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JinjingandOrca
6fbb6f300e
Three independent connection killers found in the SSH/remote freeze audit. FINDING A - the reconnect ladder never escalated for post-handshake drops. scheduleReconnect() used the single published state.reconnectAttempt for both the delay index and the give-up test, and runReconnectAttempt() zeroed it before connecting (ssh.ts gates the relay redeploy on 0-at-connected). Every post-handshake drop therefore re-entered at 1000ms forever, ~3600 relay redeploys/hour, and 'reconnection-failed' was unreachable for a flapping host. New SshReconnectLadder splits the delay index (advanced by every retry) from the failure streak (advanced only by a failed handshake), so flaps back off while give-up semantics stay byte-identical to shipped. FINDING B - notify() closed the client whenever a frame exceeded the producer frame capacity, conflating a permanently un-sendable frame with transient backpressure. A 5000-event fs.changed is 425KB against a 49KB cap, so the watcher flood killed the link and re-killed on every reattach+replay. notify() now drops and logs once per generation; fs.changed is chunked to each sink's capacity with a control-lane overflow marker as the resync fallback; agent-hook envelopes shed lastAssistantMessage/interactivePrompt/subagents to fit. FINDING B2 - sendResponse routed >1MB responses to a lane whose admission ignores the frame cap and closed the client on rejection, so a large fs.listFiles dropped the SSH host. It now substitutes a JSON-RPC error so the request fails instead of the connection. Also moves fs.streamEnd/fs.streamError to the control lane so a terminal frame cannot be dropped by the producer-lane check. Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>