12 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Neil	efb5d247e2	perf: avoid copying unchanged artifact share records (#23141)	2026-09-26 12:57:06 -07:00
Neil	bfdec26352	fix(lint): enable anti-slop/no-object-parameters (#20781) ... The rule rejects the broad `object` type on any function input (declarations, expressions, arrows, methods, call/construct signatures, function types), plus local aliases and unions that resolve to `object`. `object` accepts every non-primitive while exposing no properties, so it documents nothing and pushes callers into assertions at the boundary. Fixes all 185 violations across src, config, tests and mobile, and flips the rule from "off" to "error" in config/oxlint-anti-slop.json. Approach: replace each `object` input with the type its owner already has. Most sites took an existing domain type or a type-only import (36 added); 40 new aliases name shapes that had none. Where a value is genuinely only compared by reference, it gets a named identity token instead of a shape -- `Record<string, never>`, the built-in `WeakKey`, or a `unique symbol` brand, matching the branding already used in src/shared. Same treatment for WeakMap and Map key parameters. Two `as unknown as` casts became unnecessary once the parameter carried a real type and were removed; no new casts were added. Suppressions added: none. No `oxlint-disable` for this rule anywhere, and no max-lines disable or per-file bump. Three files sat exactly at their max-lines cap, so the added type imports were made line-neutral rather than suppressed: - src/main/ipc/browser.ts exports the existing guest-registration args type (renamed BrowserGuestArgs) so browser.test.ts reuses it on one line. - pane-scroll.ts takes TerminalScrollIntentTarget through the existing pane-manager-types import via a type-only re-export. - direct-rpc-client.ts drops the identity parameter entirely: the session check moved into the sendProbe callback that owns the token. Verified: anti-slop config reports zero violations over src config tests mobile; run-typecheck-projects-in-parallel exits 0; 144 affected test files pass (1749 tests); oxlint and oxfmt clean on all changed files. Mobile has no runnable test/typecheck target in this worktree (expo is not installed), so its 6 files were typechecked against a standalone config and diffed against the base branch -- error sets are byte-identical, including test files.	2026-09-15 01:59:58 -07:00
3 people	6494f2a4f0	fix(native-chat): resume a structured chat from Agent Session History (#18933) ... * fix(native-chat): resume a structured chat from Agent Session History Clicking Resume on a chat-UI row could only reveal an already-open tab. If the chat had been closed, or this process had never published it, the click re-read an inventory that did not contain it and toasted "Retry in a moment" — advice that could never come true, because nothing republishes an unpublished tab. The legacy `claude --resume` fallback is deliberately refused for structured-owned rows, so the row had no way back at all. `close` already keeps the record and the journal on disk so a session can be attached again, and the hold path already resurrects one in full. What was missing was the tab: `restoreReadableSessions` is latched to run once, at startup, so nothing could ask for a single session later. Adds `agentSession.reveal`. The host looks up its own record, restores the session readable, and republishes the tab through the same call `agentSession.create` uses. Deliberately narrow: - It takes no hold. A provider child exists because a surface asked, and the chat pane asks when it binds. - A journal it cannot read is not a refusal. A chat whose journal predates the SQLite store restores to nothing here, but attach still recovers it, so the tab is published and the pane's hold finishes the job. - Workspace and provider come from the record, never the client, so a session id alone cannot aim the publication at another workspace. Claude and Codex both, by construction: eligibility is `adapterSupportsRecord`, which the router answers from the record's own provider. Gated on a new advertised capability rather than probing for method_not_found, matching agent-session.structured.hold.v1 — absence is visible during negotiation instead of by calling. * fix(native-chat): negotiate reveal against the host that owns the workspace The capability gate read the LOCAL runtime's advertised capabilities while the call went to the host that owns the workspace, which for a paired workspace is a different build. On desktop the renderer and its local host are always the same build, so the gate passed unconditionally and proved nothing about the host being called: an older paired host still received the unknown method and its method_not_found was reported to the user as 'this chat is no longer on this host'. The cache it read also starts empty and resets to empty when status.get fails, so 'not fetched yet' and 'unsupported' were the same value. Gate on the environment that will answer, the way agentSession.close already does, and skip the round trip entirely for a local host. Reveal now reports four outcomes instead of a boolean, so a host that is merely too old is not reported as a chat that is gone, and a host we could not reach keeps the retryable message. Also syncs the localization catalog: the 'gone' key shipped without an en.json entry, which reddens static analysis and verify while typecheck stays green. * fix(native-chat): tell a refused reveal apart from a missing chat The host raises two refusals here and they mean opposite things to a user: it holds no such record, or it holds one no adapter of its own can open. The client collapsed both into 'this chat is no longer on this host', which is a eulogy for a chat still sitting on disk. Read the refusal code, and fold the host-side case in with the too-old host under one honest message, since the remedy for both is the same. Adds the coverage the readiness pass found missing: the host's reveal answer itself (workspace and provider from the record, both refusals, an unreadable journal, a live session), and the activation branches for a host that cannot open the chat and for one that never answered. * fix(native-chat): read a host version block as the host's age, not a lost link The capability probe reaches assertRuntimeStatusCompatible, which throws a runtime_compat_block error. Treating that as unreachable told a user with an out-of-date host to retry, which is the one thing that cannot help. Branch on isRuntimeCompatBlockError the way remote-agent-session-launch already does for the same probe. Also adds the refusal-code case a previous commit claimed and did not deliver: nothing drove a structured_agent_session_unsupported reply through the reveal client, which is the branch that commit existed to add. Corrects a doc comment that reveal made wrong: attach is no longer the only call that builds the host. * fix(native-chat): let a dragged history row reach the same reveal as a click Dropping an Agent Session History row onto a pane activated the tab by id and, on a miss, raised the very toast this PR exists to remove — so the same row answered a click and a drop differently, and the drop kept the advice that can never come true. The structured branch never used the drop pane, so routing it through the shared activation loses nothing and gains the reveal. The helper only ever read one field, so its parameter narrows to that field and the drag payload satisfies it directly. A source ratchet holds both entry points to the reveal-capable path, since a mounted drag harness does not exist for this layer and what regresses is a call site, not a rendering. * fix(native-chat): stop an advisory refresh ending the click, and one click per row Manual QA found the reveal never ran: the inventory refresh that precedes it is an optimization, but its failure returned early with 'not available yet, retry in a moment' — reinstating the dead end this PR removes, one step earlier. A failed refresh now falls through to the reveal, which is the repair and does not need the refresh to have worked. The click can chain a refresh, a capability probe, a reveal and a second refresh, each with its own timeout, while nothing on the row says it is working. A per-session in-flight guard keeps an impatient second click from running the whole sequence again and landing its own toast. Also drops an unreachable owner scope: the snapshot apply discards any worktree whose execution host is not local before it reads one, so naming a remote scope there described a synchronisation that cannot happen. * fix(native-chat): bound the capability probe and stop naming the wrong machine The in-flight guard releases when the activation settles, so an await that never settles holds the row for the life of the process. The capability probe was the one call in the chain not raced against a deadline: on a cache hit it awaits a promise an earlier probe created, which may carry no deadline of its own. Race it like the two calls around it. A version block can name either side — evaluateRuntimeCompat reports client-too-old as well as host-too-old — so a message that blamed the host pointed half of those at the wrong machine. Name the remedy instead of the machine, which is true for every case that reaches it. * chore: remove a scratch repro file committed by mistake It was swept into the previous commit by a broad `git add` while a diagnostic ran in this worktree. It asserts the current renderer-sync defect as expected behaviour, so it would fail the moment that defect is fixed. * fix(native-chat): stop a reveal's own inventory refresh discarding its republished tab Manual QA: the host answered reveal with ok:true and republished the tab, and the chat still did not reopen — only a renderer reload brought it back. The renderer publishes under one epoch string for its whole lifetime, and a frame recorded under a different lineage retires that epoch permanently with nothing to un-retire it. The Resume click asks for an inventory first, and a worktree the host holds no entry for answers with the none/v0 sentinel; the structured path recorded it, retiring the renderer's own epoch, so the tab the reveal published a moment later was dropped. A reload minted a new epoch, which is why reloading appeared to fix it. A frame that carries no publication is not a later publication to fence against. Treat the sentinel and a removal frame as a cursor reset, the way the mainstream session-tabs path already clears its tracking — its comment names this exact hazard: recording that sentinel would retire the host epoch and reject the next live frame. Pre-existing, and it swallows an ordinary new-tab launch on an empty worktree too; the reveal is what turned a silent invisibility into a visible failure. * fix(native-chat): let a retraction prune its rows without retiring the epoch Correcting the previous commit. Skipping a retraction frame outright stopped it pruning the mirrored rows, so a worktree the host no longer publishes would have kept a chat on screen with nothing behind it. Apply the frame as before and clear its cursors instead of recording them, which is what the mainstream session-tabs path does. The unpublished sentinel keeps its cursor now too: it is skipped rather than cleared, so a stale frame arriving late is still fenced. Adds the case the earlier version would have broken. * fix(native-chat): keep the retraction's fences, and fence the reveal's refresh Correcting the retraction handling again. Clearing its cursors was more than the bug needed and cost a guard: the host mints a fresh epoch when it rebuilds a pruned entry, so a republication is never gated by the retained cursor, while dropping it left an inventory response issued before the close free to land afterwards and strand a chat row for a worktree the host no longer publishes. Skip only the recording. The mainstream path keeps its epoch history for the same reason, as a tombstone fence. The test that justified the stronger clearing asserted a host behaviour that does not exist — a rebuilt entry republishing under the renderer's epoch with a restarted counter. It now uses what publishStructuredAgentSessionTab actually mints for a pruned entry, and a new case covers the frame that would strand. Also fences the reveal's inventory refresh on the sync generation, which every other caller that applies an inventory already does: structured chat can be switched off mid-flight, and the answer would otherwise re-seed a row into a renderer that just discarded them. * fix(native-chat): drop the retraction's epoch history, keep its version cursor Third and final shape for this branch, and the only one of the three that holds. Keeping both maps re-poisons the epoch one cycle later: the consumer here is also the publisher, so the history's current is the renderer's own lifetime epoch, and recording the reveal's fresh epoch retires it. The next chat the renderer publishes is then dropped — this bug again, one close later. Deleting both loses the guard that stops a frame issued before the close landing after it and stranding a row nothing republishes. So: clear the history, keep the cursor. The mainstream path keeps its history as a tombstone because there the epochs belong to a remote publisher; that reasoning does not carry to a path that publishes under its own. Each of the three variants now fails a different test. * fix(native-chat): a retraction forgets what is current, not the tombstones The delete lost a fence the cursor cannot replace: the version cursor only compares within a lineage, so a delayed frame from an already-superseded epoch had nothing left to stop it putting a chat row back for a worktree the host no longer publishes. Keeping the record intact had the opposite fault — the renderer's own epoch is the history's current, so the next frame under any other epoch retired it. Clearing only current does neither: noteRetiredValue retires nothing when there is nothing current, and the tombstones stay. Each of the four shapes now fails a different test. * fix(native-chat): narrow the retraction frame through its own type Typecheck caught what the tests could not: `removed` is not on RuntimeMobileSessionTabsResult. The repo already names the shape — RuntimeMobileSessionTabsRemovedResult — so this reads it through a guard rather than the inline cast the mainstream path uses. --------- Co-authored-by: Orca Worker <orca-worker@localhost> Co-authored-by: Merge Sim <sim@local>	2026-09-06 00:50:20 -07:00
3 people	0cbb01ef4b	fix(security): apply the Windows path-hardening ACL that never ran (#17884) ... * fix(security): apply the Windows path-hardening ACL that never ran `buildWindowsRestrictAclArgs` invoked the hardening script as `powershell.exe -Command <script> <path> <sid> <isDir>`. `-Command` does not populate `$args`; it appends the trailing tokens to the command text. The script therefore read `$args[1]` as `$null`, threw `NullArrayIndex` at `$allowedSids[$sidText] = $true` under `$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'`, and exited 1. Both callers swallowed that: the async callback was empty and `applySecurePathRestriction` returned `true` regardless, while the sync `catch` returned `false` and nobody logged. Every Windows secure path has been left on its inherited ACL since the ACL was introduced (#5006), and nothing said so. Replace PowerShell with `icacls.exe`, which takes plain argv. That removes the quoting surface entirely rather than escaping it: interpolating a path into the command text would have turned a dead no-op into arbitrary PowerShell on a filesystem path, since `-Command` executes what it appends. It also drops the execution-policy dependency and the `powershell.exe` spawn an EDR flags, and runs ~25x faster than the PowerShell cold start. Hardening is now three passes: `/reset` to purge explicit ACEs that `/inheritance:r` leaves behind, `/inheritance:r` plus a `/grant:r` per allowed SID, then a read-back that checks the DACL is protected and grants only the intended rights. The predecessor's verification block was equally dead, and an apply that is never read back is only half a control. Failures stay non-fatal — non-NTFS volumes, network paths and restricted tokens fail legitimately and must not break startup — but they are no longer invisible: every failure is logged, and a failed async apply now evicts its cache entry so the next call retries instead of trusting a success that never happened. Routing through `runProcess`/`runProcessSync` also retires this file's `node:child_process` allowlist entry. * fix(security): verify the hardened ACL by identity, not by shape Review found the bug class this PR fixes surviving inside the fix. The verify pass checked rule count, absence of the inherited marker, and exact rights — never *who* the rules named. Granting Everyone full control satisfies all three, so hardening reported success on a DACL that handed the credential to every local account, and most of the real-filesystem tests still passed. Verification now reads the descriptor back with `icacls /save`, which emits SDDL with raw SIDs, and compares the principal set exactly. That is also locale-independent by construction: the previous parse read localized account names out of icacls' OEM-codepage stdout, where a non-ASCII path survived by accident rather than by the documented mechanism. SDDL parsing moves to `windows-security-descriptor.ts`. Two further self-inflicted problems, both measured: The post-rename re-harden led with `/reset`, which re-widened a DACL that was already correct — the staged file's protected DACL survives the rename, so the pass had nothing to do but open a window. Polling an external process during a write into a relocated root caught it: the e2ee keypair dropped to `BUILTIN\Users:(RX)` plus `Authenticated Users:(M)` — read *and* write — before tightening again. Hardening now verifies first and returns early when the DACL already reads back correct, which closes the window and cuts the steady state from three spawns to one. Re-measured: 158 samples, one DACL state, zero broad. Evicting the cache on every failed async apply reintroduced #4901. The env store re-hardens on the read path at ~2/s, so on a host where hardening cannot work (FAT32, network path, restricted token) that was two icacls spawns and two warnings a second, forever. Async retries now take a retry floor and a hard per-path attempt cap. The write path keeps retrying unthrottled — it is user-driven, and a failed credential ACL must still be retried on the next write. Also: failures route through a reporter hook that the main process points at the diagnostic tracer, because `console.warn` reaches nothing in a packaged GUI-subsystem build; `writeSecureFile` returns whether hardening took, and the async branch reports `pending` rather than claiming `applied`; a transient `whoami` failure no longer disables hardening for the process lifetime, and the SID is shape-validated; the `/c` guard now covers the synchronous runner too. * fix(security): re-probe hardening instead of latching a transient failure The per-process attempt cap added for the read-path storm was a permanent latch: one AV scan, momentary lock or %TEMP% blip and every later credential write in that session went unhardened, silently, on a host where hardening would now succeed. Same defect class as #17858's computer-use host, and worse here because what stops happening is security hardening on credential files and nothing said so. The retry budget now bounds the *rate*, not the lifetime: at most three attempts per path per minute, re-probing in every later window, forever. The transition is announced in both directions — `throttled` once per window on entry, `recovered` when a rate-limited path hardens again — so a host stuck in the degraded state is diagnosable rather than merely quiet. The reporter type covers both, and the main process ends the `recovered` span successfully rather than failing it. Extracted to secure-path-hardening-retry-budget.ts, which keeps secure-file.ts under its line cap without a max-lines disable. Also confirms the second flagged risk rather than assuming it: a real unwritable %TEMP% is now covered by a test proving verification fails closed, reports at the `verify` stage, and still leaves the ACL applied — so that path loses proof, not protection, and with the lifetime cap gone it can no longer combine into a permanent-off state. * fix(security): verify a directory's whole inheritance flag set The flag check tested only that `OI` was present — never that `CI` was, nor that nothing else was. That was harmless while `/reset` + `/grant` ran on every pass and repaired whatever was there. The verify-first short-circuit made it load-bearing: what verification accepts is now left alone, so a latent under-check went live because a different fix started depending on it. Two directory DACLs passed while being wrong — both protected, three non-inherited full-control rules, correct SIDs, differing from correct only in their flags: (OI)(F) - no CI, so subdirectories are left unprotected (OI)(CI)(IO) - inherit-only, so the directory object itself grants nobody anything; the next writeFileSync into it fails with EPERM, on a directory just cached as hardened Verification now compares the whole flag set, which also rejects IO and NP, and names the offending flags in the failure. Both shapes are planted in real-filesystem regression tests, including an assertion that a write into the repaired directory succeeds and its child inherits. Confirmed both tests fail against the old check and pass against this one. * fix(security): back the hardening retry off exponentially The fixed one-minute window bounded the retry rate but left a standing floor of three attempts per path per minute on a host where hardening can never succeed — FAT32/exFAT, a network path, a redirected profile. That budget is per path and there are several secure files, so the floor multiplied into tens of thousands of icacls spawns a day for work guaranteed to fail. The delay now doubles after each consecutive failure, from a one-minute floor to a thirty-minute ceiling, and the attempt cap is gone entirely: once the backoff elapses the path is re-probed however long it has been failing. A permanently incapable host settles at ~2 attempts/hour. Slowing the backstop costs almost nothing, because it is not the recovery mechanism: the synchronous write path is deliberately unthrottled, so a host that recovers hardens on its very next credential write regardless of what the read-path budget says. The `throttled`/`recovered` reports are unchanged and matter more here, since the quiet periods between probes are now much longer. The curve is pinned in a new unit test against the exported delay function rather than a copy of its constants, covering the doubling, the ceiling holding at 5000 consecutive failures, a 30-day failing path still re-probing, one announcement per degraded episode, and per-path isolation. The integration tests keep only what they uniquely prove: that the read path is wired to the budget, and that a day of failures still re-probes. Confirmed four of these fail against a reinstated lifetime cap. * ci(windows): run the real-icacls DACL suite in CI The win32 suite only self-skips off Windows, so it passed vacuously in every lane. Register it the way the cmd-shim suite is registered. * fix(security): describe the cache's real cost, which is icacls now Both cache comments still justified themselves with PowerShell -- "~1-1.5s" and "a PowerShell spawn every read" -- in the same file whose PR removed PowerShell from this path. The caches are still right, but for different numbers, and the old ones are the kind an engineer would reasonably delete a cache over. The real shape: hardening verifies first and returns early, so an already-correct DACL costs one synchronous icacls spawn and a rewrite costs four (verify, reset, grant, verify). Still worth caching on the read path, which polls at ~2/s. * test(security): make the DACL suite safe to schedule Registering this spec in the Windows lane put it under two rules it had never been measured against. Teardown now goes through `removeTreeSync`, which the lane's boundary test requires, and repairs the DACLs the suite plants on purpose first: those retries only cover transient locks, so a regressed `(OI)(CI)(IO)` repair leaves the root un-removable and `afterAll` throws EPERM. And the no-permission case decides by elevation before it writes anything. `windows-2022` runs elevated, where hardening succeeds: the old branch asserted nothing about denial and instead replaced the `hosts` DACL, then `icacls /reset` -- which is not a restore, it drops the explicit `SYSTEM:(F)` that file ships with. Ephemeral in CI; permanent for a developer running the lane from an elevated shell. Now it asserts or it skips. The probe reads the token integrity SID rather than `icacls /save`, which succeeds unelevated (`BUILTIN\Users:(RX)` carries READ_CONTROL) and would have skipped the case on every machine. * fix(security): measure the hardening latches on a clock that cannot go backwards `mayAttemptHardening` compared wall-clock times, so any backwards step -- an NTP correction, a VM snapshot restore, a user changing the clock -- made the elapsed time negative and held every failing path below its delay until the clock caught up. Measured at the 30-minute ceiling with the clock stepped back a year, the path was refused at +0d, +1d, +30d, +180d and +364d, and re-probed only at +366d. That is the permanent latch the exponential backoff was added to remove, and it contradicts the module's own "bounds the rate without ever bounding the lifetime". The SID lookup's own one-minute window had the identical shape and is worse: a failed lookup makes `planFor` return null, which disables the synchronous *write* path too, so the write-path exemption that recovers the read-path budget cannot recover it. Both now measure elapsed monotonic time, following the repo's existing `monotonicNowMs` spelling. Two things the write path was not doing, both found in the same pass: - A successful synchronous apply now records the outcome. It is exempt from the budget, but it was also invisible to it, so a host that had demonstrably recovered kept the read path backing off for up to 30 minutes and no `recovered` transition ever came from that lane. Only success is recorded; recording failure would put the exempt lane back under the budget. - `writeSecureFile`'s JSDoc now says its boolean covers the file only. The directory harden is fire-and-forget and answers `pending` on Windows regardless, so a `true` says nothing about the directory's ACL. * fix(security): stop the hardening test doubles from faking a no-op Three CI failures on this branch, one failure shape: hardening silently does nothing and the check that should have caught it agrees. The auth critical-path test hand-rolled a `node:child_process` factory with `execFileSync`/`execFile`. The rewritten ACL path goes through `runProcessSync`, i.e. `spawnSync`, which the factory never returned — so every spawn threw into the SID lookup's bare catch, `planFor` returned null, and hardening no-opped. It mocks `child-process/run-process` now, the boundary production code actually calls and the one sibling ACL tests already mock: an export missing there fails loudly by name instead of returning undefined. Its fake icacls writes a real UTF-16LE SDDL file, so the pinned spawn count per write is a property of the ACL path rather than of the double. The test forces `platform='win32'`, so this failed on every platform, Linux CI included. `windowsSystem32Binary` is a production bug, not a test bug: it builds a Windows path with the host `join`, which off-platform yields the mixed `C:\Windows/System32/whoami.exe`. On Windows the two joins agree, which is why it survived; on Linux the SID lookup's whoami match missed and 27 of secure-file's 32 tests exercised a lane that never ran. These are always Windows paths, so `path.win32.join` is what it should have been. The import-boundary pin still read 160 after this branch migrated secure-path-windows-acl.ts off `node:child_process`; the ratchet correctly refuses a pin left above reality. * fix(security): resolve the machine-relative SDDL alias, and stop a denied read destroying the file Path hardening verified the DACL it wrote by comparing the SIDs `icacls /save` reports. SDDL substitutes two-letter aliases for well-known SIDs, and the resolution table could only hold constants -- but `LA` and `LG` name an account by RID inside the *machine's own* SID, so on a box whose user is the built-in Administrator (a CI runner, an Administrator-only install) the current user read back as `LA`, matched nothing, and hardening reported failure for every path. Resolve those two against the machine authority derived from the user SID; without one they stay unresolved and the comparison still fails closed. Three secret stores treated any read failure as "malformed -- regenerate" and overwrote. A hardened file granting a SID this process does not hold reads as EPERM while its directory stays writable, so the overwrite succeeds: renaming over an unreadable file needs FILE_DELETE_CHILD on the parent, not DELETE on the file. That destroyed the E2EE secret key, every paired device's bearer token, and the plugin vault. Distinguish EPERM/EACCES from a parse failure and refuse. Also close the async lane's unhandled rejection: `void p.then(onSettled)` turned a throw from `onSettled` into a dead main process, and the retry budget it calls threw whenever nothing had configured it -- a contract held only by import order. The budget now defaults its own bounds. * test(windows): say which ACEs icacls listed when a planted DACL fails `toHaveLength` reports only a count and vitest elides the array, so three preconditions failing on the CI runner said "expected 3, got 6" and nothing about what the sixth entry was. Name the entries in the failure. * fix(security): stop three more stores overwriting what they were denied Same swallow-default-overwrite shape as the readers already fixed, found by sweeping every store that reads under a hardened root. - plugin-storage-store.ts returned `{}` on any read failure and set()/delete() wrote it back, losing the plugin KV store. It is the secrets store's shape line for line, so the two now behave identically. - relay-revoke-outbox.ts returned [] and save() wrote it, dropping revocations that never reached the relay -- a revoked device stays live. - profile-cloud-session-store.ts mapped an EPERM read onto `decrypt-failed`, which fails the `status === 'found'` guard in clearCloudSessionIfUnchanged and falls through to an rmSync of the account session. A denied read now reports `unreadable`, which licenses nothing; the refresh path bails on it and the auth status surfaces it rather than reporting a bare reconnect. All reuse isPermissionDeniedError. The predicate stays an EPERM/EACCES allow list rather than "ENOENT defaults, everything else throws": these stores are meant to self-heal a truncated or malformed file, and inverting it would turn a corrupt keypair into an app that cannot start. The distinction that matters is "could not read it" versus "read it and it was garbage". * test(windows): plant fixture DACLs that cannot inherit what they did not plant %TEMP% grants [SYSTEM, Administrators, <user>] (OI)(CI)(F) by default, and those propagate into every fixture. Three preconditions read back 4 and 6 ACEs where 3 were planted, and the extras looked like Orca's own hardening because the shape is identical -- on a runner whose user is the built-in Administrator, the inherited trio IS the trio production grants. Combining /inheritance:r with /grant:r leaves the argument order to icacls, and that combined form drops the inherited ACEs on Windows 11 but keeps them as explicit ones on the Windows Server runner. Removing inheritance in its own invocation makes the grant the whole DACL on either host, and the fixture root is de-inherited once up front so nothing propagates in. Rooting the fixtures outside %TEMP% would not have fixed this: any directory inherits from wherever it lives. The fix is to stop inheriting, not to move. No assertion is relaxed -- the counts stay exact. * test(windows): pick a foreign SID that stays foreign on an elevated runner `S-1-5-32-544` is only foreign to a token that is not an administrator. The CI runner is elevated AND logged in as the built-in Administrator, so granting Administrators granted the reader full control: the file stayed readable, and all six preservation assertions went vacuous rather than proving anything. BUILTIN\Guests is resolvable everywhere and no interactive token is a member, so the read is denied on an unelevated developer box and on the runner alike. An unresolvable SID would have been the stronger choice but icacls rejects one with ERROR_NONE_MAPPED (1332). The premise guard is what caught this -- it asserted the file was actually unreadable instead of trusting the grant, and named elevation as the suspect. * fix(security): refuse on any read that never reached the contents, not just a denied one isPermissionDeniedError becomes isUnreadableError, because "permission denied" was never the concept -- "could not read it", as opposed to "read it and it was garbage", is. EBUSY, EMFILE, ENFILE and EIO say exactly as little about a file's contents as EACCES does, and they fell into the branch that regenerates and overwrites. On Windows EBUSY is the likelier of the two: antivirus holding a credential open at the moment of a startup read produces it, which makes it a commoner path to the same permanent loss than the ACL case that motivated the original fix. Still an allow list, deliberately: ENOENT keeps licensing a create, and a parse failure keeps self-healing. The stores are built to recover from a truncated write, and turning that into a refusal would trade a recoverable state for an unrecoverable one on the startup path. Also fixes the regression suite's own premise on an elevated runner: makeUnreadable combined /inheritance:r with /grant:r, and that form keeps %TEMP%'s inherited [SYSTEM, Administrators, user] as explicit ACEs on Windows Server -- so the file stayed readable and all six assertions were vacuous. Same split-the-invocation fix as the ACL suite's planter. * test(windows): skip the preservation suite where a read cannot be denied An elevated token logged in as the built-in Administrator reads straight through a DACL that grants it nothing -- confirmed on the CI runner against both BUILTIN\Administrators and BUILTIN\Guests, and with the grant split into its own icacls invocation so the DACL really was the planted one. On such a host the premise these tests rest on does not hold, and every assertion would pass while proving nothing. So probe once at module scope and skip rather than assert vacuously -- the same trade the ACL suite already makes for its unelevated-only case. The gate stays in the compound `<win32 check> && <flag>` form the win32 lane ratchet detects, so the file stays registered in both lane lists. Coverage is not lost where it counts: isUnreadableError has unit tests that run on every platform and every host, and the stores' refusal is exercised in full on any machine where a denial is reproducible -- which is every developer box. --------- Co-authored-by: Orca Worker <orca-worker@localhost> Co-authored-by: Neil <4138956+nwparker@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-09-05 21:13:06 -07:00
Neil	9f0054d89c	ci: skip idle Mac allocations and redundant native compiler setup (#18954) ... * ci: avoid idle Mac allocations and cached native toolchain installs * test: anchor artifact fixtures before their fixed expiry	2026-09-05 17:35:20 -07:00
Neil	71f2c5d3f9	test: keep artifact share fixtures unexpired across calendar dates (#18955)	2026-09-05 17:15:57 -07:00
Jinjing	899304d515	Increase artifact content size limit from 5 MiB to 10 MiB (#17910) ... Doubles the maximum UTF-8 bytes accepted for manually shared artifacts, enabling users to share larger content while maintaining recovery and transport constraints.	2026-09-01 03:16:34 -07:00
Jinwoo Hong	02a7742406	fix(artifacts): raise desktop sharing limit to 5 MiB (#17708) ... * fix(artifacts): raise desktop sharing limit to 5 MiB * fix(artifacts): enforce recovery content limit * fix(artifacts): bound recovery request envelopes * fix(artifacts): clarify oversized request error	2026-08-31 16:51:11 -04:00
Jinwoo Hong	536d17dca3	fix(artifacts): recover committed cloud mutations (#13796)	2026-08-11 12:13:16 -07:00
Jinwoo Hong	6397668271	Add manual artifact sharing from HTML and Markdown views (#13369)	2026-08-09 16:11:16 -07:00
JinjingandOrca	3ec48a74d5	Gate artifact publishing behind off-by-default capability (#13368) ... * fix(artifacts): gate agent artifact publishing behind an off-by-default capability Public artifact sharing was reachable by any agent through `orca artifacts share`: the Artifacts settings toggle only controlled sidebar visibility, and nothing in the main process checked a capability before minting a public URL. Add `artifactSharingEnabled` (default off) and enforce it in ArtifactCloudService.share/update — before auth, network, or the share-record write — so the CLI, relay-forwarded remote CLI, and IPC paths are all denied. The denial carries a stable `artifact_sharing_disabled` code plus next steps through the RPC error allowlist, so the CLI prints actionable guidance. list, unshare, and delete stay ungated: turning publishing off must not strand already-published links. The capability is absent from the `settings.update` RPC schema, so an agent cannot grant it to itself — only the desktop UI can. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * fix(artifacts): gate agent artifact publishing behind an off-by-default Publishing is blocked until enabled in Settings → Artifacts. CLI preflights the capability before reading files to avoid unnecessary uploads. RPC surface rejects capability grants so callers cannot self-grant. UI shows opt-in workflow and recovery path when publishing is off. Web clients mirror the host's setting read-only. --------- Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>	2026-08-09 13:19:08 -07:00
Jinwoo Hong	c991bb27d3	Add account-backed artifact sharing (#13012)	2026-08-07 23:02:29 -07:00