Files
orca/src/shared/remote-runtime-subscription-connect-bound.test.ts
Neil 2531dc9d5a fix(runtime): bound the connect phase against an unreachable host, at the transport (#20053)
* fix(runtime): bound the remote-runtime connect against an unreachable host

A host that is powered off or firewalled black-holes the TCP SYN, so the
remote-runtime WebSocket neither opens nor errors. The Node-side transports
set no connect bound, leaving the caller's whole-request timeout as the only
one: every `orca <cmd> --environment <unreachable>` sat silent for 60s before
failing with a generic `runtime_timeout`.

Measured on an unreachable paired host (win-lowspec, SYNs dropped): terminal
list / worktree list / repo list / status each took 60.19-60.26s; the same
command against a reachable host answered in 0.24s. So this was the shared
transport, not one command.

Pass `handshakeTimeout` at the three shared remote-runtime WebSocket
construction sites, which `ws` applies across TCP connect and the HTTP
upgrade. The value matches the bound the browser transport already used.

The failure keeps code `remote_runtime_unavailable` so the existing
transport-loss classification in terminal-process-inspection still applies,
and the message names the endpoint and stops at "unverifiable" — per
docs/reference/ssh-execution-boundary.md, loss of contact is never evidence
that the host's work stopped.

* fix(relay): bound the control socket's connect phase at the transport

The relay control socket was constructed with no `handshakeTimeout`, the same
gap fixed for the remote-runtime transports. It was not a live defect: the
class-level `connectDeadlineMs` (15s) also covers a stalled connect, and that
deadline does fire — its `unref()` is safe because the pending TCP connect is
itself a ref'd libuv handle that holds the event loop open. Measured in a bare
Node process: unref'd timer with an empty loop never fires (exit at 0ms), but
the same timer alongside a black-holed connect fired at 2003ms.

It was a defect waiting on a refactor. The two bounds cover different phases,
and the class deadline covers the connect phase only incidentally.

DO NOT REMOVE EITHER BOUND AS REDUNDANT. They are not. Proven by mutation:

- Remove the transport bound -> a stalled *connect* falls through to the class
  deadline, rejecting with `relay_control_connect_timeout` after the full
  deadline instead of the transport error.
- Remove the class deadline -> a stall during the *proving* phase (socket open,
  host proof never answered) is unbounded; the incumbent test hangs 30s.
  `handshakeTimeout` cannot see that phase at all.

Reuses `remoteRuntimeConnectOptions` rather than forking a second helper, and
moves the construction into `relay-control-socket-factory.ts` so a caller that
needs a relay control socket gets the bound instead of re-deriving an unbounded
one. `handshakeTimeoutMs` is settable apart from `connectDeadlineMs` so a test
can stall the connect alone and assert which bound produced the rejection —
error identity, not elapsed time.

The connect-bound ratchet now covers the relay site and asserts the site still
resolves, so an allowlist that silently stopped matching cannot pass vacuously.

* fix(lint): carry SAFETY rationales for the connect-bound casts

main tightened typescript/consistent-type-assertions to assertionStyle:
never, which the rebase brings onto these added lines. Dropping the
generic default is not typeable, so each cast keeps its own rationale.

* fix(runtime): keep the bounded connect failure inside both message gates

The connect bound's new wording dropped out of the two gates that classify
remote-transport failures by message text, and those gates are the only ones
that run on the path the bound made reachable.

`subscribeRemoteRuntimeTransport` reports a connect failure by *rejecting* the
subscribe promise, and that rejection crosses `ipcMain.handle`, which keeps only
the message. The renderer then classifies it with `RECOVERABLE_MESSAGE_FRAGMENTS`.
`Could not reach the remote Orca runtime at …` matched no fragment, so it read as
fatal: `recovery.cancel()` and a red banner instead of a retry. Before the bound
existed this case reached the 15s subscription-start timer, whose message did
match a fragment, so introducing a 12s bound turned an auto-recovering pane into
a dead-ended one — the #12650 shape.

The same wording also fell outside `REMOTE_RUNTIME_UNREACHABLE_RE`, so the
Tailscale remedy was dropped for precisely the unreachable-host failure it
exists for.

Keep the canonical phrase both gates already recognise rather than teaching each
gate a second synonym for one condition, and pin it: the phrase is now a named
constant, the corpus in `remote-runtime-transport-error-agreement.test.ts` grows
the coded, hinted and code-stripped producers derived from the real helper, and
a new subscribe-path test proves the connect bound (not the start timer) is what
fires and that its message still classifies as recoverable once the code is
gone. Verdict wording is unchanged: `unverifiable`, never a synonym for exited.

Also states the bound in seconds, corrects the module comment (`handshakeTimeout`
is a socket inactivity timer, so a slow-but-answering host is not cut off), and
splits the subscription contract types out to stay under `max-lines`.

* fix(relay): drop the duplicate connect bound on the control socket

The claim that `connectDeadlineMs` cannot see a black-holed connect is false.
`RelayControlClient.connect()` constructs the socket and arms `connectTimer` in
the same synchronous call — `new WebSocket()` never blocks — and `expireConnect`
fires from `opening` as well as `proving`. The class deadline was already a
strict superset of a transport `handshakeTimeout` on that socket.

It was also inert. Production passes neither option, so the transport bound was
derived from `connectDeadlineMs` and both timers were 15_000, armed in the same
tick; the ws timer is an inactivity timer armed on the later `socket` event, so
it could not win. Its only reachable effect was changing which string a stalled
relay connect rejects with, and it narrowed an existing test's 20ms deadline
into a handshake bound it could race.

So this removes the factory, the test-only `handshakeTimeoutMs` option and the
source-grep test whose premise was wrong, and replaces them with a test that
holds the real ground: a connect whose upgrade is never answered expires on the
class deadline. Moving the timer arm after `open`, or narrowing `expireConnect`
to `proving`, both turn it red — which is what a future reader needs before
concluding the phase is uncovered and adding a second bound again.

No behaviour change for a reachable relay, and none for the verdict: a stalled
connect still rejects and still reaches `unverifiable`, never `exited`.

* fix(runtime): stop the endpoint in the failure message from undoing the fix

Putting the endpoint into the message created three problems the message itself
caused.

The Tailscale hint is idempotent by testing whether "tailscale" already appears
anywhere in the message. That held while the message was fixed copy. Now a host
called `tailscale-box` puts the word there itself, and the hint — the only
actionable remedy on an unreachable host — is suppressed for it. Key the guard
on the two hints instead of the word.

The endpoint comes from a pasted pairing code, which is only length-capped;
`normalizePairingUrl` rejects userinfo but nothing re-validates a stored offer.
Render scheme, host and port only, so a pasted `wss://user:secret@host` cannot
reach a surface the user reads.

And drop the elapsed time from the wording. `handshakeTimeout` is a socket
inactivity timer, so a `wss://` host that completes TCP and then goes silent
re-arms it once and fails at about twice the bound; measured at 2008ms against a
1000ms bound. "within 12s" would have been wrong there, and the endpoint is the
actionable part regardless.

Also refuse a non-positive or non-finite bound: `ws` and `net` both gate on a
truthy timeout, so `0` left the connect completely unbounded while still
satisfying the connect-bound ratchet.

* fix(runtime): keep the endpoint from smuggling a verdict into the message

`isRemoteTerminalGoneMessage` in the pty transport substring-matches
`terminal_gone` / `terminal_exited` / `no_connected_pty`, and it runs before the
recoverable-connection gate: a match retires the pane's terminal id and cancels
recovery. WHATWG URL accepts `_` in a special-scheme host, so once the failure
message carried the endpoint, `ws://terminal_gone.example:6768` turned loss of
contact into a terminal-gone verdict — the one conclusion
`docs/reference/ssh-execution-boundary.md` forbids.

Render the host only when it matches a hostname or IP-literal grammar that
cannot carry such a token, and fall back to naming no endpoint at all. A
well-formed host, including a bracketed IPv6 literal, is still shown.

* docs(runtime): say why this connect bound is not the relay's removed duplicate
2026-09-16 22:23:03 -07:00

98 lines
3.9 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* The subscribe path is the one that regressed: its connect failure rejects the subscribe
* promise rather than reaching `onError`, and that rejection crosses `ipcMain.handle`, which
* keeps only the message. So this file pins two things together — that the connect bound, not
* the subscription-start timer, is what fires against a silent host, and that the message it
* produces still classifies as recoverable once the code is gone. Split them and a future
* rewording passes both halves while dead-ending the terminal pane.
*/
import { createServer, type Server, type Socket } from 'node:net'
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
import { generateKeyPair, publicKeyToBase64 } from './e2ee-crypto'
import { RemoteRuntimeClientError } from './remote-runtime-client-error'
import {
isRecoverableRemoteRuntimeConnectionError,
toRemoteRuntimeClientErrorLike
} from './remote-runtime-client-error-classification'
import { subscribeRemoteRuntimeTransport } from './remote-runtime-subscription-transport'
import { withRemoteRuntimeTailscaleHint } from './remote-runtime-tailscale-hint'
const servers = new Set<Server>()
const sockets = new Set<Socket>()
afterEach(async () => {
for (const socket of sockets) {
socket.destroy()
}
sockets.clear()
await Promise.all(
[...servers].map(
(server) =>
new Promise<void>((resolve) => {
server.close(() => resolve())
})
)
)
servers.clear()
})
/** Accepts TCP but never answers the upgrade — the same silence a black-holed host produces. */
async function listenSilentUpgradeServer(): Promise<string> {
const server = createServer((socket) => {
sockets.add(socket)
socket.once('close', () => sockets.delete(socket))
})
servers.add(server)
await new Promise<void>((resolve) => server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', resolve))
const address = server.address()
if (address === null || typeof address === 'string') {
throw new Error('expected a TCP address')
}
return `ws://127.0.0.1:${address.port}`
}
describe('remote runtime subscription connect bound', () => {
it('fails an unanswered subscribe on the connect bound, with a message that survives the code strip', async () => {
const endpoint = await listenSilentUpgradeServer()
const keyPair = generateKeyPair()
const rejection = await subscribeRemoteRuntimeTransport(
{
v: 2,
endpoint,
deviceToken: 'device-token',
publicKeyB64: publicKeyToBase64(keyPair.publicKey)
},
'terminal.multiplex',
{},
// Why: comfortably longer than the connect bound, reproducing production's
// 12s < 15s ordering. If the bound stops firing, the start timer wins and
// the code/message assertions below change.
2_000,
{ onResponse: vi.fn(), onError: vi.fn(), onClose: vi.fn() },
{ connectTimeoutMs: 150 }
).then(
() => null,
(reason: unknown) => reason
)
expect(rejection).toBeInstanceOf(RemoteRuntimeClientError)
// oxlint-disable-next-line typescript/consistent-type-assertions -- SAFETY: re-proved by the assertion above.
const error = rejection as RemoteRuntimeClientError
// The connect bound, not the subscription-start timer.
expect(error.code).toBe('remote_runtime_unavailable')
expect(error.code).not.toBe('runtime_timeout')
expect(error.message).toContain(endpoint)
// Loss of contact is never evidence the host's work stopped.
expect(error.message).toContain('unverifiable')
expect(error.message).not.toMatch(/\b(exited|gone|stopped|empty|no terminals)\b/i)
// What the renderer actually sees: ipcMain.handle forwards the message only.
const stripped = toRemoteRuntimeClientErrorLike(new Error(error.message))
expect(stripped.code).toBeUndefined()
expect(isRecoverableRemoteRuntimeConnectionError(stripped)).toBe(true)
expect(withRemoteRuntimeTailscaleHint(error.message, endpoint)).not.toBe(error.message)
})
})