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7650abe224 |
fix(macos): tell the user when Orca's terminal service can't read their folder, and walk them through the fix (#21923)
* fix(macos): tell the user when Orca's terminal service can't read their folder
On macOS, a terminal daemon that survived an app update can be refused access to
a workspace under Documents, Desktop, or Downloads while the Orca app itself can
still read it. Terminals opened there die with "Operation not permitted" and
nothing on screen explains why. The daemon has reported `cwdReadableByDaemon` on
every create since #18043 and main has emitted `daemon_pty_cwd_denied` on proven
divergence since then; the field data says 1,438 users hit it in 21 days. What
was missing was the notice.
The verdict itself moves off `access()`. A grant-less probe on an affected
machine showed a TCC mode where `access(R_OK|X_OK)` passes on `~/Documents` and
`opendir` still fails, so the check now does what a shell listing its cwd does:
`opendirSync`, one `readSync`, `closeSync`. Only EPERM/EACCES reads as denial —
a missing path, a non-directory, or an unexpected error still reads as readable,
so a non-permission failure can never masquerade as one. The same probe is what
the app side compares with, through one oracle shared by the telemetry emitter
and the notice, so the spawn path reads the directory once.
Proven divergence now also records evidence in main: one entry, keyed by the
daemon's pid, start time and launch nonce, carrying an opaque digest of that
identity and the folder class. No path leaves main. The existing focus-time
`macTccAttribution` poll carries it to the renderer, which raises a second toast
latched per daemon scope: dismissed stays dismissed, and a restart mints a new
identity so the poll returns null and the toast clears with no post-restart
probe. If the replacement daemon is denied too, about 31% of cases, the next
spawn re-records under the new scope and the notice returns, now with the
re-allow sentence doing the work.
No new IPC channel, no daemon protocol field, no polling change, and nothing new
on the spawn path beyond one `opendir`. `daemon_folder_access_notice` counts
shown, dismissed and open_manage_sessions against `daemon_pty_cwd_denied` as the
denominator; `shown` is emitted from main the first time a scope leaves the IPC
handler, so the renderer carries no telemetry plumbing for it.
* fix(macos): clear folder-access evidence only when the same folder class reads back
A readable spawn in ~/code said nothing about a Documents denial but was
hiding the notice; retire the evidence only when the daemon reads a folder
of the class it was denied on.
* fix(macos): say what a terminal-service restart actually does
The Manage Sessions restart confirmation still described the product as it was
before agents resumed themselves: it promised panes showing "Process exited"
that the user reopens by hand, and mentioned legacy-protocol sessions nobody
outside the daemon code can act on. Open terminals and agents come back on
their own now, so the old copy made a routine remedy sound like data loss.
It also called the thing a "daemon". The same restart is about to be offered
from a user-facing fix dialog, so both surfaces now say "terminal service", and
the confirm button is just "Restart".
The new body adds the one fact the old one never stated: terminals on remote
hosts are not affected. Translations of the two changed strings are dropped so
the five non-English locales fall back to English rather than keep showing copy
that is now wrong.
* feat(macos): give the denied-folder notice a fix the user can follow
The folder-access toast told the user their terminal service could not read
Documents and then handed them a paragraph: restart from Manage Sessions, and
if that does not work, re-allow Orca in System Settings. Both halves were
guesses. Roughly a third of restarts do not fix it, and the user had no way to
know which case they were in before spending every open terminal on finding
out.
Main can now answer that. `daemon-folder-access-probe.ts` forks a short-lived
child of the app binary the same way the daemon itself is forked, runs one
opendir/readdir/closedir against the denied path, and prints a single JSON
line. macOS attributes a TCC grant to the process that forked the child, so a
child of the app running now answers exactly the question the running daemon
cannot: would a replacement daemon get in? The child goes through the shared
child-process wrapper, never a shell, with a 3s deadline, a 1KB output cap and
an environment scrubbed to PATH/HOME/TMPDIR. Every failure — timeout, bad
output, spawn error — reads as `unknown`, never as a verdict.
That answer rides out as `restartWillHelp` on the evidence the existing
focus-time poll already carries, and the toast becomes a title and two buttons:
Fix… and Not now. Fix opens a dialog with the two real steps. When the grant is
already in place, step one is shown as done and Restart is live. When it is
not, step one is open and Restart is disabled until it completes — which it
does by itself, because the poll re-probes while the answer is still no, and
returning from System Settings is the moment that lands. An unanswered probe
never accuses the user of a missing grant; it leaves both steps open.
Restart calls the management API directly rather than stacking the Manage
Sessions confirmation on top, since the dialog already states the consequence.
Success replaces the steps with a done line and takes the toast down; failure
says so inline and leaves the button usable.
System Settings opens through the existing developer-permissions pane opener,
which takes an id rather than a URL, with Files and Folders added to it. The
event's action enum now also counts fix_opened, settings_opened,
restart_clicked and — emitted from main when a replacement daemon's first spawn
lands in the folder class the previous one was denied on — whether the restart
actually worked.
* fix(macos): let the folder-access notice return after a poll that read no daemon
A daemon identity reads as null during any reconnect blip, and the poll reports that as
"no mismatch". The notice dismissed itself and then never showed again for that daemon,
because the once-per-daemon latch still held its scope. Only "Not now" should latch.
* fix(macos): say what the folder-access notice costs the user
One line read like a stray warning. The toast now says who is blocked and what fails,
and still leaves the steps to the fix dialog.
* fix(macos): give the folder-access toast one action and the X, like every other toast
"Fix" is the only button; the X dismisses. Sonner fires onDismiss for programmatic
dismissals too, so the post-restart takedown now goes through the store and the hook,
and only a user's X is counted as dismissed.
* fix(macos): keep the fix dialog's steps a checklist and put the one action in the footer
Buttons inside each step made the list look like a form, and a footer Close duplicated
the X. The footer now carries the active step's action, with a ghost Cancel; a probe
that could not answer says so under step 1 instead of showing a check.
* fix(macos): let the checklist show the fix landed instead of saying so
A hedged sentence addressed to the user read like chat. On success both steps check
off and the footer offers Done; the unanswered-probe helper is a status, not advice.
* chore(i18n): drop the fix dialog's unused close key
* Revert "chore(i18n): drop the fix dialog's unused close key"
This reverts commit
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07c7606fee |
fix(computer-use): reap detached macOS helpers through owner exit (#20926)
Reclaim detached macOS computer-use helpers on abandoned requests and transports. Keep ownership from spawn, escalate SIGTERM to SIGKILL, force pending reaps when the sidecar exits, and clean each failed startup's private socket directory. Based on #14494 by @JuuuuHong. Preserve the original helper ownership/reaping design and regression tests while retaining the upstream line-buffer optimization and adding real-process teardown and resource-bound tests. Fixes #9141. Co-authored-by: JuuuuHong <juhang720@gmail.com> |
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22ce8d69a1 |
fix(lint): enable anti-slop/no-module-mocking (#20783)
The rule rejects `vi.mock` / `vi.doMock` / `vi.unstable_mockModule` and the
`jest` equivalents, on the argument that a test which rewrites the module graph
asserts against a stand-in the production code never sees. It is already off for
`**/*.test.{ts,tsx}`, `**/*.spec.{ts,tsx}`, `tests/**` and `**/__mocks__/**` via
the existing override in config/oxlint-anti-slop.json; that override is
unchanged here. What the rule actually catches is module mocking that has drifted
out of a spec and into a first-party `.ts` support module, where nothing marks it
as test-only.
73 violations at baseline, all of them in test-support code. 9 were relocated
back into spec files the override already exempts; the remaining 64 sit in 10
files that are test-only but do not match the override globs, and carry a
file-level disable naming the rule and the reason.
Relocated:
- terminal-hydration-store-test-bootstrap.ts: the sonner / sync-runtime-graph /
pty-transport `vi.mock` calls moved into the two specs that import it
(terminals-hydration-canonical-rows, terminals-hydration-canonical-pty-overlap).
Vitest hoists `vi.mock` inside a test file, so registration is strictly earlier
than the previous module-eval-time call; the bootstrap keeps only the preload
API proxy. Both importers were updated.
- ipc-events-ssh-authority-test-fixtures.ts: the 6 direct-ssh `vi.doMock` calls
moved into useIpcEvents-agent-status-ssh-authority.test.ts as a local
`stubDirectSshModules()` helper, which also de-duplicates the three copies the
spec already had inline. The fixture now returns the store state and coordinator
doubles it builds, typed via the exported DirectSshReconnectCoordinatorDouble.
Suppressed, with justification (each is `/* oxlint-disable
anti-slop/no-module-mocking -- ... */`, rule named, no blanket disable):
- config/scripts/headless-serve-shutdown-matrix.test.mjs (1) - a genuine Vitest
spec that the override misses only because its globs say {ts,tsx}. The script
under test is a top-level CLI module; the alternative is spawning real docker.
- src/main/codex-accounts/runtime-home-service-test-harness.ts (1) - stubs one
probe predicate in ../pty/shell-startup-env, imported directly by several
main-process readers; 17 specs share it.
- src/main/computer/desktop-script-provider-test-harness.ts (2) - stubs
child_process/fs-promises for a provider that shells out; 8 specs share it.
- src/main/github/work-item-search-test-harness.ts (4) - one consumer lives in
tests/e2e, where the relative mock ids resolve differently, so moving the calls
into the specs would silently stop mocking there.
- src/renderer/src/components/automations/automations-page-test-harness.tsx (14)
- the mount rig for 10 AutomationsPage specs.
- src/renderer/src/components/terminal-pane/remote-runtime-pty-transport-test-harness.ts
(1) - stubs refreshWebRuntimeSessionTabsSnapshot, imported directly by several
renderer runtime modules; 18 specs share it.
- src/renderer/src/hooks/ipc-events-agent-status-window-test-fixtures.ts (7) -
stubReactSyncEffect/stubAuxiliaryModules, shared by 11 specs.
- src/renderer/src/hooks/ipc-events-close-routing-test-harness.ts (11) - stubs
and hook invocation are one unit; 4 specs share it.
- src/renderer/src/hooks/ipc-events-terminal-create-test-harness.ts (13) - its
only spec is at 799 of an 800 max-lines budget.
- src/renderer/src/hooks/ipc-events-test-harness.ts (10) - shared by 8 specs.
No violation was converted to real dependency injection, and no max-lines disable
was added.
Verified: the audit command exits 0 with no output (and reports errors on a
planted probe, so the rule is live); node config/scripts/run-typecheck-projects-in-parallel.mjs
exits 0; 354 spec files / 2506 tests covering every importer of every touched
file pass. No mobile/ file was touched.
The changed-code quality gate's root Oxlint scan runs without --config so it never
loads the anti-slop JS plugin, which made all 10 of those file-level suppressions
read as "Unused oxlint-disable directive". check-changed-code-quality.mjs now
exempts directives naming an anti-slop rule from that unused-directive warning,
the same carve-out isCastingDirectiveUnusedWarning already makes for the casting
suppressions the casting config enforces. Such a directive can never suppress a
root-config rule, so nothing the root scan would otherwise report is hidden;
audit:anti-slop remains the scan that enforces the rule.
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659f204fec |
perf: avoid rescanning partial Windows desktop responses (#20235)
* perf: avoid rescanning partial Windows desktop responses * fix: own the retained serve-channel tail and pin the no-newline invariant - Copy the retained partial line via ownRetainedString after each drain so a 13+ char tail no longer pins the whole drained response as a V8 SlicedString (measured 23 MB -> 22 KB for 32 pending tails behind 1 Mi lines); regression test with --expose-gc. - Add a test asserting the retained buffer never contains a newline after a drain, which the chunk-only fast path depends on. - Locate the first delimiter with decoded.indexOf offset by the retained length instead of rescanning the whole accumulated buffer; test pins that no indexOf runs over more than the new chunk. --------- Co-authored-by: Orca Worker <orca-worker@localhost> Co-authored-by: Neil <neil@stably.ai> |
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a0d26cadd8 |
perf(computer): avoid rescanning fragmented native provider replies (#20348)
Co-authored-by: m4air <m4air@Mac.localdomain> |
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687a22e1ee |
fix(computer-use): run the Windows runtime as one persistent helper (#17858)
* fix(computer-use): run the Windows runtime as one persistent helper
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint raised multi-stage Execution + Collection
incidents against Orca on Windows ("Screenshots were taken unexpectedly on
this device... Screen capture code was found in a script launched by
powershell.exe", factor "Executes suspicious MSIL code"). The desktop script
provider spawned a fresh powershell.exe per operation, so a single computer-use
session produced a burst of short-lived PIDs and re-emitted runtime.ps1's
inline Add-Type P/Invoke assembly on every click.
runtime.ps1 gains a -Serve mode that loads its assemblies once and then reads
NDJSON requests from stdin, and a new DesktopScriptRuntimeHost owns one
long-lived child: lazy spawn, strict serialization, a 30s per-request timeout,
restart on crash, a 120s idle shutdown, and dispose() on provider teardown. The
one-shot -OperationPath path stays as the fallback, and Linux keeps its python3
bridge unchanged.
Both Windows spawn sites now use -ExecutionPolicy RemoteSigned instead of
Bypass, falling back once to Bypass (and logging) when a Restricted host
refuses the unsigned script.
* fix(computer-use): recover the runtime host instead of latching it off
Review follow-up on the persistent Windows computer-use helper.
A helper that died before producing a line set an unavailable flag nothing ever
cleared, and the client then dropped the host for the life of the session. One
transient bad spawn — a Defender scan, a locked CSC temp directory — silently
restored the per-click powershell.exe burst and per-operation MSIL emission this
work exists to remove, with computer use still working so nothing looked wrong.
Start failures are now retried, then cool down for 60s, then re-probed; the
client keeps the host so it can come back. Repeated post-answer crashes cool
down too, and a single reply no longer clears the failure count.
The one-shot bridge decided its execution-policy retry from a message that fell
back to stdout, so a window title containing "SecurityError" could replay a
non-idempotent operation — a double click, keystroke or paste — and stick the
session on Bypass. The retry now requires empty stdout and a matching stderr.
Serve-mode replies carry an echoed request id. Without one a single stray stdout
line would make every later response answer the previous request, acting on
stale element indexes with no error raised; a mismatch now kills the child.
Non-JSON noise is ignored rather than counted as the helper having answered.
Also: warnings reach the main process over the sidecar's IPC channel rather than
its piped, unread stdio; the child is watched on close rather than exit; dispose
latches so a queued request cannot respawn during teardown; and the host is
split into a serve channel and an availability policy to stay under max-lines.
* fix(computer-use): prove a helper never started before replaying its request
The retry that replaced the permanent-latch bug could deliver unrequested
input. send() re-sent the same request whenever the helper died without
replying, but "no reply came back" is not "the operation did not run":
runtime.ps1 synthesizes the click and only then builds the snapshot, which
allocates a full-window bitmap and walks the UIA tree — a native GDI+/UIA fault
there is uncatchable, and leaves the click already delivered. A deterministic
fault meant three clicks from the host plus a fourth from the one-shot bridge,
surfaced as a single failed operation.
-Serve now writes one {"ready":true} line after its Add-Type work and before
its first read, so "never started" is a fact rather than an inference. A request
is replayed only when the helper died before announcing. A runtime.ps1 that
predates the announcement — reachable through the provider path override — is
covered by an observation-tool allowlist until a ready line proves otherwise.
Host-detected aborts (timeout, desynchronised reply, oversized line) suppress
the exit handler, so they were bypassing failure accounting entirely and a
helper failing that way was respawned once per operation forever. They now
count and are logged.
Also stop charging twice for one outage: entering the cooldown resets the
failure count, so the first death after recovery no longer re-enters a full
cooldown and an interleaved workload cannot be stranded on the one-shot bridge.
* fix(computer-use): ignore a stdin write callback from a torn-down helper
stop() destroys stdin, so a write still queued at teardown calls back with
ERR_STREAM_DESTROYED. The callback carried no channel or request identity and
write() had no closed guard, so it ran abortChannel a second time: stopChannel
no-opped but recordFailure and the warning did not, charging two failures for
one operation and reaching the 3-strike cooldown at half the intended rate.
That feeds the same accounting that keeps a persistently broken helper from
respawning once per operation.
The same root also allowed a late callback landing after a replacement channel
existed to stop that channel and reject a different request with the previous
one's error. Node fires the destroyed-stream callback on the next tick, well
before a new request arrives, so the double-count is the reachable effect;
binding the callback closes both.
write() now drops payloads and error reports once closed, and the host ignores
any report whose channel or request id is no longer current.
* test(computer-use): pin each stale-write guard independently
The channel's closed guard and the host's request-identity check are redundant
by design, and the existing tests only failed when both were absent. Someone
deleting one, believing the other was the covered one, would have got a green
suite and a live regression — the same shape as a test that passes without the
fix it was written for.
Each is now pinned on its own. The channel's half is tested against the channel
directly: after stop() it takes no writes and reports no error from one already
queued, which the host cannot observe because it drops the channel at the same
moment. The host's half is pinned by the case the channel cannot see — a live
channel whose request was already answered, where backpressure delivers a write
callback for a request that is no longer pending.
Removing either guard alone now fails a test. Both carry a comment saying they
are deliberately redundant and separately pinned, so the next reader does not
have to rediscover this from the diff.
* ci(windows): run the computer-use runtime host suite in CI
The win32 suite only self-skips off Windows, so it passed vacuously in
every lane. Register it the way the cmd-shim suite is registered.
* fix(computer-use): time the runtime host cooldown on a monotonic clock
The start-failure cooldown was a wall-clock deadline, so a backwards step —
an NTP correction, a VM snapshot restore, a user changing the clock — left
`remainingCooldown()` returning the cooldown plus the whole step. A one-hour
step measured 3,660,000ms, and ten real minutes later still 3,060,000ms.
Nothing shortens it from there. Only `recordSuccess()` clears the cooldown on
a non-dispose path, and no request can reach a helper to succeed while it
holds, so every `send()` throws `runtime_host_unavailable` first. The host is
built with no `now` override and its lifecycle is a module-level singleton
that shuts down at process exit, so the latch held for the sidecar's life —
computer use kept working via the one-shot bridge while the per-click
powershell.exe burst this host exists to remove came back silently.
Store the instant the cooldown began and compare elapsed monotonic time,
following the two fixes in #17884. The field is `number | null` rather than
sentinel 0 because `performance.now()` legitimately returns 0.
Both new tests leave `now` unset, because the bug was in the default the host
picks and a test that injects a clock cannot see it.
* fix(computer-use): give a queued request its own deadline
The 30s request timeout was armed only in `sendOnce`, once a request reached
a helper. A request behind N timing-out ones therefore waited roughly N times
that with no deadline of its own: bounded, but the caller sees an `await` that
looks hung for minutes and gets no error to act on.
Move the serialization tail into its own class and arm a deadline at enqueue
time. Only the wait is bounded — a request that reaches a helper still gets
its full execution budget, so nothing that used to succeed now fails. An
expired request is dropped rather than sent late: the caller has already been
told it failed, and a click delivered after that is worse than no click.
The tail keeps its never-rejecting shape and chains on the turn rather than on
the raced promise, so a caller giving up early cannot release the next request
while its predecessor is still in flight.
* fix(computer-use): stop reading a locked file as an execution policy block
`UnauthorizedAccess` is the FullyQualifiedErrorId PowerShell reports for a
policy block, and it is also a strict prefix of `UnauthorizedAccessException`,
which .NET raises for any ordinary locked or ACL-denied file. The predicate
matched the token unanchored, so an AV scan holding runtime.ps1 or a locked
CSC temp directory was read as a policy block.
Two consequences, both bad. `escalateExecutionPolicy()` has no path back, so
one false match spent the rest of the session on `-ExecutionPolicy Bypass` —
the exact command line token this stack exists to stop emitting. And on the
one-shot path `isPolicyBlockedStart` re-runs the operation: one-shot mode
writes stdout only after the operation returns, so a crash partway through an
action is indistinguishable from a helper that never started, and the click
lands twice.
Measured on Windows against all three records, which the test carries verbatim
as fixtures:
policy/Restricted FullyQualifiedErrorId: UnauthorizedAccess
policy/RemoteSigned FullyQualifiedErrorId: UnauthorizedAccess
genuine access denied FullyQualifiedErrorId: UnauthorizedAccessException
`\b` is the whole discriminator: between `s` and `E` both sides are word
characters, so no boundary exists there and the exception cannot match.
Dropped two alternatives that measurement showed were wrong. `PSSecurityException`
never appears — the record surfaces through a native-command wrapper and reports
`ParentContainsErrorRecordException`. The prose is wrong three times over: it
differs by policy, it is localized, and PowerShell hard-wraps it mid-sentence.
Anchoring on the `FullyQualifiedErrorId:`/`CategoryInfo:` labels would be more
precise again, but those labels are localized where the values are not, so it
would lose a real block on a non-English host and strand it with no fallback.
Matching the values with word boundaries keeps both directions; a fixture with
translated labels pins it.
The escalation stays sticky. With the predicate correct, it only fires on a
machine that really does block, where re-probing the preferred policy would buy
a guaranteed failed spawn per operation.
* fix(computer-use): route a malformed request back to the request that caused it
`ConvertFrom-Json` throws before `$requestId` is read, so the serve loop
answered an unparseable request with an untagged error. On the client that is
not an error at all: `deliver()` sees no matching id, calls `abortChannel`,
kills the helper and charges a failure — and the helper's own message is
discarded. A parse failure was reported as a stream desync with no trace of
the real cause, and three of them walked into the 60s cooldown behind three
misleading "did not match" messages.
Recover the id from the raw line when the parse fails. No wire change: the
response shape is untouched and `BridgeResponse.requestId` already documents
this echo. It is the same shape the helper already returns for `not_a_tool`,
where the id survives because it is read before the operation runs. Both
mixed pairings degrade safely — a new script with an old client resolves the
error normally, and an old script with a new client still aborts, but now
reports what the helper said.
When the line is mangled past recovering an id, the desync abort is the honest
outcome, so keep it and carry the helper's text into it rather than replacing
it. A line the helper could not tag is usually the only account of the cause.
Proven against the real `runtime.ps1 -Serve`: the host can only write
well-formed JSON, so the parse-failure branch is unreachable through it and
the test drives the channel directly.
* fix(computer-use): keep the Bypass escalation only when Bypass actually works
AppLocker and WDAC constrained language mode raise PSSecurityException under
the same SecurityError category a real execution-policy block uses, so the
predicate matches them - correctly, on the evidence available. But those block
the script at parse time, which `-ExecutionPolicy Bypass` cannot lift. The
escalation was sticky unconditionally, so on a WDAC host we misdiagnosed,
retried, failed again, and then latched: every later command line carried the
most heavily weighted MDE token there is, on exactly the hardened, monitored
enterprise machine that is watching for it.
Treat the escalation as the diagnosis it is. A fallback that cannot start a
helper either disproves it - the policy was not what stopped the first attempt
- so revert to RemoteSigned instead of latching. When Bypass does start a
helper the diagnosis is confirmed and it stays sticky exactly as before, so a
genuinely Restricted machine still never pays a re-probe per operation.
The revert lands inside the outage rather than only at its end, so a
misdiagnosis costs one Bypass command line instead of one per attempt, and an
escalation that never proved itself does not outlive the cooldown that ends
the outage. Deliberately not a permanent "fallback is useless" flag: a Bypass
attempt that failed for a transient reason would then disable the fallback for
the session, which is the same latch in the other direction.
Only `runtime_host_unavailable` proves no helper started, so only that reverts;
a helper that started and then died proves Bypass works. That also makes the
policy branch reachable on a final attempt for the first time, so it now
rejects as unavailable rather than a generic error - that code is what routes
the operation to the one-shot bridge, which carries its own policy fallback,
and without it an all-blocked host would fail operations outright instead of
degrading. The pre-existing "reports itself unavailable when Bypass is also
refused" test pins that.
---------
Co-authored-by: Orca Worker <orca-worker@localhost>
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f975035809 |
refactor(ipc): split preflight and SSH registry out of the ipcMain modules (#15927)
* refactor(preflight): split agent detection out of the ipcMain registration
First of the IPC extractions the revised design requires. `src/main/ipc/preflight.ts`
mixed 285 lines of agent/tool detection with 35 lines of `ipcMain.handle`
registration, and the runtime calls that detection during normal operation
(`orca-runtime.ts:573`, plus the preflight RPC methods). So the runtime dragged
`ipcMain` into its graph to reach pure logic.
Detection moves to `src/main/preflight/agent-detection.ts` — named for what it
contains, per AGENTS.md. `ipc/preflight.ts` keeps only the handler registration and
re-exports the domain module so existing importers are unaffected. The runtime and
its RPC methods now import the domain module directly.
Ratchet baseline 36 → 35: `src/main/ipc/preflight.ts` is no longer reachable from
the runtime. The gate detected the improvement and refused to pass until the
baseline tightened, which is the behaviour it was built for.
Verified: 2 files / 1,187 tests pass across every suite touching preflight;
`pnpm typecheck` clean; `oxlint` clean.
* refactor(ssh): split the SSH target registry out of the ipcMain module
Second IPC extraction, and by far the biggest win: this removes **eight** modules
from the runtime's Electron graph, taking the ratchet baseline 35 → 27.
The runtime needed five thin accessors from `src/main/ipc/ssh.ts` —
`connectRegisteredSshTarget`, `getRegisteredSshState`, `listRegisteredSshTargets`,
`listRegisteredRemovedSshTargetLabels`, `getActiveMultiplexer`. Each is a one-line
read over module-level state. Importing them dragged in `ipcMain`, `powerMonitor`
and a `BrowserWindow` accessor — and, transitively, `ipc/pty.ts` (8,031 lines),
`ssh-browse`, `ssh-passphrase`, `ssh-relay-deploy`, `ssh-remote-cli-host-passthrough`,
`wsl-hook-relay-launch` and `user-data-path`.
`src/main/ssh/ssh-target-registry.ts` now holds that state plus its accessors.
`registerSshHandlers` populates it; the runtime reads it. The indirection is kept
deliberately: SSH providers register after construction and may reconnect, so
callers must resolve the current generation rather than freeze one.
`ipc/ssh.ts` re-exports all five, so non-test importers are unaffected.
`connectRegisteredSshTarget` still throws `ssh_handlers_not_registered` when no
handler layer registered — a headless host must fail loudly rather than report a
target as unreachable, which would read as `exited` (see ssh-execution-boundary.md).
Verified: 9 files / 59 tests across the ssh, automations and trust-preset suites;
orca-runtime.test.ts 1,183 pass; `pnpm typecheck` clean; `oxlint` clean.
* refactor(host): resolve the app root through the port in fork-reachable modules
`parcel-watcher-entry-path.ts` and `session-scanner-service-entry-path.ts` read the
app root via `require('electron').app` inside a try/catch that already returns null
when Electron is absent. They were therefore correct under plain Node at runtime and
only failed the *static* text check — which is real, not pedantic: the comment in
`ports/port-scan-command-client.ts:19` records that the plain-node-entry-guard fails
on that literal text, try/catch or not.
`hasAppEnvironment() ? getAppEnvironment() : null` gives the identical "no app root
here" answer without the text. That restores `hasAppEnvironment`, which an earlier
commit in this stack deleted as unused — it now has the caller it was waiting for.
Ratchet baseline 27 → 25.
Verified: 74 files / 458 tests; `pnpm typecheck` clean; `oxlint` clean.
* test(ssh): mock the SSH target registry alongside the ipc/ssh mock
Thirty-eight suites mocked `vi.mock('./ssh')` for `getActiveMultiplexer`. That
factory went inert when production started importing the accessor from
`../ssh/ssh-target-registry`, so the real module loaded and the assertions drifted.
Adds a companion registry mock returning the same stub, plus a
`sshTargetRegistryModuleMock` builder beside the existing `sshModuleMock` so the
shared harness stays one place. No assertion changed.
Found by a full-suite run: the targeted ssh/runtime suites were green while
30 tests in ipc/worktrees and ipc/repos were not.
* refactor(runtime): read app paths and the packaged flag through the port
`orca-runtime.ts` is the last module in its own graph that imports `electron`
directly. Nineteen of its uses were `app.getPath` (12) and `app.isPackaged` (7) —
exactly what the AppEnvironment port already covers.
Also removes a dead `const { app } = require('electron')` inside
`getOrchestrationDb`. It was left unused once the path came from the port, and it
is precisely the dynamic-require pattern `plain-node-entry-guard.ts` exists to
catch, sitting in the runtime's own constructor path.
What still binds `orca-runtime.ts` to Electron is now three sites, not nineteen:
`new Notification(...)` (one), `BrowserWindow.fromId` (one), and the
`ipcMain.on('terminal:tabCreateReply')` renderer round-trip — which is the browser
tab path, and the same one that would hang a headless host for ten seconds.
Two suites drove `electronMocks.app.isPackaged` directly; they now install a fake
AppEnvironment reading the same mutable field, so their per-test toggles work
unchanged and no assertion moved.
Verified: 376 files / 4,717 tests across src/main/runtime; typecheck and oxlint clean.
* test(serve): add the built-artifact terminal round-trip acceptance smoke
"The server started" proves almost nothing. Terminal creation dispatches into
OrcaRuntimeService, and without an installed headless PTY controller that path
falls through to a renderer reply that never arrives and times out after ten
seconds. A boot probe, a port bind, and a `host.platform` call all pass against a
server whose terminals are dead — which is exactly the gap the design doc's own
boot proof was retracted for.
This boots the BUILT `out/main/index.js --serve`, parses its ready payload, pairs a
real client over the advertised endpoint, lists worktrees, creates a terminal, runs
a command through the PTY, asserts the output comes back, and asserts clean
shutdown. It drives nothing but the public pairing + RPC surface, so the same
script is the acceptance gate a future Node-only backend must pass unchanged.
The sentinel invokes `process.execPath` rather than `echo`, because the shell
differs per platform and node does not.
Verified both directions: passes against the real server, and fails with an
actionable message when the command produces no output — a smoke that cannot fail
is worthless.
* fix(ssh): fail loudly when the multiplexer resolver was never installed
`getActiveMultiplexer` resolves through a resolver that `ipc/ssh.ts` installs at
module scope. A process that never loads the SSH layer — which is the whole point
of the Node-only backend — would get `undefined` from every call.
`undefined` already means something specific here: "not connected". So a missing
resolver and a disconnected target were indistinguishable, and a host with no SSH
layer would quietly report every target as not connected. That is the
unverifiable-reported-as-exited conflation `docs/reference/ssh-execution-boundary.md`
exists to prevent — the doc is explicit that absence of contact is never evidence
of absence of the thing.
A missing resolver is a wiring error, not a connection state, so it throws, matching
what `connectRegisteredSshTarget` already does for unregistered handlers.
Verified: 432 files / 4,759 tests across ipc, ssh, preflight, automations and trust
presets; typecheck and oxlint clean.
* refactor(pty): stop faking a BrowserWindow for the headless PTY path
`registerHeadlessPtyRuntime` passed `registerPtyHandlers` a stub object cast to
`BrowserWindow` whose `isDestroyed()` returned true and whose `webContents.send`
was a no-op — a window-shaped thing that lied about being a window, purely to
satisfy the type. Adversarial review named it as the same "looks fine, silently
returns a lie" pattern this codebase rejects elsewhere, and it is the shape that
keeps `electron` on a path that otherwise needs none.
`registerPtyHandlers` now takes `BrowserWindow | null`. An absent renderer is
semantically identical to a destroyed one — all 42 call sites already guarded on
`isDestroyed()` and skipped — so `src/main/ipc/pty-renderer-surface.ts` states that
directly: `isRendererGone`, `sendToRenderer`, `rendererWebContents`. The compound
`isDestroyed() || webContents.isDestroyed()` guards collapse into one predicate.
`isPtyWriteEventFromMainWindow` becomes null-tolerant and fails closed: with no
renderer no sender can legitimately match, so every write is rejected. Those
handlers cannot fire headless today, but failing closed is the right answer if that
ever changes.
This is the precondition for installing a PTY controller without Electron, which is
what a Node-only backend needs and what `terminal.create` actually calls.
Verified: 129 files / 2,473 tests across ipc/pty, providers and orca-runtime; the
built-artifact acceptance smoke still passes end-to-end (boot → pair →
terminal.create → sentinel → close), which is the check that matters most here
since this changes the headless PTY path itself; typecheck and oxlint clean.
* refactor(pty): read app paths and the packaged flag through the port
Follows the fake-window removal. `ipc/pty.ts` had nine `app.*` reads — all
`getPath`, `getVersion` or `isPackaged` — which the AppEnvironment port already
covers. The `BrowserWindow` import was also dead after the null-window change.
What still binds this file to Electron is now `ipcMain` (75 uses, all handler
registration) and `powerMonitor` (2). That is a clean statement of the remaining
job: split logic from registration, the same shape already applied to preflight
and the SSH registry.
Test wiring: the shared `pty-ipc-suite-environment` beforeEach installs a fake
AppEnvironment that reads through the existing `vi.mock('electron')` app object
rather than freezing values — suites toggle `app.isPackaged` mid-test to exercise
dev-mode spawn paths, so the port has to observe the same mutable field. One edit
in the shared harness covers every pty suite.
Verified: 128 files / 1,290 tests across ipc/pty and providers; the built-artifact
acceptance smoke passes; typecheck and oxlint clean; ratchet unchanged at 25.
* refactor(pty): inject the ipcMain surface so the PTY module loads without Electron
This closes the round-3 blocker: "the doc never says how orcad installs
setPtyController without Electron."
`registerPtyHandlers` owns the `RuntimePtyController` that `terminal.create`
actually spawns through — the thing a Node backend needs and cannot get from the
provider thunks. The module was otherwise host-agnostic already; the only thing
pinning 8,031 lines to Electron was a static `ipcMain` / `powerMonitor` import used
purely to register renderer handlers that no headless host will ever receive.
`src/main/ipc/pty-host-bindings.ts` makes those surfaces settable, defaulting to
no-ops. Unlike AppEnvironment and SecretStore, the default does NOT throw: a host
with no renderer legitimately has nothing to register against, so not registering
handlers nobody can call is correct rather than a hidden downgrade. The desktop
installs the real objects in `attach-main-window-services` before its handlers run.
Also converts the remaining electron import to a top-level `import type`. oxlint's
`no-import-type-side-effects` caught that inline `type` specifiers still leave a
side-effect import — precisely the "type-only is not enough if esbuild still emits
require('electron')" trap a reviewer flagged.
**`src/main/ipc/pty.ts` now bundles with zero `require("electron")`.** A Node entry
can call `registerPtyHandlers(null, runtime, …)` and get a working PTY controller.
Verified: 128 files / 1,290 tests across ipc/pty and providers; the built-artifact
acceptance smoke passes end-to-end — which is the check that matters, since this
changes how every PTY handler registers; typecheck and oxlint clean.
* fix(pty-bindings): drop two unused eslint-disable directives
CI runs oxlint with unused-disable reporting; the two
`@typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any` suppressions I added were never triggered by
any enabled rule, so they failed static analysis as dead directives. The `any[]`
rest args stay — they mirror electron's own IpcMain signature, and narrowing them
would reject the real object at the desktop call site.
Verified with the exact CI invocation: `oxlint --format github` reports 0 warnings,
0 errors across the repo.
* fix(pty): install the host bindings per process, not per window
A real regression my own change introduced, caught by the SSH docker E2E
(`paired-startup-exec-readiness` — "recovers startup exec through a headed paired
desktop owner"). It reproduced on rerun, so it was not a flake.
`setPtyHostBindings` was called inside `attachMainWindowServices`, i.e. when a
window attaches. But `registerHeadlessPtyRuntime` (index.ts:3163) calls
`registerPtyHandlers` on the serve path *before* any window exists — so those
handlers registered against the no-op default and never reached the real `ipcMain`.
A paired desktop owner then attached to a runtime whose PTY handlers were wired to
nothing.
The bindings describe the *host*, not the *window*: an Electron main process always
has `ipcMain`, whether or not a window is open. Installing them beside
`setAppEnvironment`/`setSecretStore` at the top of bootstrap fixes both paths.
Verified: 128 files / 1,290 tests; the built-artifact acceptance smoke passes;
typecheck clean; `oxlint --format github` (the exact CI invocation) reports 0/0.
* feat(orcad): de-electron the runtime core and add the Node entry + build gate
**`src/main/runtime/orca-runtime.ts` — 41,048 lines — no longer imports electron.**
Its last three sites go through `runtime-desktop-surface.ts`: a native notification,
the authoritative-window lookup, and the one `ipcMain` channel used by the
renderer-backed tab-create fallback. All three are unreachable without a renderer —
`createTerminal` already takes the background branch when no window exists (#10333) —
so a Node host installs none and the runtime relays notifications to paired clients,
which is the better destination anyway. Ratchet 25 → 24.
Adds `src/main/orcad/orcad-entry.ts`: Node host adapters plus a `startOrcad` that
constructs the runtime, installs the PTY controller via `registerPtyHandlers(null, …)`,
and serves RPC. It sets two defaults the constructor gets wrong for a headless host —
`canRecoverPersistentLocalPtys: false` (no daemon here) and
`getDesktopWindowStatus: 'blocked'` (a Node host can never be promoted to a desktop
window, which is what `'openable'` claims).
Adds `config/scripts/build-orcad.mjs`, which **currently fails, on purpose**: 25
modules still import electron (browser and speech clusters, plugins, jira/proxy,
filesystem-watcher, and four `require('electron').app` one-liners). It names them.
Two bugs found while building it, both worth recording:
- The first bundle looked clean and was not. `electron` was bundleable, so esbuild
rewrote the metafile `path` to the resolved file under node_modules and a check for
`path === 'electron'` passed while the package was in the bundle — it failed at
runtime with electron's own installer message. The check now reads `original`, and
electron is marked external so a residual import fails loudly instead.
- `jsonc-parser`'s UMD build breaks the bundle at load; aliased to its ESM entry, the
same fix `build-relay.mjs` already carries.
Verified: desktop unchanged — the built-artifact acceptance smoke passes, runtime/pty/
provider suites green, typecheck clean, `oxlint --format github` 0/0.
* refactor(host): drop the last two require('electron') app lookups
`computer/sidecar-client.ts` and `ports/port-scan-command-client.ts` read the app
root through `require('electron').app` inside a try/catch. Both were already correct
under plain Node at runtime — they return null when it throws — but the literal text
fails the plain-Node entry guard regardless, which is why port-scan carried a comment
warning it must never become reachable from a fork entry.
Reading the AppEnvironment port gives the identical "no app root here" answer without
the text, so that warning is now obsolete and the comment says so.
Ratchet 24 → 22. Every remaining entry is a real coupling: the browser cluster (15,
which variant B does not ship), speech (2), plugins (2), and jira/proxy-settings (2,
needing an HttpClient port for Chromium session partitions).
Verified: 25 files / 209 tests; acceptance smoke passes; typecheck and
`oxlint --format github` clean.
* docs(orcad): record that the ratchet under-counts orcad's graph
The ratchet reports 22 electron importers; the orcad build reports 23. The extra is
agent-hooks/wsl-hook-relay-launch.ts, and the cause is a gap in the gate rather than
a rounding error: the ratchet measures what orca-runtime + runtime-rpc reach, while
orcad's entry also imports ipc/pty directly to install the PTY controller.
Once orcad ships it must become a ratchet entry point, or the two numbers drift and
the gate quietly stops covering the artifact it exists for.
* refactor(runtime): inject the browser commands factory
Drops 14 modules from the runtime's Electron graph in one change — the whole Chromium
browser cluster. Ratchet 22 → 8.
`OrcaRuntimeService` constructed `RuntimeBrowserCommands` as a field initializer, and
that construction is what pulled in `BrowserWindow`, `session`, `webContents` and the
cookie jars. Importing the class for its *type* is free; only building it costs.
So the class import becomes `import type`, and the instance comes from
`runtime-browser-commands-factory.ts`. The desktop installs the real factory at the
Electron entry. **All ~80 existing `this.browserCommands.*.bind(...)` delegations are
untouched** — a review round specifically warned that rewriting those was the
expensive, risky part, and this avoids it entirely.
With no factory installed, browser commands reject per call with `browser_unavailable`
rather than resolving to a stub that silently succeeds. The runtime already filters
browser capabilities out of `getStatus()` when no backend exists, so clients do not
offer the affordance in the first place.
Also corrects a stale comment in `pty-renderer-surface.ts` that still described the
fake window as present tense; it was deleted two commits ago.
Verified: 451 files / 5,513 tests across `src/main/browser` and `src/main/runtime` —
the entire browser automation suite; the built-artifact acceptance smoke passes;
`pnpm typecheck` and `oxlint --format github` clean.
* refactor(host): extract the plugin client list and port two app lookups
Ratchet 8 → 5.
- `listPluginsForClients` moves to `src/main/plugins/plugin-client-list.ts`. It needed
only three `plugins/*` helpers, none of them Electron — it was colocated with
`ipcMain.handle` registrations, so the runtime's `plugins.list` RPC dragged all of
Electron in to call a function that reads a lockfile. Same shape as preflight.
Dropping it also releases `ipc/plugin-marketplaces.ts`.
- `agent-hooks/wsl-hook-relay-launch.ts` and `speech/stt-service.ts` read `getAppPath`
and `isPackaged` through the AppEnvironment port.
The five that remain are all genuinely Chromium and need the HttpClient port or a
watcher split, not another mechanical swap: `browser/cdp-bridge` (webContents),
`ipc/filesystem-watcher` (ipcMain), `jira/authenticated-request` and
`network/proxy-settings` (net + session partitions), `speech/model-manager`
(`net.request`, which honors app proxy settings that Node https does not — replacing
it is a behaviour change, not a rename).
Verified: 219 files / 1,922 tests across plugins, speech, agent-hooks and the runtime
RPC methods; the built-artifact acceptance smoke passes; typecheck and
`oxlint --format github` clean.
* refactor(network): resolve the default proxy session lazily
Ratchet 5 → 4.
`proxy-settings.ts` needed exactly one Electron value: `session.defaultSession`, as
the fallback when a caller does not pass `options.proxySession`. Callers could already
inject a session; only the default was hard-wired. It now comes from a settable
resolver, so the module loads under plain Node.
**A resolver rather than a Session, because a Session eagerly throws.** The first
attempt installed `session.defaultSession` directly in pre-ready bootstrap and broke
startup outright — `TypeError: Session can only be received when app is ready`. The
acceptance smoke caught it before commit. Deferring to first use is always after ready.
Behaviour with no session is not a degradation: there is no Chromium proxy config to
discover, so `resolveProxy` is skipped and the environment variables become the whole
answer rather than a fallback. Applying rules to a session that does not exist is
likewise skipped; settings are still honoured because outbound requests read the env.
This reaches past Jira — a review round noted `ensureElectronProxyFromEnvironment` is
also on the Claude HTTP path via `oauth-refresh.ts` and `rate-limits/claude-fetcher.ts`.
Verified: 48 files / 526 tests across network, jira and rate-limits; the
built-artifact acceptance smoke passes; typecheck and `oxlint --format github` clean.
* fix(index): merge the duplicate proxy-settings import
CI's code-quality lint (`oxlint --config config/oxlint-code-quality-native-plugins.json
--deny-warnings`) flags a module imported twice in one file. My earlier insertion added
a second `./network/proxy-settings` import beside the existing one.
Verified with CI's exact invocation: exit 0.
* refactor(network): add the HttpClient port and lift BrowserError out of cdp-bridge
Ratchet 4 → 2.
Two unrelated couplings, both of the same shape — a small thing living inside a
Chromium-heavy file.
`BrowserError` is a seven-line error class with no dependencies, but it lived in
`browser/cdp-bridge.ts`, which imports `webContents`. The runtime catches that type on
paths with nothing to do with CDP, so one import kept a Node host from loading the
runtime at all. Moved to `browser/browser-error.ts`; cdp-bridge re-exports it.
`jira/authenticated-request.ts` fetches through `net.fetch` and reads
`session.defaultSession`. `network/http-client.ts` makes both settable. This one is a
**named port rather than a silent fallback, because the fallback is not transparent**:
Electron's net follows Chromium session/proxy state, avoids undici's stale keep-alive
sockets after a VPN path change, and sends a Chrome user agent that Jira's XSRF check
depends on. A Node host gets `globalThis.fetch`, reads proxy config from the
environment, and sends Node's user agent. That difference is documented at the port.
`session.defaultSession` is read per call, not captured at install — it throws before
the app is ready, which is the mistake the previous commit made and the acceptance
smoke caught.
Test wiring: `jira/client.test.ts` installs the port *inside* `loadClientModule`, after
its `vi.resetModules()`, since the reset gives the module a fresh singleton.
Verified: 461 files / 5,616 tests across jira, browser, network and runtime; the
built-artifact acceptance smoke passes; typecheck, `oxlint --format github` and the
code-quality lint with `--deny-warnings` all clean.
* fix(http-client): register the Node fetch fallback with the call-site audit
`global-fetch-call-site-audit.test.ts` guards every global-fetch use, because the
global runs on undici where an unread response body can crash the whole process
(orca#8695). The HttpClient port's Node fallback is a new such call site and was
unregistered — the guard caught it in a full-suite run.
Registered with the reasoning, and the port's doc comment now states the body-safety
contract explicitly: it hands the Response straight to its caller and never inspects
it, so the consume/cancel obligation stays exactly where it already was — with the
caller, unchanged from when they called Electron's net directly.
Two comments elsewhere mentioned the global by name and tripped the line scan as false
positives; reworded to describe the behaviour rather than name the API.
Verified: audit passes; typecheck and `oxlint --format github` clean.
* fix(app-environment): read hasAppEnvironment through the realm slot
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2a760e310b |
fix(computer): report unasserted accessibility actions (#15028)
* fix(computer): report unasserted accessibility actions * fix(computer): fail closed on missing action metadata * Fix merged tab search test fixture |
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66dfdc456f |
feat(computer-use): support macOS middle click and stop the silent left-click fallback (#14721)
* feat(computer-use): support macOS middle click and gate the AX click path `--mouse-button middle` already validated end-to-end through the CLI, the zod schema, and the provider validator, and both the Windows and Linux providers honored it. Only the macOS provider rejected it outright with "middle-click is not yet supported", so the flag was a dead end on the one platform that has no fallback. Two changes: - Add `.middle` to the macOS button mapping. macOS has no dedicated middle event family, so it rides `otherMouseDown`/`otherMouseUp` with the button number carried by `mouseButton: .center`; that constructor argument is honored for exactly the `otherMouse*` types, so no extra field write is needed. - Validate the requested button before the accessibility fast path, and skip that path for buttons it cannot express. Previously the raw string was read unvalidated, and `performClickAction` only special-cased `right`, so `click --mouse-button middle --element-index N` (no modifiers, count 1) fell through to `AXPress` — a left click — and reported success with `path: "accessibility"`. Any unrecognized button string did the same. This matches guards the Windows and Linux providers already had. The button enum moves into `OrcaComputerUseMacOSCore` so it is unit-testable; `main.swift` keeps only the CoreGraphics mapping. Also documents `--mouse-button` in the computer-use skill guide, which never mentioned the flag, so agents on Windows and Linux had no way to discover it. * test(computer-use): cover macOS middle click in the real-desktop e2e suite * test(computer-use): prove macOS middle-click delivery |
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991a3fe963 |
chore(lint): update oxlint to 1.77 and enable no-op cleanup rules (#13901)
Enable eleven oxlint rules that simplify code without changing behavior, and fix
every existing violation. Each candidate was gated on measured cost rather than
assumption, so rules that regressed runtime performance or type checking were
dropped instead of suppressed.
typescript/no-redundant-type-constituents is the largest addition: 113 sites, no
autofix. Dead constituents are deleted. Where the redundant literal existed to
document intent (`string | 'all'`), it is preserved as `(string & {})`, which
keeps the autocomplete hint the original code was reaching for instead of
flattening it away. The rule also caught a broken import —
remote-shared-control-retirement-probe.ts pulled RuntimeStatus from
src/shared/types, which does not export it, so the type silently degraded to
`any`; no tsconfig covers that file, so tsc never saw it.
oxlint stays at 1.77.0 rather than 1.78.0 because .npmrc sets
minimum-release-age=4320 and 1.78.0 is younger than that window.
Rules evaluated and rejected, with what disqualified each:
- prefer-string-raw: String.raw is a runtime call, not a literal (184x slower)
- prefer-string-replace-all: 26% slower
- text-encoding-identifier-case: ~5% slower, reproducible
- prefer-spread: [...str] is 110% slower than split('') and differs on surrogates
- no-implicit-coercion: `!!x` narrows types and `Boolean(x)` does not (22 tsc errors)
- prefer-arrow-callback: arrows are not constructible, breaking `new` on mocks
- object-shorthand: rewrites source text asserted by a tracked reliability gate
- switch-case-braces: pushes ten files past max-lines, which cannot be suppressed
- no-useless-switch-case: drops `case undefined:` that switch-exhaustiveness-check needs
- arrow-body-style: 115 violations have no fix, and it breaks max-lines
- newline-after-import: false-positives on the leading-semicolon ASI idiom
electron-vite-output-contract asserted on the literal
Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call text; retarget it to Object.hasOwn, which
rejects inherited keys identically.
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d5c5322442 | refactor(computer): remove orphaned helpers (#13511) | ||
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73c5009b82 |
chore(dead-code): drop ~2k lines of unreachable exports and orphan modules (#12077)
* chore(dead-code): drop 2k lines of unreachable exports and orphan modules Ran knip across every build entry (main, preload, renderer, popout, web, cli, relay, workers, forked sidecars, config scripts) and removed what no entry graph can reach. - 11 orphan modules nothing imported, plus one test that only covered them - 159 unused exports/types, with their now-dead helpers, imports and tests Each candidate was verified against dynamic references before deletion. 42 knip hits were false positives and are kept: shared modules consumed by the mobile/ workspace, the src/shared/plugins/** public API, vendored shadcn primitives, and relay wire-protocol constants held for compatibility. Adds knip.json + `pnpm audit:dead-code` so this stays measurable. Verified: pnpm typecheck, pnpm lint, and 2081 tests across the 73 affected test files all pass. * chore(dead-code): move knip config under config/ Root-level additions are blocked by the root directory guard. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> --------- Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> |
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8ad9448905 | revert: restore pre-worker process boundaries (#11481) | ||
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1f2f809a11 | fix(computer): bind macOS helper to supervised peer pid (#11475) | ||
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ef90f6099c |
fix(computer): supervise Linux and Windows desktop providers from main (#11468)
* fix(computer): supervise desktop providers from main * fix(computer): remove unreachable provider timeout mapping * test(computer): flush stale supervisor response |
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d0f341ad69 |
fix(computer-use): make modifier clicks interruption-safe (#11451)
* fix(computer-use): make modifier clicks interruption-safe * fix(computer-use): pace modified Windows multiclicks * fix(computer-use): address modifier safety review |
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48184b9e21 |
fix(computer): supervise macOS helper from main (#11441)
Move native macOS helper process ownership into Electron main while preserving the sidecar as the authenticated socket peer. Add fixed lifecycle IPC, bounded claim and release handling, confirmed-exit tracking, sidecar and helper force-kill escalation, cleanup across failure paths, and focused lifecycle coverage. |
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aab112933e |
Revert "fix(memory): bound OOM-prone accumulators (#10179)" (#10255)
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> |
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8f40ddf328 | fix(memory): bound OOM-prone accumulators (#10179) | ||
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8478babe62 |
chore: remove 31 unused files (~3.6k lines of dead code) (#7494)
Removes 31 fully-orphaned source files with zero references anywhere in the codebase, surfaced by knip static analysis and independently verified (import-specifier grep across .ts/.tsx/.mjs/.cjs/.html/build configs, transitive-cluster + basename-collision analysis). Notable clusters: - GitHub issue-comment composer + its close-reason dropdown/labels/popovers (GitHubIssueCommentComposer and everything only it imported) - Create-PR dialog components superseded by inline SourceControl logic - right-sidebar Search/SearchHeader (unused search UI) - two stale source-control-primary-* renderer duplicates (live logic moved to src/shared/) - CliAgentSkillSetup superseded by CliSection; its entry removed from the AgentSkillSetupPanel governance test Verified: typecheck (node/cli/web), oxlint, localization catalog+coverage, full unit suite (24,581 tests), and electron-vite + web bundler builds all pass with these files removed. |
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46646d7ff1 |
chore(lint): upgrade oxlint to 1.71 + enable 7 new rules (autofixed backlog) (#6841)
* chore(lint): upgrade oxlint to 1.71 and enable 7 new rules Upgrade oxlint 1.67.0 -> 1.71.0 (1.72 was blocked by the repo's 3-day minimum-release-age supply-chain guard; nothing here needs it). The bump is a no-op on the existing config. Enable 3 error rules (backlog autofixed to zero in this commit) and 4 warn rules (surface signal without gating CI): error (autofixed, behavior-preserving): - unicorn/prefer-node-protocol (~1531 sites: bare builtin -> node:) - typescript/no-import-type-side-effects (~36: all-inline-type -> import type) - unicorn/no-array-reverse (19: copy-then-reverse -> toReversed) warn (real signal, current fires are test-only/correct): - unicorn/no-array-fill-with-reference-type (aliasing footgun guard) - typescript/no-unsafe-function-type (bans bare Function type) - unicorn/prefer-array-flat-map (map().flat() -> flatMap()) - unicorn/prefer-regexp-test (.match() in bool ctx -> .test()) mobile/.oxlintrc.json extends root, so it inherits all 7; the autofix ran from root and covered mobile/ too. Verification (all green): oxlint 0 errors (root+mobile+aux configs), oxfmt clean, typecheck (node+cli+web), vitest 22795 passed / 0 failed, builds (electron-vite + web + cli) succeed. node: rewrites confirmed to skip embedded SSH/CLI string payloads (AST-only); all toReversed sites verified to operate on fresh copies or write-once locals. * chore(lint): bump mobile oxlint to 1.71 so inherited rules parse mobile/ is a standalone pnpm project pinning its own oxlint@1.67, which lacks unicorn/no-array-fill-with-reference-type (needs >=1.70). Since mobile/.oxlintrc.json extends the root config, mobile CI's 'cd mobile && oxlint' failed to parse the new rule. Bump mobile to match root (1.71). Verified in mobile/: oxlint 0 errors, oxfmt --check clean, tsc --noEmit pass, vitest 978 passed / 0 failed. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> --------- Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> |
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499b900f1b | Remove unused dead-code exports (#6821) | ||
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972078f2c4 |
Fix paste ownership, input bounds, and IPC validation
Supersedes #5745, #5746, and #5747. |
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76cb846d68 |
Harden computer use runtime and CLI (#4705)
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> |
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885f3c3b25 |
Fix macOS provider launch failures (#3958)
* fix: handle macos provider launch failures * fix macos provider launch failure race Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> * fix repeated missing upstream probes Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> --------- Co-authored-by: Jinwoo-H <jinwoo0825@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> |
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be594b8652 |
Fix macOS helper path and token cleanup (#3961)
## Summary - stop the macOS helper from unlinking caller-supplied socket and token paths - keep parent-owned token cleanup tied to the helper startup that created it - fail closed for non-socket socket-path collisions and cover helper cleanup races with regression tests ## Verification - swift test --package-path native/computer-use-macos - pnpm exec vitest run --config config/vitest.config.ts src/main/computer/macos-native-provider-client.test.ts - pnpm run typecheck:node - pnpm lint - pnpm run build:computer-macos - Electron/helper startup smoke validation |
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3dc07cd3da | fix: bound desktop snapshot cache | ||
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7a9ef01854 | perf: stop failed macOS provider startups (#4155) | ||
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d16268caed | perf: bound desktop screenshot payloads (#4083) | ||
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bcddccae2b | fix: harden shared platform helpers (#3877) | ||
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1009ac9083 | chore: update Electron to 42 (#3919) | ||
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a3e392ee64 | Clean up macOS provider socket listeners | ||
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6e2f20abe2 | Clean up computer sidecar child listeners | ||
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70c0f3dc0a | fix: restart computer sidecar after errors (#3761) | ||
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adb96dd450 |
Reconnect native macOS provider after socket errors (#3762)
* fix: reconnect native macos provider after socket errors * test: cover macos helper socket cleanup Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> --------- Co-authored-by: Jinwoo-H <jinwoo0825@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> |
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72511eba28 | fix: time out computer permission helper launch (#3810) | ||
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c99eb29bb0 | chore: remove unused code | ||
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acd0f0dc6d | fix: time out desktop script bridge (#3802) | ||
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afd1509672 | fix: clean up permission status helper listeners (#3774) | ||
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ddf41efb2a | fix: clean up macos provider socket listeners (#3766) | ||
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41b43618b9 | fix: ignore stale macos provider socket events (#3720) | ||
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d166e61e76 | fix: ignore stale computer sidecar exits (#3718) | ||
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fc124d032a | fix: clear native notification fallback timers (#3306) | ||
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3a40c62169 |
Improve Computer Use permission setup (#2758)
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> |
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cb58b109e0 | feat: add workspace space analyzer (#1877) | ||
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bec16ff11b |
fix: pr-bug-scan validated finding from #1705 (#1708)
Aligned shouldUseMacOSNativeProvider gate with send-time check by using resolveMacOSComputerUseExecutablePath, restoring symmetry so RPCs no longer throw when only the bundle exists. Co-authored-by: orca-bug-scan-bot <orca-bug-scan-bot@stably.ai> |
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ff7de93928 |
Fix macOS computer-use helper permission checks (#1705)
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> |
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0f54103dda |
Add native computer-use automation (#1683)
Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai> |