Files
orca/src/shared/plugins/plugin-kill-list.ts
T
NeilandOrca 5c59c84c7a fix(plugins): close four trust-boundary holes in the plugin system (#11232)
* fix(plugins): close trust-boundary holes in the plugin system

Move five security decisions to their chokepoints rather than leaving them
enumerated at individual call sites.

- Kill-list revocation reaches content packs: PluginContentPackRegistry now
  takes an isKilled predicate and intersects it with any caller-supplied
  approval, so a killed plugin's VM recipes can no longer reach
  spawn(..., { shell: true }) through either reconcile() call site.
- Bound kill-list generatedAt to a 24h future skew at the parse chokepoint.
  A far-future timestamp previously made every genuine later list look
  "older" and disabled revocation permanently, persisted across restarts.
- Protect the whole auto.components.settings.Plugin* translation subtree
  instead of an enumerated prefix list, so language packs cannot forge the
  consent provenance badge or rewrite install-error security copy.
- Resolve manifest panel icons by own-key only; "constructor"/"__proto__"
  previously yielded non-component prototype members that crashed the
  right sidebar to its error boundary.
- Give panel liveness frames a reserved control budget so a panel that
  saturates its action budget can still answer the watchdog.

Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>

* fix(plugins): keep the kill-list future bound off the cache read path

The schema-level generatedAt bound re-judged the on-disk cache against the
device clock at every launch, so a client whose clock ran behind the last
genuine publication discarded its whole cached kill list and started with
zero revocations. Move the bound to the two fetch chokepoints instead.

Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>

* fix(plugins): remove the reserved-lane starvation window and the revocation TOCTOU

Review follow-ups on the trust-boundary fixes:

- The reserved liveness lane had a per-window count equal to the ping
  interval, so a panel's own pong-shaped traffic could spend it and drop
  the next genuine reply — reintroducing the starvation the lane exists to
  prevent. The lane is now size-bounded only; rate stays bounded because
  every pong is also charged to the data budget.
- Only schema-valid pongs take the lane now, so near-miss pong-shaped junk
  cannot drain it. readPanelPongId replaces the zod parse on this
  guest-controlled path (a rejected safeParse allocates an issue list, ~90x
  the accepted-path cost) and is pinned to the schema by a parity test.
- Re-read the kill list inside approveAtomically: approvedKeys is snapshotted
  before an awaited verification phase, so a plugin killed during that wait
  could still publish VM recipes and language packs.
- Assert the curated icon resolves to FileText; the old equality also passed
  when both sides fell back to Plug.

Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>

* fix(plugins): match zod's safe-integer bound in the pong reader

readPanelPongId used Number.isInteger, but zod's .int() rejects anything
above 2**53-1, so pingIds like 1e100 took the reserved lane the schema
would have refused. The parity test never probed that boundary.

Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
2026-07-28 17:49:20 -07:00

64 lines
2.3 KiB
TypeScript

import { z } from 'zod'
import { isQualifiedPluginKey } from './plugin-manifest'
export const PLUGIN_KILL_LIST_ENTRY_LIMIT = 4_096
/** Publisher clocks and client clocks disagree by minutes, never by days. */
export const PLUGIN_KILL_LIST_FUTURE_SKEW_MS = 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000
const advisoryUrlSchema = z
.string()
.url()
.max(2_048)
.refine((value) => new URL(value).protocol === 'https:', 'advisory URL must use HTTPS')
export const pluginKillListEntrySchema = z.strictObject({
pluginKey: z.string().refine(isQualifiedPluginKey, 'invalid qualified plugin key'),
reason: z.string().min(1).max(1_024),
advisoryUrl: advisoryUrlSchema.optional()
})
export const pluginKillListSchema = z
.strictObject({
version: z.literal(1),
generatedAt: z.string().datetime({ offset: true }),
plugins: z.array(pluginKillListEntrySchema).max(PLUGIN_KILL_LIST_ENTRY_LIMIT)
})
.superRefine((killList, context) => {
const seen = new Set<string>()
for (const [index, plugin] of killList.plugins.entries()) {
if (seen.has(plugin.pluginKey)) {
context.addIssue({
code: z.ZodIssueCode.custom,
path: ['plugins', index, 'pluginKey'],
message: `duplicate killed plugin: ${plugin.pluginKey}`
})
}
seen.add(plugin.pluginKey)
}
})
export type PluginKillList = z.infer<typeof pluginKillListSchema>
export type PluginKillListEntry = z.infer<typeof pluginKillListEntrySchema>
/** A far-future generatedAt makes every genuine later list look "older" and
* disables revocation permanently. Checked only on freshly fetched snapshots:
* a cached list was already accepted once, and re-judging it against the
* device clock would drop live revocations whenever that clock runs slow. */
export function isPluginKillListTooFarInFuture(
killList: PluginKillList,
now = Date.now()
): boolean {
return Date.parse(killList.generatedAt) > now + PLUGIN_KILL_LIST_FUTURE_SKEW_MS
}
export function killedPluginKeys(killList: PluginKillList): ReadonlySet<string> {
return new Set(killList.plugins.map((plugin) => plugin.pluginKey))
}
export function findKilledPlugin(
killList: PluginKillList,
pluginKey: string
): PluginKillListEntry | null {
return killList.plugins.find((plugin) => plugin.pluginKey === pluginKey) ?? null
}