Files
orca/src/shared/windows-secure-dacl.ts
T
Brennan Benson 4217095c06 Support Windows native Antigravity account switching (#34637)
* Support Windows native Antigravity account credentials

* Preserve Antigravity prompt arguments and sanitize Windows file failures

* Preserve Windows credential bytes and distinguish native read failures

* Import Buffer type in Windows security declarations

* Expose native credential bytes without a Node type dependency

* Let Windows agy launches keep shell ownership

* fix: declare Windows account messages and cover owner scope

* fix: resolve Windows account authority before snapshot projection

* fix: share Windows credential parsing with saved account reader

* test: type saved account identity lookup mock

* test: isolate native account fixture host detection

* test: reuse filesystem mock for container marker control

* test: preserve native credential contract failure diagnostics

* test: normalize private read expectation and cover Windows boundary
2026-10-29 14:31:23 -07:00

68 lines
2.8 KiB
TypeScript

import { WINDOWS_FILE_ALL_ACCESS, type WindowsDacl } from './windows-security-addon'
/** SYSTEM and the local Administrators group: they can take ownership regardless, so denying them buys nothing. */
export const LOCAL_SYSTEM_SID = 'S-1-5-18'
export const BUILTIN_ADMINISTRATORS_SID = 'S-1-5-32-544'
export const ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE = 0
export const ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE = 1
export const OBJECT_INHERIT_ACE = 0x1
export const CONTAINER_INHERIT_ACE = 0x2
export const INHERIT_ONLY_ACE = 0x8
const GENERIC_ALL = 0x10000000
/** Install protected user/SYSTEM/Administrators full control; directory rules inherit so newly created children start restricted. */
export function hardenedDaclSddl(userSid: string, isDirectory: boolean): string {
const flags = isDirectory ? 'OICI' : ''
return `D:P(A;${flags};FA;;;${LOCAL_SYSTEM_SID})(A;${flags};FA;;;${BUILTIN_ADMINISTRATORS_SID})(A;${flags};FA;;;${userSid})`
}
/** Allow only user/SYSTEM/Administrators, require parent-inheritance protection and usable user access.
* Accept equivalent private legacy DACLs instead of rewriting them to exactly match the current recipe. */
export function findSecureDaclViolation(
dacl: WindowsDacl | null,
userSid: string,
isDirectory: boolean
): string | null {
const privateViolation = findPrivateDaclViolation(dacl, userSid)
if (privateViolation || !dacl) {
return privateViolation
}
if (!dacl.protected) {
return 'DACL is not protected; the parent still propagates into it'
}
const inheritsToChildren = OBJECT_INHERIT_ACE | CONTAINER_INHERIT_ACE
const usable = dacl.aces.some(
(ace) =>
ace.type === ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE &&
ace.sid === userSid &&
(ace.flags & INHERIT_ONLY_ACE) === 0 &&
((ace.mask & GENERIC_ALL) !== 0 ||
(ace.mask & WINDOWS_FILE_ALL_ACCESS) === WINDOWS_FILE_ALL_ACCESS) &&
(!isDirectory || (ace.flags & inheritsToChildren) === inheritsToChildren)
)
return usable ? null : `missing full control for ${userSid}`
}
/** Private CLI files may inherit a private parent; reading must not rewrite their permissions. */
export function findPrivateDaclViolation(dacl: WindowsDacl | null, userSid: string): string | null {
if (!dacl) {
return 'the path has a NULL DACL, which grants everyone everything'
}
// Object, callback and conditional ACEs can grant by rules this check cannot evaluate.
const unsupported = dacl.aces.find(
(ace) => ace.type !== ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE && ace.type !== ACCESS_DENIED_ACE_TYPE
)
if (unsupported) {
return `unsupported ACE type ${unsupported.type}`
}
const allowed = new Set([userSid, LOCAL_SYSTEM_SID, BUILTIN_ADMINISTRATORS_SID])
const stranger = dacl.aces.find(
(ace) => ace.type === ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE_TYPE && !allowed.has(ace.sid ?? '')
)
if (stranger) {
return `unexpected rule for ${stranger.sid}`
}
return null
}