Files
orca/src/main/plugins/plugin-kill-list-service.test.ts
T
NeilandOrca 5c59c84c7a fix(plugins): close four trust-boundary holes in the plugin system (#11232)
* fix(plugins): close trust-boundary holes in the plugin system

Move five security decisions to their chokepoints rather than leaving them
enumerated at individual call sites.

- Kill-list revocation reaches content packs: PluginContentPackRegistry now
  takes an isKilled predicate and intersects it with any caller-supplied
  approval, so a killed plugin's VM recipes can no longer reach
  spawn(..., { shell: true }) through either reconcile() call site.
- Bound kill-list generatedAt to a 24h future skew at the parse chokepoint.
  A far-future timestamp previously made every genuine later list look
  "older" and disabled revocation permanently, persisted across restarts.
- Protect the whole auto.components.settings.Plugin* translation subtree
  instead of an enumerated prefix list, so language packs cannot forge the
  consent provenance badge or rewrite install-error security copy.
- Resolve manifest panel icons by own-key only; "constructor"/"__proto__"
  previously yielded non-component prototype members that crashed the
  right sidebar to its error boundary.
- Give panel liveness frames a reserved control budget so a panel that
  saturates its action budget can still answer the watchdog.

Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>

* fix(plugins): keep the kill-list future bound off the cache read path

The schema-level generatedAt bound re-judged the on-disk cache against the
device clock at every launch, so a client whose clock ran behind the last
genuine publication discarded its whole cached kill list and started with
zero revocations. Move the bound to the two fetch chokepoints instead.

Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>

* fix(plugins): remove the reserved-lane starvation window and the revocation TOCTOU

Review follow-ups on the trust-boundary fixes:

- The reserved liveness lane had a per-window count equal to the ping
  interval, so a panel's own pong-shaped traffic could spend it and drop
  the next genuine reply — reintroducing the starvation the lane exists to
  prevent. The lane is now size-bounded only; rate stays bounded because
  every pong is also charged to the data budget.
- Only schema-valid pongs take the lane now, so near-miss pong-shaped junk
  cannot drain it. readPanelPongId replaces the zod parse on this
  guest-controlled path (a rejected safeParse allocates an issue list, ~90x
  the accepted-path cost) and is pinned to the schema by a parity test.
- Re-read the kill list inside approveAtomically: approvedKeys is snapshotted
  before an awaited verification phase, so a plugin killed during that wait
  could still publish VM recipes and language packs.
- Assert the curated icon resolves to FileText; the old equality also passed
  when both sides fell back to Plug.

Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>

* fix(plugins): match zod's safe-integer bound in the pong reader

readPanelPongId used Number.isInteger, but zod's .int() rejects anything
above 2**53-1, so pingIds like 1e100 took the reserved lane the schema
would have refused. The parity test never probed that boundary.

Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
2026-07-28 17:49:20 -07:00

159 lines
6.0 KiB
TypeScript

import { mkdtemp, rm } from 'node:fs/promises'
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
import { join } from 'node:path'
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
import type { PluginKillList } from '../../shared/plugins/plugin-kill-list'
import { fetchPluginKillList, PluginKillListService } from './plugin-kill-list-service'
import type { PluginKillListStore } from './plugin-kill-list-store'
const roots: string[] = []
async function tempRoot(): Promise<string> {
const root = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), 'orca-plugin-kill-list-'))
roots.push(root)
return root
}
function killList(date = '2026-07-12T20:00:00Z'): PluginKillList {
return {
version: 1,
generatedAt: date,
plugins: [{ pluginKey: 'community.unsafe', reason: 'Malware advisory' }]
}
}
afterEach(async () => {
vi.useRealTimers()
await Promise.all(roots.splice(0).map((root) => rm(root, { recursive: true, force: true })))
})
describe('PluginKillListService', () => {
it('loads cached revocations before any network refresh', async () => {
const root = await tempRoot()
const first = new PluginKillListService({
pluginsDataDir: root,
fetcher: async () => killList()
})
await first.refresh()
const fetcher = vi.fn(async () => killList())
const restarted = new PluginKillListService({ pluginsDataDir: root, fetcher })
await restarted.initialize()
expect(restarted.reason('community.unsafe')).toBe('Malware advisory')
expect(fetcher).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
})
it('publishes valid refreshes and notifies runtime reconciliation', async () => {
const service = new PluginKillListService({
pluginsDataDir: await tempRoot(),
fetcher: async () => killList()
})
const changed = vi.fn()
service.onChanged(changed)
await service.refresh()
expect(service.find('community.unsafe')).toMatchObject({ reason: 'Malware advisory' })
expect(changed).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
})
it('starts with no revocations after a corrupt cache and accepts a valid refresh', async () => {
const store = {
read: vi.fn().mockRejectedValue(new Error('invalid JSON')),
write: vi.fn().mockResolvedValue(undefined)
} as unknown as PluginKillListStore
const warning = vi.spyOn(console, 'warn').mockImplementation(() => undefined)
const service = new PluginKillListService({
pluginsDataDir: await tempRoot(),
store,
fetcher: async () => killList()
})
await expect(service.initialize()).resolves.toBeUndefined()
expect(service.snapshot()).toBeNull()
await expect(service.refresh()).resolves.toEqual(killList())
expect(service.reason('community.unsafe')).toBe('Malware advisory')
expect(warning).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
'[plugins] ignoring invalid cached plugin safety list:',
expect.any(Error)
)
})
it('keeps accepting genuine lists after a far-future snapshot is published', async () => {
const root = await tempRoot()
const fetcher = vi
.fn<() => Promise<PluginKillList>>()
.mockResolvedValueOnce(killList('9999-12-31T23:59:59Z'))
.mockResolvedValueOnce(killList('2026-07-12T20:00:00Z'))
const service = new PluginKillListService({ pluginsDataDir: root, fetcher })
await expect(service.refresh()).rejects.toThrow()
await expect(service.refresh()).resolves.toMatchObject({
generatedAt: '2026-07-12T20:00:00Z'
})
expect(service.reason('community.unsafe')).toBe('Malware advisory')
// The poisoned snapshot must not have been cached for the next launch.
const restarted = new PluginKillListService({ pluginsDataDir: root, fetcher })
await restarted.initialize()
expect(restarted.snapshot()?.generatedAt).toBe('2026-07-12T20:00:00Z')
})
it('keeps cached revocations live when the device clock runs far behind', async () => {
const root = await tempRoot()
const generatedAt = new Date().toISOString()
const published = new PluginKillListService({
pluginsDataDir: root,
fetcher: async () => killList(generatedAt)
})
await published.refresh()
// A dead RTC / restored VM snapshot must not re-judge an already-accepted
// cache against the wrong clock and silently un-revoke a killed plugin.
vi.useFakeTimers()
vi.setSystemTime(new Date(Date.parse(generatedAt) - 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000))
const restarted = new PluginKillListService({
pluginsDataDir: root,
fetcher: async () => killList(generatedAt)
})
await restarted.initialize()
expect(restarted.snapshot()?.generatedAt).toBe(generatedAt)
expect(restarted.reason('community.unsafe')).toBe('Malware advisory')
// A refresh the skewed clock cannot vouch for is refused, but refusing it
// must never downgrade the revocations already in force.
await expect(restarted.refresh()).rejects.toThrow()
expect(restarted.reason('community.unsafe')).toBe('Malware advisory')
})
it('rejects a replayed older snapshot without replacing cached revocations', async () => {
const fetcher = vi
.fn<() => Promise<PluginKillList>>()
.mockResolvedValueOnce(killList('2026-07-12T20:00:00Z'))
.mockResolvedValueOnce(killList('2026-07-11T20:00:00Z'))
const service = new PluginKillListService({ pluginsDataDir: await tempRoot(), fetcher })
await service.refresh()
await expect(service.refresh()).rejects.toThrow('older snapshot')
expect(service.snapshot()?.generatedAt).toBe('2026-07-12T20:00:00Z')
})
})
describe('fetchPluginKillList', () => {
it('validates a bounded HTTPS response body', async () => {
const fetcher = vi.fn<typeof fetch>().mockResolvedValue(
new Response(JSON.stringify(killList()), {
status: 200,
headers: { 'content-type': 'application/json' }
})
)
await expect(fetchPluginKillList(fetcher)).resolves.toEqual(killList())
})
it('rejects non-success responses', async () => {
const fetcher = vi.fn<typeof fetch>().mockResolvedValue(new Response('no', { status: 503 }))
await expect(fetchPluginKillList(fetcher)).rejects.toThrow('HTTP 503')
})
})