Files
orca/src
OrcaWinandOrca Worker c3c764fa03 docs(win): record why the PTY OSC 133 bootstrap keeps -EncodedCommand (#17875)
The MDE report lists src/main/daemon/shell-ready.ts as a contributing
"suspicious PowerShell" site and cites VS Code as using -Command. Measured
against a real VS Code fork install, VS Code's -Command payload is a one-liner
that dot-sources a *file*; that shape is execution-policy gated and is blocked
under Restricted and AllSigned, so it would silently drop OSC 133 -- and with
it foreground-process and exit-code tracking -- on the managed fleets MDE runs
on.

Inline -Command does carry the payload intact through node-pty/ConPTY
(powershell.exe 5.1 and pwsh 7.6.5), so the switch is feasible. It is declined
because no PTY site spells -ExecutionPolicy Bypass, AMSI and script-block
logging decode the payload either way, and the swap would put
$ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode, a Global:prompt override and
[char]27-assembled control sequences in clear text on every terminal's command
line -- higher-signal than the token it removes.

No behaviour change. Adds the rationale at the payload's source of truth,
one-line pointers at the three PTY launch sites, and a ratchet that both
launch builders must deliver the bootstrap byte for byte.

Co-authored-by: Orca Worker <orca-worker@localhost>
2026-09-01 23:21:14 -07:00
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