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70bebbc895a8e6ef227e7f282176234f8f5f650f
8031
Commits
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70bebbc895 | fix(ui): unmount project selector before dialog handoff | ||
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d3501f7ad6 |
fix(worktrees): stop a failed worktree scan from being recorded as an authoritative empty listing (#18456)
* fix(worktrees): stop a failed worktree scan from pruning as an authoritative empty listing A `git worktree list` that could not run at all — a WSL distro that stopped resolving, a hung mount, a git binary that errored — was softened to `[]` by the lenient listing path, so the detected scan published it as `authoritative: true, worktrees: []`. That disables the #1158 retention guard, drops every persisted tab for the repo, and the pruned session is written back to disk on the next launch. The loss is permanent, not a transient glitch. Route the detected scan through a strict listing that still reports the two genuinely empty states (repo path gone, not a Git repo) as `[]`. Everything else rejects, so the existing catch answers `authoritative: false` and the destructive halves (`rememberLocalWorktreeRoots`, `pruneLineageForMissingRepoWorktrees`) never see a failed scan. Also make the failure readable: wsl.exe reports its own launch failures as exit 0xFFFFFFFF with an EMPTY stderr and the `Wsl/Service/WSL_E_*` line on stdout as UTF-16LE, which is why the field bundle carried a git error with no text. Set WSL_UTF8 for WSL-routed git (matching the wsl runner, #9010) and attach that stdout diagnostic to the error so `git.exec` spans name the cause. * fix(worktrees): surface a failed worktree scan's cause on the repo header with a retry A failed scan now travels with its reason (optional unavailableReason on DetectedWorktreeListResult), the repo header shows it with click-to-retry, and the WSL deleted-guest-directory shape measured on a real Windows host is pinned as retained-not-pruned. |
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901c6771ff |
fix(agents): detect agent CLIs installed outside a version manager (#18336)
* fix(agents): detect agent CLIs installed outside a version manager The install-dir fallback that answers "is this agent installed?" when the login-shell PATH probe fails listed only version-manager bin dirs, so codex/opencode/cursor-agent installed by Homebrew, npm's default global prefix, snap, nix, or the CLI's own installer read as not installed. Where this is decisive, corrected from the previous message: the `orca` CLI, whose detectSkillsCliAgentKeys (src/cli/handlers/skills.ts) calls detectCommandsInInstallDirs directly and whose entry point seeds no PATH, plus unpackaged/dev runs. NOT the packaged desktop app: patchPackagedProcessPath (configure-process.ts:114) appends /opt/homebrew/bin, /usr/local/bin, ~/.opencode/bin and the Linux/nix prefixes onto process.env.PATH at main-process-preflight.ts:147, before any detection, and mergePathSegments preserves them, so the PATH scan reaches those dirs first and this fallback never fires for them. That means this does NOT explain the packaged macOS v1.4.194 report of codex/cursor-agent/opencode all undetected -- that report stays open and uninvestigated. Second correction: the fallback now carries the prefixes Homebrew actually uses on Linux (/home/linuxbrew/.linuxbrew/bin), plus /snap/bin and the two nix profile dirs, matching what patchPackagedProcessPath already seeds. The WSL guest prelude gains the same entries. Leaving them out closed the native/WSL asymmetry on darwin only, on the platforms where the fallback is decisive. Appended last so a version-manager install still wins, and kept out of getVersionManagerBinPaths, whose result is PREPENDED to PATH (#18234). Lives in its own module so node-cli-command-resolution.ts stays under max-lines. The test stages every path through `join` and asserts via detectCommandsInInstallDirs as well as resolveCliCommands, so it holds on a Windows dev machine and pins the "absolute path means installed" contract. * fix(agents): align system install-dir order across the three PATH lists Round-2 review remediation. The blocking finding was about the handoff artifact, not the code: the summary handed to review described a 2-file/+38 change with 3 new macOS dirs, while HEAD is 4 files/+227 with 6 lookup dirs plus 5 new WSL-guest prelude entries, and the quoted failing test names never existed. Restated against HEAD in the handoff; no rebuttal, the reviewer was right. Justification for the entries the summary never described: the fallback exists to close the native/WSL asymmetry for a CLI no version manager installed, and patchPackagedProcessPath already seeds Linuxbrew, /snap/bin and both nix profile dirs (configure-process.ts:141-158). Shipping only the darwin subset would have left a Linux or WSL user with a snap/nix install still reading as not installed while the packaged macOS user did not -- the asymmetry the change is for. Code changes, all from the non-blocking list: - The three lists disagreed on order while claiming to be kept in step, so a CLI in both /usr/local/bin and /snap/bin could resolve to a different binary than the seeded PATH scan or the WSL guest probe found. All three now use the seed's relative order, pinned by a new duplicate-install test and an offset assertion on the prelude. The prelude's system block also moved after the nvm glob so a version manager still wins in the guest, as it does natively. - The parity docstring asserted "the same set patchPackagedProcessPath appends, minus the sbin dirs and the generic ~/bin", which was false: it also omits ~/.vite-plus/bin (seeded by configure-process.ts:156, but no probed agent command maps to it) and /opt/homebrew off darwin. All three gaps are now named as deliberate. - win32 returns [] and stays that way, but the branch now says why: %USERPROFILE%\.opencode\bin has never had install-dir coverage in either list, and the seed's system block is POSIX-only too. Pre-existing, unchanged. - The detectCommandsInInstallDirs case read the ambient process.env.PATH, so on a box with /usr/local/bin on PATH only the opencode assertion exercised the fallback. It now stubs the GUI-launch PATH, so both do. Unchanged and restated: this does NOT explain the packaged macOS v1.4.194 report of codex/cursor-agent/opencode all undetected, and must not close G6 report #3. patchPackagedProcessPath returns early unless app.isPackaged and seeds all six dirs before any detection, and mergePathSegments never deletes them, so the packaged PATH scan reaches them first and this fallback never fires there. Decisive only for the `orca` CLI's detectSkillsCliAgentKeys and unpackaged/dev runs. Verification: the suite is red without the production hunks (5 failed/3 passed) and green with them (8 passed); 11 related suites pass (197 tests); tc:node, tc:cli, oxlint, oxfmt and the max-lines ratchet are clean. * fix(agents): correct the ordering-parity claims and widen the seed-leak guard Round-3 review found two docstring claims that are false as written and one guard that only asserted a third of its list. - system-cli-install-dirs.ts claimed a CLI in two of these dirs resolves the same here as in the packaged PATH seed. True inside the system block, false across it: `claude` in both ~/.local/bin and /opt/homebrew/bin resolves to ~/.local/bin via the fallback (getBaseVersionManagerDirectories leads) and to /opt/homebrew/bin via the seed, which appends ~/.local/bin last. Scope the claim to the block and name the gap instead of asserting it away. No behavior change: closing it would hoist a system dir over a version-manager one (#18234). - posix-version-manager-bin-dirs.ts justified moving "/usr/local/bin" after the nvm glob with "a version manager still wins in the guest, as it does natively". The glob expands lexicographically; native orders nvm dirs default-alias-first (#10932), so that is not parity. Record the move as the one behavior change in the file and bound it: entries are appended behind a resolved login PATH, and both consumers only test presence. - The #18234 seed-leak guard asserted only /opt/homebrew/bin and /usr/local/bin were absent from getVersionManagerBinPaths, leaving the four other new dirs unpinned. It now spells out all seven across darwin and linux -- spelled out rather than derived from getSystemCliInstallDirectories, which would pass vacuously against exactly the refactor it guards. Tests 8 passed (8); 5 failed / 3 passed with the production hunks reverted to origin/main. tsc node + cli clean, oxlint clean. * fix(agents): find Pi's own installer dir in the CLI install-dir fallback The fallback added `~/.opencode/bin` but skipped `~/.vite-plus/bin` on the claim that no probed agent command maps to it. False: `pi` is a probed detect command on every runtime (`tui-agent-config.ts`, no `detectUnsupportedRuntimes`) and `~/.vite-plus/bin` is the Pi installer's default — the two dirs #829 named and `patchPackagedProcessPath` seeds together. Added to both the native fallback and the WSL guest prelude, so a Pi installed by its own script is found by the `orca` CLI and in WSL, not just on a seeded packaged PATH. Also, all narrower: - `/snap/bin` + Linuxbrew now gate on `linux` like the seed does, instead of every non-darwin posix. - Docstring: `/opt/homebrew` off darwin is the one remaining seed gap and says why; the "lookup-only" paragraph names the `withCliRuntimeOnPath` exception. - New seed-order test derives the expected order from `getSystemCliInstallDirectories`, so reordering either list fails. The PR body's claim that SSH hosts benefit is dropped: they answer `preflight.detectAgents` from `src/relay/preflight-handler.ts` via `isCommandOnPathForRelay`, a separate bundle that never reaches this module. * fix(agents): build the CLI install-dir fallback order once and pin it on both resolvers resolveCliCommand (every spawn site) and resolveCliCommands (detection) each spelled the nvm -> version-manager -> system-dir order by hand, which is how the native and WSL lists drifted apart before. One getCliInstallDirectories now feeds both, and the test pins system dirs LAST on both resolvers, on darwin and linux, plus a derived check that the WSL guest prelude keeps every native version-manager dir ahead of the native system block. |
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f4c2821167 |
refactor(agent-session-journal): move the session journal onto SQLite (#18652)
* refactor(agent-session-journal): move the session journal onto SQLite The agent-session journal kept its state in three hand-rolled file formats: an append-only `log.jsonl` with torn-tail repair, a `snapshot.json` holding folded state plus a retained tail, and byte-quarantine files for anything unreadable. This replaces all of it with one SQLite database per session — `journal.db` beside the existing `blobs/` store — using the in-house adapter and the open/pragma/migrate/harden pattern the orchestration database already follows. Two tables: `journal_rows` (the append-only log, keyed by `(session_id, epoch, seq)`) and `journal_sessions` (the derived projection, upserted in the SAME transaction as every insert). Rows stay JSON in one column, so the row schema, the version upcast chain, and the reducer survive byte for byte — `journal-reducer.test.ts` and four other suites pass unchanged and are the regression proof. Deleted: `journal-log-file.ts`, `journal-compaction.ts`, `journal-corruption-quarantine.ts`, and the public `compact()` / `compactionBoundary` / `autoCompact` members, none of which had a non-test caller. Existing `log.jsonl` / `snapshot.json` journals are deliberately abandoned. No importer: a session created on the old path stops working, which is acceptable because the feature is off by default. ## The physical quota is repriced, because SQLite does not charge like a file The 256 MiB per-session bound is unchanged, but the arithmetic under it could not survive: SQLite grows the database in pages and the WAL in frames, and the checkpoint that copies the WAL forward holds the same pages in both files at once, so a transaction's peak is about twice its content. Admission now charges the candidate transaction's own measured page cost, validated against a sweep that runs as a regression test (`journal-database-space.test.ts`) rather than derived from reasoning about the allocator. Four things are load-bearing rather than tuning, each measured: - `auto_vacuum = INCREMENTAL` must be set BEFORE `journal_mode = WAL`. Set it after and it is ignored with no error, reclamation silently becomes a no-op, and the file never shrinks again. Both halves are asserted. - `wal_autocheckpoint = 0` plus an explicit `wal_checkpoint(TRUNCATE)` at the end of every write path, so the one moment the same pages live in two files is a moment the charge accounts for. - Reclamation runs in bounded chunks. A single unbounded `incremental_vacuum` took a 252 MB directory to 504 MB — the reclamation added to defend the bound would have breached it. `PRAGMA incremental_vacuum(N)` also frees exactly one page unless it is stepped to completion, which no size assertion catches, so the freed page count is asserted directly. - A blocked checkpoint leaves the WAL on disk together with the database growth it already copied, so admission charges that deferred copy explicitly. The term is zero whenever the last checkpoint succeeded, so the uncontended path admits and refuses an identical set. The epoch discard is `DELETE FROM journal_rows` with no WHERE clause, which takes SQLite's truncate optimization: measured at ~0.26% of the database in WAL bytes where the `WHERE session_id = ?` form rewrote every emptied leaf at up to 99%. One database per session is what makes the unqualified form correct. An open, empty journal costs 57,344 bytes before a single row exists, so a configured quota below `JOURNAL_MIN_SESSION_BYTES` now fails loudly at open with the existing `journal_bound_exceeded` instead of as a run of identical append failures. No production caller configures one; the affected surface is test fixtures, rescaled to the smallest value that restores what each case proves. ## One deliberate behaviour change Compaction was the only mechanism that shed bytes inside an epoch, and the write path called it precisely so an append at the bound was not refused. The SQLite-shaped replacement — a bounded prefix delete — cannot be used: with the snapshot gone the surviving rows ARE the state, so dropping the oldest of them loses the oldest transcript silently at the next reopen. So no row is ever shed inside an epoch, and a session whose row bytes alone reach the bound now refuses every append where it previously compacted and continued. A loud typed refusal beats silent data loss. What still sheds is unreferenced BLOB bytes — the dominant and unbounded byte source — on the same write-path hook. The escape from the hard stop is the fold that already exists, `replaceEpochItems`, which now actually returns bytes to the filesystem instead of leaving them on the freelist. The prune's protected set is a union of live reducer digests AND the candidate row's own digests, including those cited only by a nested lifecycle-batch mutation. Content addressing never rewrites a digest already on disk, so protecting live state alone deletes the blob the append is about to cite — a dangling reference that surfaces one reopen later as an empty expansion on an item the user can see. `journal-store-blob-budget.test.ts` pins it, and it goes red when the set is narrowed back. ## Handle ownership A file handle used to be opened and closed per append; a SQLite handle is held for the session's lifetime. Every path that can open a connection now has one owner: the open function owns its raw connection until it returns, the store owns its retained one and releases it in a new `close()`, and every other connection is closed by the call that opened it. The attach, recovery, eviction, map-overwrite and host-teardown paths close what they drop, and host teardown is failure-complete — the sink-barrier flush throws by design, so a trailing close statement would be skipped on exactly the path that leaks. `close()` has a stated contract: admission at enqueue and permanent, the close step on the same queue past that gate, one shared in-flight attempt, fulfilment terminal, and the release last and deliberately unguarded so a retry re-enters it. Guarding the release would skip it on retry, guaranteeing a permanent leak in exactly the case where it did not release. `journal_closed` joins the error union for a write after `close()`; no file outside the directory references any of these codes. * fix(agent-session-journal): make a COMMIT final, stop repairs deleting valid rows, and keep rejected closes retryable Six review findings on the SQLite journal migration. 1. A successful COMMIT is now the point of no return. The ordinary append, the epoch roll and the epoch replacement each adopt the committed row or epoch BEFORE any post-commit filesystem work; checkpoint, reclaim, blob prune and directory measurement run through `runJournalPostCommit`, which is best-effort by design and falls back to the transaction's own charge as a conservative footprint. Previously a post-COMMIT scan failure rejected a durable append and the next one reused its sequence, and a failed epoch housekeeping step left the store writing into a prefix already deleted. 2. Corruption repair preserves instead of destroying. A rejected suffix is copied into a new `journal_quarantine` table and removed from the live epoch in ONE transaction per chunk, charged against the session bound before a byte is written; a journal that cannot afford the copy refuses to open rather than falling back to deletion. The repair state is exposed as `journal.repair` and the rows are readable through `recoverQuarantinedRows()`, so Orca-owned submission, receipt and lifecycle identity survives a gap or a malformed row. 3. The physical charge covers the B-tree key payload. `session_id` and `epoch` are stored in both tables and both primary-key indexes and appear nowhere in `row_json`, so the journal boundary now bounds them and `journalTxnPhysicalCost` charges those bounds plus the projection upsert. The charge sweep runs the exact production transaction at maximum admitted key sizes. 4. A rejected `close()` no longer orphans its handle. Callers hand the journal to `agentSessionJournalCloseRetries` instead of swallowing the rejection, the attach map replacement is ABORTED when the previous journal will not close, host teardown retries what the registry holds, and a failed runtime teardown is retained so the next stop is a real retry. 5. `journalWalBytes()` returns zero only for ENOENT and propagates every other stat error, so admission and reclamation fail closed. 6. The WAL contention test closes the writer before removing its temp root and asserts the directory is removable once handles close. Regression coverage: post-commit divergence (4), corruption repair (5), key bounds (5), WAL stat (8), close retry (5), plus a runtime stop-retry case. Each fix was ablated on this head and the matching tests go red. * fix(agent-session-journal): anchor replay at sequence 1, make quarantine append-only, and charge it in bytes Three ways the corruption quarantine still lost rows it was written to keep. Replay validated contiguity from the first row that HAPPENED to remain, so an epoch missing only its sequence-1 row declared the leftovers contiguous and set no `truncateFrom`. The load was still corrupt, so recovery imported provider history and `replaceEpochItems` deleted every live row — including Orca-minted submission, receipt and lifecycle identity that no transcript can reconstruct, and that nothing had quarantined. Replay now anchors at sequence 1, so a missing epoch row rejects the whole surviving range before any replacement runs. `journal_quarantine` was keyed on `(session_id, epoch, seq)` and copied with `INSERT OR REPLACE`. A repair frees the sequences it removed and the live epoch reuses them, so a second repair in the same epoch silently deleted what the first preserved. The table is now keyed on a surrogate `quarantine_id`, the copy is a plain append, and `(epoch, seq)` is metadata; existing v1 databases are rekeyed in the migration that already bumps `user_version`. The admission charge read `length(row_json)`, which counts CHARACTERS for a TEXT value where `journalTxnPhysicalCost` expects physical UTF-8 bytes. A multibyte suffix was charged at up to a third of what it writes, which defeats the pre-write physical bound — over a megabyte on a maximum-size lifecycle batch. * fix(agent-session-journal): keep a repaired epoch anchored and stop the v1 quarantine migration doubling the file Replay validated numeric contiguity from sequence 1 but never that sequence 1 IS the epoch row. When the anchor was missing the repair set aside every surviving row, and if provider-history import then failed — a transcript that is temporarily gone is enough — the journal reopened as a clean, row-less epoch: an ordinary append took sequence 1, replay accepted it, read-restore published it as history, and automatic recovery never ran again while the user's real messages sat in quarantine. Replay now rejects an unanchored prefix, the open publishes an `unreconcilable_prefix` anchor for an epoch its repair emptied, and that anchor keeps reporting corrupt — so provider history is retried on every attach — until the timeline is rebuilt or the session writes content of its own. A repair also discloses rows it set aside when no line was unreadable at all, which is the case that removes the most. The v1 quarantine rekey copied every legacy row into the new table inside one transaction and dropped the old one. A quarantine holds whole rejected rows: a single 8 MiB row nearly doubled the database past the physical bound the open had already checked, the dropped pages only reached the freelist, and the next open refused the session it had just migrated. The v1 table is renamed and frozen instead, and reads take both generations. Table creation also moves inside the migration transaction, so a crash can no longer leave a v2-shaped database still reporting version 0 for an older build to write into. * fix(agent-session-journal): stop an empty provider transcript retiring the repair marker A transcript that exists but decodes to zero messages was imported as a success: the import published an empty `legacy_import` replacement that deleted the `unreconcilable_prefix` anchor and its disclosure, so the next probe read the session as clean and every later attach skipped provider recovery while the user's rows sat in quarantine for good. The import now leaves the epoch untouched when nothing decodes, reporting `replaced: false`, and recovery treats that like a transcript it could not read — the marker stands and a later attach with real history rebuilds the timeline. * style(agent-session-journal): merge the duplicate journal-database-space import * refactor(agent-session-journal): drop quarantine, byte bound, blob spill and rate limit Match what comparable implementations do: the journal is an unbounded append-only SQLite log with no side tables and no admission control. Corruption: the rejected suffix is DELETED rather than copied into a quarantine table. The load still reports `corrupt` and recovery still rebuilds the epoch from provider history, so the observable outcome is unchanged — only the preservation half is gone. The schema is back to one version with two tables; no v1 database exists outside unmerged commits of this branch, so the rekey migration and the two-generation read path go with it. Sequence-1 epoch anchoring and the empty-provider-transcript retry are kept: both are about the corrupt signal being correct. Size: no `maxSessionBytes`, so no page-cost arithmetic, reclaim band, incremental vacuum, lifecycle byte reservations or `journal_bound_exceeded`. `auto_vacuum` and `wal_autocheckpoint = 0` existed only to make a transaction's physical cost predictable for that charge; with the charge gone SQLite's default checkpointing is what the journal wants, and the explicit pre-close checkpoint is redundant with the one `db.close()` performs. WAL, `synchronous = FULL` and `busy_timeout` stay. Payloads: an oversized body is truncated at the existing inline cap with the existing marker and the remainder is discarded, bounded at the translation layer that already calls these helpers. The truncation point and message do not change; the content-addressed blob directory and all digest tracking do. Rate: no `maxAppendsPerWindow` and no `journal_rate_exceeded`. `JournalPayloadLimits` is now just the inline cap. * fix(agent-session-journal): mark a partial repair pending and bound multi-block tool input A repair that keeps its prefix had nothing durable to show for the suffix it deleted: a sequence gap costs no malformed row, so no disclosure is appended, and the surviving rows keep their epoch anchor. The next probe read a contiguous anchored prefix, called it clean, and the deleted stretch of timeline was never asked for again — silent loss, with the deletion already committed. The deletion now writes a `journal_repairs` marker in the SAME transaction, and replay keeps reporting corrupt while it stands. It retires under exactly the rule the emptied-epoch anchor takes: a fresh epoch carries the rebuild, or the session writes content of its own past the sequence the repair left free. The repair's own disclosure is not that content. Legacy import bounded a tool call's input only when it was the message's sole block; the multi-block path returned `tool-call` unchanged, so a mixed message from Claude, Grok or an omp execution cell persisted the whole input despite `inlineHeadBytes`. `boundBlock` now routes it through `boundToolInput`. Also drops canonical comments describing quarantine, snapshot files, blob storage and blob compaction — none of which exist any more. * fix(agent-session-wire): stop awaiting the synchronous journal probe loadJournal runs on a sync-database connection and returns JournalLoad | null, so both wire call sites were awaiting a non-Promise. The type-aware code-quality gate flags it; the native gate does not. --------- Co-authored-by: Merge Sim <sim@local> |
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92456b1618 |
perf(ports): serve unchanged macOS listeners from remembered metadata (#18650)
* perf(ports): serve unchanged macOS listeners from remembered metadata The workspace port scan shells out three times every 30s while the window is visible. Profiling an idle app showed the cycle costs 0.67s of CPU — about 2.2% of a core sustained, roughly 65% of Orca's total idle CPU — and two of those three commands only re-derive the command line and cwd of listeners that have not changed since the last scan. Reuse the metadata already remembered for a listener when this scan's free lsof -F c process name still matches, so a recycled pid re-probes instead of inheriting a dead process's attribution. In steady state that drops the cycle to the single listening scan. * perf(ports): pin cached listener metadata to its socket and re-probe every tenth scan The metadata cache trusted an entry on pid:host:port plus the lsof -F c process name, so a recycled pid running the same command name on the same port would inherit a dead process's command line and cwd, and a process that chdir'd while listening kept its old cwd forever. Add the socket's kernel identity (lsof -F d) to the already-running listening command — measured at no spawn and no wall-time cost — and require it to match before reusing an entry: a restarted process listens through a new socket. Also re-probe every remembered entry every tenth scan (~5 min) so a changed cwd cannot go stale indefinitely. Steady state stays at one command per cycle for nine of every ten scans. * docs(ports): note the ordering contract between the reuse split and the remember step * fix(ports): never authorize a kill from remembered listener metadata requireMetadata is the SIGTERM authorization re-scan, and its own comment says it must never land on a cycle that skipped owner attribution. The metadata cache could serve it entirely from memory, so a process that had chdir'd out of a worktree could stay attributed to it for up to the re-probe ceiling and be killed on Stop. That caller now always probes; background polls still cache. * fix(ports): re-derive every port of a pid when any one of them needs metadata A process listening on several ports could have one row served from remembered metadata and another from a fresh probe, so a process that moved between scans reported two different workspace attributions until the next full re-probe. Decide per pid first, then hydrate only pids that need no probe at all. * refactor(ports): let the cache module own the requireMetadata bypass Keeps the scanner under the max-lines gate and puts the cache policy with the cache rather than at the call site. |
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5083b58b9c |
fix(desktop): never replay a refresh token after a timeout; jitter relay lease renewal (#18719)
Two independent desktop hardening changes that share one incident date.
1. Refresh-token replay. A refresh POST that aborts client-side leaves the
token's fate unknown: the server may already have rotated it before the
reply was lost. Every caller above this module (the relay auth coordinator
most of all) then re-entered and resent the same stored token, which the
server reads as reuse and answers by revoking the whole token family. On
2026-09-04 that turned a slow refresh endpoint into 21,605 sign-outs.
- The refresh endpoint now gets one 60s attempt instead of a 30s attempt
plus a replayed retry.
- A failure with no status line is ambiguous: it is never retried, and the
token is recorded so a re-entry within 30s is refused outright rather
than replayed. The block is bounded, not permanent -- the token is only
possibly spent, and a permanent block would sign out every desktop whose
refresh merely timed out.
- Before any retry or replay the stored session is re-read; if another
caller already rotated it, that result is adopted and the old token is
never sent again.
- Only a definitive 5xx, which proves the server rejected without
rotating, is retried, and exactly once.
- A 401 on a token whose earlier attempt never answered now logs
orca_cloud_refresh_possible_replay so support can tell a real revocation
from a sign-out we caused ourselves. clearCloudSessionIfUnchanged
semantics are unchanged and still emit the invalidation event.
2. Lease renewal jitter. Both desktop renewal timers took the mean of a
60s-wide window before expiry. A cell recreate reconnects a whole cohort
inside one second, so every host in it renewed inside the same second ~54
minutes later, re-bursting the fleet every ~54 minutes. Renewal now
carries full +/-10% jitter, spreading the same cohort over ~10 minutes.
Early renewal is free on the server side: the rebind branch resets the
full 55-minute TTL from whenever it arrives, with no minimum-age or
early-renewal restriction (cloud/apps/relay/src/host-session-registry.ts
:736-743, and :794 for a fresh session). Only lateness is fatal -- :997
drains and closes a lease that has expired. The base interval is therefore
shrunk to fit the upward jitter rather than clipping the jittered value at
the margin, which keeps the distribution unbiased and keeps every sample at
least 90s before expiry. No wire change.
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b2c6f029ef |
perf(settings): commit free-text account settings on a debounce, not per keystroke (#18651)
* perf(settings): commit free-text account settings on a debounce, not per keystroke Four raw text inputs bound value straight to the store and called updateSettings in onChange, so every character was an IPC round trip that replaced the settings object identity in every other window, re-rendering everything subscribed to it. Route them through a DebouncedSettingsTextInput that keeps a local draft and commits after 700ms, on blur, and on unmount — matching the repository-hook script draft. The draft lives in the input component because the account sections are render functions the settings search calls conditionally, so hooks cannot legally live in them. * fix(settings): update the draft's latest-commit ref in an effect, not during render * fix(settings): flush a pending text-setting draft on beforeunload and drop the dirty flag A window close or app quit never unmounts the React tree, so the unmount flush could not run and a value typed within the last 700ms was lost. The close coordinator already dispatches a synthetic beforeunload while the tree is mounted, so listen for it the same way the session checkpoint does. The pending timer is now the single source of truth for "uncommitted edits"; the separate dirty flag it duplicated is gone. |
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368a6d6ca7 |
perf(terminal): use real event-loop yields between chunked writes (#18627)
* perf(terminal): use real event-loop yields between chunked writes Both chunk-write loops yielded with setTimeout(resolve, 0), which is not a yield but a timer tick. The paste executor's awaits are nested, so Chromium clamps them to ~4ms each; a 4MB paste is ~256 chunks and up to a second of dead time. The main-process pty:write loop pays a Node timer round trip per 16KiB. Use the shared MessageChannel-based yieldToEventLoop in the renderer (already used by pty-input-write-queue one file over) and setImmediate in main (already used by the remote-runtime terminal.send path and the usage scanners). * test(terminal): pin the event-loop yield between chunked PTY writes The paste executor must default to the shared yieldToEventLoop helper and write-input must yield via setImmediate; neither was covered, so a refactor back to setTimeout(0) would have passed every suite. Both tests are deterministic: the renderer test mocks the helper module and spies on setTimeout with the operation timeout disabled, and the main-process test fakes only setTimeout so a timer-based yield stalls while a setImmediate yield races to completion on real check-phase turns. |
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9008fb70a6 |
perf(sidebar): share one natural-worktree-id scan and drop a redundant row-key join (#18647)
The natural-worktree-id Set was spelled out four times — twice in the drag groups module, once in the drag session hook, once in the drag units module — each as rows.flatMap(row => cond ? [id] : []), which allocates a throwaway array per row. All four memoize on the same rows, so they recompute together. Share one loop-based helper. use-row-measurement also built a joined string of every row key purely as an effect dependency, alongside a Set memoized on the same input. A fresh Set always changes identity, so the string could never fire the effect on its own. |
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2881955bae |
perf(agent-hooks): stop cloning the whole status roster on every hook event (#18642)
AgentAwakeService.setStatuses deep-copied every row of an array the hook server had just built fresh, and getEligibleRunningStatusCount allocated a filtered array only to read its length. Both run on every agent turn and tool call, and both scale with cached panes rather than with the one pane that changed. Copy the array without cloning its rows, and count in place. At 500 panes the per-event cost drops from 5.34us to 1.78us. |
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a663a21fff |
perf(orchestration): project task columns so task reads hit the statement cache (#18641)
SyncDatabase refuses to cache any statement containing a wildcard, so every SELECT * FROM tasks recompiled on each call. getTask sits on the dispatch and lifecycle paths and listTasks runs several times per coordinator tick on the 2s poll, so those recompiles were continuous during a run. Project TASK_COLUMNS explicitly, the same fix #18420 applied to the graph publish, using the column list already imported in this file. getTask drops from 7.88us to 2.18us per call. |
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c1850e3cc7 |
perf(claude-usage): reject non-assistant transcript lines before parsing them (#18640)
Only assistant records carry usage, but the parser ran JSON.parse on every line first and checked the type after. Claude transcripts interleave user and tool-result lines that routinely embed whole files or captured command output, so the scanner built and discarded a full object graph for each of them. A substring gate on the line rejects them first: median 50.5ms to 8.4ms over 20000 realistic lines. |
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a7223be538 |
perf(agent-hooks): find spool newlines with Buffer.indexOf, not a per-byte loop (#18639)
readSpoolFile walked every byte of every spooled JSONL file in an interpreted loop to locate newlines. drainAgentHookSpool runs inside start() before the hook listener binds, over up to AGENT_HOOK_SPOOL_MAX_FILES files, so this sits on the startup path. Buffer.indexOf reaches the same newlines via memchr. A 5.3MB spool file drops from 32.50ms to 9.26ms per read. The torn-trailing-line contract is unchanged: a final line with no newline is still left unconsumed. |
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1b4159a318 |
perf(sidebar): stop building host projections the row model throws away (#18638)
* perf(sidebar): stop building host projections the row model throws away getMixedHostContextLabels built a label map for every visible worktree and then returned undefined unless two distinct hosts existed — so a single-host install, the common case, paid the whole build on every buildRows rebuild. Decide first, then build only when it is mixed. getHostWorktreeCounts repeated getHostWorktreeIds' dedupe walk to compute a number that is exactly the id list's length, and both loops built the identity string twice per row. Derive the counts and hoist the identity. * fix(test): correct the worktree types import path and drop an unused parameter |
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537a75c94d |
perf(source-control): stop reconciling selection on every panel render (#18637)
reconcileSourceControlSelectionState was called straight from the hook body, so it reran on every Source Control render — every commit-message keystroke and every status poll — and built a Set over every visible row to prune a selection that had not moved. Add an early return for the common empty-selection case and memoize the call on its three inputs. At 500 changed files the empty case drops from 13.10µs to 0.03µs per call. |
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6093b9f058 |
perf(renderer): stop two store selectors allocating on every write (#18632)
The Claude and Codex account sync keys stringify a runtime map and join the whole managed-account roster. Both are pure functions of settings, but they ran inside useAppStore selectors, which Zustand re-runs on every store write. Memoize both on settings identity in one shared module. terminalTabLivenessMatches ran on every tab write including title frames and allocated an [index, value] tuple per worktree and per tab in each changed bucket; indexed loops visit the same entries in the same order. |
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7ccabe5073 |
perf(right-sidebar): cache the active checks status instead of rebuilding its cache keys per store write (#18631)
* perf(right-sidebar): cache the active checks status instead of rebuilding its cache keys per store write The right sidebar is always mounted, so getActiveChecksStatus ran on every store write while it was open and rebuilt two provider cache-key strings plus a branch regex replace each time, only to return the same scalar. Memoize on the input references, matching selectFloatingVisibleTabCount. * refactor(right-sidebar): derive the active checks cache key and parameter type from one key list The cache was keyed on a hand-written field list that had to be kept in sync with every store field computeActiveChecksStatus reads; missing one would leave the sidebar checks badge silently stale. Derive both the parameter type and the cache key from ACTIVE_CHECKS_STATUS_INPUT_KEYS so TypeScript rejects reading a field the cache is not keyed on, and add a Proxy test that records every property actually read and fails on any unkeyed one. |
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9130c6ee6c |
perf(editor): build the closing-fence pattern once per fence, not once per line (#18629)
markdownFenceRanges recompiled the closing-fence RegExp for every line inside an open code fence, though it only depends on the fence's own marker and length. A 100k-line fenced block went from 16.6ms to 5.8ms. |
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fb99bcc3a4 |
perf(terminal): gate the Command Code banner scan before building its scan windows (#18628)
Every PTY chunk on every pane built two ~4KB scan windows and then, for panes that have not shown the banner, stripped terminal control sequences three times over them. The existing prefilter ran after that work and only required the letters C, o and d, which nearly every code agent's output contains. COMMAND_CODE_BANNER_RE requires a literal '#' and stripTerminalControl only removes characters, so raw bytes without one cannot match. Check that against the carry and the chunk before either window is built. |
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1b692088b8 |
perf(terminal): stop copying every PTY chunk for two startup-error detectors (#18626)
Both detectors ran a case-folding copy on every PTY chunk for the pane's whole life, to answer a boolean that is read at most once. git-bash-console-capacity lowercased carry+chunk per chunk. A match that was not already found has to end inside the new chunk, and the marker's last character is a digit, so a chunk without it can skip the copy and fold only the 44-char carry. codex-backfill-error-detector allocated a lowercased copy of the full 4KB carry per chunk; a precompiled case-insensitive regex tests the carry in place. |
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f46823a30a |
test(renderer): pin the runtime-target selector's identity stability (#18625)
#18685 landed the fix (select the host id, derive in useMemo) without a regression guard. This is that guard: it drives 50 unrelated store writes and asserts the consumer re-renders once and the returned target keeps its identity. Confirmed to fail against the pre-#18685 hook (51 renders). |
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c5ed53a1f5 |
perf(git): overlap the three independent submodule status reads (#18623)
getSubmoduleStatus awaited the inner status, the parent gitlink oid and the submodule HEAD one after another, though none depends on another's result. The Source Control panel re-runs this on every parent status poll while a submodule row is expanded, and the same function backs the git.submoduleStatus RPC, so over SSH or WSL each read was a separate round trip. Total latency drops from the sum of the round trips to the longest one. |
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d9680eb753 |
fix(startup): apply the HTTP/1.1 compatibility toggle for migrated profiles, and stop parsing the settings file pre-ready (#18621)
* perf(startup): read the HTTP/1.1 compatibility flag from a marker, not the settings file configureElectronNetworkCompatibility() runs before app.whenReady(), and it answered one boolean by synchronously reading and JSON.parsing the whole orca-data.json — 1.54 MB on a real profile here, measured at 6.6ms read + 3.5ms parse. The Store parses the identical file again moments later, so the first parse was pure waste on the critical path of every cold start. Cache the flag in a few-byte marker next to the other pre-ready markers (gpu-fallback, hang-detection), written at store load and whenever the setting changes. When no marker exists yet the old full read still runs, so an upgrading profile keeps the setting on its first launch. * refactor(startup): drop the unused marker clear helper |
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cae616384f |
perf(orchestration): bound the worker terminal archive in linear time (#18622)
boundArchiveLines built its kept-lines array with kept.unshift() per line, which is O(n) per call. The 256KB char budget admits ~262k lines when they are short, so a blank-line-heavy terminal tail turned the truncation into a quadratic main-process stall: 4.3s for a 300k-line input here, versus 6ms after collecting newest-first and reversing once. Order and truncation boundary are unchanged. |
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ef428d879e |
feat(relay): tell the phone when its desktop is signed out (#18698)
On 2026-09-04 an auth outage signed ~21,600 desktops out of Orca Cloud and every paired phone showed the generic "Can't reach desktop" for hours. The desktop knew why, the cell watched it happen, and neither could say so. The desktop now names auth loss on its control close reason; the cell remembers that reason per (userId, relayHostId) and replays it as the close reason of the 4404 it already sends a phone whose host is absent; the phone turns it into "Desktop signed out — sign in to Orca on your desktop to reconnect". Retry cadence, close codes and every message body are untouched. The reason rides the WebSocket close reason because there is no additive JSON channel to a shipped phone: RelayPhoneHelloSchema, RelayAuthSchema and the director's ResolveResponseSchema are all zod .strict(), and /v1/connect rejects any query string outright. A new close code was also rejected — an old phone would fall out of mobileRelayRecoveryFor and off the 5-15s host-offline backoff onto the faster transport backoff. The cell keeps the reason in memory rather than Postgres: a phone reaches the cell its host's assignment row already names, which is the cell that saw the close, and losing it on a cell restart degrades to today's verdict rather than a wrong one. |
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77334e7c8b |
fix(orca-profiles): tell the renderer when a cloud session is revoked (#18694)
A revoked refresh-token family makes the main process clear the stored cloud session, but the renderer cached orcaProfileAuthStatus at startup and only re-fetched when it was empty. The account card kept showing "Connected" and Mobile pairing kept showing a generic Relay failure until the user restarted the app. - Push: clearing a session on an auth failure now emits an invalidation event that broadcasts orcaProfiles:authStatusChanged to every window; the renderer re-reads auth status from it. Explicit sign-out is unchanged. - Pull: every pane that renders auth state re-reads it on mount through useOrcaProfileAuthStatusRefresh instead of only when the store is empty. - Copy: a Relay mint failure re-reads auth status, and the failure notice says the session expired and to sign in again instead of offering a retry that cannot succeed. The LAN path is untouched. |
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d9e44a6749 |
Keep the floating workspace above a working native chat pane (#18692)
* Keep the floating workspace above a working native chat pane While an agent is streaming, `data-native-chat-working='true'` promoted the native chat pane shell from z-10 to z-50, above the floating workspace panel's z-45. Both compete in the root stacking context, so the chat column painted over a summoned floating workspace and only the sliver past the chat's right edge stayed visible. Lower the working-state rule to z-44. It still clears the z-40 updater and onboarding chrome the rule was added for (#16729) and the 41-44 band was otherwise empty. Raising the panel instead would put it over the z-50 modal layer it deliberately sits under. The existing layering test pinned z-index 50 with no upper bound, which is what let this through; it now derives both bounds from source. * Stop the layering test reading a comment as the panel class The panel's z-index was read with a lazy match from the data attribute to the first `z-[NN]`. Nearby comments cite bare tiers (the toggle button's own note mentions z-[45]), so a reworded comment landing after the attribute would be read as the class. Strip comments and anchor to `className=`. --------- Co-authored-by: Merge Sim <sim@local> |
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5412276776 | Fix status bar runtime target render loop (#18685) | ||
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3e4fd4a7af |
Shorten orchestration skill description under the Agent Skills 1024-char limit (#18683)
* Shorten orchestration skill description under the Agent Skills 1024-char limit The folded description was 1038 chars, so spec-conforming installers such as SkillStar rejected the bundled orchestration skill. Drop the two clauses already covered elsewhere in the same description: "decomposing work across agents" (implied by "structured multi-agent coordination") and "automation of the browser embedded inside Orca" (restated by the locked `orca-cli` embedded-pages sentence). Every routing trigger asserted by orchestration-skill-guidance.test.mjs, the orca-cli handoff boundary, and the Computer Use boundary are unchanged. Result: 958 chars. Add config/scripts/skill-description-length.test.mjs, which parses every skills/*/SKILL.md frontmatter with `yaml` and fails on an empty or >1024 char description, so the regression cannot return. orca-cli sits at 1015 and is left as is. Fixes #17935 * Keep the embedded browser in the orchestration description's orca-cli routing Restores the word "browser" in the orca-cli sentence ("and the Orca embedded browser") so agents scanning for it still route embedded-browser control to orca-cli. Description is 985 chars, 39 under the spec limit. |
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b0df874b7b |
Add tab scrollbar (#18526)
* Add interactive scroll indicator for tab strip - Support thumb dragging and track clicking to scroll - Auto-expand on hover and show when scrolling - Forward wheel events to tab container - Disable indicator during tab drag operations * Fully hide scroll indicator when disabled When disabled, the tab strip scroll indicator is hidden, unexpandable on hover, and doesn't forward wheel events. Consolidates disabled state checks across visibility, event handling, and CSS classes. * Cleanup active scroll indicator drag when disabled When the scroll indicator becomes disabled or hidden mid-drag, immediately cancel the drag operation to prevent window listeners and body styles (cursor, user-select) from remaining in a stuck state. * Refine tab scroll indicator appearance and sizing Reduce idle and expanded heights by 1px and 2px respectively, simplify color expressions from color-mix to straightforward opacity utilities, and use transparent background at rest for a more subtle, cohesive appearance. |
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67999dcaae |
Keep attention glyph knockout white when row is selected (#18679)
* Simplify palette attention glyph styling Remove visual styling from the container so the glyph appears as a lightweight overlay on the row icon, not a selection bubble. * Keep attention glyph knockout white when row is selected The glyph now uses a white background (bg-popover) with a ring to create a visual knockout effect that separates it from the icon. This prevents the glyph from inheriting the row selection styling, ensuring it stays visible and distinct regardless of selection state. * Correct attention glyph knockout color description to popover-colored |
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0d2375a7ff |
fix(remote): stop a disclosure list latching the mirror completeness gate (#18619)
* fix(remote): stop a disclosure list latching the mirror completeness gate `hostScope.omittedHostIds` was doing two jobs with opposite requirements. As disclosure it must over-name: `omitted-host-scope-selectors.ts` deliberately keeps ids for servers that are no longer paired so a caller can still see the gap, and `docs/reference/ssh-execution-boundary.md` requires a listing to name what it did not cover. As a completeness gate it must name only coverage that was owed and not delivered, or it latches. It latched. `workspaceSessionsByHostId` keeps a partition for every runtime a machine has ever paired with and nothing prunes it, and a mirrored `remote:` row names its peer too — so any client that has ever paired outward publishes a permanently non-empty `omittedHostIds`. `probeHostLiveTerminals` read that as `unverifiable`, `markHostSessionMirrorHydrated` never fired, and panes parked on `parkUntilHostSessionMirrorHydrates` never drained. `hostScopeCensusIsComplete` gives the gate its own answer and leaves the disclosure list alone. A `runtime:` host is never owed coverage by the runtime answering: a paired runtime is a peer with its own control plane reached with `--environment`, and there is no paired-runtime PTY provider for this runtime to have queried. Two other branches stay load-bearing — an absent scope is a host too old to claim one, and a listing that covered no host proves nothing. No wire change: the host publishes byte-identical content and only the client's reading moves, so this reaches the reporter by updating their client alone rather than waiting for their remote. That also avoids a new field's fallback rule, where "absent means complete" would recreate the bug with the polarity flipped. `queried-host-kinds.test.ts` pins the invariant the predicate rests on at its source, because the consolidation moving the SSH path onto orcad is the change most likely to introduce a runtime-backed PTY provider and quietly invalidate it. Fixes #18595 * test(remote): pin the orphan-recovery host-scope gate and narrow the invariant claim The readiness review found the second gate unpinned: reverting `web-session-terminal-orphan-recovery-inventory.ts` alone to the pre-PR expression left the whole renderer suite green, because every existing fixture passes `omittedHostIds: []`. The commit claimed two gates and proved one. Four cases now drive `resolveTerminalOrphanInventory` through a non-empty scope. Reverting that gate alone fails the peer-runtime case. Note the absent-scope case deletes the key rather than passing `undefined`, because `listResult` substitutes its default for `undefined` — routing through the fixture there silently tests the default instead. `queried-host-kinds.test.ts` also claimed more than it caught: a runtime-backed transport registered under an SSH connection id reports as `ssh:` and passes, which is the shape the orcad consolidation is expected to take. It pins the spelling this function emits, which is what the gate keys on, and now says so. * fix(remote): require a legible covered host before believing a census CodeRabbit found a real asymmetry: the predicate refused an omitted host id it could not parse, but accepted an unparseable *covered* id as proof of coverage. `isTerminalListResult` validates only that `hostIds` is an array, so `{hostIds: ['runtime:'], omittedHostIds: ['runtime:env-7']}` was `unverifiable` before this PR and would have become `complete` after it. Taken as "at least one legible covered host" rather than the suggested "every id parses". A host that later gains a kind this client cannot parse would otherwise report an incomplete census forever — which is this bug in a new coat, and the failure mode the predicate exists to prevent. The check exposed four tests publishing `hostIds: ['remote-runtime']`, a bare environment id that `parseExecutionHostId` rejects. No host emits that: a runtime answering `terminal.list` names the execution hosts it covered, which is `local` — verified against a live paired runtime. Those fixtures are corrected to the shape the wire actually carries, which is why the assertions move. |
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14e4031948 |
test(pty): make the F24 patch pins catch the regressions they name (#18660)
Two of the pins added in #18635 did not discriminate. Found by review of the merged change; both are test-only defects, the fix itself is unaffected. `resolves the ConPTY DLL before it claims the close` searched the whole patch for `HANDLE hLibrary = LoadConptyDll(info, useConptyDll);`. That line occurs twice -- PtyConnect's copy comes first -- so indexOf always matched PtyConnect, and the ordering assertion held no matter where PtyKill resolved the DLL. Verified by simulation: moving PtyKill's resolve back below the claim left the suite green. `reaches hShell only under the null check` used a marker as a slice END bound without checking it existed. If that marker vanished the slice ran to the end of the patch, the stray-line filter found nothing, and the test passed silently. Both now anchor inside the PtyKill hunk only, located by its header's function context rather than line numbers. `indexIn` throws on a missing marker instead of returning -1, so a marker that moves fails the assertion that depends on it rather than making it vacuous. Adds the pin that was missing entirely: PtyKill's half of the two-sided baton free. Without it a self-exit followed by kill() -- the ordinary pane close -- leaks one baton and one entry in the vector get_pty_baton scans linearly. Mutation-tested rather than only revert-tested, because wholesale reverting the patch is what hid this: it fails every assertion for the trivial reason that nothing matches. Simulating each specific regression instead: - move PtyKill's DLL resolve below the claim -> 1 failed (was: 0) - drop PtyKill's baton free, line-count-neutral -> 2 failed (was: 0) Wholesale revert still fails all 9. Refs F24. |
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f7e3af254a |
fix(pty): close the pseudoconsole and dispose the conout worker on Windows self-exit (F24) (#18635)
* fix(pty): close the pseudoconsole when a Windows shell exits by itself
`ClosePseudoConsole` is the only thing that reaps a ConPTY's console host.
node-pty calls it from one place, `PtyKill`, which starts by looking the baton
up by id -- and the exit watcher in `SetupExitCallback` erased that baton the
moment the shell died. So on the self-exit path (typing `exit`, how panes
usually close) the lookup missed, `PtyKill` did nothing at all, and the
pseudoconsole was never closed.
The baton now survives until BOTH the shell has exited and `kill()` has run;
whichever arrives second frees it. `PtyKill` copies `hpc` out under the lock and
closes it afterwards, guards `TerminateProcess` on a shell handle the watcher
may already have closed, and duplicates that handle rather than reordering, so
upstream's close-then-terminate sequence is unchanged.
Measured on Windows 11, 20 self-exit cycles driven exactly as Orca drives them
(`onExit -> destroy()`), handles bucketed by NT object type:
relay spawn (no useConptyDll) 225 -> 285 (+1 Process +2 File/term)
after 219 -> 219 FLAT
desktop spawn (useConptyDll) 239 -> 439 (+1 Process +2 Thread +5 File/term)
after 235 -> 395 (+2 Thread +4 File/term)
The desktop residue is a separate defect in the `useConptyDll` branch of
`WindowsPtyAgent.kill()`, which disposes the conout worker only from an
`_outSocket.on('data')` handler -- and no data arrives after the shell has gone.
Fixing that line as well takes the desktop to 222 -> 222 FLAT, but it lives in
the `kill()` hunk owned by F23, so it is left to that change.
Refs F24.
* fix(pty): dispose the conout worker when a Windows shell exits by itself
Second, independent defect on the same self-exit path, and the larger half of
the desktop's leak. The `useConptyDll` branch of `WindowsPtyAgent.kill()`
disposed the conout worker only from an `_outSocket.on('data')` handler -- and
once the shell has gone no more data ever arrives, so the worker was never
disposed. The non-DLL branch three lines above already disposed unconditionally,
which is why only the desktop (the only spawner that sets `useConptyDll`) hit it.
Measured on Windows 11, 20 cycles, handles bucketed by NT object type, totals:
self-exit, relay spawn 225 -> 285 now 219 -> 219 FLAT
self-exit, desktop spawn 239 -> 439 now 222 -> 222 FLAT
explicit kill, relay spawn 225 -> 285 now 219 -> 219 FLAT
explicit kill, desktop spawn 235 -> 395 now 219 -> 219 FLAT
Neither fix alone is enough on the desktop: the pseudoconsole close is worth
+1 Process +1 File per terminal, this dispose +2 Thread +4 File.
The relay asset (config/relay-assets/node-pty-1.1.0-windows-pty-teardown-patch.cjs)
deliberately gets no counterpart: the relay takes the non-DLL branch, where the
dispose is already unconditional. Its reconstruction table needs the new hunk
though, or un-applying the desktop hunks no longer yields published node-pty.
Taken over from F23 at win-relay-qa's request after they verified that the
desktop never executes the non-DLL branch F23 was scoped around.
Refs F24.
* fix(pty): harden PtyKill against a failed handle duplication and a missing DLL
Both from review of #18635.
DuplicateHandle's result was dropped. On the live explicit-kill path a failed
duplication left hShellDup null, which the guard below could not tell apart from
the self-exit case, so TerminateProcess was skipped and the shell kept running
after its pane closed -- a worse outcome than the handle leak this patch exists
to fix. The failure now terminates through handle->hShell under the lock, where
it is valid and where TerminateProcess does not block. The only cost is that the
rare path kills before the console closes instead of after.
LoadConptyDll is now resolved BEFORE any baton state is touched, matching what
PtyConnect already does for the same reason. It throws when conpty.dll is
missing, and a throw after consoleClosed was set would strand the pseudoconsole
permanently: the retry finds the work claimed and does nothing.
Also corrects three comments the earlier commits made stale:
- the ptyJobMutex note still said PtyKill reads the table unlocked
- PtyListJobProcessIds said the baton is gone once the shell exits; it now
outlives the shell, and the nulled hJob is what makes the answer null
- windows-pty-job.ts said node-pty drops its handle record on exit
Re-measured on Windows 11 with the rebuilt binary, 20 cycles, all four paths
still flat: self-exit relay 219->219, self-exit desktop 222->222, explicit-kill
relay 219->219, explicit-kill desktop 219->219. Both explicit-kill runs report
22/22 shells exited, so the kill still lands.
Refs F24.
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886fcf083f |
fix(runtime): let a scoped worktree listing report the host it could not cover (#18645)
* fix(runtime): let a scoped worktree listing report the host it could not cover
`orca worktree list --repo <id>` passed `[]` as `knownHostIds`, so a scoped
listing could never report a gap — for any host kind, reachable or not. With zero
matched rows both scope lists are empty by construction, and the answer is
`{hostIds: [], omittedHostIds: []}`: byte-identical to a repo that genuinely has
no worktrees. docs/reference/ssh-execution-boundary.md forbids a listing from
implying exactly that.
Measured on one runtime with one refusing SSH host, in the same second:
unscoped totalCount 0 omittedHostIds ["local","ssh:<target>"] (+ --host selectors)
scoped totalCount 0 hostScope {"hostIds":[],"omittedHostIds":[]}
The same runtime reports nine omitted hosts unscoped and zero scoped against a
live profile, so this is not a subtle inconsistency: it is one runtime giving two
contradictory answers about its own coverage.
A scoped listing now names the one host the caller asked about. That costs
nothing when rows come back — the host lands in `covered`, so it is never
reported omitted — and is the whole answer when they do not. Hosts the caller
scoped out are still never named, which a test pins, because naming them all is
the obvious over-correction.
* test(runtime): pin the scoped host derivation for local and executionHostId repos
Review flagged that the host-scope cases only covered a connectionId repo.
getRepoExecutionHostId reads two spellings, and a scoped listing naming the
wrong host would be worse than naming none, so both are pinned. Both fail with
the fix reverted.
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637dc30a32 |
fix(relay): observe Windows PTY child processes instead of answering false (#18591)
* fix(relay): observe Windows PTY child processes instead of answering false `processHasChildren` returned a hardcoded `false` on Windows, and a hardcoded negative is indistinguishable from a measurement. Every close guard reads it as "nothing is running in this pane", so an SSH-to-Windows tab running a build closed with no prompt. Measured on a real Windows SSH host: a live `PING.EXE` under the pane's `cmd.exe` still reported `hasChildProcesses: false`, while the identical harness on Linux reported `sleep` / `true`. Windows has no `ps`, but it does have a process table, and the pane walk over it already existed for the foreground reader. The answer now comes from `queryWindowsPaneProcessInventory`; a table it could not read reports `unverifiable` rather than a fabricated negative. `hasChildProcesses` is a boolean, which cannot hold the third answer, and it is read both as "busy, do not close" and as "the agent took the PTY, safe to type into" — so no single mapping of `unverifiable` is safe for both. The verdict moves to a new optional `childProcessEvidence` member that the close paths read; the boolean keeps its exact meaning for every client that cannot. Cost: `pty.inspectProcess` is the polled path and a relay host has no `@vscode/windows-process-tree`, so its table read falls back to the 1.36s CIM scan. Polling that would reinstate the fork storm the shared table exists to prevent, so only a caller whose answer decides something asks for the scan. * fix(runtime): forward scanChildProcesses through the environment inspection RPC `guardRunningTerminalClose` asks the host to pay for a real child-process read, but the environment path dropped the option before it reached the wire: the renderer sent only `expectedIncarnationId`, and the RPC schema — the shared `TerminalHandle` — silently stripped anything else. A host routing that pane through an SSH relay then declined to scan and answered `unverifiable`, which `inspectionReportsRunningWork` reads as running work. The result was a close confirmation on an idle pane, which is the nag this PR exists to avoid. Forwarded through all four layers: renderer payload, RPC schema, method handler, and the runtime/controller signatures. The schema is a dedicated extension rather than a field on `TerminalHandle`, so `clearBuffer`/`agentStatus`/`isRunningAgent` keep refusing an option they have no use for. The silent strip is not itself the defect — it is what makes a new optional member safe to send to an old host, per docs/reference/remote-wire-compatibility.md. The defect was the schema and its caller drifting inside one version, so the tests pin the registered method rather than the schema alone: pointing it back at `TerminalHandle` compiles, parses, and drops the option. Found by review on #18591. * fix(terminal): teach the shared running-work probe the third child-process answer Rebasing onto main landed `probePtyRunningWork`, which is a better home for this than the close guard: it already speaks `live` / `unverifiable` / `exited`, and it exists so the tab-close and window-close guards cannot drift. The child-process verdict belongs there, not in a parallel predicate beside it. So the mapping moves into the probe and `inspectionReportsRunningWork` is deleted rather than kept alongside. The probe now asks for the scan, and a host that could not observe the pane reports `unverifiable` instead of collapsing onto `exited` -- which is what `hasChildProcesses: false` meant on every Windows relay. The pane-close path is routed through the same probe for the same reason; it was the third caller asking this question through a direct inspect of its own. |
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766b5b153c |
fix(relay): release the ConPTY conin handle after teardown, not before it (#18601)
A Windows SSH relay leaked one Windows File handle per terminal, for the life of the relay process, across reconnects. node-pty's `kill()` flips `readable` on the conin and conout sockets and destroys neither; `_cleanUpProcess` destroys `_outSocket`, so only conin is stranded, and it wraps a real named-pipe handle from `fs.openSync(term.conin, 'w')`. The obvious fix -- and the one config/patches/node-pty@1.1.0.patch ships for the desktop -- releases it at the top of the branch, before `_getConsoleProcessList()` forks and before the native kill. Measured against a real Windows SSH host, that is three times worse than leaving the leak alone: teardown aborts partway, the forked console-list agent is never reaped, and both pipe handles stay alive. Releasing it at the end of the branch instead is flat. 20 spawn/kill cycles, handles bucketed by NT object type, identical numbers standalone and through a real relay: published node-pty File +1/terminal, Process flat desktop patch placement File +2/terminal, Process +1/terminal released last (this) File flat, Process flat `windowsTerminal.js` takes the desktop's error-listener hunks verbatim. The conin listener is not what fixes the leak -- adding it alone changed nothing -- but it is what keeps a pipe error retiring one terminal instead of the host. The desktop patch has the early placement and therefore the regression, measured against its exact installed tree. Correcting it there needs its own verification on a Windows desktop build, so the trees diverge on this one hunk deliberately and a test pins that so a future patch sync cannot copy the bug back. |
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fb69f00b65 |
fix(hosts): resolve a folder workspace's SSH host from the repo's host, not its raw connectionId (#18598)
* fix(hosts): resolve a folder workspace's SSH host from the repo's host, not its raw connectionId
`resolveFolderWorkspaceHost` inferred a workspace's host by reading
`repo.connectionId` directly. SSH ownership has two spellings on a repo row, and
a row carrying only `executionHostId: 'ssh:<target>'` has no `connectionId` to
read — so it counted as a local repo and the workspace resolved `{ kind: 'local' }`.
That is an execute-here answer for a workspace whose files are on an SSH host,
the #11163 class, and it fires on a well-formed row.
Resolve the host first, then read the target off it. Every other row keeps its
existing contribution, including a `runtime:` row's nested SSH target: that
target is not this client's to dial, but narrowing it here would be a second
behaviour change riding on this one. The runtime branch above still answers
`local`, and now says so — `FolderWorkspaceHost` has no runtime variant, and
widening the type is its own change, not an oversight to be silently corrected.
Three smaller items that stand on their own:
- `resolveWorktreeExecutionHost` gains a `malformed` reason distinct from
`unknown`. `unknown` (nothing carries the id) is a verdict the launch path may
legitimately dispose of as a plain local folder; `malformed` (the row named a
host that cannot be parsed) must fail closed. One word for two situations is
the shape that lost the distinction in #18006. The strict read is private to
that module: `getRepoExecutionHostId` stays the answer everywhere else, since
its fall-through to `local` is harmless for the grouping, label and index
callers that are nearly all of its ~340 call sites.
- `readAllWorktreeMetaForRepo` / `readWorktreeMetaForRepo` replace four
open-coded copies of the same host-qualified read (the F7/F8 lockstep shape).
- `getExecutionHostLabel` answers 'Unknown host' rather than 'All hosts' for an
id that names no host. Showing one unroutable row as though it were on every
host is wrong on its own terms. Plain English like every other label in that
module, none of which resolve through the renderer's i18n catalog.
* fix(hosts): resolve the host in candidate selection too, not just in resolution
The first pass fixed how a repo row is classified once it reaches
`resolveFolderWorkspaceHost`. The candidate filter decides which rows reach it at
all, and it read `repo.connectionId` raw as well — so an SSH-only row outside the
project-group subtree was dropped before the new logic could see it, and the
execute-here bug survived for the population the fix was for, via a different
path. Found in review by CodeRabbit.
Three repo-row reads had the same root cause, not one:
- the scope-connection filter, comparing a path repo's raw field against the
workspace/group connection;
- the group-connection set, built from group repos' raw fields;
- that set's membership test against path repos' raw fields.
The last two are one comparison with the mismatch on either side, so resolving
only the path side would have reintroduced it from the other direction.
All three, plus the resolution loop, now go through one `getRepoScopeConnectionId`
helper. Non-SSH hosts still fall back to the raw field, so a `runtime:` row keeps
contributing its nested target exactly as before.
The new tests use a repo matched only by path, outside the subtree — the
population every existing test missed, which is why four passing revert-tests
did not catch this. One of them is labelled as pinning the resolver rather than
the filter: under the old raw read both rows came back connectionless and matched
each other by accident, so it survives a filter revert and must not be counted as
coverage for it.
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2ee507d744 |
fix(ssh): move Windows file writes off PowerShell 5.1 stdin onto sftp (#18596)
* fix(ssh): move Windows file writes off PowerShell 5.1 stdin onto sftp #16432 was fixed by chunking writes to 32KB, on the belief that a `DefaultShell=cmd.exe` host caps one stdin at roughly 50KB. Re-measured on Windows 11 26200.9168 / OpenSSH_for_Windows_10.0p2, that premise is wrong in both directions, and the chunking does not fix the hang. The real constraint: a read on Windows PowerShell 5.1's redirected-stdin handle over a non-pty ssh exec can die permanently when it finds the stream momentarily empty, taking both the remaining data and the EOF with it. It is probabilistic per such read — not a size threshold, and not certain on the first one. Measured by swapping the copy loop for a counting reader: a 1.5s gap before any byte -> 0 bytes received, 6 of 6 1 byte, 1.5s gap, then 32767 -> exactly 1 byte 32768, 1.5s gap, then 32768 -> exactly 32768 a continuous 2MB -> 167936 / 270336 / 372736 Those three 2MB figures are one payload run three times under the same conditions, which is what rules out a threshold. Independently reproduced by a second harness where one 1.9MB counted read completed through 39 reads and another died after 11. A payload that fits one burst usually presents only one read that can find the stream empty, which is why 32KB mostly works — and it still failed 15 times in 120 under load, and 1 in 40 on a quiet host. Neither rate survives the 62 execs a 1.9MB file needs: even 2.5% compounds to about four uploads in five failing. No chunk size helps, because the defect is per blocking read, not per byte. Three controls on the same host, same DefaultShell, rule out both a size limit and cmd.exe: `findstr` took 2,016,000 bytes through one exec's stdin, sftp moved 1.9MB 5/5, and PowerShell 7 took 2MB in one exec. Windows writes now go over the sftp subsystem, whose batch script is read by the *local* client, so no remote process reads a pipe at all. PowerShell 7 is the fallback where sftp is unavailable, and Windows PowerShell 5.1 is last, still bounded, and now reports the host limitation and its remedy instead of a bare timeout. Measured on the same host, through this code: 1.9MB x20 all succeeded, hash-verified, median 315ms, against 0/6 before. 32KB x120 zero hangs, against 15/120. Also: - Stage under a unique name per attempt. An abandoned write leaves a remote process that may still hold the staging file, and losing contact is not evidence it died (docs/reference/ssh-execution-boundary.md), so a retry must not reuse a name its predecessor may own. Sweep is best-effort and never treated as proof of anything. - Create upload directories over sftp too; the JSON mkdir batch rode the same defective read. - Cover makeWindowsWriteFileCommand and the publish command against the 8000-char budget, which F11 flagged as untested. * fix(ssh): replace the staged Windows write atomically, and translate ssh -l Three review findings, all on the failure path that the success-path measurements say nothing about. CodeRabbit, Critical: the publish deleted the destination before moving the staged file onto it, so a failed move destroyed the user's existing file and left a window where a reader saw no file at all. That is worse than the truncated partial the staging discipline exists to prevent. Now File.Replace (Win32 ReplaceFile, atomic), falling back to a plain Move only when the destination is absent — and that race is safe, because a destination appearing in between makes Move throw with the staged file preserved. The exclusive branch already had it right: Move throwing on an existing destination is the exclusive contract. Append stays non-atomic and now says why. buildSshArgs can emit '-l <username>' for a config alias no Host block claims, and the translator threw on it. isSftpUnavailableError read that throw as 'this host cannot do sftp', so those hosts fell back to the defective PowerShell 5.1 path and had the refusal cached against them for 30 minutes, silently. '-l' now maps to '-o User=', with a test for the exact argument shape buildSshArgs produces in that case. CodeRabbit, minor: two assertions passed on an absent observation — an unmatched regex yields '' and every() is true of an empty list. Both now assert the positive form first, and the same audit was applied to the three other some()/every() assertions in the file. The temp-file test now asserts mode 0600 rather than only that the file is cleaned up. * fix(ssh): keep a path sftp cannot spell from becoming a verdict about the host Audit of isSftpUnavailableError, prompted by the '-l' gap having the same shape: a per-operation condition being written into a per-host cache that holds for 30 minutes. It had a second instance, and this one was mine. UnsupportedSftpPathError was classified as 'this host cannot do sftp', but it is thrown for a UNC or relative destination and for any path sftp's batch lexer cannot quote -- including a *local* filename containing a newline, which POSIX clients allow. One such file would have routed every later Windows write to that host down the defective PowerShell 5.1 path for the rest of the cache window. The host verdict is now only the errors that really are host-scoped: a refused subsystem, a client that will not start, and an untranslatable argument list. A path refusal falls back for that one write and leaves the cache alone, in both the file-write and directory-creation paths. Revert-tested. Removing the operation-scoped catch fails all three new tests, whether or not the predicate is also widened. Widening the predicate alone does not fail them, correctly: with the catch in place the predicate no longer gates that path, so keeping it narrow is defence-in-depth rather than the live mechanism. Flag audit at the same time: -F, -o, -T, -S, -p, -i, -J, -l and -- are now the complete set buildSshArgs can emit, and all are handled. * fix(ssh): make the atomic publish actually run, and unroll the mkdir batch Two runtime defects that only a real host could surface. Both were invisible to unit tests that assert the shape of the generated command string, because both are PowerShell rejecting an argument at execution time. File.Replace was passed a bare $null for destinationBackupFileName. PowerShell coerces $null to an empty string when binding a .NET string parameter, and Replace rejects that with 'The path is not of a legal form' -- so every create-mode publish failed. The Critical fix was inert as shipped. Now [NullString]::Value, which is the construct that exists for this. Measured on awin, same staging-file lock, opposite outcomes: old publish rc=1 destination MISSING <- prior contents destroyed new publish rc=1 destination PRESENT, sha 7f06b7e0... unchanged control, destination present, no lock rc=0 replaced exactly control, destination absent, no lock rc=0 Move fallback created it End-to-end through the real uploader afterwards: 1.9MB x15 all hashes exact, median 303ms; overwrite of an existing destination exact both times. Separately, the PowerShell mkdir fallback could not create a tree of more than one directory. '@($json | ConvertFrom-Json)' wraps the parsed array in another array, so the loop variable binds to the whole thing and [string] of it is the paths joined by spaces. It only ever worked for a one-element batch, where stringifying a single-element array happens to yield the element -- which is why no existing test caught it. Pre-existing on main; fixed here because this PR puts that command on the fallback tier and claims the ladder works. Both tiers now verified live against a three-directory tree. |
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cc9e9ed65f |
fix(crash-reporting): sample system memory before the process is gone (#18356)
* fix(crash-reporting): sample system memory before the renderer dies * fix(crash-reporting): make the pre-gone host sample decisive, not just present Round-1 review said the shipped field set could not decide G4-oom. Fixed. Decisive field (blocking #1). The investigation's own win-lowspec repro falsified "low available commit kills": at a 127 MB commit floor Windows grew the pagefile to 2029 MB and nothing died, and it named the missing datum — pagefile-growth headroom / system-drive free space. `getSystemMemoryInfo()` gives neither. Added `swap-volume-free-space.ts`: one `fs.statfs` on the volume backing the pagefile (SystemRoot on Windows, the root fs elsewhere, resolved via `path.parse().root`), published as `systemMemoryPreGoneSwapVolumeFreeMB`. Together with the already-emitted commit limit that separates "commit was low" from "commit was refused". Pagefile *max* size needs a registry read; skipped deliberately — per-operation interpreter spawning is exactly what docs/reference/windows-edr-posture.md says not to add for telemetry. Darwin honesty (blocking #2). Every reading now carries `systemMemoryPressureSignal`: `available-commit` on Windows (swapFree is ullAvailPageFile), `mem-available` on Linux when MemAvailable is present, `none` otherwise — which is always on darwin. A future analyst cannot now table `freeMB: 272` from a healthy Mac as evidence of exhaustion, because the same record says the platform gave no pressure verdict. Partial rebuttal on the suggested reuse: `host-memory.ts:86` was considered and rejected as a periodic source. It spawns `/usr/bin/memory_pressure` per call, and the sampler this PR needs runs every 10 s for the app's lifetime; a subprocess at that cadence is worse than the gap it closes. The reviewer conceded this tradeoff is arguable — what was not acceptable was shipping the darwin gap silently, so it is now in the data, not only in a comment. Staleness (blocking #3). Confirmed the measurement: four of five G4 reports carried a ~37 s-old sample (4872/36796/37332/38017/39715 ms). Host memory no longer rides the 60 s process-metrics sweep; `pre-gone-host-memory.ts` samples it on its own 10 s timer with its own `systemMemoryPreGoneSampleAgeMs`. One GlobalMemoryStatusEx-class call plus one statfs is cheap enough at that rate. A refusal shorter than the interval stays invisible and the module comment says so — no polling cadence fixes that. Non-blocking, all taken: renamed `gone-time-system-memory.ts` -> `system-memory-details.ts` with the now-false "reads AFTER the crash" framing scoped to the gone-time caller; pre-gone host keys moved out of the `processMetrics` namespace to `systemMemoryPreGone*`, so the string-surgery `preGoneDetailKey` helper is gone and a `systemMemory` prefix scan sees both reads; the bare catch no longer spans both halves of the sample, and a test pins that a throwing host read leaves the process-metric sample intact; the inert second test is replaced by three that go red without this change (verified: swap-volume, pressure-signal and cadence assertions all fail when the production hunks are reverted). Rebuttal, non-blocking #5 (duplicated electron mock across two test files): declined. `vi.mock` is hoisted per file, so the mock cannot be shared without a setup module, and this directory already has 26 focused test files that each re-declare it. Splitting by concern is the local convention. `startPreGoneProcessMetricsSampling` is renamed `startPreGoneCrashSampling` since it now starts two samplers. * fix(crash-reporting): test the arming, gate the swap volume, unblock the host read Round-2 review blocked on four items. All four addressed. WHAT THIS BRANCH ACTUALLY DOES, AT HEAD (blocking #4). The commit-1 message ("13 lines, 1 production file, no new module, new optional numeric fields only", `processMetricsPreGoneSystemMemory*` keys, a `preGoneDetailKey` helper, a `pre-gone-system-memory.test.ts`) describes a superseded revision; every one of those claims is false now, so it must not be used as the PR description. The change against origin/main is: 3 new production modules (`pre-gone-host-memory.ts`, `system-memory-details.ts`, `swap-volume-free-space.ts`), 1 deleted (`gone-time-system-memory.ts`), plus edits to `process-gone-diagnostics.ts` and `main-process-ready-runtime.ts` and 2 test files. It adds a second main-process interval timer that runs for the life of the app: every 10 s one synchronous GlobalMemoryStatusEx-class read, and on win32/darwin one `fs.statfs` on the swap-backing volume. Details are `systemMemoryPreGone*`, and two of them are STRINGS, not numbers: `systemMemoryPreGonePressureSignal` (enum) and `systemMemoryPreGoneSwapVolume` (a drive label, separator-trimmed so it is not a path). Both are assigned after `sanitizeCrashReportDetails`; neither carries user content. Arming is now tested (blocking #1). The reviewer deleted `startPreGoneSystemMemorySampling(...)` from `startPreGoneCrashSampling` and all 264 tests stayed green — confirmed and fixed. `pre-gone-host-memory.test.ts` now calls `startPreGoneCrashSampling()` with production defaults and asserts both `setInterval` calls, their literal periods `[60_000, 10_000]`, that both timers are unref'd, and that advancing 10 s takes a fresh host sample that reaches `buildProcessGoneCrashDetails` with `SampleAgeMs: 0`. Verified red on revert: deleting the arming line -> 1 failure; changing the interval constant to 30_000 -> 1 failure (the old assertion compared the constant to itself and caught neither). The tautological `10_000 < 60_000 / 2` test is gone, superseded by this one. Swap volume is win32/darwin only (blocking #2). On Linux swap is a fixed partition, a fixed-size swapfile, or zram; none grow into root-fs free space, so `SwapVolumeFreeMB: 380000` beside `SwapFreeMB: 0` would have invited exactly the wrong verdict on the two Linux cluster members. `swapVolumeAnchor` returns undefined off win32/darwin, so no field and no statfs at all. The comment claiming "elsewhere swap is on the root fs" was wrong and is gone. The Windows anchor is still the DEFAULT pagefile volume, so the measured volume now ships with the number (`systemMemoryPreGoneSwapVolume: 'C:'`) instead of being implied. The honesty label covers it: win32 reads `available-commit` only when the volume datum is present, and `available-commit-unqualified` otherwise — which also fixes non-blocking #5, where the synchronous gone-time read claimed a verdict its own fields could not support. Host read no longer waits on statfs (blocking #3). `samplePreGoneSystemMemory` now commits the synchronous memory reading first and merges volume free space in afterwards, so the cadence is 10 s regardless of disk-metadata latency and a hung volume can no longer stop host sampling — precisely the paging-storm case this exists for. The in-flight latch now guards only the statfs. Verified red on revert to the serialized shape (2 failures). A stale-but-slow-moving volume value merging into a newer memory sample is deliberate and commented. Non-blocking #3 (reset does not invalidate an in-flight sample): fixed with a generation counter bumped by `resetPreGoneSystemMemorySamplingForTest`, so a late statfs cannot repopulate a reset sample. Separately, the volume read now only runs after a host sample committed, which removes the real `statfs('/')` side effect from `process-gone-diagnostics.test.ts` entirely. REBUTTAL, darwin `memory_pressure` reuse (non-blocking #2): declined, with evidence. `readDarwinAvailableMemory` at src/main/memory/host-memory.ts:87 is reached only via `collectHostMemory` <- `runSnapshot` <- `collectMemorySnapshot`, whose only callers are the `memory:getSnapshot` IPC handler and orca-runtime-pty-foreground-process-reads.ts:170 — both on demand. There is no periodic snapshot, so there is no cached reading to reuse for free; adopting it means spawning `/usr/bin/memory_pressure` on a main-process timer for the life of the app, and its module-global `darwinAvailabilitySupported` latch is shared with the memory UI. The gap is not hidden: darwin ships `PressureSignal: 'none'` in the data, and the module comment now cites the existing reader and why it is not used here rather than claiming Orca lacks one. Verified: `vitest src/main/crash-reporting src/main/startup src/main/memory` = 769 passed / 6 skipped (crash-reporting re-run 5x, no flake); `tsc --noEmit -p config/tsconfig.node.json` 0; `oxlint` 0; `oxfmt --check` 0. * fix(crash-reporting): stop a stale statfs qualifying the commit verdict Round-3 adversarial review, 2 blocking. Both fixed with mutation-verified tests. 1. `mergeSwapVolumeFreeSpace` merged the volume reading into whatever sample was current at RESOLUTION time, and `pressureSignal` then upgraded win32 from `available-commit-unqualified` to the decisive `available-commit` on the strength of it. The `swapVolumeReadInFlight` latch makes every intervening tick skip the merge, so the lag is as old as the last STARTED statfs, not the last tick — and no age field exposed it, because `systemMemoryPreGoneSampleAgeMs` describes only the synchronous memory read. Reviewer's executed scenario: a statfs issued at t=0 on a healthy host (40 GB free) resolving at t=20 s of commit pressure emitted `SwapFreeMB: 200` beside `SwapVolumeFreeMB: 40000`, labelled `available-commit`, with `SampleAgeMs: 0`. That reads as "the pagefile had room, so this was not a commit refusal" — the opposite conclusion, wearing the branch's highest-confidence label, on exactly the win32 G4-oom reports this exists to decide. The datum still ships (it is the only pagefile-expandability signal there is), but now: - the sample carries `swapVolumeSampledAtMs` — the tick that ISSUED the statfs, never the one it resolved on — surfaced as `systemMemoryPreGoneSwapVolumeAgeMs`; - only a statfs that answers on its own tick may qualify the verdict. `withSwapVolumeFreeSpace` takes `coTimed`; false keeps `available-commit-unqualified`. The next tick issues a fresh statfs, so the verdict recovers on its own. 2. The branch's sole production entry point — `startPreGoneCrashSampling()` at main-process-ready-runtime.ts:128 — was untested. Deleting it left 691 tests across crash-reporting/ and startup/ green, while a comment in the new test file claimed that gap was why the test was written. This is pure instrumentation, so that one line is the whole of its value in the shipped app. Added a source-level wiring test (the pattern this repo already uses for arm-once ready-phase lines) that pins the import, exactly one call, the call at statement indent, and that `main-process-ready.ts` awaits the function it lives in. The misleading comment is gone. Mutation-verified — each goes red alone: coTimed -> always true 1 failed (verdict) drop swapVolumeSampledAtMs age 1 failed (verdict test) delete startPreGoneCrashSampling() 1 failed (wiring) wrap it in `if (!is.dev) { ... }` 1 failed (wiring) Verified: tsc -p config/tsconfig.node.json exit 0; oxlint src/main/crash-reporting src/main/startup exit 0; 268 tests in crash-reporting/ pass. Across crash-reporting/ + startup/ + memory/: 769 passed, 2 failed — both environment-dependent and failing identically on the unmodified tree (Xvfb rebind, and a whole-repo glob census that times out). * fix(crash-reporting): stop free disk standing in for pagefile growability The win32 reading was promoted to the decisive `available-commit` whenever a co-timed volume number merely existed, which the data cannot support: a fixed or disabled pagefile grows into no amount of empty disk, its maximum is unreadable here, and the measured volume is only the DEFAULT pagefile drive. A host with 180 MB of available commit, a commit limit at RAM and 812 GB free read as "the pagefile had room" — the opposite conclusion, under the branch's most confident label. The volume datum is now named for what it is (`available-commit-volume-cotimed`, context beside the commit number), and the one decisive win32 case — a commit limit at or below RAM, i.e. no pagefile behind it — gets its own label. Also: carry the last volume reading onto the sample that replaces it, aged and non-qualifying, so a statfs slower than one tick no longer makes the field vanish from the reports it exists for; don't commit a reading whose every memory field failed, which shipped an age and a disk-free number with no host memory beside them; and move the startup wiring test beside the file it pins, scoped to the ready-phase entry's own body so the call cannot satisfy it from a sibling export nothing calls. * fix(crash-reporting): co-time the statfs by tick, not sample identity A tick whose host read fails leaves the pre-gone sample object in place, so the identity check still read a 25 s-late statfs as co-timed. |
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7a714d1bd2 |
fix(terminals): add equality bailouts to the tab pane-expansion actions (#18332)
* fix(terminals): bail out of no-op pane-expansion store writes
* test(terminals): lock the root-state identity of the bailout
A `return {}` bailout keeps the map reference but still allocates a new
root state, so zustand walks every listener. Assert root identity too.
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9acfba401a |
fix(crash-reporting): stop claiming kills that never landed, and leave proof when the own-Chromium pid set is unreadable (#18578)
* fix(crash-reporting): stop the codex POSIX teardown claiming a group that was already gone terminatePosixTree's default group signal swallowed every process.kill error and then recorded a self_tree_kill unconditionally, so an ESRCH — proof the group was already gone and this teardown killed nothing — still put a suspect in the five-second render-process-gone attribution window. Every sibling group-kill in the tree already records only on a proven signal: terminateDedicatedPosixGroup in this same file, forceKillPosixPtyProcessGroups, and the claude account-login teardown. This makes the outlier match them. * fix(crash-reporting): leave proof when the own-Chromium pid set cannot be read `readOrcaChromiumProcessPids` returns an empty set when `getAppMetrics()` throws, which is the right decision — refusing every kill would orphan every PTY, git, codex and notebook tree main tears down, and on main a refusal from `killSourceControlAgentProcess` releases the managed-home lock with the agent still alive. But the empty set was byte-identical to "no Chromium on this host", so the fail-open was invisible in a field bundle. Keeps the decision, adds a coalesced durable `own_chromium_pids_unreadable` crumb so the two cases are distinguishable. Coalesced because the gate reads this set on every tree kill. * style(crash-reporting): tighten the group-signal comments to the WHY |
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11e459e933 |
fix(crash-reporting): bound replay-guard wedge bursts in the ring without losing their spans (#18441)
`terminal_replay_guard_wedged_release` was not in COALESCED_RENDERER_BREADCRUMB_NAMES, and its per-pane hashes give every entry a unique ring identity. One mount/reveal/wake transition expires every in-flight replay write at once, so a burst arrives as N distinct entries against a 30-slot FIFO ring. Measured, from the 09-02 corpus (121 `renderer.breadcrumb` spans across 9 of 55 diagnostic bundles): - bundle 26461769: 26 events in 0.96s - murlock1000: 62 events over 85s - 8907a508 mixes two call sites in one window (2 crumbs carry `tabIdHash`, 2 do not) Not measured: no captured report's ring actually lost slots to this crumb. All 57 reports have zero wedge crumbs in `Recent activity:`, and in all 9 bundles the burst predates the report's ring window — for 26461769 the burst ran 13:36:03.784Z-13:36:04.742Z while the ring-owning main process started at 13:43:44.380Z, 7m40s later. So this bounds a demonstrated hazard, not an observed loss. An earlier draft of this commit asserted "26 of 30 slots / 87% of the pre-crash trail" as a measurement; that was a model, and it is removed. The burst evidence lives entirely in the durable span stream, and suppressed repeats normally emit no span (see the 1000-emissions/1-span case in crash-reporting-renderer-breadcrumbs.test.ts), so coalescing alone would have cut that 121-event corpus to 13 with the multiplicity recorded nowhere. Instead: - the ring coalesces: one slot per call site, plus `suppressedSinceLast` - every wedge event still emits its own `renderer.breadcrumb` span, via PER_EVENT_TRACED_COALESCED_BREADCRUMB_NAMES. Span volume is unchanged at 121, and the span deliberately carries no count so a span-stream total cannot double-count what the ring already claims - the coalesce key is `ptyId`/`tabIdHash` *presence*, not name alone: those fields are absent on the restore call site (restoreScrollbackBuffers) and present on reattach, so name-only keying would collapse 8907a508's two call sites into whichever crumb landed last. Bounded at 4 slots per storm, matching the webgl `kind` and duplicate-tab `resolvedToActiveWorktree` precedents in the same file. Replaying the corpus timestamps: 121 events -> 14 ring writes. This is a diagnostics fix, not a crash fix. It does not stop panes wedging, and it does not explain the "can't type" reports in this round. |
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b85510f3a9 |
fix(terminal): warn about remote work when closing the window or quitting (#18593)
The native window-close warning was built from a local-only pty set: any worktree with a connectionId was dropped whole, and any remote runtime pty was filtered out. A build, test run, or agent on an SSH or Orca Remote host was therefore structurally invisible to it, on every platform. The quit path skipped the check entirely (#524), so remote work got no prompt at all. Route both paths through the same probe the tab-close guard uses, so the two cannot drift, and keep the verdict vocabulary of the SSH execution boundary: only a host that answers "no children" suppresses the warning. An unreachable host is `unverifiable`, never `exited`, so it warns rather than quitting silently — with its own copy, because "could not reach the host" is a different claim than "processes are running". Quit still ignores local ptys, preserving #524: quitting is an unambiguous instruction to end this machine's processes, but not to end execution on someone else's, which a bounded relay grace period will SIGKILL once the countdown expires. The probe budget is 1.5s (vs the tab guard's 4s) because quit is time sensitive; expiry raises the prompt, so an unreachable host costs a click rather than the 15s RPC timeout or a silently orphaned build. |
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561a94038c |
fix(ssh): stop the daemon's own services from blocking the superseded-relay reap (#18586)
`isReapableRelayHusk` required `childCount === 0`, where `childCount` came from `pgrep -P <relay> | grep -c .`. But the relay forks service children of its own, and `relay-ai-vault-service.js` never exits once spawned. Any relay that had served a single AI Vault request therefore reported a non-zero child count forever, so the sweep answered `retained-live-work` for a superseded, disconnected relay holding no user work at all — and its version directory stayed pinned against GC by its own live socket. The probe now censuses each direct child instead of counting them, and the reap gate reads the count of children it could *not* positively identify as relay infrastructure. The asymmetry is the safety argument (docs/reference/ssh-execution-boundary.md): subtracting a child we can name is positive knowledge, assuming about one we cannot is not. An unrecognised argv, an argv `ps` would not print, and a host without `pgrep` all keep the relay unreapable. `reapEmptyRelayHuskCommand` re-runs the same census on the host immediately before signalling. Fixes #13614 |
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3941edd4b6 |
perf(ipc): build the filesystem allowed-root list once per authorization (#18423)
* perf(ipc): build the filesystem allowed-root list once per authorization * perf(ipc): keep the allowed-root snapshot lazy so granted external paths build nothing Hoisting getAllowedRoots to the top of resolveAuthorizedPath made every read of a path covered by an external grant build the full root list, where main built none (the grant answered before isPathAllowed reached the roots). Build on first use instead: still one build per authorization, zero when a grant already answers. * test(ipc): skip the allowed-root symlink escapes on Windows Unprivileged Windows cannot create symlinks (EPERM), so both cases failed in setup instead of exercising the escape check. |
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7574ee8403 |
fix(ports): route the status-bar popover scan to the workspace's host (#17048)
* fix(ports): route the status-bar popover scan to the workspace's host - PortsStatusSegment resolved its runtime target from the global active runtime, so opening the popover on a paired-remote workspace scanned the client OS and reported zero workspace ports - Resolve the target from the active worktree's owner host, matching PortsPanel, PortRow, and WorktreeCardPorts - Add publishWorkspacePortScanForHost: store the host's scan under its own key, then republish the aggregate through setWorkspacePortScanProjection so a single-host refresh no longer drops every other host's ports - Publish through the projection setter instead of setWorkspacePortScan, which wrote the synthetic all-hosts key back into workspacePortScansByKey and made the next merge fold the aggregate into itself (duplicate rows) - Reuse the helper for the manual panel refresh and the post-stop refresh, and share the aggregate key constant with WorkspacePortScanner * test(ports): cover popover host routing and aggregate preservation - PortsStatusSegment.host-routing: popover scans the active workspace's owner host, keeps other hosts in the projection, publishes a failed scan under its own host, and stays local when the workspace has no owner - workspace-port-scan-publish: single-host key vs all-hosts projection, and repeated publishes never accumulate duplicate rows * fix(ports): surface a host whose port scan failed instead of dropping it - The merged projection only carries unavailableReason when every host failed, so one unreachable server read as "this workspace has no ports" - Add getUnavailableWorkspacePortHosts: hosts that failed while another host still answered, with the local host distinguished by a null environment id - Show one notice per failed host in the popover, named by its runtime environment or the local host label, above the surviving hosts' ports - Reuse the existing scan-unavailable string so no catalog entry is added * test(ports): prove the popover's own failed scan reaches the host notice - Make the mocked store setters write back, so a publish and the notice that reads it can no longer name different scan keys with every assertion green - Cover open popover -> remote scan rejects -> notice names the host, the seam the store-write and render-only tests each stopped short of - Drop an assertion comment that claimed to prove port preservation when it only exercised the render path * fix(ports): review nits — single-write publish, colon-safe host keys, failure port retention, docstrings * fix(ports): keep the popover count and body in agreement, name every failed host - A failed scan retains the host's last-good ports, and the badge/header count them; the notice now sits above the list instead of replacing it, so the popover no longer claims N ports over an empty body. - getUnavailableWorkspacePortHosts reports all-hosts-failed too, so total loss of contact names each host instead of printing raw scan keys under platform 'unknown'. - Scan keys parse to a discriminated host ref, so an unrecognised key is 'unknown' rather than silently blamed on the local machine. - Extract useWorktreeRuntimeTarget for the four ports surfaces that hand-rolled the same owner-settings spread. * fix(ports): label the local host from the failed scan's platform, not the renderer's userAgent A paired web client's browser is not the Orca host, so deriving 'Local Mac' from navigator.userAgent mislabels a Linux host. Carry each failed scan's own platform through the unavailable-host list instead. * fix(ports): keep the Ports panel list under its failure notice too The retained-ports change gave a failed scan both ports and an unavailableReason, and the right-sidebar panel hid every section behind the notice — stripping the stop and open actions for ports the status bar still counts. Gate the sections on whether anything is left to list, matching the popover, behind a testable predicate. * fix(ports): let a retained-port failure keep its debounce grace period The popover publishes the host's last-good ports alongside the failure reason the moment its own scan fails. reconcileTransientPortScanFailures treated any published result carrying unavailableReason as a spent grace period, so the very next background poll replaced those ports with an empty unavailable scan — the retention never survived one poll interval. Keep the grace while the published result still has ports; the tolerance still clears them on schedule. * fix(ports): prune stale hosts in the poll's single map write A manual publish (the ports popover) can resolve after the host-set change already pruned its key, re-adding it; the poll's per-key writes only ever added, so a removed host kept its ports in the count and held a permanent unavailable notice until the next host-set change. Publish the poll's already-pruned map in one replaceWorkspacePortScans instead, which also collapses N per-host notifications into one and drops any synthetic all-hosts key that leaked in. * fix(ports): fail closed for direct SSH workspaces --------- Co-authored-by: Neil <4138956+nwparker@users.noreply.github.com> |
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8854b5ded5 |
perf(ssh): coalesce concurrent git.listWorktrees reads (#18419)
* perf(ssh): coalesce concurrent pty.inspectProcess and git.listWorktrees reads Both were the only reads in their provider class with no in-flight dedupe while their siblings already had it. Route them through the existing InFlightPromiseDedupe, keyed per (relay pty id, incarnation) and per repoPath, scoped to the provider instance so two hosts never share an entry. The worktree listing clears from invalidateGitReads(), and a signalled read keeps its own request so one caller's abort cannot cancel its joiners' scan. In-flight only, no TTL: the relay does answer inspectProcess from a 500ms TTL-cached process table, but a client TTL would compound with it rather than match it, so it is not a free win. * perf(ssh): drop the inspectProcess half, ratchet per-read host observations The `git.listWorktrees` dedupe ships unchanged. The `pty.inspectProcess` dedupe is reverted: the host mints one `observationEpoch` per request and the pane foreground reader commits it per read, so two overlapping probes sharing one reply make the second read a stale replay and `admitRemoteForegroundEvidence` rejects it -- a would-be `live` identity read becomes `unverifiable`. The pane foreground tracker overlaps its own probes by design (cancel-and-reissue after a 350 ms settle), so that path is reachable. Adds a ratchet that fails when the dedupe returns, driving the real reader through the real provider operations. * fix(ssh): move the inspect ratchet to the provider it guards The ratchet lived under src/renderer and imported src/main/providers/ssh-pty-provider-rpc-operations, dragging the whole main-process graph into config/tsconfig.tc.web.json (TS6307). Split it: the request-counter ratchet moves next to the provider it pins, and the renderer file keeps the why -- a shared host observation degrades the second overlapping read to unverifiable -- against the real reader with no cross-project import. * docs(ssh): document the worktree-list coalescing contract |
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f36c03e84a |
fix(windows): make the install-dir ACL repair rescue the launch it runs in (#18361)
* fix(windows): repair the poisoned install-dir ACL before the window, not after The install-dir LPAC ACL poison (electron/electron#51761) still costs every affected machine at least one crash: the probe that detects it is setImmediate-deferred and answers 0.9-3.0s in, while createMainWindow runs synchronously in the same frame and its renderer dies at init 48-1373ms later. - Persist the poison verdict the moment the probe reports it, and await the repair (bounded at 20s) before any window is created on a launch that already carries the marker. - Do not engage the GPU safe-graphics fallback while the install-dir ACL verdict is poisoned or still outstanding. Safe graphics does not rescue a poisoned tree, and --in-process-gpu removes the GPU child, erasing the sibling-death evidence that identifies the shape (4 field reports landed in 'misc' this way). - Clear the safe-graphics marker once the repair lands, so a repaired machine stops launching software-rendered for the rest of that build. - Give the repair marker a bounded retry budget: it was written on failure and matched regardless of outcome, so one transient failure pinned a machine to 'marker-hit' for the life of that version. * test(windows): pin the install-dir ACL repair against the real icacls binary * fix(windows): stop the install-DACL verdict from outliving the evidence Adversarial review round 1. Five blocking findings, all addressed. 1. gpu-lifecycle guard had only a source grep (green with the polarity inverted). The stated justification -- that gpu-lifecycle's import graph cannot be driven in-process -- was wrong: mocking `electron` plus `@electron-toolkit/utils` imports it fine. Replaced with gpu-lifecycle-install-dir-acl-guard.test.ts, which drives the real handleGpuChildCrash against a stub tracker. All four cases go red when the guard is flipped to `if (!isInstallDirAclSuspect())`. 2. A clean probe verdict retired the on-disk marker but not the in-memory `poison` verdict, so a machine the probe just proved healthy kept suppressing the GPU safe-graphics fallback and kept the dialog accusing the install folder -- permanently, since a `status:'failed'` probe deliberately keeps the marker. A positive clean reading now latches `installDirReadClean`, drops the verdict, and outranks a repair result that lands after it (a 'failed' from a repair with nothing left to fix must not re-accuse). 'repaired' is kept: it is not a contradiction and it is what tells the user to reload. 3. `noteWindowsInstallDirAclProbePending()` ran on every `openMainWindow` while the probe is once-per-process, so every tray/second-instance reopen armed a 15s window in which `recordGpuCrash` was never called at all -- on healthy machines. `probeWindowsInstallDirAcl` now reports whether THIS call dispatched, and only a dispatch arms the grace window. 4. The pre-window ordering guarantee was defeatable and untested. `focusExistingMainWindow` opens a window whenever there is none and the app is ready -- true for the whole 20s gate, which is exactly when a user double-clicks the shortcut again. Added a `canOpenWindow` seam (same 'pending' semantics as the existing `!app.isReady()` case) wired to `isBlockingInstallDirAclRepairInFlight()`, plus windows-install-dir-acl-startup-wiring.test.ts pinning the await ahead of both window-creation paths and both new call sites. 5. windows-install-dir-acl-repair.win32.test.ts was absent from the pr.yml win32 allowlist, so it ran nowhere. Added. Also from the non-blocking list: - The repair no longer clears a `userConfirmed: true` safe-graphics marker; "keep safe graphics" is a user choice, not Orca's automatic latch. - `repairWindowsInstallDirPackageAcl` now reports its dispatch too, so a second entry into the gate resolves immediately instead of eating the full 20s budget waiting on an `onDone` that is never coming. - The gate is wrapped in try/catch/finally, matching the contract the probe documents as mandatory for anything upstream of window creation. Rebutted, not applied: - "Gate should be conditioned on app.isPackaged." A dev launch only carries the poison marker if a dev launch actually probed that tree and found the signature, in which case the dev renderer is dying the same way and the repair is exactly what is needed. The adjacent `isPackaged` check guards a packaged-only early-window optimisation, not a correctness boundary. - "Fold the poison marker into the repair marker's `outcome`." They answer different questions with different lifetimes. The repair marker is a retry budget (`attempts >= 3` disables the repair for that version) and is never cleared; the poison marker is cleared by a successful repair and by a clean probe. A `'pending'` outcome written before the attempt would bump `attempts`, so three launches killed mid-repair would permanently disable a repair that never once ran icacls to completion. * fix(windows): keep counting GPU crashes while the install-DACL verdict is pending Adversarial review round 2. Both blocking findings addressed. 1. handleGpuChildCrash early-returned on isInstallDirAclSuspect() BEFORE recordGpuCrash, so the crash left no trace in the 30s rolling window. The suspect window is armed on every win32 non-serve launch, and the field bundles put it at 0.8-1.7s after main_window_created on hosts whose DACL is clean (matchesPoisonSignature=false) -- squarely inside the 2.1-6.2s bad-driver bursts this repo already pinned in gpu-crash-fallback-field-sessions.test.ts. A healthy machine with a failing driver could lose an entire coalesced burst and never engage safe graphics. The crash is now always recorded; only the engagement consults the verdict, and it waits for the verdict rather than acting on the suspicion (waitForInstallDirAclVerdict, resolved by the probe's onDone or by the existing 15s grace, whichever lands first). Deviation from the review's suggested shape, deliberately: awaiting the verdict before persisting anything reintroduces the exact race gpu-fallback-engagement.ts documents -- Chromium aborts the whole browser process on the 6th GPU crash, ~1.3s after the 3rd, which is less than the probe takes to answer. So the unconfirmed marker is written up front and withdrawn if the verdict comes back poisoned. A machine killed mid-wait still comes back software-rendered, and its marker is unconfirmed, which is the state the repair's own clear already retires. gpu-lifecycle-install-dir-acl-guard.test.ts now drives the real GpuCrashFallbackTracker and the real engagement path (the restart prompt firing is the signal) instead of a stub tracker, and covers the case the previous suite could not express: a burst that lands entirely inside the pending window still engages once the probe reports clean. Four reverts go red -- restoring the pre-record guard (2 tests), dropping the wait, dropping the post-wait re-check, and dropping the pre-wait marker write (2 tests). 2. The round-1 evidence block quoted commits, a test name and pass counts that no longer exist, and its real-icacls Windows run predated the commit that rewrote the gate. Re-run at this commit; counts and the live-Windows result are restated in the handoff rather than carried forward. Also from the non-blocking list: - 'marker-hit' conflated "already repaired" with "retry budget spent", because hasMarkerFor matches outcome === 'repaired' too. The result now carries alreadyRepaired, and the recovery maps that to stage 'repaired' -- so a launch killed between a successful repair and its marker clear no longer tells the user the folder needs an administrator, no longer latches isInstallDirAclSuspect() for the session, and does retire the poison marker. Not applied, with reasoning: - "clearGpuFallbackMarker narrowed to userConfirmed === false leaves the target population software-rendered after a repair." The summary was overstated and is corrected, but the narrowing stands: a userConfirmed marker now requires a clean DACL verdict, because the restart prompt that writes it is exactly what the gate above withholds while the install is a suspect. The population this family targets can no longer reach confirmMarker while poisoned. - "writeInstallDirAclPoisonMarker re-stamps on a budget-exhausted machine forever." True, but on that machine the tree really is still poisoned and the gate resolves immediately ('skipped', no icacls spawn, no 20s wait), so the marker is telling the truth. Retiring it would be wrong; only a clean probe reading should. * fix(windows): register the real-icacls spec and stop its teardown racing icacls Two ratchets were red: - windows-lane-tree-removal-boundary: the win32 spec's afterAll used raw rmSync on a tree two icacls.exe children had just rewritten DACLs on, which is the EPERM race removeTreeSync exists for. - win32-test-lane-registration: the spec was in the pr.yml argv but not in WINDOWS_PACKAGE_TESTS, so a future diff touching only test files would not select package_windows and the spec would self-skip on ubuntu and report success. * fix(windows): re-arm the GPU fallback latch when the install-DACL verdict withholds it recordGpuCrash reports the threshold crossing exactly once and latches `engaged`. handleGpuChildCrash consumes that report before consulting the DACL verdict, and installDirAclClearsGpuFallback then discards it — so nothing could ever engage safe graphics again in that process. A machine whose tree the repair fixes and whose driver is genuinely broken stayed hardware-accelerated through an unbounded crash loop, with no prompt and no marker. disengage() releases only the one-shot latch; the crash window is untouched, so a real driver burst is still never erased. Test is RED without the re-arm. * fix(windows): keep the safe-graphics marker while an install-DACL repair is in flight The gate dispatches a repair without arming the probe clock, so waitForInstallDirAclVerdict() returns immediately and the withdrawal deleted the marker inside Chromium's FATAL window (crash 6 lands ~1.3s after crash 3, well inside the 20s gate). The process then died mid-repair, spent no attempt, and relaunched hardware accelerated into the same gate — spawning the same GPU children, FATALing again, forever. Hold the marker while poison.stage is 'pending' so that launch comes back software rendered and the next gate runs to completion. Still not engaged this launch, so --in-process-gpu does not erase the sibling-death evidence. A terminal verdict has no next step to rescue, so it still withdraws. Both new tests are RED without the retention. * fix(windows): stop a repaired marker outranking a fresh poison verdict The probe reads the install DACL and finds it poisoned; `startRepair` dispatches; `markerHitFor` sees a repair marker recording `outcome: 'repaired'` for the same installDir+appVersion and reports `alreadyRepaired`, which the recovery module maps to stage 'repaired'. So the launch that just proved the tree poisoned runs no icacls, deletes the poison marker that arms the next launch's pre-window gate, clears the suspect flag so `--in-process-gpu` can engage on a tree safe graphics cannot rescue, and tells the user "Orca repaired the permissions." Reachable whenever the tree is re-poisoned after one successful repair of the same version, and whenever a repair reports success without clearing the tree — the silent icacls no-op this module exists to document. A DACL reading taken this launch now outranks the marker: `probeConfirmedPoisoned` stops `outcome: 'repaired'` short-circuiting the repair. The attempt budget still bounds it, so an unrepairable tree does not re-spawn icacls forever. The pre-window gate does not set the flag — it acts on a marker from an earlier launch, not on evidence of its own, so a recorded repair still outranks it there. Also drives the GPU-fallback re-arm test through a repair that actually completes 'repaired', rather than a later clean probe, which is the route the review exercised. * fix(windows): make the pre-window ACL gate act on the poison evidence it fired on The gate fired on a poison marker — an earlier launch's DACL reading that nothing has retired — but withheld `probeConfirmedPoisoned` from the repair, so a repair marker recording an older success still short-circuited it. On the three-launch shape the gate exists for (repair succeeds; tree is re-poisoned; the next launch's probe records the poison but dies before writing its repair marker) the gate ran no icacls, deleted the poison marker that arms every later gate, un-suspected the tree so --in-process-gpu could engage, and told the user "Orca repaired the permissions." `applyInstallDirAclProbeVerdict` then swallowed that launch's own reading behind `if (poison) return`. Both callers of `startRepair` hold outstanding poison evidence, so the flag is now unconditional (renamed `poisonEvidenceOutstanding`) and `marker-hit` means only that the attempt budget is spent. The probe guard is narrowed to an in-flight gate repair: a reading taken after the gate finished re-arms the poison marker and downgrades a claimed repair. Also: withholding safe graphics now ends with the repair budget. A machine whose attempts are spent while the signature persists was denied safe graphics on every launch for the life of that appVersion — and had its marker deleted each time — including the healthy installs the probe's flag-blind ACE match over-matches, where the driver really is broken. Non-blocking, same lane: re-read `isQuitting` after the up-to-15s verdict wait, and skip the recovered-launch prompt when the ACL gate retired the marker read before whenReady. * fix(windows): stop a timed-out gate repair outranking a later poison reading The gate's 20s budget expires while icacls runs on under its own 120s cap, so the probe can read the tree poisoned while that repair is still in flight. Its success claim then deleted the poison marker, un-suspected the tree and told the user their permissions were fixed. The reading is now latched and outranks it. * fix(windows): stop a gate repair claim pre-empting this launch's probe reading Round-7 adversarial findings, both driven against the real modules: - isInstallDirAclSuspect returned false the moment the pre-window gate set stage 'repaired', short-circuiting ahead of the probe-pending grace check. The GPU children die 48-1373ms after window creation while the probe answers 0.9-3.0s in, so an icacls that silently no-opped (exit 0, tree untouched) opened exactly that interval to --in-process-gpu on a still-poisoned tree - and a 'keep safe graphics' answer then pinned a userConfirmed marker no later repair may clear, with the poison marker already deleted so no later launch gates. The claim now stays provisional until this launch's probe corroborates it or the grace window lapses. - A probe reading that disproves a 'repaired' claim re-armed the poison marker but never restored the unconfirmed safe-graphics marker the claim had cleared, so the next launch relaunched hardware-accelerated into the re-armed gate. The clear is now captured and handed back on disproof. * test(windows): pin the nested and update-inherited grants against real icacls The live spec asserted the grant landed on the root-level module file only. It now also pins that the flagless /T pass reaches a nested file carrying its own protected DACL (the shape app.asar.unpacked and node_modules have), and that a file written after the repair inherits the (OI)(CI) root grant - the stated reason that grant form exists. * fix(windows): keep the recovered-launch prompt silent while the tree is the suspect Round-8 fresh-eyes finding, driven against the real modules: the prompt re-read the marker the pre-window gate may have retired, but never consulted isInstallDirAclSuspect() - so after a FAILED gate (tree still a live suspect, window blank behind the 10s reveal fallback, Keep as both defaultId and cancelId) a 'keep it' answer pinned a userConfirmed marker no later repair may clear, on the exact victim class the repair cannot help. The guard now covers both gate outcomes; staying silent leaves the marker unconfirmed, which a successful repair still retires. --------- Co-authored-by: Orca Worker <orca-worker@localhost> Co-authored-by: OrcaWin <alpha-eng@stably.ai> |
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36354f1742 |
perf(remote): read the repo catalog once per publish, not once per worktree (#18410)
* perf(remote): read the repo catalog once per publish, not once per worktree `remoteWorkspace:setForConnectedTargets` costs 13 ms of main-thread time per call at 0.48 calls/sec — 0.63% of wall on a real session, the second most expensive IPC handler in the main process. Almost all of it is one line. `exportRemoteWorkspaceSession` asks `isTargetWorktree(worktreeId)` once per worktree in the session, and that callback called `targetForWorktree(store, ...)`, which called `store.getRepos()` — and `getRepos()` maps `hydrateRepo` over every repo row. So publishing to one SSH target re-hydrated the whole repo catalog once per worktree, then threw a fresh `createRepoRowExecutionHostLookup` (which itself `filter`s the catalog per lookup) away each time. The lookup is now built once per handler invocation and shared across targets: the rows cannot change inside one synchronous projection, and they are the same for every target. On the session that surfaced this — 413 worktrees, 13 repos, 1 connected target — that is 413 catalog hydrations (5369 `hydrateRepo` calls) per publish reduced to 1 (13 calls). The repo normaliser reached through `hydrateRepo` was the #2 self-time function in a 30 s main-process CPU profile at 0.25%. No user-facing trade-off: identical ownership resolution, identical exported session, identical stale-revision handling. * perf(remote): resolve each worktree's owning target once per publish Follow-up on the same handler: hoisting `store.getRepos()` removed the repeat hydration, but the ownership resolution itself was still repeated once per connected target. `targetForWorktree` computes a connection id from the repo catalog alone — only the final `=== targetId` differs — so exporting to N targets ran the identical resolution N times over every worktree key, and the projection asks the question once per key of `tabsByWorktree`, `activeTabIdByWorktree`, `lastVisitedAtByWorktreeId` and `defaultTerminalTabsAppliedByWorktreeId`. Resolutions are now memoised for the life of one publish, keyed on `(worktreeId, executionHostId)` because both participate in resolution. Test asserts 6 worktree keys resolve 6 times across 2 targets instead of 12. * perf(remote): skip the session and repo reads when no hydrated target is connected Hoisting the catalog read made a zero-connected-target publish pay for a full repo hydration it never did before. Return early instead. |