabsByWorktree row means the user closed the last terminal; adoption reads an empty base row as a gap to fill. Same value, opposite readings, so the boundary is asserted rather than argued: the tombstone lands in the owning partition, restores as a present empty row rather than a deleted key, is declined by the real seeding predicate, is published as an empty list, and the legacy-transition resurrection happens once and cannot recur. * docs(reliability): record the adoption guards and the tombstone boundary in the gate * test(e2e): read the SSH restart assertions from the partition that owns them ssh-cold-activation-restore asserted persistence through session.get() with no host, which is the local partition an SSH worktree's rows no longer live in. The invariant it means to check is that the state is persisted where the boot read will find it, so it now unions local and ssh:<targetId> and stays correct on both layouts. Confirmed the product invariant separately rather than by the edit: the behavioural half of both tests - the full app restart, the active worktree, the eager terminal remount and the PTY-owner reclaim against a real Docker OpenSSH host - runs after this check and passes. 2 passed in 48.9s. * test(e2e): read ssh-restart-tab-accumulation from the owning partition too Same layout-coupled read as ssh-cold-activation-restore: the pre-quit flush asserted through session.get() with no host. Verified against a real Docker OpenSSH target - both repeated quit/relaunch cycles keep exactly the restored SSH tabs, no accumulation and no loss. 2 passed in 52.9s. * fix(lint): clear the casting gate on the partition adoption main tightened typescript/consistent-type-assertions to assertionStyle: never, which the rebase brings onto these added lines. Most of the round-trip fixtures did not need a cast at all -- three were hiding wrong-shaped literals (a browser workspace keyed 'name', a unified tab keyed 'type', a layout keyed 'direction'), now written as the types they stand for. The adoption reads narrow through an isRecord predicate instead of casting, which also stops a null entry throwing out of Object.keys. What is left is dynamic-field writes and unknown-typed IPC returns, each with its own SAFETY rationale. * fix(session): give an SSH folder workspace one owning partition boot can find The partition owner rule already names `ssh:<targetId>` for a repo-backed worktree, but `getFolderWorkspacePartitionHostId` still answered 'local' for a folder workspace while main's `RuntimeWorkspaceSessionController.getPreferredHostId` answered `ssh:<targetId>` for the same key. That is #12723 unfixed for folder workspaces, and once the renderer started writing `ssh:*` at all it got worse: a save's field-level patch carries only the rows routed to that partition, so a `tabsByWorktree` write without the folder row erased the row main had put there. The reason the renderer could not route there was real - boot discovered SSH partitions from the repo catalog, which cannot name a target whose only workspace is a folder. So persistence now answers that directly over `session:list-host-ids`, and boot reads the partitions that exist rather than the ones a catalog implies. Removing a folder workspace prunes its rows from the owning partition too, or the census would adopt them back on the next launch as a workspace the user already deleted. Adoption now decides from the repo catalog instead of from co-presence. Two partitions holding one bare `repoId::path` is not evidence of a collision - that is the exact shape the repair exists for - so the verdict comes from `resolveWorktreeExecutionHost`: a repo id registered on more than one host is contested and may only be gap-filled, and one the catalog positively resolves to a different host is residue this partition does not own and is not adopted at all. Without the second rule a stale partition sorting first won the read and was then written into the live one. Nothing is deleted either way; the rows stay where they are. Finally, a workspace adopted out of a partition now routes back to that partition. Routing used to re-derive an owner from the catalog, so a boot whose repos had not hydrated moved the rows it had just reunited back into 'local' and re-stranded them. Contested ids are withheld from that override, because routing the whole bare id to one host is the loss the gap-fill prevents. The publish path resolves each workspace's owner once for the whole publish, shared with the projection, so the per-target catalog attribution does not repeat it per connected host. * fix(session): drop a deleted workspace from every partition, not just the local blob Adversarial review of the previous commit found three ways the partition census - which now reads whatever persistence holds rather than what the repo catalog implies - keeps rows alive that nothing should keep alive. `deleteProjectGroup` pruned only the local blob, so every folder workspace under a deleted group left its rows in `ssh:<targetId>`; the next boot adopted them back, named that partition their owner and wrote them there again, forever. `removeFolderWorkspace` had the same hole for a workspace whose partition its host expression could not name: main never persists a folder workspace's `executionHostId`, and `RuntimeWorkspaceSessionController` can infer a connection from the group's repos that the workspace row itself does not carry. Deriving the partition at delete time is the wrong question - a deleted workspace owns nothing anywhere - so both paths now remove it from every partition. The third is on the read side. A contested id is deliberately withheld from the read-source override so the write cannot carry one host's rows into another's partition, but the routing that then re-derives an owner answers 'local' for an id the catalog cannot name. Adopting such a row moved it out of the partition that owns it and into the blob: the two-store split this change exists to remove. A contested id the assembled session holds no row for is therefore not adopted at all. Gap-filling stays available for a contested id the session already names, since that row's own partition is what the write follows. Declining to adopt leaves a row invisible for one boot; it never deletes one. Also: the folder-key guard in both catalog attributions was dead, because `getRepoIdFromWorktreeId` hands back the whole key rather than nothing when there is no `::`. The verdict was right and the resolution wasted; it now skips by shape. And the two type assertions the changed-code casting gate rejected are gone rather than suppressed. * fix(session): park the rows a partition read declines instead of letting the next write erase them A partition write replaces each field with exactly what the unified session routed there. So a row the read left out of that session is erased from its own partition the moment any sibling workspace writes the same one - and with SSH partitions now the owning store, that row is then in no partition at all. Three separate decisions produce such rows: residue the catalog attributes to another host, a contested id withheld so the write cannot carry one host's rows into another's partition, and a workspace the base already holds the live copy of. Declining to show a row was quietly deleting it. The machinery for this already exists. `attachHostSessionShadow` writes a contested runtime co-claimant's parked rows straight back into its own slice before the write, so the primary's write cannot erase them; the ssh partitions simply were not among the slices the contention split arbitrates. The read now parks everything it is not returning to an ssh partition into that same shadow, and the existing re-attach puts it back. Leak, never kill - docs/reference/ssh-execution- boundary.md - and a row no partition holds is unrecoverable. Second, the contested branch of the tab adoption read `Object.hasOwn` as "the base has tabs here". An empty list satisfies it, so whenever a legacy id happened to be contested, #12721's empty local row won over the host's real one - the exact reading the module's own header, and the gate invariant it is pinned by, say is wrong. An empty row is the gap this repair fills, so it is now treated as one. * test(session): pin the empty-base-row gap for a contested id Mutation testing found the assertion missing: reverting the gate to `Object.hasOwn` left all 39 assertions passing, which makes the fix that reads an empty base tab row as a gap unguarded. The #12721 shape does not stop being a gap because the id happens to be contested. --------- Co-authored-by: Robert Nisipeanu <github@nisipeanu.com> Co-authored-by: Jinwoo-H <Jinwoo-H@users.noreply.github.com> |
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2531dc9d5a |
fix(runtime): bound the connect phase against an unreachable host, at the transport (#20053)
* fix(runtime): bound the remote-runtime connect against an unreachable host A host that is powered off or firewalled black-holes the TCP SYN, so the remote-runtime WebSocket neither opens nor errors. The Node-side transports set no connect bound, leaving the caller's whole-request timeout as the only one: every `orca <cmd> --environment <unreachable>` sat silent for 60s before failing with a generic `runtime_timeout`. Measured on an unreachable paired host (win-lowspec, SYNs dropped): terminal list / worktree list / repo list / status each took 60.19-60.26s; the same command against a reachable host answered in 0.24s. So this was the shared transport, not one command. Pass `handshakeTimeout` at the three shared remote-runtime WebSocket construction sites, which `ws` applies across TCP connect and the HTTP upgrade. The value matches the bound the browser transport already used. The failure keeps code `remote_runtime_unavailable` so the existing transport-loss classification in terminal-process-inspection still applies, and the message names the endpoint and stops at "unverifiable" — per docs/reference/ssh-execution-boundary.md, loss of contact is never evidence that the host's work stopped. * fix(relay): bound the control socket's connect phase at the transport The relay control socket was constructed with no `handshakeTimeout`, the same gap fixed for the remote-runtime transports. It was not a live defect: the class-level `connectDeadlineMs` (15s) also covers a stalled connect, and that deadline does fire — its `unref()` is safe because the pending TCP connect is itself a ref'd libuv handle that holds the event loop open. Measured in a bare Node process: unref'd timer with an empty loop never fires (exit at 0ms), but the same timer alongside a black-holed connect fired at 2003ms. It was a defect waiting on a refactor. The two bounds cover different phases, and the class deadline covers the connect phase only incidentally. DO NOT REMOVE EITHER BOUND AS REDUNDANT. They are not. Proven by mutation: - Remove the transport bound -> a stalled *connect* falls through to the class deadline, rejecting with `relay_control_connect_timeout` after the full deadline instead of the transport error. - Remove the class deadline -> a stall during the *proving* phase (socket open, host proof never answered) is unbounded; the incumbent test hangs 30s. `handshakeTimeout` cannot see that phase at all. Reuses `remoteRuntimeConnectOptions` rather than forking a second helper, and moves the construction into `relay-control-socket-factory.ts` so a caller that needs a relay control socket gets the bound instead of re-deriving an unbounded one. `handshakeTimeoutMs` is settable apart from `connectDeadlineMs` so a test can stall the connect alone and assert which bound produced the rejection — error identity, not elapsed time. The connect-bound ratchet now covers the relay site and asserts the site still resolves, so an allowlist that silently stopped matching cannot pass vacuously. * fix(lint): carry SAFETY rationales for the connect-bound casts main tightened typescript/consistent-type-assertions to assertionStyle: never, which the rebase brings onto these added lines. Dropping the generic default is not typeable, so each cast keeps its own rationale. * fix(runtime): keep the bounded connect failure inside both message gates The connect bound's new wording dropped out of the two gates that classify remote-transport failures by message text, and those gates are the only ones that run on the path the bound made reachable. `subscribeRemoteRuntimeTransport` reports a connect failure by *rejecting* the subscribe promise, and that rejection crosses `ipcMain.handle`, which keeps only the message. The renderer then classifies it with `RECOVERABLE_MESSAGE_FRAGMENTS`. `Could not reach the remote Orca runtime at …` matched no fragment, so it read as fatal: `recovery.cancel()` and a red banner instead of a retry. Before the bound existed this case reached the 15s subscription-start timer, whose message did match a fragment, so introducing a 12s bound turned an auto-recovering pane into a dead-ended one — the #12650 shape. The same wording also fell outside `REMOTE_RUNTIME_UNREACHABLE_RE`, so the Tailscale remedy was dropped for precisely the unreachable-host failure it exists for. Keep the canonical phrase both gates already recognise rather than teaching each gate a second synonym for one condition, and pin it: the phrase is now a named constant, the corpus in `remote-runtime-transport-error-agreement.test.ts` grows the coded, hinted and code-stripped producers derived from the real helper, and a new subscribe-path test proves the connect bound (not the start timer) is what fires and that its message still classifies as recoverable once the code is gone. Verdict wording is unchanged: `unverifiable`, never a synonym for exited. Also states the bound in seconds, corrects the module comment (`handshakeTimeout` is a socket inactivity timer, so a slow-but-answering host is not cut off), and splits the subscription contract types out to stay under `max-lines`. * fix(relay): drop the duplicate connect bound on the control socket The claim that `connectDeadlineMs` cannot see a black-holed connect is false. `RelayControlClient.connect()` constructs the socket and arms `connectTimer` in the same synchronous call — `new WebSocket()` never blocks — and `expireConnect` fires from `opening` as well as `proving`. The class deadline was already a strict superset of a transport `handshakeTimeout` on that socket. It was also inert. Production passes neither option, so the transport bound was derived from `connectDeadlineMs` and both timers were 15_000, armed in the same tick; the ws timer is an inactivity timer armed on the later `socket` event, so it could not win. Its only reachable effect was changing which string a stalled relay connect rejects with, and it narrowed an existing test's 20ms deadline into a handshake bound it could race. So this removes the factory, the test-only `handshakeTimeoutMs` option and the source-grep test whose premise was wrong, and replaces them with a test that holds the real ground: a connect whose upgrade is never answered expires on the class deadline. Moving the timer arm after `open`, or narrowing `expireConnect` to `proving`, both turn it red — which is what a future reader needs before concluding the phase is uncovered and adding a second bound again. No behaviour change for a reachable relay, and none for the verdict: a stalled connect still rejects and still reaches `unverifiable`, never `exited`. * fix(runtime): stop the endpoint in the failure message from undoing the fix Putting the endpoint into the message created three problems the message itself caused. The Tailscale hint is idempotent by testing whether "tailscale" already appears anywhere in the message. That held while the message was fixed copy. Now a host called `tailscale-box` puts the word there itself, and the hint — the only actionable remedy on an unreachable host — is suppressed for it. Key the guard on the two hints instead of the word. The endpoint comes from a pasted pairing code, which is only length-capped; `normalizePairingUrl` rejects userinfo but nothing re-validates a stored offer. Render scheme, host and port only, so a pasted `wss://user:secret@host` cannot reach a surface the user reads. And drop the elapsed time from the wording. `handshakeTimeout` is a socket inactivity timer, so a `wss://` host that completes TCP and then goes silent re-arms it once and fails at about twice the bound; measured at 2008ms against a 1000ms bound. "within 12s" would have been wrong there, and the endpoint is the actionable part regardless. Also refuse a non-positive or non-finite bound: `ws` and `net` both gate on a truthy timeout, so `0` left the connect completely unbounded while still satisfying the connect-bound ratchet. * fix(runtime): keep the endpoint from smuggling a verdict into the message `isRemoteTerminalGoneMessage` in the pty transport substring-matches `terminal_gone` / `terminal_exited` / `no_connected_pty`, and it runs before the recoverable-connection gate: a match retires the pane's terminal id and cancels recovery. WHATWG URL accepts `_` in a special-scheme host, so once the failure message carried the endpoint, `ws://terminal_gone.example:6768` turned loss of contact into a terminal-gone verdict — the one conclusion `docs/reference/ssh-execution-boundary.md` forbids. Render the host only when it matches a hostname or IP-literal grammar that cannot carry such a token, and fall back to naming no endpoint at all. A well-formed host, including a bracketed IPv6 literal, is still shown. * docs(runtime): say why this connect bound is not the relay's removed duplicate |
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7f5141ae2d |
Make the Agent Permissions toggle apply to Codex chat (#20977)
* fix(structured-chat): deliver the permission posture through each transport's own contract Codex posture moves off app-server argv onto typed `thread/start` and `thread/resume` params. Manual states `on-request` / `workspace-write` explicitly instead of omitting the fields, which app-server resolved through the mirrored config.toml — a Manual thread on a home carrying `approval_policy = "never"` never prompted. Claude keeps its owned `--dangerously-skip-permissions` flag through SDK `extraArgs`; the SDK's typed bypass option emits a newer allow flag that older user-installed binaries reject. Posture is re-derived from current settings on every session acquisition. * fix(structured-chat): parse permission arguments as argv * fix(structured-chat): keep permission policy authoritative |
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0bf815a480 |
fix(agent-launch): make a lost launch safe to retry (#21106)
* feat(agent-launch): make a lost launch safe to retry `agent.launch` could not be retried safely. Only a create-worktree target carrying a clientMutationId got any idempotency at all, and that was a 60s in-memory cache with no caller partition that dies with the process; an existing-workspace launch got none. Mobile retries a lost create by design, so the retry is the ordinary case — and a retry past that cache meant a second worktree and a second agent. A caller may now name its launch with an optional `operationId` and get one execution, the recorded answer on every replay, and a truthful refusal when the outcome is unknown. Admission runs before the worktree selector is resolved, so a replay answers from the record rather than re-deciding against today's world. The core is an atomic claim. Admission alone cannot decide who runs: two replays both read `pending`, and settling `unknown` replaces the outcome blind, so two serialized writes are not a compare-and-swap and both callers execute. A conditional current-state swap now reports which caller won, and settlement is monotone so a late `unknown` cannot erase a recorded success. Also here: a host-computed fingerprint over the launch intent that excludes mutable settings, the full launch result persisted so a replay returns the receipt and warning that cannot be recomputed once settings move, and a derived child operation id for the inner attach — the ledger key carries no method, so forwarding the launch id would make the attach conflict with its own launch. Safety, not recovery. Nothing here probes for a surface a dead attempt left behind, adopts one, or finishes an interrupted publication. Callers that send no `operationId` keep today's behaviour exactly, which is why the field is optional and the host advertises `agent.launch.replay.v1`: an older host strips an unknown param and launches anyway, so a client may only treat a retry as safe once the host has said it enforces the ledger. * fix(agent-launch): keep an unreadable launch payload from costing the store Review follow-ups on the replay-safety ledger. A recorded `launch` payload must not gate row validity. `isAgentLaunchResult` is a hand-maintained mirror of a result type later work will edit, and `isAgentSessionOperationRow` is consulted by the store loader, where one rejected row makes the whole file unparseable — a primary and backup that both fail to parse raise `agent_session_store_corrupt` and the profile loses every lease. That is the same argument the row already makes for keeping `sessionId` required, applied to the field this PR added. The payload is now typed `unknown`, left out of the row guard, and narrowed where it is read, so a payload this build cannot read refuses exactly one replay. A recorded failure now replays as the code the launch raised. Narrowing it through the closed `agentSession.*` refusal list answered `worktree_not_found` with `agent_session_operation_invalid` — the ledger's "your id is malformed" signal, which invites a client to mint a fresh id when the truthful answer is that this launch definitively did not run and the same id is safe to retry. The persisted failure code is bounded on the way in. A code is an identifier, but `error.message` is free text: an errno sentence carrying an absolute path arrived here as one and was written into a file re-serialized whole on every later operation. Bounded on write only — a length check in the row validator would reject rows this same build wrote, which is the hazard above. Comments: the caller key does not give one client a single namespace across surfaces, because the structured attach this launch performs partitions under `structuredCallerFor`; the two coincide only for a bearer-identity caller with no paired device, which is exactly when the derived child id is load-bearing. Recorded as a known limit that a `lost` claim cannot tell a sibling executing now from one a restart abandoned; telling them apart needs execution-generation tagging, which is recovery. Tests: the store-level ablation was inert — it defined a local stand-in and passed identically with and without the guard. It now substitutes the non-atomic composition into the handler's own store and watches one tap create two workspaces. Each of the four new guards was watched failing against the unfixed code: `agent_session_store_corrupt` on reopen, `expected false to be true` on the row guard, `agent_session_operation_invalid` in place of `worktree_not_found`, and a 6042-character code where 128 is the bound. * fix(agent-launch): keep live retries in one execution * docs(agent-launch): clarify failed replay guidance |
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de4dab93cb |
test(shared): drop the duplicated separator-only git grep test (#21116)
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aad41b1a40 |
fix(native-chat): render approvals from the harness presentation, not serialized tool input (#21087)
* fix(native-chat): render approvals from the harness presentation, not serialized tool input The approval card built its title from the tool name and rendered JSON.stringify(input) into an element with no height bound. Any large payload - a file write's contents, a proposed plan - pushed the action buttons past the viewport with no way to scroll to them, leaving the prompt unanswerable without zooming the pane out. Thread the agent SDK's own presentation fields through the prompt registry into the journal item: title, displayName, description, decisionReason, blockedPath and matchedAskRule. The SDK documents its title as the prompt text to use instead of reconstructing one, and warns that the decision reason may carry terminal escapes, so those are stripped before rendering. The card now also shows why a request was raised rather than only what it was. Bound the detail in a scrollable region that is reachable by keyboard, and cap it main-side with the existing shared tool-detail limit rather than the far looser journal payload bound. Focus moves to the card when a prompt appears and Escape resolves it, which previously did nothing because the composer owning that handler is unmounted while a prompt is pending. Mobile rendered the same unbounded detail and is fixed alongside. * fix(native-chat): keep approval actions reachable |
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55ae3b393c | fix: make git grep directory filters recursive | ||
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4b87bc718e |
refactor(agent-launch): redefine the agent.launch contract (#20999)
* refactor(agent-launch): redefine the agent.launch contract
`agent.launch` has no clients yet, so the contract is redefined in place
rather than versioned.
- params require `operation.id`, pinned to the shipped operation-id mint so
the host can read the embedded timestamp back. No caller-supplied
fingerprint: the host derives its own.
- the result carries `disposition` ('created' | 'replayed', the same
vocabulary `RuntimeCreateAgentSessionResult` already uses) and a single
top-level `warning` instead of one on the terminal arm only.
- the prompt receipt becomes an outcome enum, so a receipt can under-claim
instead of reporting a bare `delivered: false`.
- the dead `customization` field is deleted, and the mode-reason union and
receipt are declared once in shared with main re-exporting.
- `clientMutationId` joins the reserved create fields, with a test pinning
the list to the create schema in both directions.
Contract only; no behaviour change and no ledger wiring.
* docs(agent-launch): stop calling the stripped set "agent fields"
`clientMutationId` joined AGENT_LAUNCH_RESERVED_CREATE_FIELDS, so three
comments describing the stripped set as agent fields now teach the wrong
model — including a SAFETY rationale, where a reader is trusting it most.
The rationale's claim is unchanged and still sound: deleting keys from a
parsed object leaves the rest the parsed shape.
* refactor(agent-launch): make the attempt id the launch's only idempotency key
Review follow-ups on the contract redefinition.
`operation: { id }` becomes a flat `clientOperationId`, spelled the way
`terminal.createAgentSession` and the structured mutation envelope already
spell the same concept, and admitted by the shipped
`parseAgentSessionOperationTimestamp` rather than a second copy of its
pattern — so `agent-session-host-authority` keeps the regex private.
The handler now dedupes on that id instead of the create payload's
`clientMutationId`. That field is optional, so keying on it left any launch
that omitted one with no idempotency at all, while the required attempt id
did nothing. Reserving `clientMutationId` is still right, but for the reason
the comments now give: `createManagedWorktree` never reads it, so a copy left
in the forwarded payload is inert while still reading as a guarantee. The
previous rationale — that it was a second live dedupe key — was not true.
`messageId` moves onto the prompt receipt's `journaled` arm so a producer
cannot report the text as committed without saying where, and `rpcCallerKey`
picks up the `terminal.create` call site it was lifted from instead of
shipping with no callers.
* docs(agent-launch): record why disposition is two-valued only for now
The ledger admits attempts whose outcome was never recorded, and neither
`created` nor `replayed` can say "I cannot tell you" — a caller handed
`created` for an unresolved attempt starts a second agent. Noted at the type
rather than in review, so whoever wires the ledger reads it where they edit.
* fix(agent-launch): keep contract within implemented guarantees
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533b0bd02e |
fix(native-chat): count a turn from the send that opened it (#21086)
* fix(native-chat): count a turn from the send that opened it The live turn indicator switched on at the submission but anchored its clock at the provider turn-open, so it jumped back by exactly the dispatch latency the moment the turn opened. Measured on a real Claude session: the counter climbed to "Working for 25s", reset to "Working for 0s", then settled "Worked for 26s" — three readings of one turn, from two different instants. The host now resolves the send that opened a turn and publishes it as an additive optional `requestedAt` on the turn lifecycle row. `startedAt` keeps its exact meaning, the provider turn-open, and is never rewritten, so clients that cannot be upgraded see no change to any value they already read. Both providers write it; it is omitted when no send can be named (provider-resumed turns, replayed history). Readers take one origin, `requestedAt ?? startedAt`, for both the live counter and the settled host interval, so the two cannot disagree. The provider's own reported duration keeps outranking the host interval, unchanged. The host-to-local clock conversion is now latched once per turn rather than re-derived per render. `receivedAt - hostNow` carries that sample's one-way delivery latency as well as skew, and the reducer replaces the sample on every frame, so re-deriving imported fresh jitter and could move the anchor later — the same class of backwards jump this change removes. With the conversion fixed, an origin that improves moves the anchor earlier by exactly that much, so displayed elapsed only grows. No monotonicity guard is added; the ordering is structural. Desktop and mobile drove byte-identical copies of the timing hook, so both are collapsed onto one React-free helper in shared. Regression tests drive the origin resolution rather than an already-resolved anchor, assert in milliseconds because second-flooring hides the sub-second case, and include a deliberate host/client skew so a raw timestamp assignment cannot pass on a machine where the two clocks agree. * fix(native-chat): correlate Codex turn origins by echo * fix(native-chat): preserve causal turn timing ownership * fix(native-chat): keep settled turn timing continuous |
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52b53c5bda |
feat(settings): choose the default terminal shell (#21085)
* feat(settings): configure default terminal shell * test(terminal): cover default shell selection * fix(terminal): apply shell setting to daemon PTYs * test(terminal): provide PTY dimensions in shell cases * fix(settings): clarify default shell behavior * feat(settings): make shell choice explicit * fix(settings): keep shell control testable without preload * fix(settings): slim terminal shell control * chore(i18n): allow terminal shell setting labels * chore(i18n): mark dynamic shell label |
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9add08bb59 |
test(mobile): recorder follow-ups — write ordinal, teardown streams, context anchor, salvage observation, provider pass-through, React draw (#21088)
* refactor(mobile-recorder): one shared write ordinal for requests, payloads and effects
`sent` stamped each payload and effect with the number of requests sent at
write time, which orders those two lists against sends but never against each
other. A family that sends no requests therefore had every stamp at `0`:
moving `host-worktree-refresh.ts`'s two initial snapshot reads from after
`client.subscribe` to before it moved none of the 705 goldens.
One monotonic counter per recording now stamps requests, payloads and effects
alike at the moment each is written, so the three append-only lists are ordered
against each other. The same reorder now fails five goldens. A request is
stamped at the logical `sendRequest` call rather than when its physical payload
is published, so a send that waited for connected carries two distinct stamps.
Full re-record from the pinned baseline: 699 bodies moved, 6 header-only,
0 added, 0 deleted; the only moved JSON paths are `sent` leaving and `ordinal`
arriving on `sender`, `payloads` and `effects`. Decoding with those two fields
stripped leaves all 705 header-only.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JNnE9qzUZMMnqpZWCqM3nb
* feat(mobile-recorder): observe streams still registered at teardown
Closing a stream only writes to the wire when its method has an unsubscribe
builder. `notifications.subscribe` has none, so a cleanup that forgets its
local `unsubscribeStream()` leaks a live registry record and nothing on the
wire changes. Until now that class was covered by one hand-written scenario
per method, which stops the stream and cuts over so the leak reappears as a
second subscribe payload.
Teardown now asks each session's `RpcClientStreamRegistry` what it still holds,
after the product's cleanup and before the transport disposes it, and records a
non-empty answer as a `streams-registered-at-teardown` effect carrying each
stream's method, subscribe payload and cancelled flag. The set is read off the
registry's own map: a mirror kept by the recorder would reproduce the product's
bookkeeping rather than observe it. Deleting `unsubscribeStream()` from
`mobile-notifications.ts` fails 7 goldens now, against 1 before.
Re-record: 4 bodies moved, 701 header-only, 0 added, 0 deleted. All four are
the two `runtime.clientEvents.subscribe` matrices, on partitions whose subscribe
reply is not a well-formed `ready`: with no subscription id to unsubscribe with,
the registry deliberately holds the cancelled record, which is why the
observation carries `cancelled`.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JNnE9qzUZMMnqpZWCqM3nb
* refactor(mobile-recorder): one host-client context exposure, anchored on the product source
Five adapter modules each carried `exports.recorderHostClientContext = Ctx;`
inside a source string appended to `client-context.tsx`. `Ctx` is a
module-private local, so the reference lives in a string no type checker
follows: renaming it typechecks clean and fails a recording with a
`ReferenceError` a hundred seconds in, five times over.
`hostClientContextExposure` and `loadHostClientContext` are the one copy, and
`adapter-seam.test.ts` asserts the declaration the exposure names still exists
exactly once in `client-context.tsx` and refuses a sixth inline copy. A rename
remains invisible to `tsc` — nothing but editing the fenced product module
makes a private local checkable — so the anchor is what turns it into one
failure that says what moved.
Also splits the subscription tests out of `recording-runner.test.ts`, which
items 1 and 2 had pushed past `max-lines`.
Re-record: 705 header-only, 0 bodies moved, 0 added, 0 deleted; `recorderSha256`
on all 705 and `adapterSha256` on the 23 goldens mounted through the five
modules.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JNnE9qzUZMMnqpZWCqM3nb
* feat(mobile-recorder): record what a checked read salvaged
`collectSalvageDrops` builds a report on every decoded reply — which array
elements a `salvagingArray` threw away, which members a `salvagedOptional`
read as absent — and `classifyRpcReply` puts it on the outcome, where nothing
reads it. Which rows a reply lost was therefore visible nowhere, including in
a golden.
The recorder wraps `classifyRpcReply` on the mounted module, the one seam every
checked read passes through and the only one that knows the operation the drop
happened under, and records a non-empty report as a `reply-salvage` effect. No
product code changes; the report was already being built and discarded.
No golden carries one. All 19,384 checked reads in the corpus decode their reply
whole, because the reply matrix varies the envelope a host sends rather than the
shape of a row inside a result. The observation pins that absence, and moves the
first time a narrowed element or member schema drops a recorded row — including
where nothing downstream reads it. `salvage-observation.test.ts` is what keeps
the observation honest, driving a malformed row and a malformed optional through
the real `git.status` reply schema.
Re-record: 705 header-only on `recorderSha256`, 0 bodies moved, 0 added,
0 deleted.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JNnE9qzUZMMnqpZWCqM3nb
* fix(source-control): let hostedReview.create carry a provider token this build does not list
`HostedReviewCreate.provider` was a closed `z.enum`, so a client repeating back
a provider a newer host named in its own eligibility reply had its create
rejected at params validation. Mobile worked around it with a SAFETY-annotated
assertion: narrowing to `'unsupported'` before sending would have made the host
refuse its own provider, so the token was cast through instead.
The schema member is now `z.string()`, and both create handlers narrow through
`supportsHostedReviewCreation` before calling the runtime, so an arm this build
does not know answers `unsupported_provider` with readable copy rather than a
params error the client cannot act on. `createHostedReview`'s own refusal is
the single source of that copy. The mobile assertion is deleted.
Product change on a fenced path, so the goldens are not re-recorded: the whole
recording suite replays green against the corpus committed in the previous
commit, 825 passed, zero golden movement.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JNnE9qzUZMMnqpZWCqM3nb
* test(source-control): annotate the runtime stub cast in the provider refusal test
The changed-code quality gate counts a new `as unknown as OrcaRuntimeService`
as a finding. A narrower stand-in does not exist: the interface has 1047
members and `Pick` of the three this test uses is not assignable.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JNnE9qzUZMMnqpZWCqM3nb
* fix(mobile-recorder): pay React's lazy Math.random draw before the seeded run
React resolves `enqueueTask` by reading `module['require' + Math.random()]` and memoizes the
result, so a process draws exactly one `Math.random()` the first time it awaits `act`. The runner
drains through `act` after every step, so that draw landed inside whichever recording ran first and
ate the seeded sequence's first value: a family recording a `Math.random()`-derived param recorded
one value when it ran alone and a different one when it ran after any other family, and an adapter
could only dodge it by drawing in its factory ahead of the first drain.
The scheduler now pays that draw once per process, before it installs the seeded generator, so the
seeded sequence starts at the same value for every recording. Priming is awaited, which makes
`start` async.
Goldens re-recorded: 705 header-only, `recorderSha256` alone. No golden carried a first-in-process
value, so nothing moved in a body.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JNnE9qzUZMMnqpZWCqM3nb
* fix(mobile-recorder): drain before reading the streams left at teardown
The teardown observation read the registry after `dispose()` returned but before the scheduler
drained, so a cleanup that closes its stream on a due 0ms timer had not run yet and was recorded as
an uncancelled registration — the one shape this observation reserves for a cleanup that never ran.
A deferred close and a stream nobody ever closed were byte-identical.
The drain now runs before the read, with the transport still disposed after it. A second drain stays
after disposal: tearing the registries down rejects what the product still awaited, and an unhandled
rejection is an effect the cleanup checkpoint has to see.
Also: the registry size comparison in `registeredStreams()` could never fire, because `size()`
returns `this.streams.size` on the same object; `RECORDER_HOST_CLIENT_CONTEXT` is used only in its
own module and no longer exported; and `streamPayloads` now says what it holds, which is every frame
the registry publishes rather than only subscribes.
Goldens are stale in this commit and are re-recorded in the next one.
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JNnE9qzUZMMnqpZWCqM3nb
* test(mobile): re-record the corpus after the baseline repin and the teardown drain
Recorded from a detached worktree pinned at
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85d1ffc072 |
fix: accept enterprise managed GitHub owner logins (#20450)
Unify owner validation across project pickers and repository overrides. Preserve EMU usernames in API and auth-status branch-prefix resolution, with regression coverage. Co-authored-by: Neil <neil@stably.ai> |
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97aa5ff19b |
fix(mobile): open native chat when a new worktree launches a default agent (#19850)
* refactor(agent-launch): make the launch-mode decision surface-neutral
`decideWorkerStartMode` was the only shared answer to "structured chat session
or terminal agent?", but it lived in an orchestration-named module and spoke
orchestration's vocabulary, so the other launch surfaces could not call it.
Move the decision to `main/agent-launch/agent-launch-mode` unchanged and leave
`orchestration-worker-start-mode` as the adapter that supplies the noun.
A worker is not a special kind of launch; it is the same launch with a dispatch
attached. Naming the receipt's subject is the only thing orchestration actually
contributed, so that is the only thing the adapter keeps: "worker" in both
sentences, plus the `--terminal` wording, which reads as nonsense anywhere a
`--terminal` flag does not exist. Both are pinned, because they are asserted.
No behavior change. The receipts are byte-identical for every reachable case,
proven by running the new pin against both implementations.
Also pins the wording, which nothing was holding. The existing suites assert
`toContain` fragments ('terminal agent', 'cannot create') and the CLI suite
asserts a receipt handed to it by a mock rather than one this code produced;
all six files stayed green against a deliberately corrupted vocabulary. A
dispatch receipt is the only place a structured-to-terminal downgrade explains
itself, so the whole sentence is the contract, not a fragment of it.
* feat(agent-launch): add the launch intent and the one executor that runs it
The sequencing around the launch decision was duplicated per surface, and the
duplicate is where the bug lives. A new worktree was created agent-first, so
its startup terminal WAS the agent and the structured branch below it could
never be reached — every new-worktree launch was a PTY regardless of the user's
default. Orchestration fixed that for itself in #19431; mobile and the CLI
still have it.
`executeAgentLaunch` inverts the order once, for everyone. When the preference
is structured the worktree is created with NO startup agent, the executing host
is then asked whether it can host a session for the workspace that now exists,
and only then is a surface created. The host verdict cannot be hoisted above
creation: `agentSession.createSupport` only answers for a workspace it can
resolve, which is why the decision stays in two halves.
Agent-first creation is deliberately preserved for PTY launches — it is what
sequences the agent's startup command behind the setup runner, so wait-for-setup
comes for free there.
What actually differs per surface is only how a surface is built (an
orchestration worker's session takes a dispatch hold and a mailbox a plain
launch must not take), so that is injected as a factory rather than branched on.
The intent also strips the reserved agent fields from a migrated create payload:
a caller moving off `worktree.create` passes its existing params, and a stale
`startupAgent` in there would re-create the very path this replaces.
Tests assert order and arguments, not just the resulting mode. Reintroducing
agent-first creation reddens 4 of 11.
* feat(agent-launch): expose the launch executor as the agent.launch RPC
Adds `agent.launch` — one host-side method that decides structured-vs-terminal and
creates the surface — wired to the real runtime factories: `createManagedWorktree`
for the workspace, forking on `startupAgent` exactly as the orchestration worker
path does; `createStructuredAgentSessionForWorktree` for a chat session; and
`createTerminal` for a PTY agent. Allowlisted for mobile, which is the surface the
routing gap was reported on.
`worktree.create` is untouched. Its `startupAgent` keeps meaning "spawn a PTY agent"
verbatim, because it answers with `agentTerminalHandle` only on that path: a host
that quietly routed it to a structured session would hand every older client a
response with no handle and no error. All new behaviour sits behind
`agent.launch.v1`, which the host now advertises and a remote client must negotiate,
so a client that does not gets today's behaviour unchanged.
* feat(mobile): route workspace creates through agent.launch
Picking an agent on the mobile create sheet always produced a terminal, even
when the user's default was native chat, because all three create paths put
`startupAgent` on `worktree.create`. That means "create the worktree
agent-first", so its startup terminal IS the agent and the structured branch
below it is unreachable — while the same phone's in-workspace "+" button opened
a chat.
The blank, branch and new-branch creates now send the same payload through
`agent.launch` and let the host settle the surface. `worktree.create` is
untouched, and a host that does not advertise `agent.launch.v1` (read from the
existing `status.get` probe) keeps today's path exactly.
Work-item creates stay on `worktree.create`: they pre-fill the issue/PR URL as
an unsent `startupDraft`, which a structured session cannot hold yet, so routing
them would submit the URL as a first turn.
* fix(agent-launch): drop the deleted draft-prompt blocker from the reason map
main removed the draft-prompt blocker in #19681 (a structured session now holds
an unsent draft), so the exhaustive Record no longer typechecks.
* chore(agent-launch): carry a SAFETY rationale on the agent placement cast
The type-assertion gate landed after this branch's base, so the new file's
copy of the worker-start cast is now a changed-code finding.
* chore(agent-launch): carry agent.launch through main's RPC typing and casting gates
The typed-method contract, the generated params catalog and the
`assertionStyle: never` casting scan all landed after this branch's base.
- AGENT_LAUNCH_METHODS kept an `RpcMethod[]` annotation, which widened its
method name to `string` and broke assignability; every sibling infers instead.
- `agent.launch` binds a schema under src/main, so it joins the catalog's
RPC_METHODS_WITHOUT_SHARED_PARAMS and the parity gate's hand-listed twin.
- The now-typed methods make most test casts unnecessary; the few that remain
carry the line-specific SAFETY rationale the casting gate requires.
* test(mobile): supply the agent-launch fixture the create-submit recording needs
The golden RPC recordings landed upstream while this branch was out, so they
first met agent.launch here. Three things had to happen, and only one of them is
a fixture bump.
1. workspace-settings-mounts.ts mounts useNewWorkspaceCreateSubmit against a
fixture model that throws on any member it was not given. This PR added a
required getAgentLaunchSupport, so the submit aborted with "Missing model
fixture" before it ever issued the create, and three cleanup checkpoints
vanished. That read like a product regression and was not one. Supplying the
member restores the recording byte-for-byte; it is pinned false for the same
reason the cutover probe is, so the baseline stays on worktree.create.
2. Editing that adapter moves adapterSha256 for the twelve settings goldens it
mounts. Their recordings are unchanged - header only, by design: the digest
is per-golden so editing a module fails exactly the goldens that mounted it.
3. Five goldens changed behaviourally, and both changes are this PR's:
the capability probe now reports agentLaunch, and a create whose reply
carries no worktree returns "Failed to create workspace" instead of throwing
a TypeError off an unguarded result.worktree read. The launch route needs
that guard, since a receipt can arrive without a worktreeId.
* refactor(mobile): decode the launch receipt instead of asserting its shape
The changed-code quality gate refuses type assertions, and the eight it flagged
were worth removing rather than suppressing.
The production one was the point. readAgentLaunchCreateOutcome asserted the RPC
payload into Partial<AgentLaunchResult> and then runtime-checked it anyway, so
the assertion bought nothing and claimed a contract the host had not proven. It
now narrows with `in` and validates each hop, which is the same nullability
question readCreateResult already answers on the sibling path - a launch receipt
can legitimately arrive without a worktreeId. AgentLaunchCreateOutcome ties
worktreeId to the shared contract so a change there fails this reader's
typecheck rather than passing a differently-typed field through.
The test fakes claimed a whole RpcClient via `as unknown as RpcClient` while
implementing one member. They now build a typed literal, matching the pattern in
use-mobile-structured-agent-options.test.ts. The read sites cast params and then
read one field; they now assert the payload with toMatchObject, which removes
the cast and pins more of the shape than the cast did.
Also pins the warning passthrough, which nothing covered: a terminal launch that
seats the workspace but cannot start the pty reports why, and the absent, blank,
non-string and structured-surface cases report nothing. Writing that test caught
a real drop I had introduced in the reader.
* ci(mobile): re-run Mobile Checks when a shared capability changes
Mobile Checks is path-filtered to mobile/**, but mobile imports the negotiated
capability names straight from src/shared/protocol-version.ts and records the
whole capability read verbatim in its goldens. So a capability added desktop-side
rewrites a mobile fixture while never triggering the suite that would catch it.
That is what happened here: #19849 introduced agent.launch.v1 and Mobile Checks
never ran on it. Verified at the run level rather than by check name - the
window-free check-runs API on
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f02d09c1ba |
fix(native-chat): deliver queued messages while the chat pane is hidden (#20659)
* fix(native-chat): deliver queued messages while the chat pane is hidden With two or more messages queued, everything behind the head waited on the user's attention. The drain only inspected the head and returned unless it was `queued`, and a `pending` send deliberately leaves the head `dispatching`. An entry only leaves that state through the journal subscription, which is torn down when the pane goes hidden -- and a worktree switch hides it. Two changes, both needed: - One shared admission rule now says what the queue does next, and the drain takes its `dispatch`: the first `queued` entry, skipping entries the host has already acknowledged. It still stops at an `unconfirmed` entry or a refusal the user must act on. Order is not the outbox's to keep -- the host appends the submission inside the per-session serialize chain before dispatching, so journal order is arrival order. Holding the tail bought no ordering guarantee and cost delivery. Single-flight still keeps sends strictly sequential, and a launch prompt's in-flight send, which runs outside it, still stops the queue. - The journal subscription now stays open while a session has undelivered outbox entries, published from the `writeOutbox` choke point. The subscription's retaining hold is what also keeps the host from evicting the session 15s after the last turn, which would otherwise turn the stall into a blocked head refusing `agent_session_ownership_unknown`. An acknowledged entry stays in the outbox rather than retiring on `pending`: the text is safe either way, since the journal upserts a render item from the submission's own body, but a `pending` can still settle `rejected` or `unknown` and only the entry carries the retry state that answer needs. Follow-on corrections the head-only assumption had hidden: - Single-flight is released where the disposition is applied, not in a later `.finally`. That state write is what re-runs the drain, so the release has to land first or the queue has no trigger left. - One ref now holds the in-flight entry's id instead of a bare boolean, and the reconcile effect keys its release on that, not on the head, so a journal update about the head can no longer discard a still-unsettled send of the tail. - A refusal blocks the entry it refused, read back by index so a rotated id is preserved. - The automatic unknown probe and the Retry affordance both read the blocker at whatever index it sits, the Retry through the same shared rule as the drain. `raises no delivery notice for a stuck message behind a healthy head` asserted that a message behind an admitted head raises nothing, because a Retry could not act on it. It now can, so that guard is rewritten to assert the notice names that entry and its Retry sends that entry. * fix(native-chat): resume outbox after journal admission and scope subscriptions * test: name outbox send request by domain role |
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36cdb34097 |
test(agent-status): pin each legacy-bypass detector to its own case (#21004)
The ratchet's planted-fixture test collapsed every detection into a deduplicated kind set, so `passed-map` — which has two independent producing sites — stayed green when either one broke on its own. Give each planted form its own case with an exact expected detection. |
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a28085adbf |
refactor(mobile): checked reply readers for the source-control domain (step 7 pilot) (#20950)
* test(mobile): ratchet the 201 unchecked RPC reply readers Step 4 moved every call-site cast into an RpcOperation's `read`, but 201 of those readers still answer `compatible: true` for any payload: `rpcUncheckedPayloadReader` (163), `rpcReadUnchecked` (26 outside its own module) and `rpcUncheckedMemberReader` (12), across 42 files. The cast moved; it did not become true. Held as data with an AST boundary test, shaped on the raw-request-port ratchet: a file that is not listed fails, a listed file that no longer has one fails, and a count that rises fails. Only a call counts, so an import is not a reader and prose never is. No behaviour change: this commit adds a list and a test. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JNnE9qzUZMMnqpZWCqM3nb * feat(mobile): validate the source-control domain's RPC replies at arrival Replaces all 17 unchecked readers in mobile/src/source-control/ with `rpcResultVariant(variant, schema)`, so a malformed reply is an `RpcIncompatibleReplyError` naming the operation instead of a TypeError three frames downstream. The inventory drops 201 -> 184 and the five source-control operations files leave it entirely. This is a behaviour change, scoped to malformed replies. Six reply-matrix goldens move; every named-scenario golden and every `normal` partition is byte-identical, which is the parity claim. Schemas live one module per reply domain, beside the operations that read them: git-status, git-compare, git-history, hosted-review and worktree-metadata. A member is required only where a consumer reads it unguarded, and each schema records the consumer line that justifies it. Nothing is `.strict()`; every reply a consumer publishes verbatim keeps `z.looseObject` so an undeclared host member still passes through. Six replies have no reader anywhere in mobile and get `z.unknown()`, which is the honest schema for them, not a holdout. Three readers stay total by construction, because their contract is that an unreadable reply is a value rather than an error: the `git.status` projection (a null status three screens route on), the `session.tabs.list` reveal (a null list means poll again) and the generated commit message (a screen's copy, never a decode error in a text field). They gain the salvage report, not a verdict. Consumers take the schema's output type, so `MobileGitStatusResult` and the branch-compare aliases now name what mobile reads rather than the desktop aggregate, and seven call-site casts are gone. Three requirements came from the goldens, not from the host types: `git.history` sends `timestamp: null`, `hostedReview.getCreationEligibility` sends a `reviewLookupOutcome` the shared union does not list, and the `git.status` projection writes an absent member as a present `undefined`. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JNnE9qzUZMMnqpZWCqM3nb * test(mobile): re-record the six source-control reply-matrix goldens step 7 moves Six goldens, all on malformed partitions. Every named-scenario golden and every `normal` partition is unchanged, which is the parity claim for this step. git.history-read / git.history#1 result-absent, result-null, inner-ok-missing, inner-false-string-error, inner-false-object-error: the load rejected with a TypeError reading 'items' or 'map' off undefined/null; it now rejects with `incompatible_reply: git.history-page (git.history)`. hostedReview.eligibility + create-intent / hostedReview.getCreationEligibility result-absent, result-null, inner-ok-*: the fetch fulfilled with the error envelope itself, re-typed as an eligibility and published into the compose prefill; it now rejects, and both callers already route that to the same "eligibility unavailable" state a null answer produced. hostedReview.create-chain + create-intent / hostedReview.create result-absent, result-null, inner-ok-missing, inner-false-object-error: the create form showed the raw TypeError text "Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'ok')"; it now shows the incompatible-reply message. Every header digest is unchanged -- baseline, recorder, adapter, scenario and lockfile all match -- so the diff is the behaviour and nothing else. Recorded from this branch into a scratch directory and copied in, because there is no scoped honest alternative: scripts/rpc-recording.mts refuses to run unless the product tree equals the pinned baseline, and the README's remedy for an intended behaviour change is to repin, which rewrites the `baseline` header of all 667 goldens. So these six now carry a pin whose tree no longer produces them. That is a real gap in the oracle's design for behaviour changes, not a detail of this step, and it needs a decision before this lands. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JNnE9qzUZMMnqpZWCqM3nb * test(mobile): pin the four reply-schema properties the goldens found Each of these cost a reply-matrix golden while writing the source-control schemas, and none of them follows from reading the consumers or the host types: a newer host's undeclared members must still decode, `git.history` sends `timestamp: null`, `hostedReview.getCreationEligibility` sends a `reviewLookupOutcome` the shared union does not list, and the `git.status` projection writes an absent member as a present `undefined`. The `.strict()` case is the one worth stating twice: at the top level it rejects the reply, and on the entry it drops the row, which shows a dirty worktree an empty Changes list. The fifth test pins the salvage report that makes such a drop visible instead of silent. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JNnE9qzUZMMnqpZWCqM3nb * fix(mobile): give an unreadable reply a message a user can read `RpcIncompatibleReplyError` put `incompatible_reply: <op> (<method>)` in `message`, and `message` is what the screens hand to a toast. Step 7 is the first change that can reach this error at all, so the token would have shipped to users as its own error copy. Fixed at the boundary rather than per site: `message` is now plain copy, and the machine token moved to `code` (`incompatible_reply`) and `name` (`RpcIncompatibleReplyError`), both readable by callers. The cross-bundle fallback in `isRpcIncompatibleReplyError` matched on the old message prefix, so it now matches on `name`, which a foreign copy of the module still carries. No existing test pinned the old text. Two new ones pin the copy, the token and the foreign-copy match. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01JNnE9qzUZMMnqpZWCqM3nb * test(mobile): repin the recording baseline to this branch and re-record Commit |
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740887fbbb |
feat(settings): connected computers rows for session history indexing (#20887)
* feat(session-search): add ranked history panel search and consent * test: wait for initial session indexing before refreshing results * feat(session-history): add local search settings and index controls * Use shared local host identifier for session index status * feat(session-search): merge all-computers search across hosts The `all` scope on `aiVault:searchSessions` now fans out from the desktop to every host the session list enumerates and merges the pages into one. Legs run in parallel: the local index through the search service, SSH and runtime hosts through the existing remote search client. Two fixed orders, because relevance scores from independent indexes are not comparable. `newest` asks every leg for recency and k-way merges on `updatedAt`, nulls last, ties broken on execution host id. `relevance` rotates hosts in host-id order by their own rank. The merged cursor is an opaque base64url payload holding each host's cursor, how many of its current page were already emitted, and the generation that offset counts into, plus the page size and sort the cursor belongs to. A host whose index moved is fenced to `stale` and stops contributing; the rest keep paging. Per-host outcomes ride back on one new optional `hosts` field on the results response. `aiVault:searchStatus` with `all` stays refused, and neither the runtime RPC nor the CLI gains the scope, so a fan-out is never two hops. * fix(preload): let the search bridge address the all-computers scope * feat(settings): live index status, enable confirm, advanced delete * feat(session-search): search every computer from the history panel The panel's "All computers" scope produced no request: the hook parsed the scope into a single host id and stopped when that was null, so the panel answered "Choose one computer to search its sessions." The desktop already merges every enumerated host behind `aiVault:searchSessions`, so pass the scope straight through and stamp each hit with the host it came back on. Hosts the merge could not search are named under the results header with a short reason, since a silent partial answer reads as "no such session". (cherry picked from commit |
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aee98ccaa0 |
fix(browser): make the browser identity one process-wide choice (#13822) (#20767)
* feat(browser): process-wide browser identity, chosen before ready
Electron resolves worker identity from a single process-global default, so two
coherent identities cannot coexist in one process. This makes clean/native one
app-wide decision read before `ready`, instead of a per-profile one that leaves
documents on one identity and every worker request on the other.
Both identities are load-bearing, measured across four origins at five reps:
the cleaned identity clears an embedded Turnstile widget and WhatsApp's browser
check where native is refused; native clears a full-page Cloudflare interstitial
that the cleaned identity never clears.
Base commit only: removing the per-profile field, its settings surface, and the
migration notice follow.
* test(browser): cover cross-context UA wire identity
* refactor(browser): make user agent identity app-wide
* test(browser): repair process identity wire fixture
* Fix browser identity startup migration failures
* WIP: rescue in-flight reduced-design work from a dead worker
Worker ctx_cb5b1262d7fe stopped ~2h ago mid-implementation (last heartbeat
2026-09-14T22:48:06Z) leaving this uncommitted. Committed unverified to make it
recoverable; not reviewed, not necessarily green.
* fix(browser): repair the rescued identity work so it typechecks
Finishes the interrupted edits in
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a01027697c |
feat(session-search): enable indexing on paired servers from a client (#20886)
* feat(session-search): add ranked history panel search and consent * test: wait for initial session indexing before refreshing results * feat(session-history): add local search settings and index controls * Use shared local host identifier for session index status * feat(session-search): merge all-computers search across hosts The `all` scope on `aiVault:searchSessions` now fans out from the desktop to every host the session list enumerates and merges the pages into one. Legs run in parallel: the local index through the search service, SSH and runtime hosts through the existing remote search client. Two fixed orders, because relevance scores from independent indexes are not comparable. `newest` asks every leg for recency and k-way merges on `updatedAt`, nulls last, ties broken on execution host id. `relevance` rotates hosts in host-id order by their own rank. The merged cursor is an opaque base64url payload holding each host's cursor, how many of its current page were already emitted, and the generation that offset counts into, plus the page size and sort the cursor belongs to. A host whose index moved is fenced to `stale` and stops contributing; the rest keep paging. Per-host outcomes ride back on one new optional `hosts` field on the results response. `aiVault:searchStatus` with `all` stays refused, and neither the runtime RPC nor the CLI gains the scope, so a fan-out is never two hops. * fix(preload): let the search bridge address the all-computers scope * feat(settings): live index status, enable confirm, advanced delete * feat(session-search): search every computer from the history panel The panel's "All computers" scope produced no request: the hook parsed the scope into a single host id and stopped when that was null, so the panel answered "Choose one computer to search its sessions." The desktop already merges every enumerated host behind `aiVault:searchSessions`, so pass the scope straight through and stamp each hit with the host it came back on. Hosts the merge could not search are named under the results header with a short reason, since a silent partial answer reads as "no such session". (cherry picked from commit |
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46ed53b88a |
feat(session-search): merge all-computers search across hosts (#20670)
* feat(session-history): add local search settings and index controls * Use shared local host identifier for session index status * feat(session-search): merge all-computers search across hosts The `all` scope on `aiVault:searchSessions` now fans out from the desktop to every host the session list enumerates and merges the pages into one. Legs run in parallel: the local index through the search service, SSH and runtime hosts through the existing remote search client. Two fixed orders, because relevance scores from independent indexes are not comparable. `newest` asks every leg for recency and k-way merges on `updatedAt`, nulls last, ties broken on execution host id. `relevance` rotates hosts in host-id order by their own rank. The merged cursor is an opaque base64url payload holding each host's cursor, how many of its current page were already emitted, and the generation that offset counts into, plus the page size and sort the cursor belongs to. A host whose index moved is fenced to `stale` and stops contributing; the rest keep paging. Per-host outcomes ride back on one new optional `hosts` field on the results response. `aiVault:searchStatus` with `all` stays refused, and neither the runtime RPC nor the CLI gains the scope, so a fan-out is never two hops. * fix(preload): let the search bridge address the all-computers scope * feat(settings): live index status, enable confirm, advanced delete * fix(settings): let Button and Collapsible own their spacing and type |
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0d2f7bcea3 |
fix(session-search): index OpenCode SQLite sessions (#20870)
* feat(session-search): index OpenCode SQLite sessions OpenCode sessions live in one SQLite database read on a worker thread, and the worker only ever answered with the newest few messages for the panel preview. The parser therefore published nothing over the transcript channel, so the search index wrote a placeholder row for every OpenCode candidate and no OpenCode message was ever searchable. Adds a `capture` request to the worker protocol that returns the session and every text part of every user/assistant turn from one open of the database. The agent parser asks for it whenever a sink is listening, so OpenCode joins the whole-document sources on the same path as Grok, Cursor and Gemini. The placeholder path (`parserPublishesMessages`, `noteUnreachableParser`) is gone; an OpenCode read that fails now fails like any other file. Bumps the index schema so existing indexes drop their placeholder rows, and adds `sessionsByAgent` to the index status, which is the count that made this bug visible. * test(session-search): assert every source speaks, not every agent OpenCode has two storage shapes, so asking only that some OpenCode session published messages was satisfied by the legacy JSON fixture while every SQLite session in the vault stayed silent. Assert per discovered source and keep the agent-coverage check beside it. * feat(session-search): capture OpenCode tool and reasoning parts Text parts alone left OpenCode behind every file-based provider: a command someone ran, what it printed, and the model's reasoning were all unsearchable. Widens the capture query to text, reasoning and tool parts. Reasoning folds into the turn's own words, the way the shared block list already treats a thinking block. Each tool part becomes one `tool` message carrying the call line and what came back, built with the same `toolCallText` every file provider uses; OpenCode's `filePath` is renamed to the `file_path` spelling that list knows, so a call is findable by its file argument. Adds a decoded-size ceiling beside the existing part ceiling. It is the bound a non-streaming source needs and a streaming one does not: a JSONL provider publishes each message as it reads it, while this one holds a whole session before posting it across the worker boundary. Neither ceiling truncates; both fail the read so it is retried and surfaces. * fix(ai-vault): fail an OpenCode capture it cannot read the message parts of `readOpenCodeSessionMessages` returned an empty list when the message-part schema probe failed. The sink-aware reader treats that as a complete read, so the consumer committed nothing and marked the source `current`: the session stayed out of the index with nothing on its row to say why and no retry. The part limit a few lines below already throws for exactly this reason, so the two now agree. The preview path is unchanged and still degrades to no messages, which is what a list read should do. Also throws from the fixture's `appendOpenCodeSqliteTurn` when the session id names no row, instead of falling back to the fixture epoch and appending orphan messages a test would then assert over. |
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3e5eb0329a |
feat(cli): orca search over the agent session index (#20514)
* feat(cli): orca search over the agent session index `orca search <query>` calls PR 5's `aiVault.searchSessions` over the CLI's existing runtime RPC, against the host `--environment` / `--pairing-code` selects and no other. `orca search --index-status` calls `aiVault.searchStatus`. It is the proof the contract works with no panel. Every flag maps onto a contract field and nothing else: `--scope`, `--fresh`, `--limit`, `--cursor`, repeatable `--agent` and `--path`, `--since`, `--sort`, `--debug`, `--json`. No fan-out, no merged output, no `--host`. One command rather than a `search status` subcommand: the query is a bare positional, so `orca search status` could not be told apart from searching for the word "status". `--status` is unavailable because `orchestration task-list --status <state>` already owns the name as a valued flag. No new runtime capability. PR 5 decided an explicit `method_not_found` refusal maps to `unavailable/no-service`, so reusing `createSessionSearchClient` gives an old host a plain "this host runs no session search service" answer at exit 0 instead of a raw JSON-RPC error. `CommandSpec.repeatableFlags` scopes repeatability per command, because `--agent` must repeat for search and stay single-valued for `worktree create`. `help.ts` sat exactly at max-lines, so `skills-command-flag-help.ts` becomes `command-scoped-flag-help.ts` carrying both tables at the same call-site size. * refactor(cli): drop the search type assertions main's casting gate now rejects Main gained a `consistent-type-assertions: never` scan in the changed-code gate after this branch was cut, and it reported twelve assertions in the new files. The four in the argument parser were avoidable. `readEnum` now keeps the value `find` returns, which already carries the narrow type, and the agent filter goes through an `isAiVaultAgent` predicate over a `Set<string>` instead of widening the agent tuple. The test now narrows the printed envelope by shape and re-reads the printed result through `AiVaultSearchResponseSchema`, so the JSON assertions are checked rather than claimed, and the flag table is typed so its callback needs no cast. One assertion is left, for the structural fake client, with the SAFETY rationale AGENTS.md requires. * fix(cli): sanitize host strings and scope pre-command repeatable flags Route every host-supplied string the search formatter prints through the escape stripper, and resolve the repeatable-flag set from the command tokens ahead when a flag sits before the command. * refactor(cli): resolve repeatable flag rules once per command * fix(cli): clarify session search availability and SSH scope * feat(cli): hide orca search until the settings toggle ships `orca search` stays dispatchable but leaves every discovery surface: root help, group help, unknown-command suggestions, and `agent-context --json`. `buildAgentContext` did not filter hidden specs, so it also stops leaking the hidden `terminal stop`. |
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291b4ddd6f |
feat(agent-status): route structured sessions through canonical ownership (#20718)
* feat(agent-status): route structured status through canonical ownership and fence child lifetimes Restacked onto the canonical store and child-work contract. Completing that restack drops the `reopenStructuredParent` mutation flag this change had carried, along with its contract field, its codec branch, and its single call site in structured ingest, which passed a hardcoded `true`. The flag was a narrow escape hatch from the absolute `tombstones.has(...)` rule that governed parent upserts in this branch's original base. The canonical store replaces that rule with a revision envelope, because a bounded store compacts tombstones away and a presence-based guard silently stops fencing once one is evicted. With the envelope deciding the outcome, the escape hatch has nothing left to escape from, so removing it changes no production behaviour. `agent-status-store-reopen.test.ts` is rewritten against the envelope: the reopen case now pins that an unflagged republication succeeds while replay from before the reopen stays fenced even after the parent tombstone is compacted away, and the second case pins where the guard genuinely bites — a republication inside the removing mutation itself, for every subject kind. * fix(agent-status): re-admit unchanged structured owners after teardown * fix(agent-status): clear anti-slop object-param and Reflect.apply findings - agent-status-store-byte-budget.ts: type the byte-budget helper's record parameter as the union of what its call sites actually pass (the snapshot header plus each store entity record) instead of the broad `object`. - server-structured-canonical-status.test.ts: replace `Reflect.apply` with a typed, explicitly-bound call that models a caller at an untyped boundary omitting the trusted owner subject. * docs(agent-status): drop the 2A progress doc from docs/reference docs/reference/ holds implementation detail, not rollout progress. The canonical-boundary notes move to the effort's working directory; the agent-status-store status section keeps the boundary statement and loses the now-dangling link. * fix(agent-status): mint the canonical epoch on first use, not at construction The hook server's canonical store was built in an instance-member initializer, so constructing AgentHookServer — which happens at import time for the module singleton — demanded a live randomUUID. Any importer that stubs node:crypto threw 'Invalid agent status store epoch' before a single test ran. The store is now created on first canonical access and reset by dropping it, so construction owes nothing to a crypto implementation and the epoch still rotates per authority incarnation. * fix(agent-status): drop the orphaned snapshot budget and a duplicated pane guard Two leftovers from the canonical-store routing change: agent-status-store-snapshot-budget.ts lost its only caller when the store state switched to agentStatusStoreFitsByteBudget. Nothing in the repo imports it now, so the module goes with the caller it existed for. The replacement is not a straight copy: it only memoises a record's measured size once the record is frozen, so a still-mutable record can no longer return a stale byte count. persistedStructuredWorkerPaneKeyIsValid repeated its public-pane-key rejection verbatim three lines below the first one. The tests covering that rejection pass on the first occurrence alone, so the second decided nothing and only obscured which predicate was load-bearing. * fix(agent-status): stop a failed structured publish from latching as owned Three defects found reviewing the structured routing path. combinedStatusEntries defaulted a missing listing order to 0, but the counter it compares against starts at 1, so any unordered row sorted above every ordered one. Unknown order now sorts last. The owner map recorded a session as owned before the sink ran. A publish that threw therefore left matchesLocation reporting an owned location for a row that was never written, and the unchanged-projection path — the only thing that would re-offer it — stopped. The address still has to survive a throw so teardown can forget a row that did land, so the two facts are now separate: the address is recorded up front, and only a publish that returned marks the row as landed. The reopen test claimed the revision envelope rather than the tombstone fences a stale replay. It cannot tell: transport consecutiveness, the parent-revision validator and the tombstone guard each refuse that replay alone, and ablating any two leaves the test green. It now asserts the outcome and says so. |
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78609330d1 |
Fix browser viewport presets incorrectly scaled by UI zoom (#20962)
* Fix browser viewport presets scaled incorrectly by UI zoom Browser viewport presets must remain in window DIP (native) coordinates but scale in CSS pixels as UI zoom changes. Store preset dimensions as CSS variables in DIP, then divide by the live UI zoom factor in the stylesheet. Also consolidate zoom factor calculations across the app to use a shared `uiZoomFactorFromLevel()` function and add `windowDipToCssPx()` for converting native coordinates to CSS pixels. * Move viewport preset zoom compensation to CSS class Inline width/height styles outrank class rules, preventing the zoom compensation from applying. Using a class rule ensures the viewport scales correctly as the UI zoom factor changes. |
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c702e77bc7 |
Stop reading the terminal arguments field on the structured chat route (#20944)
* fix(native-chat): stop reading the terminal arguments field on the structured chat route Setting Claude's Arguments to "--dangerously-skip-permissions --model Opus" made every new Claude tab open in the old terminal-backed chat instead of the new structured one, with nothing on screen to explain why. Removing "--model Opus" fixed it. The cause was a whole-string comparison: the configured arguments were checked against a single blessed value per agent, so any added token at all — including one the agent supports — stopped the string matching and the launch was demoted. Structured chat does not run the interactive CLI. It drives Claude through the Agent SDK and Codex through app-server, and those take narrower option sets that are versioned separately from the CLI's, so one free-text field cannot have a guaranteed meaning for all three. The structured route now reads only what it can actually honour: a replaced launch command, or a launch that names its own working directory. Terminal launches still apply the field exactly as before. Permission posture no longer travels as a raw flag. It is derived from the resolved launch arguments, which is the same fact a terminal launch acts on and which falls back to the default Orca ships when the field was never touched, so bypass stays on by default and Manual is still honoured. Claude gets the SDK's typed permissionMode and allowDangerouslySkipPermissions at query start; Codex gets its bypass flag placed before the app-server subcommand. Both are re-derived per acquisition beside the auth policy and environment overlay rather than stored in the session record, so nothing can disagree with the setting. Codex also loses the --profile, --add-dir and -c passthrough that reached app-server through that field. Only the permission posture comes back. * test(native-chat): pin routing authority on the narrowed feasibility input The routing-authority pin still named the old bundled blocker and built its "customized" fixture out of the arguments field, which is no longer a feasibility input. Both are now the launch command, and arguments and environment are customized on both passes of the loop, so the flag handed to the shared resolver tracks the command alone — a caller that resumed reading either one fails here. No case is dropped and no assertion is relaxed: the blocker list is still exhaustive and every caller must still honour a refusal from the shared resolver. |
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9ed561c1d2 |
fix(claude): judge Stop against the turn the journal published (#20921)
* fix(claude): judge Stop against the turn the journal published A Stop could be refused for the turn the user was actually looking at. The client derives the id it sends from the published journal rows, but the host compared it against the adapter's own in-memory turn. The journal sink drains asynchronously, so that in-memory value can already name a turn whose row has not landed — an id no client has been shown, and one the client's Stop can therefore never match. The user pressed Stop and nothing stopped. Fix the guard's source rather than the guard. ownsRequestedTurn stays: it is what stops a delayed request from interrupting a later turn, and without it a stale Stop would reach a session-scoped interrupt that settles every queued send as durably rejected. The host now resolves the live turn from the journal projection and hands it to the adapter, which prefers it and falls back to its in-memory read for direct callers that have no journal. It is passed as a read rather than a value because the guard re-checks after the delivery fence may have waited seconds; a value captured at request time would interrupt whatever turn ran next. Both callers supply it. The handoff's own Stop bypasses performCancel, so its body moves into stopNativeHandoffTurn beside the file's other extracted flows, which is also what lets it be tested on its own. * fix(claude): fall back to the in-memory turn while the journal drains The journal drains through a serialized async queue, so a live turn routinely has no published row yet. Judging a Stop only against the journal refused in that window, which gates a user action on bookkeeping. The journal stays authoritative while it HAS an answer; a null read falls through to the in-memory turn, and the nothing-dispatched clause is unchanged. Both call sites now read the live turn through `journal.activeTurnId()`, which folds reduced items instead of rendering and sorting a whole snapshot. |
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47bb473ec6 |
Remove agent map from dashboard popout (#20929)
The agent map view was not functional and its components have been removed entirely. The dashboard popout now only supports the kanban board view, with all map-related code, utilities, types, and translations cleaned up accordingly. |
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96d77b37c5 |
perf: always show project names and remove notification scans (#20931)
* perf: avoid repeated agent scans when labeling notifications * perf: always label notifications and remove project counting * fix: qualify the notification project group by its folder's host Folder notifications resolved the folder host-aware, then looked its project group up by bare ID. The owner index fails a bare ID closed when two hosts publish the same group ID, so a remote folder lost the project name the catalog already had. Also drops the identity rescans that recovered display fields: the catalog finders now return the caller's row type, matching findIndexedRepoOwnerForHost. Updates the idle-arbitration expectation that still asserted the removed hasMultipleActiveRepos flag. |
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7ec2986fd1 |
fix(lint): merge the duplicate agent-status contract type imports (#20907)
main's tip fails audit:code-quality:native on import(no-duplicates), which reds the static analysis and verify jobs of every open PR via the merge ref. |
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6da72383df |
feat(agent-launch): one executor for agent launches, exposed as agent.launch (#19849)
* refactor(agent-launch): make the launch-mode decision surface-neutral
`decideWorkerStartMode` was the only shared answer to "structured chat session
or terminal agent?", but it lived in an orchestration-named module and spoke
orchestration's vocabulary, so the other launch surfaces could not call it.
Move the decision to `main/agent-launch/agent-launch-mode` unchanged and leave
`orchestration-worker-start-mode` as the adapter that supplies the noun.
A worker is not a special kind of launch; it is the same launch with a dispatch
attached. Naming the receipt's subject is the only thing orchestration actually
contributed, so that is the only thing the adapter keeps: "worker" in both
sentences, plus the `--terminal` wording, which reads as nonsense anywhere a
`--terminal` flag does not exist. Both are pinned, because they are asserted.
No behavior change. The receipts are byte-identical for every reachable case,
proven by running the new pin against both implementations.
Also pins the wording, which nothing was holding. The existing suites assert
`toContain` fragments ('terminal agent', 'cannot create') and the CLI suite
asserts a receipt handed to it by a mock rather than one this code produced;
all six files stayed green against a deliberately corrupted vocabulary. A
dispatch receipt is the only place a structured-to-terminal downgrade explains
itself, so the whole sentence is the contract, not a fragment of it.
* feat(agent-launch): add the launch intent and the one executor that runs it
The sequencing around the launch decision was duplicated per surface, and the
duplicate is where the bug lives. A new worktree was created agent-first, so
its startup terminal WAS the agent and the structured branch below it could
never be reached — every new-worktree launch was a PTY regardless of the user's
default. Orchestration fixed that for itself in #19431; mobile and the CLI
still have it.
`executeAgentLaunch` inverts the order once, for everyone. When the preference
is structured the worktree is created with NO startup agent, the executing host
is then asked whether it can host a session for the workspace that now exists,
and only then is a surface created. The host verdict cannot be hoisted above
creation: `agentSession.createSupport` only answers for a workspace it can
resolve, which is why the decision stays in two halves.
Agent-first creation is deliberately preserved for PTY launches — it is what
sequences the agent's startup command behind the setup runner, so wait-for-setup
comes for free there.
What actually differs per surface is only how a surface is built (an
orchestration worker's session takes a dispatch hold and a mailbox a plain
launch must not take), so that is injected as a factory rather than branched on.
The intent also strips the reserved agent fields from a migrated create payload:
a caller moving off `worktree.create` passes its existing params, and a stale
`startupAgent` in there would re-create the very path this replaces.
Tests assert order and arguments, not just the resulting mode. Reintroducing
agent-first creation reddens 4 of 11.
* feat(agent-launch): expose the launch executor as the agent.launch RPC
Adds `agent.launch` — one host-side method that decides structured-vs-terminal and
creates the surface — wired to the real runtime factories: `createManagedWorktree`
for the workspace, forking on `startupAgent` exactly as the orchestration worker
path does; `createStructuredAgentSessionForWorktree` for a chat session; and
`createTerminal` for a PTY agent. Allowlisted for mobile, which is the surface the
routing gap was reported on.
`worktree.create` is untouched. Its `startupAgent` keeps meaning "spawn a PTY agent"
verbatim, because it answers with `agentTerminalHandle` only on that path: a host
that quietly routed it to a structured session would hand every older client a
response with no handle and no error. All new behaviour sits behind
`agent.launch.v1`, which the host now advertises and a remote client must negotiate,
so a client that does not gets today's behaviour unchanged.
* fix(agent-launch): drop the deleted draft-prompt blocker from the reason map
main removed the draft-prompt blocker in #19681 (a structured session now holds
an unsent draft), so the exhaustive Record no longer typechecks.
* chore(agent-launch): carry a SAFETY rationale on the agent placement cast
The type-assertion gate landed after this branch's base, so the new file's
copy of the worker-start cast is now a changed-code finding.
* chore(agent-launch): carry agent.launch through main's RPC typing and casting gates
The typed-method contract, the generated params catalog and the
`assertionStyle: never` casting scan all landed after this branch's base.
- AGENT_LAUNCH_METHODS kept an `RpcMethod[]` annotation, which widened its
method name to `string` and broke assignability; every sibling infers instead.
- `agent.launch` binds a schema under src/main, so it joins the catalog's
RPC_METHODS_WITHOUT_SHARED_PARAMS and the parity gate's hand-listed twin.
- The now-typed methods make most test casts unnecessary; the few that remain
carry the line-specific SAFETY rationale the casting gate requires.
* docs(agent-launch): stop the receipt-wording comment claiming a migration
The decision was never moved out of orchestration-worker-start-mode; this PR
adds a second copy beside it. Say so, and name the unenforced agreement.
* docs(agent-launch): stop the executor comment claiming a migration that has not happened
The header asserted two things the tree does not support: that every launch
surface routes through the executor, and that the mode decision "already lived"
in `agent-launch-mode`. `agent.launch` is the executor's only consumer, and
`orchestration-worker-start-mode.ts` is byte-identical (blob
|
||
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|
13ba649c22 |
fix(terminal): let a runtime-created Windows terminal BE the requested shell (#20825)
* fix(terminal): let a runtime-created Windows terminal BE the requested shell
`orca terminal create --environment <windows-host> --command 'cmd.exe'` never
created a cmd terminal. `--command` is text the provider TYPES into whatever
shell it spawned, so the PTY stayed the host's default shell with cmd running
inside it. Captured on `awin`, whose default is Git Bash:
$ orca terminal create --environment awin --command 'cmd.exe' --json
$ orca terminal send --environment awin --terminal term_10656cf7... \
--text exit --enter
$ orca terminal read --environment awin --terminal term_10656cf7... --screen
neil@awin MINGW64 ~/orca/orca ((30f820708f...))
$ cmd.exe
Microsoft Windows [Version 10.0.26200.9445]
C:\Users\neil\orca\orca>exit
neil@awin MINGW64 ~/orca/orca ((30f820708f...))
$
The handle is alive the whole time and `terminal list` shows one healthy
terminal, because the PTY never changed — so the only symptom is that the
caller's terminal is now a shell it never asked for, and every later `send` is
quoted for the wrong one. On `win-lowspec` (default pwsh) the same create lands
cmd inside PowerShell.
Root cause
----------
There are two spawn preflights and they are twins:
- `src/main/ipc/pty/ipc/spawn-preflight.ts` — renderer/IPC spawns, i.e. a
terminal tab opened in the app.
- `src/main/ipc/pty/runtime/spawn-preflight.ts` — runtime spawns: the CLI's
`terminal.create`, headless `orca serve`, and every paired remote
environment.
Only the IPC twin read the caller's requested shell. The runtime twin passed a
literal `requestedShellOverride: undefined`, so a runtime-created terminal on
Windows could only ever be the host default. Everything downstream of that
point — `spawn-options`, the daemon, `resolvePtyShellOverride` in the relay,
`local-pty-launch-plan` — already honoured `shellOverride`; nothing upstream
could supply one.
Change
------
- Thread `shellOverride` through the runtime lane: `RuntimePtySpawnArgs` ->
runtime `spawn-preflight` -> `RuntimePtyController.spawn` ->
`TerminalCreateOptions` -> the `terminal.create` RPC's new `shell` param ->
`orca terminal create --shell`.
- Thread it through the renderer-backed lane too (`createDesktopTerminal` ->
`terminal:requestTabCreate` -> `store.createTab`), so `--shell --focus` is not
silently dropped on a local Windows app.
- An agent launch quotes its startup command for the shell it will actually run
in, so a requested shell now owns the startup-shell family instead of the
global `terminalWindowsShell` setting.
- Lift the relay's `ALLOWED_WINDOWS_SHELL_OVERRIDES` into
`isSupportedWindowsShellOverride` in `src/shared/windows-terminal-shell.ts`
(membership unchanged) so the CLI, the zod param schema, and the relay refuse
the same names. `--shell` therefore cannot carry a path or a command line into
`pty.spawn`; only allowlisted bare shell names pass.
- Gate on `TERMINAL_CREATE_SHELL_SELECTION_RUNTIME_CAPABILITY`. An older host
strips the unknown `shell` param and answers with a healthy terminal running
its default shell — a reply indistinguishable from success — so the CLI
refuses before creating anything rather than creating the wrong shell quietly.
`--shell` stays Windows-only; macOS and Linux hosts spawn the login shell and
the relay drops the value off win32 rather than honouring it half-way. A WSL
project runtime still outranks it, unchanged.
Tests
-----
- `pty-spawn-shell-override-parity.test.ts` pins both preflights against the
exact drift that caused this (verified failing with the fix reverted).
- `createTerminal` passes `shellOverride` to `ptyController.spawn` with no
startup command.
- CLI: sends `shell`, refuses a shell the host cannot spawn, and refuses a host
without the capability — in both refusals without making the round trip.
- Allowlist and `terminal.create` schema accept/refuse cases, including paths
and appended arguments.
* fix(terminal): refuse a requested shell the execution host cannot apply
The first commit made `--shell` reach the spawn, but only a LOCAL win32
execution host applies it: `spawn-options` gates the override on
`process.platform === 'win32' && !args.connectionId`. So `--shell cmd.exe`
against an SSH-routed worktree, or against a macOS/Linux host, still returned a
healthy terminal running that host's default shell — the same
indistinguishable-from-success reply the capability gate exists to prevent, one
layer down.
Refuse instead, before anything spawns. The check sits at the top of
`resolveAgentTerminalCreateOptions`, which every create lane funnels through, so
neither lane has to remember it; the desktop lane additionally refuses a
worktree-less create, which has no execution host to resolve a shell on.
An SSH host's platform and installed shells are not visible to this runtime, and
a POSIX host has no Windows shell to pick. Neither can honour the request, and
saying so is the whole point of the flag.
Docs and the CLI spec now say "refused", not "ignored".
* fix(terminal): refuse a shell that contradicts the project execution runtime
`resolveLocalWindowsTerminalRuntimeOptions` does not merely rank the project's
execution runtime above a per-terminal pick -- it REWRITES the pick, in both
directions, and says nothing:
- a WSL project forces `wsl.exe`, discarding `--shell cmd.exe`;
- a Windows-host project discards a WSL name and falls back to `COMSPEC`
(`getHostShellForProjectRuntime`), so `--shell wsl.exe` spawns cmd. That is
the common case, not an edge: `resolveProjectExecutionRuntime` resolves
`windows-host` for every project that is not WSL, while a repo belonging to no
project honours `wsl.exe` -- so the same flag behaved differently depending on
whether the repo was in a project.
Either rewrite returns a healthy terminal running a shell the caller did not ask
for, which is the failure `--shell` exists to remove.
It also split an agent launch's quoting from the shell that receives it. The
previous commit made the startup-shell family follow the REQUESTED shell, so
`--shell wsl.exe --command codex` on a Windows-host project typed POSIX-quoted
launch args into cmd. Refusing the contradiction removes that case rather than
papering over it.
Refuse instead, alongside the SSH and non-Windows refusals, from the same
`resolveAgentTerminalCreateOptions` seam every create lane funnels through.
Also from review:
- the allowlist test looped the list against itself; spell the members out.
- the runtime spec case claimed to prove the pty's shell when it asserts the
controller received the field; name it for what it checks.
Reported by an adversarial review of the branch.
* fix(terminal): canonicalize --shell and refuse a WSL-path rewrite
Review of the --shell create path turned up two ways the terminal could
still end up being a shell the caller never asked for -- the exact failure
--shell exists to remove.
Bare and mixed-case spellings passed the allowlist but reached consumers
that exact-match the canonical name: resolveWindowsShellStartupFamily
classified `cmd` as the PowerShell family, resolveWindowsShellLaunchArgs
fell through to empty shellArgs (no `chcp 65001`, no OSC 133 bootstrap that
Windows foreground status depends on), and resolveWindowsGitBashShellPath
compares case-sensitively so `Git-Bash` spawned a literal `Git-Bash`.
The allowlist is now one canonical-name map and terminal.create canonicalizes
on parse, so the spawn path only ever sees `.exe` spellings. `pwsh` and
`powershell` stay distinct binaries.
A `\\wsl$\<distro>\...` cwd made the providers force wsl.exe regardless of
the request, and terminalShellOverrideRefusal only inspected the project
runtime -- undefined for a folder workspace with no project. Refuse on the
resolved cwd and the workspace path, judging what the PTY actually gets.
Also: the capability gate reported an unreachable host as too old rather
than unavailable; the SSH CLI shim dropped capabilities from status, so
--shell there blamed the host version instead of naming SSH; and --shell
had no help entry, rendering bare in `orca terminal create --help`. Adding
that entry crossed help.ts's max-lines cap, so the flag table moved to
flag-help-text.ts rather than suppressing the rule.
Adds a behavioural test for the runtime preflight (the one-line fix was
pinned only by a source-text scan), plus coverage for the startup-command
quoting family, the no-workspace refusal, and the WSL-path refusal.
* fix(build): keep tests out of the RPC params catalog bundle
The catalog walk under methods/ already skips *.test.ts, but the contract
directory glob took every .ts. terminal-create-shell-param.test.ts is the
first test to live there, so the bundle pulled vitest into a CJS build and
the generator threw on require(). Same exclusion, same reason.
|
||
|
|
0325f1a22e |
feat(agent-status): add the canonical store and child-work contract (#20717)
* feat(agent-status): add canonical shared store contract * fix(agent-status): harden canonical store invariants * fix(agent-status): close canonical store race windows |
||
|
|
72a8c096a3 |
fix(ssh): corroborate an empty lsof answer before calling an endpoint free (#20585)
#18304 decided enumerability after `lsof` runs, keying on stderr, non-numeric output, and an abnormal exit. One failure carries none of those signals: probing as a uid that does not own the socket's holder, `lsof -t -a -U <path>` exits 1 with no stdout and no stderr. Measured on Debian 12 against #18304's own probe, a live relay owned by root probed as `nobody`: probe uid path marker pids merged nobody held.sock lsof [] <- live relay holds it merged nobody stale.sock lsof [] <- genuinely nobody merged root held.sock lsof [10] merged root stale.sock lsof [] The first two rows are byte-identical, so nothing about lsof's answer can separate them. The first reaches `verdict: exited / evidence: no-holder`, which `classifySupersededRelay` maps to `stale-endpoint-removed` and `rm -f` on an inode a live relay is still holding. `hidepid=2` produces the same shape. A positive control does not solve this. Controlling on something the probe itself holds passes precisely when we are blind: as `nobody`, `lsof -t -p $$` returns a pid while the socket query returns nothing. Blindness is to *other* uids, and another uid's process is not ours to manufacture. /proc/net/unix is. It is world-readable and lists every bound unix socket regardless of owner, so an entry for the path alongside no reported pid proves lsof was blind rather than that the path is free. Only an otherwise-clean empty answer is corroborated; a reported pid still stands on its own, and the check is skipped when the answer was already unavailable. Same run, with this change: fixed nobody held.sock unavailable [] <- no longer reapable fixed nobody stale.sock lsof [] <- still reapable fixed root held.sock lsof [10] <- unchanged fixed root stale.sock lsof [] <- unchanged The marker can only ever move from `lsof` toward `unavailable`, so this never authorises an unlink that #18304 refuses. Off Linux there is no /proc/net/unix, the check returns false, and behaviour is exactly as before -- deliberately, because defaulting to `unavailable` there would stop every macOS host from reaping a stale endpoint and trade a rare destructive bug for a universal accumulation one. The tests are Linux-gated for the same reason, with an assertion that the evidence they depend on is actually present so the block cannot pass vacuously. |
||
|
|
1457d3966c |
fix(native-chat): release sessions after provider root exit (#20502)
* fix(native-chat): bound structured chat launch * Fix post-merge test hygiene * Make structured fallback settlement exhaustive * fix(native-chat): release sessions after root exit * chore(i18n): remove legacy fallback copy * test(native-chat): remove terminal fallback census * docs(native-chat): clarify root-exit lease proof * chore(native-chat): drop unrelated formatting * fix native chat launch visibility * test(native-chat): split message rail windowing coverage * fix(native-chat): keep transport gating render-pure * fix(native-chat): coordinate launch prompt settlement * test(native-chat): align unified close ownership * fix(native-chat): correct lifecycle imports and test typing * fix(native-chat): fence restored launch cancellations * fix(native-chat): fence authoritative cancellation snapshots |
||
|
|
60d793956a |
fix(native-chat): replace the raw question tool row with an awaiting-input row (#20724)
* fix(native-chat): replace the raw question tool row with an awaiting-input row
A question tool call rendered as ordinary tool activity — "Running
AskUserQuestion" with a clipped JSON payload while live, then a "1x
AskUserQuestion {...}" run header once settled — so the one row the reader
actually has to act on read as machine output.
It now draws as "Awaiting user input: <question>", led by a comment-bubble
glyph, with the label pulsing while the answer is outstanding and reading
"Asked: <question>" once it lands. A grouped prompt names how many questions
it asks rather than quoting only the first, since one row stands for the whole
prompt. Question calls also leave the run header, so the count beside them
reports only the work that actually ran.
Codex journals only the question and never a call for it, and a pending
question was dropped from the transcript entirely — its chat log said nothing
while the agent sat blocked on the reader. Pending questions now project the
same row. Claude journals both the call and the question it raised, so the
call itself is suppressed and the one row is fed from one source.
* refactor(native-chat): derive the awaiting-input row from the question item
The first pass fabricated a synthetic `request_user_input` tool call inside the
shared journal projection so that one renderer could serve every lane. That made
a presentation choice on behalf of every consumer of that projection, including
archives and older RPC clients that never asked for it.
Question presentation is now client-local. The shared projection is restored
untouched, and the desktop transcript derives its own rows: a pending question
keeps a stable identity row through tool folding while its receipt draws the
awaiting line, and the duplicate AskUserQuestion call Claude journals beside the
question it raised is suppressed only when a matching question is open in the
same turn — so an unmatched call, or one from a lane that journals no question,
still reports itself.
Question calls now leave the run together with their paired result, which stops a
summarized ask from stranding its answer as an orphan Result row. A failed ask
keeps its error instead of being folded into the awaiting row, and an ask no
longer contends with a concurrently running tool for the active slot: both are
reported.
Adjacent pending questions — the shape Codex journals, one item per question —
group into a single awaiting row that narrows as each one is answered.
Also ships the three awaiting-row strings in the runtime-required English
catalog. Their call-site fallbacks are a shared constant rather than string
literals, so i18next cannot rebuild them from the call site and they have to be
present for the static-analysis gate to pass.
* fix(native-chat): preserve unmatched duplicate question calls
* fix(native-chat): avoid repeated grouped question text
* fix(native-chat): keep pending question text specific
* fix(native-chat): avoid repeating single question answers
* fix(native-chat): narrow question receipt subject
* fix(native-chat): preserve settled ask calls
* fix(native-chat): cover bridge ask rows
* fix(native-chat): fold settled ask receipts
* test(native-chat): cover settled ask receipt folding
|
||
|
|
62c5037cc3 |
fix(lint): avoid reflective status entry reads (#20872)
* fix(relay): resolve packaged node-pty from resources * fix(lint): avoid reflective status entry reads |
||
|
|
9ab0a18e82 |
refactor(agent-status): isolate legacy status ingress behind one admission point (#20716)
* refactor(agent-status): isolate legacy status ingress * fix(agent-hooks): move advertised-capability source onto the ingest envelope ingestRemote() gained a third positional argument in this PR (advertisedAgentStatusCapabilities) to satisfy a new ratchet requiring every legacy-ingress call site to name its capability source. Both production callers pass the same constant every time, so the argument carries zero runtime information — but Vitest's toHaveBeenCalledWith matches argument count exactly, so the pre-existing SSH relay integration test (which asserts a 2-argument call) started failing even though nothing about the actual admission decision changed. Capabilities are a property of the producing peer/connection, not an orthogonal call parameter, so move the field onto the envelope object instead of adding a third positional argument: ingestRemote reads envelope.advertisedAgentStatusCapabilities (defaulting to the unadvertised-legacy-peer set), and both call sites stamp the constant onto their envelope literal. Call arity stays at two arguments, so the pre-existing evidence test needs no change. The envelope never crosses the wire in either caller: SSH rebuilds it field-by-field from the RPC params, and the WSL path copies (never mutates) the wire-deserialized notification before stamping the field on, so this is purely an internal main-process shape change. Also strengthens the ingress ratchet test that required this: it previously only checked that the capability constant's name appeared somewhere in each caller's source, which a stray unused import could satisfy. It now asserts the actual `advertisedAgentStatusCapabilities: AGENT_STATUS_LEGACY_UNADVERTISED_PEER_CAPABILITIES` key:value binding is present. |
||
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|
231e805b1e |
fix(lint): enable anti-slop/no-shape-in-symbol-names (#20785)
Flip `anti-slop/no-shape-in-symbol-names` from "off" to "error" and clear
every violation under src, config, tests and mobile.
What the rule bans
------------------
The case-insensitive substring "shape" in any JS/TS identifier: variables,
functions, parameters, types, type parameters, class members, private names,
object-literal keys and JSX identifiers. The one exemption is a statically
accessed member read owned by another value (`zodObject.shape` is fine), so
third-party APIs stay readable without a suppression.
"Shape" names a value's structure rather than its domain role. `UserShape`,
`validateArgShape` and `errorShape` all tell you the symbol is "an object
with some fields" -- which is already what a type says -- while saying
nothing about what the value is for or who owns it. The rule forces the
name to carry the domain instead.
Violations fixed
----------------
689 violations across 109 files at baseline (verified by re-running the
audit against the pre-change tree with the rule set to "error").
Fix pattern
-----------
Rename for the domain role, not the structure:
-type FieldShape = 'list' | 'map' | 'whole'
-const FIELD_SHAPES = { ... } satisfies Record<keyof Observation, FieldShape>
+type FieldEncoding = 'list' | 'map' | 'whole'
+const FIELD_ENCODINGS = { ... } satisfies Record<keyof Observation, FieldEncoding>
-function assertGitPushTargetShape(target: unknown): void
+function assertValidGitPushTarget(target: unknown): void
-function describeReadDirPathShape(p: string): ReadDirPathKind
+function classifyReadDirPath(p: string): ReadDirPathKind
Predicates became statements about the value (`isDeltaShapedProviderFrameKind`
-> `isDeltaProviderFrameKind`, `isDeleteShapedDiscardEntry` ->
`discardDeletesEntryFile`, `isSkillsCliAgentKeyShaped` ->
`isUsableSkillsCliAgentKey`). Type aliases dropped the suffix where the
remaining name was already unambiguous (`GhGraphqlErrorShape` ->
`GhGraphqlError`).
No wire-visible name was renamed: no IPC or RPC channel, stream opcode,
request/response param, persisted field, or i18n key. The `--shape=symlink|copy`
CLI flag read by .github/workflows/skill-update-roundtrip.yml is unchanged --
only the local variable holding it was renamed.
Exemptions
----------
They are file-scoped entries in config/oxlint-anti-slop.json, not inline
`oxlint-disable` comments. An inline directive naming an anti-slop rule reads
back as an UNUSED directive under the root lint scan, which does not load this
plugin -- the changed-code quality gate counts that warning, so the comment form
cannot be used for a rule that lives only in this config.
* src/renderer/src/components/browser-pane/annotate/**:
in the screenshot annotator a "shape" is the drawn geometry -- pen, arrow,
rect, ellipse, highlight. That is a genuine domain noun, and it pervades
every symbol in the module.
* repo-icon.tsx, repo-header-project-actions.tsx, mobile MobileRepoIcon.tsx:
lucide exports the icon component as `Shapes`. The name is theirs, and the
matching REPO_LUCIDE_ICONS key is the persisted icon name shared with the
desktop picker -- renaming it would orphan saved repo icons.
* src/shared/onboarding-state-types.ts, src/shared/constants.ts:
`shapedSidebar` is a persisted onboarding-checklist field and a telemetry
enum member; renaming it would orphan saved state.
* src/shared/rpc-contract/rpc-send-params.ts: matching zod's own literal `shape`
property is what selects the ZodObject branch of the conditional type.
No exemption was added merely to avoid a rename. Eight symbols initially
suppressed as "a cross-module refactor outside this change" were proven to have
zero non-TypeScript references repo-wide and renamed instead.
Zod's `ZodRawShape` needed no exemption at all: `Readonly<Record<string,
z.ZodType>>` is its definition, so repo-update-params.ts and
ui-update-value-tolerance-params.ts spell it out instead. Likewise
telemetry-event-classification.ts now reads `.shape` through an `in` narrowing,
which also retires two pre-existing type assertions; three more assertions the
rename had dragged onto changed lines (two `JSON.parse` sites, one node:sqlite
row read) became annotations and an explicit row mapping.
Verified
--------
* Audit reports zero violations; confirmed the rule genuinely fires by
planting a probe violation.
* node config/scripts/run-typecheck-projects-in-parallel.mjs exits 0.
* Vitest over src/shared, src/main/github/project-view, the annotate module,
the repo-icon components and the Chromium SameSite electron spec: all green.
* All 66 removed "shape" identifiers grepped repo-wide across every file type;
none survive.
* node config/scripts/generate-rpc-params-catalog.mjs --check exits 0.
* node --check on every changed .mjs; oxfmt clean on all changed files.
* `pnpm run check:code-quality:changed` reports 0 findings.
Not machine-verified: the 3 mobile/ files (its Vitest run cannot resolve
`expo/tsconfig.base.json` in this worktree), and the WSL- and Playwright-gated
specs. All are rename- or comment-only hunks, read in full.
|
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|
bfdec26352 |
fix(lint): enable anti-slop/no-object-parameters (#20781)
The rule rejects the broad `object` type on any function input (declarations, expressions, arrows, methods, call/construct signatures, function types), plus local aliases and unions that resolve to `object`. `object` accepts every non-primitive while exposing no properties, so it documents nothing and pushes callers into assertions at the boundary. Fixes all 185 violations across src, config, tests and mobile, and flips the rule from "off" to "error" in config/oxlint-anti-slop.json. Approach: replace each `object` input with the type its owner already has. Most sites took an existing domain type or a type-only import (36 added); 40 new aliases name shapes that had none. Where a value is genuinely only compared by reference, it gets a named identity token instead of a shape -- `Record<string, never>`, the built-in `WeakKey`, or a `unique symbol` brand, matching the branding already used in src/shared. Same treatment for WeakMap and Map key parameters. Two `as unknown as` casts became unnecessary once the parameter carried a real type and were removed; no new casts were added. Suppressions added: none. No `oxlint-disable` for this rule anywhere, and no max-lines disable or per-file bump. Three files sat exactly at their max-lines cap, so the added type imports were made line-neutral rather than suppressed: - src/main/ipc/browser.ts exports the existing guest-registration args type (renamed BrowserGuestArgs) so browser.test.ts reuses it on one line. - pane-scroll.ts takes TerminalScrollIntentTarget through the existing pane-manager-types import via a type-only re-export. - direct-rpc-client.ts drops the identity parameter entirely: the session check moved into the sendProbe callback that owns the token. Verified: anti-slop config reports zero violations over src config tests mobile; run-typecheck-projects-in-parallel exits 0; 144 affected test files pass (1749 tests); oxlint and oxfmt clean on all changed files. Mobile has no runnable test/typecheck target in this worktree (expo is not installed), so its 6 files were typechecked against a standalone config and diffed against the base branch -- error sets are byte-identical, including test files. |
||
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e4a9d24e0c |
fix(automations): repair cron step expansion and day restriction (#20202)
The semantic half of the cron repair. Both defects change what an already-saved schedule does, so they ship together and behind a decision. #15723: parseCronField set end = start for a bare numeric field even with a slash step, so 5/15 expanded to [5] and fired hourly instead of every fifteen minutes. N/step is the open-ended N-max/step sequence now. #15896: day restriction came from expanded set cardinality, so 1-31 read as unrestricted and */2 as restricted. Restriction is lexical now: a day field restricts iff no term of it ranges over a star, matching vixie cron and robfig/cron rather than crontab(5)'s prose. Verified differentially against robfig/cron v1.2.0 across 22 expressions, 424 days, zero divergences. The two cannot ship apart: 0 9 1/1 * 1 matches 124 days under the old parser, 104 under #15723 alone, and 730 under both, because the old cardinality flags react to the corrected expansion. describeAutomationScheduleDrift reads a saved expression under both semantics and reports the ones that moved, so neither direction is silent; the service names them once at startup. No expression Orca's own presets generate drifts. Fixes #15723 Fixes #15896 |
||
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|
f107499e44 |
fix(lint): enable anti-slop/no-reflect-get (#20786)
`anti-slop/no-reflect-get` rejects every call to `Reflect.get`. The
reflective read bypasses ordinary property access and throws away the
type evidence the compiler would otherwise give you: the result is
`any`/`unknown` with no narrowing, so a typo in the key or a shape drift
in the source object is invisible until runtime. The rule's remedy is to
parse dynamic input into a named domain type (or narrow it with `in`)
and then read the field normally.
Baseline: 86 violations across 67 files. Now zero unsuppressed
violations under
`npx oxlint --config config/oxlint-anti-slop.json --ignore-pattern 'config/oxlint-plugins/anti-slop/**' src config tests mobile`.
Fix pattern
-----------
44 of the 86 were rewritten. The dominant shape was an `unknown` value
read through `Reflect.get` right after a `typeof === 'object'` guard;
those became `in`-narrowed property access, which TypeScript checks:
- Reflect.get(value, 'agents')
+ 'agents' in value ? value.agents : null
Two further shapes:
- `Reflect.get(Object(x), 'k')` on a possibly-primitive envelope became a
small named reader that boxes once and indexes a
`Record<string, unknown>` (`settingsField` in
mobile/src/transport/settings-read-operations.ts).
- Tests reaching into private state moved to TypeScript's checked
bracket-index escape hatch (`runtime['layoutQueues']`), or to a
documented read-only accessor on the owning class
(`SearchSubprocessLineAccumulator.retainedCapacityBytes()`,
`CodexSubagentExecutions.retentionSizes()`).
No type assertion was added anywhere: the diff contains zero net-new
`as` casts, `as any`, `as unknown as`, `@ts-ignore`, or
`@ts-expect-error`, so nothing was laundered into the sibling
assertion rules.
Suppressions
------------
42x `// oxlint-disable-next-line anti-slop/no-reflect-get` across 38
files. Every one is the default-forward branch of a `Proxy` `get` trap:
get(target, property, receiver) {
...
return Reflect.get(target, property, receiver)
}
`Reflect.get(target, property, receiver)` is the only construct that
forwards with correct `receiver` semantics; `target[property]` invokes
an accessor with the wrong `this` and silently breaks getters that read
sibling state. There is no typed alternative, so these are suppressed
rather than rewritten.
3x `// oxlint-disable-next-line typescript-eslint/consistent-type-definitions
-- declaration merging requires interface` in
tests/e2e/github-url-smart-input-transition.spec.ts,
tests/e2e/linear-url-workspace-entry.spec.ts, and
tests/e2e/worktree-active-delete-scroll-position.spec.ts. Replacing
`Reflect.get(window, 'x')` with typed `window.x` requires a
`declare global { interface Window }` block, and `interface` is
mandatory for declaration merging. Matches the existing convention at
tests/e2e/helpers/runtime-types.ts:63.
1x `// eslint-disable-next-line no-var -- main-process gate handle for
this spec` in tests/e2e/project-group-creation-visibility.spec.ts, for
the same reason a `var` global is needed to type the handle. Matches
tests/e2e/agent-session-log-tail-stability.spec.ts:24.
Also updates two source-text anchors in mobile's rpc-recording mutation
harness (mobile/src/test-support/rpc-recording/operation-mutations.ts
and recording-runner.test.ts), which pin the exact text of the rewritten
line in settings-read-operations.ts and would otherwise fail with
"Mutant anchor matched 0 sites, expected 1".
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f7b2736d6d |
fix(worktree): block removal when the archive hook fails (#20153)
* fix(worktree): block removal when the archive hook fails A repo's orca.yaml archive hook is the user's last chance to save work off a checkout Orca is about to delete. A failed hook was logged as advisory and stepped over, so the removal went ahead with nothing archived — and the caller could still be told it succeeded. The hook is now a blocking precondition, evaluated while the checkout, its Git registration, its agents and Orca's ownership evidence are all still intact: it sits ahead of the registration re-read, the lock/dirty preflights, stopPtys() and removeWorktree in every orchestrator that runs it. Failure is typed (worktree_archive_hook_failed) and carries the worktree path, outcome, exit code where one was observed, and the hook's output. unverifiable stays distinct from exited, so loss of contact is never read as a pass. The waiver rides its own field at every layer and is never implied by --force, which already carries the PTY-stop waiver; when used, the waived failure comes back on result.archiveHookOverride rather than being swallowed. worktree.archive-failure-blocking.v1 is advertised so an integration can tell "accepts --run-hooks" from "safely propagates a failing hook" without risking the data loss to find out. The runtime's SSH path cannot run a hook at all, so rather than delete with the archive step silently skipped it refuses — waivable like every other refusal here. #18563 retires that gate by making the path run the hook for real. Stacked on #20559, which makes a timed-out hook report honestly; without it a hook that traps SIGTERM and exits 0 would defeat this gate. Fixes #19334 * fix(worktree): close the skip-confirm dead end and the client/hook timeout gap Four review findings on the gate. A retry from the failure toast could fail for a DIFFERENT reason than the one the user had just answered, and that second failure got a bare toast with no buttons. With skipDeleteWorktreeConfirm set, the delete helpers pass no force, so waiving a failed archive hook on a dirty checkout landed on the dirty preflight and stopped there. Retry failures now re-enter the same failure toast, so every retry stays as actionable as the first attempt. Third instance of this class. The renderer gave worktree.rm a 60s budget while an archive hook may run for 120s. A hook that took 90s and succeeded timed the client out and reported failure while the host went on to delete — telling the user their delete failed and their checkout was gone. The budget is now derived from the hook's, and only when a hook can run. The SSH fail-open is logged rather than silent, and the capability's doc comment scopes what it claims: a hook that RUNS and fails cannot delete the checkout; it is not a promise the hook was found. The SSH owner-resolution test now reads a real remote orca.yaml through a stubbed provider and asserts the returned script is the remote one. It previously stopped at the lookup key, which is the coverage that let this path break twice. It fails against the row-only resolution. * fix(worktree): name a signalled hook exit, and state why prunable cleanup skips the gate Two things the rebase onto #20617 and #20576 surfaced, both found by rerunning the real-repo harness rather than by reading the diff. - #20617 added a registration-cleanup branch that returns before the archive gate. That ordering is correct — both of its arms describe a row with no checkout behind it, so there is nothing to archive and running the hook would fail on the missing cwd — but the gate's ordering invariant is documented, so the exception should be too. - A signalled hook reported `Command failed with exit code null.`, which reads as a reporting glitch rather than the `unverifiable` verdict it is about to produce. It now says the command was terminated without reporting an exit code. Introduced by #20576; the withheld `exitCode` itself was always right. Fixes #19334 |
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49e5fa597a |
refactor(lint): enable anti-slop/no-reflect-apply (#20782)
`anti-slop/no-reflect-apply` rejects `Reflect.apply(fn, thisArg, argsArray)`.
It defeats the call-signature checks TypeScript applies to an ordinary call:
the args array is checked as an array, not positionally against the callee's
parameters, so arity and type errors pass silently. Dynamic dispatch belongs
behind a named interface, not behind a reflective call.
Flipped the rule from "off" to "error" and cleared all 17 baseline violations
across `src config tests mobile` (16 sites; one file had two).
Fix pattern: `Reflect.apply(fn, recv, args)` becomes `fn.call(recv, ...args)`,
or a direct method call when the implicit receiver is already the right object.
The receiver is preserved at every site.
Where the callee is a captured built-in whose overloads split on an argument's
shape (`String.prototype.split`, `JSON.stringify`), a call-signature capture no
longer compiles once the args are passed positionally. Those three sites capture
the function through a method-shaped type
(`{ split(separator: unknown, limit?: number): string[] }['split']`), which keeps
the forwarding call checked rather than asserted.
Behaviour notes:
- `diff-section-layout.test.ts` drops a `limit === undefined ? [sep] : [sep, limit]`
conditional. Equivalent: `String.prototype.split` maps an undefined limit to
2^32-1, and the `Symbol.split` path forwards undefined either way.
- `workspace-space-compaction.test.ts` forwards `reduce`'s two arguments unchanged,
so the `arguments.length >= 2` initial-value branch is unaffected.
- `agent-session-history-byte-accounting.test.ts` is the one site where the receiver
is not literally preserved (`JSON` -> undefined). `JSON.stringify` never reads
`this` per spec, and restoring `.call(JSON, ...)` would reintroduce the overload
failure under strictBindCallApply.
No suppression comments added — the rule has zero `oxlint-disable` sites.
`Reflect.apply` still appears at electron.vite.config.ts:159, inside a template
literal of generated bootstrap source. That is string content, not lintable code.
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b8554f1c59 |
fix(composer): clarify failed attachment drops (#20704)
* refactor(renderer): give the IPC error reader a clamped and an unclamped shape * fix(composer): name the attachments a drop could not add, in one toast * fix(composer, source-control): use one stable failure toast slot - Replace per-worktree toast IDs with single slot that replaces on each failure - Remove destructive retry actions; discard must confirm in dialog - Consolidate filesystem import types to shared location - Add compactIpcErrorMessage for string error handling * refactor: centralize filesystem import types and clarify failure naming Move import result types from main/ipc to shared layer so they're available across preload and renderer. Rename uniformFailure → commonFailure and skippedOrFailed → failureCount for clarity. Simplify preload/API type definitions by reusing shared types directly instead of duplicating inlined union shapes. * Reuse single toast slot for composer drop failures Multiple drop failures now replace the previous toast instead of stacking, preventing notification clutter. Uses a dedicated toast ID separate from Source Control's stage/discard notifications. |
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f55b7ba680 |
fix(native-chat): cancel pending prompts precisely (#20601)
* fix(native-chat): hide activity while awaiting input * fix(native-chat): keep approval turns cancellable * test(native-chat): satisfy split PR quality gate * fix(native-chat): catalog approval cancellation label * fix(native-chat): include approval cancellation runtime label * fix(codex): settle prompts when cancelled turns complete * fix(codex): settle prompt registry fallbacks * test(native-chat): cover pending interaction fallbacks * test(native-chat): split prompt state coverage * test(native-chat): keep prompt state isolated * fix(native-chat): bound prompt turn backfill * refactor(codex): centralize prompt registry bounds * fix(native-chat): cancel pending prompts precisely * fix(native-chat): consolidate capability imports * fix(native-chat): harden precise prompt cancellation * fix claude cancellation teardown races * retry claude prompt lifecycle admission * bound claude prompt cancellation retry work * fix(codex): bound prompt turn identity on registration * fix(native-chat): route rejected late dispatch settlements * fix(codex): retain exact cancellable prompt turn ids --------- Co-authored-by: Merge Sim <sim@local> |