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Neil
8be1696629
Three things the reviews changed, kept visible rather than quietly edited out. THREAT MODEL WAS WRONG IN THREE PLACES. Jump hosts are not the worst case — they are already safe: shouldUseSystemSshTransport branches on exactly the inputs resolveEffectiveProxy does, and attemptConnect returns after the system probe, so ProxyJump goes through OpenSSH and is verified. Agent forwarding was overstated (gated on the user's ForwardAgent). Credential theft was understated: any auth error counts as agent fallback, so a MITM walks the user to the password AND private-key passphrase prompts, and cachedPassword replays without prompting. The relay claim was backwards — the attacker owns their own machine; the real impact is the return direction, where they become the host our workspace trusts. TYPE SCOPING IS A DOWNGRADE VECTOR WITHOUT ALGORITHM ORDERING. This was the decision I flagged as least certain and asked to have argued both ways. OpenSSH is safe only because order_hostkeyalgs() puts known types first and RFC 4253 gives the client's order priority. ssh2 negotiates ed25519 first regardless, so an attacker who cannot forge the RSA key on file just presents ed25519 and gets a friendly first-contact prompt instead of a hard failure. Keep scoping, but set algorithms.serverHostKey to lead with the types on file — and add a sixth outcome for 'unknown type, known host', which must never read as first contact. SHIP THE DEFENCE BEFORE THE DIALOG. Startup restore fires eager connects for all targets in parallel with a 15s timeout while a prompt would live 120s; ephemeral VM targets present a new key every launch; paired-web connects run on the host desktop, so the dialog opens on someone else's screen. Phase 1 is therefore no modal at all: consult known_hosts and our store, match connects, unknown persists with accept-new semantics, mismatch and revoked hard-fail. That is the whole MITM defence with none of the migration risk. Also folded in, verified live against OpenSSH 10.2p1: the without-port fallback (bracketed lookup first, then bare, where the second pass can only yield match or unknown — otherwise a bare line plus a non-default port produces a spurious prompt); hashed entries hash the candidate form; multiple files union; a cert-authority line does not match a plain key. IPv6 and bracket parsing moved INTO scope — that is a parser requirement, not a scope call, and getting it wrong produces the prompt-training harm the design exists to avoid.