* ci(windows): require a trusted signature on every shipped Windows binary
The release gate checked only the binaries it had sent for signing plus a
fixed list. A Windows binary that skipped signing or arrived after staging
could ship unsigned, and Smart App Control machines refuse to load it; that
is how unsigned dev-channel builds lost their terminals on a test machine.
Release cuts now also check every .exe/.dll/.node in the shipped installer
payload (minus the non-Windows server-template binaries) for a valid
SignPath or Microsoft signature and fail with the offender list. Dev-channel
builds run the same check in advisory mode and never fail.
* ci(windows): match signers by CN and harden the payload signature gate
- Match our signer on its exact CN and Microsoft vendors on CN+O instead of
the full subject, so a certificate renewal that moves address fields
cannot block a cut; quoted, escaped and repeated attributes cannot spoof it.
- Say how to allow a vendor when the gate fails: release staging skips any
validly signed file, so a new vendor must be added to VENDOR_IDENTITIES.
- Reset LASTEXITCODE after the check so the fail-open path really warns,
and put the script's stderr into the evidence verdict when it cannot run.
- Force UTF-8 PowerShell output and time the signature read out after
10 minutes (reported as could-not-run).
- The pass message counts only the checked binaries and no longer claims
they are all SignPath-signed.