Files
orca/src/shared/plugins/plugin-kill-list.test.ts
T
NeilandOrca 5c59c84c7a fix(plugins): close four trust-boundary holes in the plugin system (#11232)
* fix(plugins): close trust-boundary holes in the plugin system

Move five security decisions to their chokepoints rather than leaving them
enumerated at individual call sites.

- Kill-list revocation reaches content packs: PluginContentPackRegistry now
  takes an isKilled predicate and intersects it with any caller-supplied
  approval, so a killed plugin's VM recipes can no longer reach
  spawn(..., { shell: true }) through either reconcile() call site.
- Bound kill-list generatedAt to a 24h future skew at the parse chokepoint.
  A far-future timestamp previously made every genuine later list look
  "older" and disabled revocation permanently, persisted across restarts.
- Protect the whole auto.components.settings.Plugin* translation subtree
  instead of an enumerated prefix list, so language packs cannot forge the
  consent provenance badge or rewrite install-error security copy.
- Resolve manifest panel icons by own-key only; "constructor"/"__proto__"
  previously yielded non-component prototype members that crashed the
  right sidebar to its error boundary.
- Give panel liveness frames a reserved control budget so a panel that
  saturates its action budget can still answer the watchdog.

Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>

* fix(plugins): keep the kill-list future bound off the cache read path

The schema-level generatedAt bound re-judged the on-disk cache against the
device clock at every launch, so a client whose clock ran behind the last
genuine publication discarded its whole cached kill list and started with
zero revocations. Move the bound to the two fetch chokepoints instead.

Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>

* fix(plugins): remove the reserved-lane starvation window and the revocation TOCTOU

Review follow-ups on the trust-boundary fixes:

- The reserved liveness lane had a per-window count equal to the ping
  interval, so a panel's own pong-shaped traffic could spend it and drop
  the next genuine reply — reintroducing the starvation the lane exists to
  prevent. The lane is now size-bounded only; rate stays bounded because
  every pong is also charged to the data budget.
- Only schema-valid pongs take the lane now, so near-miss pong-shaped junk
  cannot drain it. readPanelPongId replaces the zod parse on this
  guest-controlled path (a rejected safeParse allocates an issue list, ~90x
  the accepted-path cost) and is pinned to the schema by a parity test.
- Re-read the kill list inside approveAtomically: approvedKeys is snapshotted
  before an awaited verification phase, so a plugin killed during that wait
  could still publish VM recipes and language packs.
- Assert the curated icon resolves to FileText; the old equality also passed
  when both sides fell back to Plug.

Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>

* fix(plugins): match zod's safe-integer bound in the pong reader

readPanelPongId used Number.isInteger, but zod's .int() rejects anything
above 2**53-1, so pingIds like 1e100 took the reserved lane the schema
would have refused. The parity test never probed that boundary.

Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>

---------

Co-authored-by: Orca <help@stably.ai>
2026-07-28 17:49:20 -07:00

109 lines
3.0 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest'
import {
PLUGIN_KILL_LIST_ENTRY_LIMIT,
PLUGIN_KILL_LIST_FUTURE_SKEW_MS,
findKilledPlugin,
isPluginKillListTooFarInFuture,
killedPluginKeys,
pluginKillListSchema,
type PluginKillList
} from './plugin-kill-list'
function entry(pluginKey = 'community.unsafe'): Record<string, unknown> {
return {
pluginKey,
reason: 'Known malicious release',
advisoryUrl: 'https://orca.example/security/unsafe'
}
}
describe('pluginKillListSchema', () => {
it('parses a strict versioned revocation document', () => {
const parsed = pluginKillListSchema.parse({
version: 1,
generatedAt: '2026-07-12T20:00:00Z',
plugins: [entry()]
})
expect(findKilledPlugin(parsed, 'community.unsafe')).toEqual(entry())
expect(killedPluginKeys(parsed)).toEqual(new Set(['community.unsafe']))
})
it.each([
{
version: 1,
generatedAt: '2026-07-12T20:00:00Z',
plugins: [],
unexpected: true
},
{
version: 1,
generatedAt: '2026-07-12T20:00:00Z',
plugins: [{ ...entry(), unexpected: true }]
},
{
version: 1,
generatedAt: 'not-a-date',
plugins: []
},
{
version: 1,
generatedAt: '2026-07-12T20:00:00Z',
plugins: [{ ...entry(), pluginKey: 'unsafe' }]
},
{
version: 1,
generatedAt: '2026-07-12T20:00:00Z',
plugins: [{ ...entry(), advisoryUrl: 'http://orca.example/advisory' }]
}
])('rejects malformed or untrusted fields', (killList) => {
expect(pluginKillListSchema.safeParse(killList).success).toBe(false)
})
it('rejects duplicate killed plugin identities', () => {
const parsed = pluginKillListSchema.safeParse({
version: 1,
generatedAt: '2026-07-12T20:00:00Z',
plugins: [entry(), entry()]
})
expect(parsed.success).toBe(false)
if (!parsed.success) {
expect(parsed.error.issues).toEqual(
expect.arrayContaining([
expect.objectContaining({ message: 'duplicate killed plugin: community.unsafe' })
])
)
}
})
it('caps the revocation document size by entry count', () => {
const plugins = Array.from({ length: PLUGIN_KILL_LIST_ENTRY_LIMIT + 1 }, (_, index) =>
entry(`publisher.plugin-${index}`)
)
expect(
pluginKillListSchema.safeParse({
version: 1,
generatedAt: '2026-07-12T20:00:00Z',
plugins
}).success
).toBe(false)
})
})
describe('isPluginKillListTooFarInFuture', () => {
const list = (generatedAt: string): PluginKillList =>
pluginKillListSchema.parse({ version: 1, generatedAt, plugins: [entry()] })
it('flags a snapshot that would freeze out every later revocation', () => {
expect(isPluginKillListTooFarInFuture(list('9999-12-31T23:59:59Z'))).toBe(true)
})
it('allows a snapshot inside the clock-skew window', () => {
const generatedAt = new Date(
Date.now() + PLUGIN_KILL_LIST_FUTURE_SKEW_MS - 60_000
).toISOString()
expect(isPluginKillListTooFarInFuture(list(generatedAt))).toBe(false)
})
})