Files
orca/config/scripts
Neil 8adc1dd208 fix(windows): close four gaps found in review
BREAKAWAY. The per-PTY job set no limits, so a child asking for
CREATE_BREAKAWAY_FROM_JOB was refused with ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED.
Installers, msiexec and some updater and service-control paths spawn
that way deliberately -- they worked before this patch and would have
failed only inside an Orca terminal, which is the worst shape a bug
report can take. JOB_OBJECT_LIMIT_BREAKAWAY_OK restores it; a child
still has to ask, so ordinary descendants stay owned.

EMPTY IS NOT UNAVAILABLE. The native reader returns an empty list --
not an error -- when CreateToolhelp32Snapshot fails, which is what an
EDR hook or a restricted token produces. Callers read that as 'nothing
is running' and teardown concludes a live PTY root is already gone. The
snapshot must contain the querying process; nothing else is
unfalsifiable, and one predicate catches empty, truncated and
permission-filtered tables alike.

NO DEADLINE. Replacing execFile dropped its 3s timeout. The vendored
reader latches a module-global while a request is in flight and clears
it only after draining its callbacks, with no try/catch -- so one wedge
leaves every later call queued behind a promise that never settles, and
the process table is dead for the life of the app. The bound is back.

GUESSED IMAGE PATH. executablePath was derived from the first
space-delimited token, which reads 'C:\Program' out of an unquoted
'C:\Program Files\nodejs\node.exe ...'. Wrong evidence is worse than
none, and the only consumer already had the full path in , so
the field is gone rather than repaired.

Also: remove_pty_baton no longer sits inside assert(), which NDEBUG
would compile away along with the call, and the job accessors hold a
lock across lookup and use -- handle values are recycled, so an
unguarded read could pass the shell-pid check against an unrelated
process and terminate the wrong job.
2026-08-21 21:55:37 -07:00
..
2026-05-15 05:44:25 -04:00