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2584ed906e
Play workspace video and music files on mobile using bounded authenticated downloads and native media controls. Adversarial review fixes cover rewritten files and Android policy tests. Includes iOS simulator screenshots and a playback recording in PR #26148. Co-authored-by: ChangJun Park <40492343+ckdwns9121@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Lirone Levy <lirone88@outlook.fr> Co-authored-by: dupi <david.li.du@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: John Cusack <5961784+John-Cusack@users.noreply.github.com>
54 lines
3.2 KiB
Swift
54 lines
3.2 KiB
Swift
enum MobileWebShellCsp {
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/// Sent as a response header on the document and nowhere else: a served document must never
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/// carry its own policy, so there is no meta tag to find and no bundle change that can relax it.
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static let header = [
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"default-src 'none'",
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"script-src 'self'",
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// React Native Web 0.21.2 injects its stylesheet at runtime with no nonce support, so the
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// Phase C page cannot paint under 'self' alone (measured: the render check under this exact
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// header). This relaxes styling only; script-src 'self' is untouched.
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"style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'",
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// `data:` because a file preview has no other shape: the desktop answers a base64 body and the
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// page composes `data:<mime>;base64,<content>` for React Native Web's Image. `https:` for the
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// remote images the page already tries to render and cannot: an agent's favicon, which is a
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// fixed `google.com/s2/favicons` URL; a project's icon, which is a favicon, an avatar or an
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// upload the host names; and whatever an artifact names inside the sealed HTML preview frame,
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// which inherits this policy because a `srcdoc` frame has no URL of its own.
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//
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// Not markdown, not the rich editor and not a review comment's avatar, whatever a later reader
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// assumes from ruling 26: markdown paints `` as a tappable link, the editor is still a
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// plain source field, and the avatar is skipped under `Platform.OS !== 'web'` by a card that
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// pins the skip in a test. All three are anticipated surfaces, and C7.10 is where they become
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// real ones.
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//
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// The bound is the destination, not the provenance. CSP matches both as schemes, so this admits
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// any image URL of either and cannot tell one the page composed from one it was handed; for
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// `data:` the mime type and the body are both the host's, and the page only checks the mime
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// type is a non-empty string. What holds is that the URL is never fetched as anything but an
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// image: img-src is the only directive admitting them, an image fetch executes nothing (an SVG
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// inside an <img> runs no script), and script-src 'self', connect-src 'self' and object-src
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// 'none' are untouched. What `https:` adds is a request whose target the rendered content
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// chose, so a document can learn it was opened; the shell's Referrer-Policy header keeps the
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// session id out.
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//
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// `http:` stays out: it reaches no image TLS cannot serve, and a cleartext image is readable
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// and replaceable in flight by anything on the path.
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"img-src 'self' data: https:",
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"font-src 'none'",
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// The origin is one read-only directory behind the manifest map, so 'self' reaches nothing the
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// page cannot already read, and the bootstrap page reads ./manifest.json through it. This is
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// the fence for fetch and XMLHttpRequest; the document-start script covers only the two things
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// the native layer cannot see.
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"connect-src 'self'",
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// Media previews play bytes downloaded through authenticated RPC, never a network URL.
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"media-src blob:",
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"object-src 'none'",
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"frame-src 'none'",
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"child-src 'none'",
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"worker-src 'none'",
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"base-uri 'none'",
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"form-action 'none'",
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"frame-ancestors 'none'"
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].joined(separator: "; ")
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}
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