# Mobile push: contract and build spec Tracking issue: stablyai/orca#8129. Design page: `/tmp/orca-mobile-push/orca-mobile-push.html`. This document is the single contract every lane builds against. Do not deviate without updating it. ## Summary A small Orca-hosted push gateway (`cloud/apps/push`) holds the APNs key and FCM credentials and sends to phones. The desktop host registers each paired phone's native push token with the gateway and asks the gateway to push on every mobile notification it already fans out over the socket. The phone dedupes by `notificationId#notificationSeq`. No ack gate, no generic mode, no staging gateway, one auth path for signed-in and accountless hosts. ## Identities - **Host public key**: the desktop's existing X25519 E2EE public key (`src/main/runtime/e2ee-keypair.ts`), 32 bytes, base64. The phone already stores it per host as `publicKeyB64`. - **hostFingerprint**: `sha256(hostPublicKey)` base64url, first 16 chars. Identical derivation to `deriveRelayHostId` in `src/main/runtime/relay/relay-http-client.ts`. Both desktop and phone can compute it. - **deviceId**: the desktop's `DeviceEntry.deviceId` for the paired phone. Opaque UUID. - **registrationId**: gateway-assigned opaque id for one (hostFingerprint, deviceId) pair. ## Gateway HTTP API Base URL: `https://push.onorca.dev` (dev override via env). JSON bodies, `Content-Type: application/json`. All schemas are zod, `.strict()`, exported from `cloud/packages/push-contract`. ### Host authentication: challenge, proof, session The host keypair is X25519 (box), so it cannot sign. Reuse the relay's challenge shape. `POST /v1/host/challenge` ```json { "v": 1, "hostPublicKeyB64": "<32 bytes b64>" } ``` → 200 ```json { "challengeId": "", "gatewayEphemeralPublicKeyB64": "<32 b64>", "nonceB64": "<24 b64>", "ciphertextB64": "", "expiresAt": } ``` - Gateway generates an ephemeral box keypair per challenge, a 24-byte nonce, and a 32-byte secret. - `plaintext = "orca-push-host-challenge/v1\0" || u32be(len(transcript)) || transcript || secret(32)` - `ciphertext = nacl.box(plaintext, nonce, hostPublicKey, gatewayEphemeralSecretKey)` - Transcript is the relay's length-prefixed field encoding (`field(name, value)` = u32be(len(name)) || name || u32be(len(value)) || value), fields in this exact order: `protocol="orca-push-host-proof/v1"`, `version=0x01`, `gatewayOrigin`, `gatewayEphemeralPublicKey`, `challengeNonce`, `challengeId`, `issuedAt` (u64be ms), `expiresAt` (u64be ms), `hostFingerprint`, `hostPublicKey`. - Challenge TTL 10 s, and 10 s is the whole window the gateway honours. The 30 s clock skew tolerance is the host's alone: it validates a timestamp the gateway chose, so it needs the allowance and the gateway does not. A gateway that subtracted the tolerance from its own check would run a 40 s TTL. Store challenge (id, secret hash, host fingerprint, host public key, expiry) in DB so any Cloud Run instance can verify. Expired rows are pruned 30 s late so a slow proof reads as expired rather than as an unknown challenge. - Issuing a challenge writes no `push_hosts` row. It is unauthenticated, so a `push_hosts` row would be a free permanent write for any caller. The row is upserted in `POST /v1/host/session` once the proof verifies, from the public key the challenge row carries. `POST /v1/host/session` ```json { "v": 1, "challengeId": "", "proofB64": "<32 b64>" } ``` - Host opens the box with its secret key, validates every transcript field (same checks as `validateTranscript` in `src/main/runtime/relay/relay-host-proof.ts`, adapted to the push fields), and returns `proof = HMAC-SHA256(secret, "orca-push-host-proof/v1\0ack\0" || transcript)`. - Gateway verifies with `timingSafeEqual`, consumes the challenge (single use), and returns ```json { "sessionToken": "", "expiresAt": , "hostFingerprint": "<16 chars>" } ``` - Session TTL 24 h. Stored hashed (sha256) in DB. Bearer on every other call: `Authorization: Bearer `. 401 with `{ "error": "session_expired" }` on expiry; host re-runs the challenge. ### Device registration `POST /v1/devices` (Bearer) ```json { "v": 1, "deviceId": "", "platform": "ios" | "android", "token": "", "apnsEnvironment": "sandbox" | "production", // ios only, required for ios "filter": { "sources": ["agent-task-complete", "terminal-bell", "plugin"], "agentStates": ["needs-input", "finished"] } } ``` → 200 `{ "registrationId": "" }`. Upsert keyed by (hostFingerprint, deviceId); a new token replaces the old. `deviceId` is caller-chosen, so a host is capped at 64 registrations: the 65th distinct `deviceId` → 409 `{ "error": "too_many_devices" }`. Re-registering a `deviceId` the host already owns is always accepted, and deleting a registration frees its slot. `GET /v1/devices` is bounded at 1024 rows to match its response schema, which the per-host cap keeps well out of reach. `filter` is stored but enforced by the host (see desktop); gateway stores it only so a host restart can re-read it. iOS tokens are variable-length, hex-encoded byte strings; Android tokens are FCM registration strings. `DELETE /v1/devices/:registrationId` (Bearer) → 204. Only the owning host may delete. `GET /v1/devices` (Bearer) → `{ "devices": [{ registrationId, deviceId, platform, dead: boolean }] }`. ### Send `POST /v1/send` (Bearer) ```json { "v": 1, "registrationIds": ["", "..."], "notification": { "notificationId": "", "notificationSeq": , "notificationEpoch": "", "source": "agent-task-complete" | "terminal-bell" | "plugin", "agentState": "needs-input" | "finished" | null, "title": "", "body": "", "worktreeId": "" } } ``` → 200 ```json { "results": [{ "registrationId": "", "status": "queued" | "dead" | "rate_limited" | "error" }] } ``` - `queued` means accepted into the coalescing window. `dead` means the provider reported the token unregistered; the host must drop the registration. Never block the socket fan-out on this call. - Quota: 60 sends per hostFingerprint per rolling hour, 200 per registration per rolling day. Over quota → `rate_limited` per result, HTTP 200. Whole request over a hard cap of 20 registrationIds → 400. The cap counts the ids as sent; the gateway then dedupes them, so a repeated id spends quota once, yields one result, and counts once toward `coalescedCount`. `results` may therefore be shorter than `registrationIds`, and callers must match a result by its `registrationId`, never by position. - Notification JSON is limited to 3000 UTF-8 bytes to leave provider envelope space; identities are preserved exactly, including long filesystem paths. Oversized payloads fail validation. - Gateway retries are deduplicated by host, registration, notification epoch, and sequence in the quota ledger for its 25-hour retention window. Duplicates return `queued` without reserving quota or enqueueing another delivery. - Both quota counters are reserved under a per-host lock held for the whole transaction. PostgreSQL reads at READ COMMITTED, so a concurrent count-then-insert would otherwise admit a whole burst. ### Request limits and unauthenticated abuse - Every POST is capped at 16 KiB by a streaming body limit, not by `Content-Length` alone: a chunked body declares no length. Over the cap → 413 `{ "error": "request_too_large" }`. - `POST /v1/host/challenge` and `POST /v1/host/session` are the only unauthenticated routes. They share one token bucket per client IP, 30 requests per minute, refilling continuously. Over the bucket → 429 `{ "error": "rate_limited" }`. The client IP is the **last** `x-forwarded-for` hop, not the first: Cloud Run appends the connecting peer, so everything left of that value is caller-supplied and can be a fresh forgery on every request, which would hand a flood a new bucket each time. `ORCA_PUSH_TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS` (default 0) says how many appenders sit between the platform and the client, so a future load balancer sets it to 1. A header with fewer hops than that depth is not trusted at all. Falls back to `x-real-ip` and then to a single shared bucket. The bucket is per instance and in memory, so the effective cap scales with the instance count; it exists to blunt a flood, not to meter. - Every other `/v1` route is capped by a second, wider bucket per client IP, 240 requests per minute, applied **before** the bearer is looked up. A bearer has to be read from the database before it can be refused, and that read takes one of only two pool connections per instance, so without this cap a flood of forged bearers would starve real hosts of the pool while every one of them got a 401. - The gateway cannot prove that a host owns the token it registers: any host with a session may register any well-formed token and send text to it, within its own quota. The phone drops such a push in the foreground because the fingerprint resolves to no paired host, and never routes a tap on it, but the OS banner shows while the app is backgrounded. Reaching it needs the victim's native token, which the gateway never returns and which only the phone and its host ever see. ### Coalescing (gateway) Per registrationId, hold sends for 3 s. If one event arrives, send it as-is. If N>1 arrive, send one summary: title `Orca`, body ` agents need attention` (or ` updates` when no needs-input), data carries the latest event's fields plus `coalescedCount`. Collapse id for a summary is `host:` so a later summary replaces it. The window is held in memory per gateway instance, so with more than one instance a burst can produce up to one summary per instance; accepted for this release, and the collapse id keeps the phone showing one banner. Transient provider errors retry at most three attempts within two minutes, honoring Retry-After and FCM minimum delays. Permanent failures are not retried. Unregister/dead-token state is re-read before every attempt. Shutdown stops admission and drains admitted requests, pending windows, and active deliveries before closing resources; a nine-second hard deadline remains below Cloud Run's termination grace. Delivery remains in memory. ### Provider payloads APNs (HTTP/2, `api.push.apple.com` or `api.sandbox.push.apple.com` by `apnsEnvironment`; JWT auth from key id + team id + `.p8`, token cached and refreshed every 50 min): - headers: `apns-topic: com.stably.orca.mobile`, `apns-push-type: alert`, `apns-priority: 10`, `apns-expiration: now+4h`, `apns-collapse-id: >` - body: `{"aps":{"alert":{"title","body"},"sound":"default","thread-id":""}, "orca":{ hostFingerprint, worktreeId, notificationId, notificationSeq, notificationEpoch, source, agentState, coalescedCount }}` - Dead token: 410, or 400 with `BadDeviceToken`/`Unregistered`/`DeviceTokenNotForTopic`. FCM (V1 `projects/onorca-cloud/messages:send`, bearer from the runtime service account via the GCE metadata server or `GOOGLE_APPLICATION_CREDENTIALS` locally): - `{"message":{"token","notification":{"title","body"},"android":{"priority":"HIGH","ttl":"14400s", "collapse_key":"","notification":{"channel_id":"orca-desktop","tag":""}}, "data":{ all orca fields as strings }}}` - Dead token: `UNREGISTERED`, or `INVALID_ARGUMENT` whose message names the token. ### Gateway storage (Postgres in prod, SQLite in tests, same pattern as `cloud/apps/relay/src/database.ts`) - `push_hosts(host_fingerprint pk, host_public_key, created_at, last_seen_at)`, written only on a verified proof and pruned after 1 h of no contact when no `push_devices` row still names the host. Nothing reads it, and any keypair mints a host for free, so it is not allowed to accumulate. - `push_sessions` holds one row per host, enforced by a unique index and transaction lock. Minting a session deletes the host's earlier one, since a desktop holds a single session and only re-proves once it is gone. - `push_challenges(challenge_id pk, host_fingerprint, host_public_key, secret_hash, transcript, expires_at, consumed_at)` - `push_sessions(token_hash pk, host_fingerprint, expires_at, created_at)` - `push_devices(registration_id pk, host_fingerprint, device_id, platform, token, apns_environment, filter_json, dead_at, created_at, updated_at, unique(host_fingerprint, device_id))` - `push_send_log(host_fingerprint, registration_id, sent_at)` for quota, pruned after 25 h. Logging: aggregate counters only. Never log tokens, titles, bodies, or raw fingerprints (log the first 4 chars of a fingerprint at most). ### Gateway env `PORT`, `ORCA_PUSH_PUBLIC_URL`, `ORCA_PUSH_DATABASE_URL` (absent → SQLite under `ORCA_PUSH_DATA_DIR`), `ORCA_PUSH_APNS_KEY` (PEM text), `ORCA_PUSH_APNS_KEY_ID`, `ORCA_PUSH_APPLE_TEAM_ID`, `ORCA_PUSH_APNS_TOPIC` (default `com.stably.orca.mobile`), `ORCA_PUSH_FCM_PROJECT_ID` (default `onorca-cloud`), `ORCA_PUSH_COALESCE_MS` (default 3000), `ORCA_PUSH_TRUSTED_PROXY_HOPS` (default 0, proxies appending to `x-forwarded-for` after the client). Secret Manager names (already exist in `onorca-cloud`): `orca-cloud-push-apns-key`, `orca-cloud-push-apns-key-id`, `orca-cloud-push-apple-team-id`. Runtime SA: `orca-cloud-push@onorca-cloud.iam.gserviceaccount.com` (already has FCM admin + secret accessor). ## Desktop (`src/main`, `src/shared`) - Capability `NOTIFICATIONS_REMOTE_PUSH_RUNTIME_CAPABILITY = 'notifications.remote-push.v1'` in `src/shared/protocol-version.ts`, advertised statically. - RPC `notifications.registerPush` params `{ platform, token, apnsEnvironment?, filter }` (same shapes as the gateway `POST /v1/devices` minus deviceId, which comes from `ctx.pairedDeviceId`). Returns `{ registered: true, registrationId } | { registered: false, reason: 'gateway_unreachable' | 'gateway_rejected' | 'not_mobile' | 'registration_storage_failed' | 'throttled' }`. A device may register at most 10 times per minute (`throttled` beyond that, its earlier registration untouched): each call is a gateway write plus a synchronous registry write on the main thread, and a paired phone could otherwise loop it. The unregister RPC is not throttled, since with nothing registered it is a lookup and with something registered it can only run once per successful register. The params schema is strict, so a caller-supplied `deviceId` is an error, not a key silently dropped. Persists `pushRegistration: { registrationId, platform, filter, registeredAt }` on `DeviceEntry` in `device-registry.ts` (new optional field, tolerated by old registries). When the gateway accepted the token but the host could not store it — the device left mobile scope mid-call (`not_mobile`) or the registry write threw (`registration_storage_failed`) — the host queues the gateway delete in the unregister outbox rather than leaking a registration nothing will ever push to. Registration, unregister, and outbox deletes are serialized per device; re-registration first settles earlier cleanup. Authentication failure never drops a durable delete. Stale send responses only clear the exact local registration observed, while provider dead-token updates match the token/platform/environment that was sent. Phones must treat any `registered: false` as "retry later", so an unknown reason string is safe to add. - RPC `notifications.unregisterPush` params null → `{ unregistered: boolean }`. Removes the field and enqueues a gateway delete in a durable outbox (`src/main/runtime/push/push-unregister-outbox.ts`, modelled on `relay-revoke-outbox.ts`). Unpair/revoke (`revokeMobileDevice`) enqueues the same. The drain re-reads the queue as it goes, so a delete queued mid-drain lands in the same pass, and a pass that leaves retryable items schedules an unref'd backoff retry (30 s, doubling, capped at 10 min) instead of waiting for the next launch. - Both RPCs added to `runtime-rpc-mobile-method-allowlist.ts`. - Push client `src/main/runtime/push/push-gateway-client.ts`: challenge/proof/session with token cache, register, delete, send. Node `fetch`. Gateway URL from `profile-cloud-auth-config.ts` (`pushGatewayUrl`, default `https://push.onorca.dev`, env override `ORCA_PUSH_GATEWAY_URL`). - Host proof answering: new `src/main/runtime/push/push-host-proof.ts`, a copy of the relay's `answerRelayHostChallenge` with the push transcript fields. Shared code with the relay proof is welcome if it stays a pure refactor. - Dispatch hook: in `RuntimeMobileNotificationController.dispatch`, after the socket fan-out, call `pushDispatcher.enqueue(eventWithSeq)`. The dispatcher applies each device's `filter`, skips `dismiss` events, maps `agentState` to `needs-input | finished` (blocked/waiting → needs-input, else finished), batches matching registrationIds into `POST /v1/send` requests of at most 20 registrations each (the gateway's per-request cap; extra devices get their own request rather than being dropped), and drops unchanged registrations the gateway reports `dead`. Failure categories are counted without payload values and logged at most once per minute (with a final flush on shutdown). Fire-and-forget with one retry after 2 s per request; never throws into dispatch. - Add `agentState` to `MobileNotificationDispatchEvent` and set it in `src/main/ipc/notifications.ts` from `args.agentState`. Fix `buildAgentTaskCompleteNotificationOptions` so `working|running|busy` never yields "finished" (title says "working" and the dispatcher treats it as not-final, i.e. no push). - Headless serve: no renderer means no `notifications:dispatch`. Document in `docs/reference/headless-linux-server.md`; do not fix here. ## Mobile (`mobile/`) - Commit `google-services.json` (from `/tmp/orca-mobile-push/google-services.json`) at `mobile/` and set `"android": { "googleServicesFile": "./google-services.json" }` in `app.json`. Add `"expo-notifications"` to `plugins` so prebuild writes the `aps-environment` entitlement. - Token: `Notifications.getDevicePushTokenAsync()`; `data` is the APNs hex or FCM string. iOS `apnsEnvironment`: `__DEV__ ? 'sandbox' : 'production'` (dev-client builds are debug, TestFlight and App Store are release). Listen with `addPushTokenListener` and re-register on change. - Settings (`mobile/app/notifications.tsx`): single "Background notifications" switch, default off, hint text exactly: "Get alerts while Orca is closed. Alerts show the same text as on your desktop. That text, your phone's push token, and opaque host and device ids pass through Orca's push service and Apple or Google. Turning this off or unpairing deletes the token." Event controls live in the shared notification-preferences section and apply to both connected and background notifications. Hide the whole section, with copy "Update your desktop app to enable background notifications", when no paired host advertises `notifications.remote-push.v1`. - Registration: on switch-on (after OS permission), and on every host reaching `connected` while the switch is on, call `notifications.registerPush` on that host if it advertises the capability. On switch-off call `notifications.unregisterPush` on every connected host and remember to retry on hosts that were offline. On host removal, best-effort unregister before deleting credentials. - Receive: `addNotificationReceivedListener` (foreground) checks `data.orca.notificationId` + `notificationSeq` against the host session seen set in `notification-reconnect-catchup.ts`; if seen, suppress via `setNotificationHandler` returning no banner; otherwise show and mark seen. Background and killed: OS shows it. - Tap: `data.orca.hostFingerprint` → hostId by computing the same sha256/base64url/16 derivation over each stored host's `publicKeyB64`; then existing `getNotificationNavigationTarget` + `useOpenNotificationRoute`. - Reopen: existing replay catch-up runs unchanged. Dismiss events also `dismissNotificationAsync` any presented notification whose `data.orca.notificationId` matches. - Old host without the capability: nothing changes. ## Infra (`cloud/infra/terraform`, `.github/workflows`) - Cloud Run service `orca-cloud-push`, region `us-central1`, project from the environment tfvars, runtime SA `orca-cloud-push@.iam.gserviceaccount.com` (exists in prod; declare and import), the three secrets mounted as env (exist; declare and import), Cloud SQL connector to the shared instance with its own database `orca_push`, min instances 1, max 4, concurrency 80, ingress all, unauthenticated invoke. - IAM: `roles/firebasecloudmessaging.admin` and `roles/serviceusage.serviceUsageConsumer` on the runtime SA (exist in prod; declare and import). Secret accessor per secret. - Hostname `push.onorca.dev`. The DNS zone lives in the apps root in `stablyai/orca-cloud`; add the Cloud Run domain mapping here and leave a TODO comment naming the record the other repo must add. - Workflow `.github/workflows/cloud-push-deploy.yml`: gated on `vars.ORCA_CLOUD_OPERATIONS_ENABLED`, Workload Identity like `cloud-relay-*`, builds the image, deploys with `--no-traffic`, probes the new revision's `/ready` and a validate-only FCM send, then shifts 100% traffic. Uses `.github/actions/cloud-sql-rollout-lease` around the schema step. - Add the new root files to `cloud/dev/contracts` and `cloud/dev/fixtures` partitions so `terraform-root-partition.test.mjs` and `Cloud Verify` pass. ## Non-goals for this release Ack gate, generic-alert mode, staging gateway, iOS Notification Service Extension, Android data-only messages, Live Activities, account-based quota tiers, dismissal via silent push. ### Device delivery preferences The desktop advertises `notifications.delivery-preferences.v1`. Completion detection remains active when desktop notifications are off; semantic validity checks still precede delivery. IPC publishes `desktopAllowed: false` for terminal events disabled by the desktop master or source switch. Desktop focus and native authorization remain desktop-only delivery gates. `notifications.subscribe` and `notifications.getMissedSince` accept optional `includeDesktopSuppressed: true`. Only opted-in callers receive those events, including replay; legacy callers keep the old filtered stream. A new phone against an older host can narrow the available events but cannot recover events that host never published. The phone defaults to following each host. `filter.followDesktop` is optional: absent retains legacy desktop gating; explicit false permits independent event choices. The desktop persists it with the paired registration and evaluates it for every send, so desktop preference changes work while the phone is disconnected. This flag is host-local and is not sent to the gateway. The phone uses the same shared event predicate for socket/replay delivery as the push dispatcher. Optional `emittedAt` carries the event time for per-device five-second burst suppression after source filtering. Desktop eligibility, source, and agent state use separate upstream cooldown buckets so filtered events cannot suppress the next eligible event. Legacy RPC callers retain workspace-wide burst suppression on the host. `filter.sound` is also host-local. False groups that device's requests separately and adds optional `notification.sound: false` to gateway sends. The gateway omits APNs `aps.sound` and uses Android's `orca-desktop-silent` channel. Missing sound preserves existing audible delivery. Deploy the updated gateway before distributing hosts that send the optional sound field: older gateways strictly reject unknown notification fields. No token or database migration is needed. The phone's master switch disables background registration as well as local scheduling. Sound and viewing preferences belong to the receiving phone. The phone suppresses a banner for its currently viewed host/workspace only while active; it never assumes desktop focus means the phone is viewing that workspace. Changes to an offline host's persisted filter take effect on reconnection. No live APNs/FCM delivery is implied by simulator notification injection. For a phone registered for background push, socket notification delivery waits while the app is inactive. On foreground, it checks the native push tray before scheduling a local fallback, so a still-connected background socket cannot duplicate APNs/FCM delivery. Unsubscribing cancels the wait without claiming delivery. Hosts without push registration keep local delivery. Native notification readers accept Expo's iOS `request.trigger.payload` as well as `request.content.data`. APNs custom fields can exist only in the former; foreground deduplication, tray replay suppression, dismissal, and tap routing all use the same reader.