NeilandClaude
8da0ca52e7
* perf(relay): release rejected first-frame connections [trade-off] * fix(relay): bound the director's rejected and redirected first-frame closes too The parent PR routed four cell-side first-frame rejections through closeRelayWebSocket but left two raw socket.close() calls in the same handler. A real-socket probe shows both still pin a connection unit for ws's full 30s close timer when the peer ignores the close frame: - 'invalid invite' is reachable by an unauthenticated peer with a well-formed but bogus credential, so the exhaustion the parent PR claims to prevent stayed reachable on the director; - 'connect to assigned cell' is the happy path for every phone's first director contact, so it is the highest-volume unbounded close here. closeWithDrain gets the same treatment; host-session-registry already closes the identical drain through the helper. Also records that the bounded close is not a user-facing trade-off: the close frame is written before the force-close timer can fire and TCP delivers it ahead of the FIN, so an abandoned peer still reads code and reason over a graceful close. The new regression asserts that, plus exactly-once release across concurrent bursts and rejection racing the peer's own disconnect (the ledger does not clamp at zero, so a double release would surface as a negative count). * refactor(relay): drop the unused closeWithDrain helper `closeWithDrain` has no callers anywhere in the repo, and its `graceMs` parameter promised a caller-supplied drain window that the body no longer honours: routing it through `closeRelayWebSocket` force-terminates after 1s regardless, so a future caller passing `graceMs: 30_000` would have had its drain silently cut short while the signature still claimed otherwise. The real drain path is `host-session-registry`, which sends the same `resolve-director` drain and closes it there. Delete the dead duplicate rather than bound a helper whose contract says "graceful". Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(relay): call the bounded close's rejection delivery best effort, not guaranteed The helper claimed the forced terminate costs an abandoned peer nothing it can observe, and the test presented its fast-peer assertion as proof. Neither holds in general: `ws` writes the close frame to the socket and `terminate()` destroys that socket a second later, so under backpressure the frame — and any `relay-moved` message queued ahead of it — can go unsent even to a peer that never stopped reading. Qualifies both comments to describe delivery as best effort and name the backpressure case. The fast-peer assertion is valid and stays exactly as it was; only its stated scope narrows, and the test is renamed to say which peer it speaks for. What the bound actually buys — a stalled peer cannot hold admission — is now stated on its own rather than resting on a delivery claim. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Orca Relay
The relay that connects the Orca mobile app to a desktop host. Phones and desktops never talk to each other directly: each opens an outbound WebSocket to a relay cell, the relay pairs the two sessions, and it splices frames between them. A director assigns hosts to cells and coordinates migrations; cells carry the user connections.
This directory is an independent pnpm workspace inside the Orca monorepo. Run
its commands from cloud/, not the repository root. The source is covered by
the repository's root MIT license.
Packages
packages/relay-contract: the wire contract shared by the relay, the desktop app, and the mobile app (frame shapes, close codes, admission budgets, splice state machine).apps/relay: the relay server. The same image runs as a director or a cell depending onORCA_RELAY_ROLE.apps/relay-fence-broker: a private, IAM-only service that owns the durable mutation lease, the Terraform checkout, and the narrow Compute mutation used when a registered target is superseded. The workflow that calls it holds read and invoke rights only, never those mutation permissions.apps/relay-ops: the relay operations console and the incident monitor behindpnpm ops:relay,pnpm incident:relay, andpnpm incident:relay-preflight.apps/pushandpackages/push-contract: the mobile push gateway that holds the APNs key and sends to phones through APNs and FCM, and its wire contract. It is deployed and operated from here but is not part of the relay data path; see docs/push-gateway.md.
Mobile push gateway
apps/push is a separate Cloud Run service from the relay. Phones never hold an
Orca credential for it: the desktop host authenticates with the same X25519
key it uses for the relay, answering an encrypted challenge to mint a 24 hour
session, then registers each paired phone's native push token and asks the
gateway to push. The gateway queues each event as its own notification,
enforces per-host quotas and request limits, and retires a
registration as soon as Apple or Google reports the token unregistered.
Provider push is the only ordinary mobile OS-banner path. The notification
socket is retained only for live dismissal and reconnect tray reconciliation;
it never creates or recovers banners. Desktop notification categories remain
authoritative.
Each delivery is persisted as one notification event. Before deploying an
incompatible queue format, stop all older push gateway revisions and clear only
unpublished push delivery fixtures; no queue preservation or migration is required.
FCM notification messages are inherently collapsible while offline and have a
small concurrent collapse-key budget, so every pending alert is not guaranteed.
Storage follows the relay pattern: PostgreSQL in production, SQLite for tests
and local development. Configure it with ORCA_PUSH_PUBLIC_URL, ORCA_PUSH_FCM_PROJECT_ID,
ORCA_PUSH_DATABASE_URL, the three APNs variables (ORCA_PUSH_APNS_KEY,
ORCA_PUSH_APNS_KEY_ID, ORCA_PUSH_APPLE_TEAM_ID, all three or none), and
optionally ORCA_PUSH_APNS_TOPIC. The FCM credential comes from
the runtime service account, so no key material is configured for Android. See
push gateway operations for deployment and recovery.
Logging is aggregate counters only. Tokens, notification titles, notification bodies, and full host fingerprints never reach a log line.
Infrastructure and operations
infra/terraform: the relay Terraform root. It owns the cells, the director, the shared Cloud SQL instance, DNS, observability, and every GitHub Workload Identity provider the relay workflows authenticate through.backend/holds the per-environment backend configuration andenvironments/the tfvars. Drive it throughpnpm infra:init,pnpm infra:plan, andpnpm infra:apply.dev/scripts: the deploy, capacity, admission, rehome, monitoring, and load scripts the workflows call, plus the contract tests that pin each workflow and Terraform surface. Run them withpnpm test.dev/contractsanddev/fixtures: the checked-in data those contract tests read, including the Terraform root partition.docs/: the relay runbooks, capacity-testing guide, incident-monitor reference, the workflow variable reference indocs/relay-workflows.md, and the push gateway runbook indocs/push-gateway.md.
Workflows
The 25 .github/workflows/cloud-*.yml workflows are the deploy and operate
surface: publish and deploy the director, roll GCE cell capacity, operate Asia
admission and regional rehoming, prove staging capacity, monitor production,
power staging up and down, and deploy the mobile push gateway.
.github/actions/cloud-sql-rollout-lease is the compare-and-swap lease that
serializes rollouts against the shared Cloud SQL instance. Push reuses that
action with its own lease object and deployment concurrency group.
Every one of them is inert. Each top-level job is gated on
vars.ORCA_CLOUD_OPERATIONS_ENABLED == 'true', a repository variable that is
unset here, so the two scheduled triggers and every manual dispatch skip
without running a step. Only the repository owner, holding the GCP identities
these workflows authenticate as, can turn them on.
Cloud Verify is not gated. It builds, typechecks, lints, tests, secret-scans,
and validates the relay Terraform on every change under cloud/, and it runs
on fork pull requests, so it configures no backend and holds no credential.
What is not here
The terraform-foundation and terraform-apps roots and the API and auth
services live in the private stablyai/orca-cloud repository. Scripts and
tests that spanned both trees were narrowed to the relay side rather than
carrying a dangling reference.
Local development
cd cloud
pnpm install
pnpm build
pnpm test
pnpm test runs the SQLite-backed suites. Tests that need PostgreSQL run only
when ORCA_RELAY_TEST_POSTGRES_URL points at a disposable PostgreSQL 16 or 17
database, for example:
docker run --rm -d --name orca-relay-pg -e POSTGRES_HOST_AUTH_METHOD=trust \
-e POSTGRES_DB=orca_relay_test -p 55440:5432 postgres:16-alpine
ORCA_RELAY_TEST_POSTGRES_URL=postgres://postgres@127.0.0.1:55440/orca_relay_test \
pnpm --filter @orca-cloud/relay test
docker rm -f orca-relay-pg
Configuration is read from environment variables validated in
apps/relay/src/config.ts. ORCA_RELAY_ASSIGNMENT_SIGNING_KEY (at least 32
bytes) is the only required value; everything else has a local default.