Commit Graph
2 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Neil 896c43564c fix(pairing): keep signed-in devices when the first-seen save fails; report revoked devices on downgraded latched hosts (#39337)
- Device registry: if saving a device's first sign-in fails, keep the sign-in in
  memory and retry the save every minute until it lands. Before, a restart after
  the pairing code's expiry treated the device as an unused, expired code and
  refused and removed it.
- Remote runtime client: when a host remembered as E2EE v2 refuses v2 and the
  legacy status check gets a sealed "unauthorized" reply, report that refusal
  instead of "update Orca on that host" with close code 4001, which managed
  orcad read as a different server on its port.
2026-11-07 00:21:24 -08:00
Neil 0efe201fbf feat(remote-runtime): use E2EE v2 for desktop and CLI connections to remote runtimes (#39218)
* feat(remote-runtime): use E2EE v2 for desktop and CLI connections to remote runtimes

Desktop connections to remote runtimes (orca serve, orcad, managed SSH,
browser bridge) and the orca CLI now use E2EE v2 framing for hosts that
support it, and fall back to the legacy framing for hosts that do not.

- One-shot requests try v2 first. A host that refuses the v2 hello
  (hosts from before v2) or refuses capabilities on v2 token auth gets
  one transparent legacy redial; nothing but the handshake is sent before
  authentication, so the redial is safe.
- After a v2 sign-in succeeds, the host's pinned key is remembered in the
  profile (shared by the app and the CLI). Every connection to that host,
  including long-lived sockets, then uses v2 and never falls back.
- Long-lived sockets keep legacy framing until a host has proven v2, so
  they never see an older host refuse a v2 hello.
- Hosts accept clientCapabilities on direct v2 token auth, so desktop and
  CLI clients keep their capability negotiation on v2. Relay token auth
  stays exact.

* feat(remote-runtime): recover a latched host that was downgraded, without a legacy downgrade path

A host this profile had signed in to over v2 was refused for good if it
was later downgraded below capability-carrying v2 token auth. Hosts now
advertise pairing.e2ee-v2-token-capabilities.v1. When a latched host
refuses v2, a one-shot request asks the host over legacy framing (keyed
to its pinned key, so only the real host can answer) for status.get:

- no capability: the host itself says it was downgraded; the latch is
  dropped and the request goes ahead over legacy;
- capability present, or no answer: the request fails with an error
  that says to update the host or check the network path. Only the
  read-only status check ever ran over legacy.

A refusal faked on the path cannot produce the host's answer, so it
cannot force legacy framing for a latched host.
2026-11-06 17:14:56 -08:00