Jinwoo Hong
e9bf6d1c3f
* fix(relay): the cell switch tool changes only the named switches and checks every key on read-back A cell resets a key missing from its switch file to its default, so the tool now reads the current object and changes only what --set names. The read-back compares every known key and fails when the cell reports ignoredKeys. * fix(relay): the cell switch tool refuses a switch the cell's image does not support It reads supportedFlags from runtime-status (#27057). An image from before that field takes only readinessLocal and ticketCheck off/shadow, so ticketCheck=enforce cannot void an old cell's object. * fix(relay): the switch tool validates the whole object, refuses voided files, and records admitMode in Postgres Every key and value of the object to be written is checked against what the image accepts (an image without the list: only the keys it applies, ticketCheck off/shadow). A file the cell did not apply is refused. admitMode=reserve needs a typed RESERVE <cell>; Postgres records reserve before the file is written, and db only after the cell reports every control leased again. * feat(relay): the switch tool knows reregisterInFlight (1-16), the flip-back pace * fix(relay): the switch tool closes the cache gap before reserve, undoes a refused write, and has a break-glass db flip After recording reserve in Postgres it waits past every director's 5 s cache and records it again (re-running the open-flow check) before writing the file. A file write refused outright (412 or 4xx) puts Postgres back to db; after a 5xx it stays reserve. An object the cell did not apply is repaired when the new object passes the image check. Break glass (typed BREAK GLASS <cell>) records db for a dead or unreachable reserve cell without its read-back. * fix(relay): a director deploy refuses a traffic move across reserve-mode support while any cell is reserve * fix(relay): the flip-back wait scales with the cell's controls and pace, and says how to finish * fix(relay): the switch tool refuses to re-arm a tripped cell, breaks glass only on a silent one, and undoes reserve if the second post is refused * feat(relay): director deploys set reserve placement, and refuse turning it off while any cell is reserve * fix(relay): Terraform keeps the deploy-owned placement and shadow cells, and the deploy guard reads placement as built and refuses dropping a reserve cell from the shadow list * fix(relay): director deploys take --admin-audience alone, name a drifted deploy identity, and carry the shadow seat-feed cells Staging passes --admin-audience for the reserve guard without durable rehome verification, which the parser refused. Only the generation and control origin now travel together, and they still need the audience. The guard decodes the caller from its token and refuses, by name, a revision whose ORCA_RELAY_DEPLOY_SERVICE_ACCOUNT is another account, instead of reading into a 401. --shadow-seat-feed-cells (preserve, all, or a cell list) is a workflow input on both director deploys; preserve keeps the serving value. A contract test parses every workflow's real argv for both deploy scripts. * fix(relay): the flag tool paces a flip back from the pool size the cell reports An image from before the field falls back to the deployed sizes.
Orca Relay
The relay that connects the Orca mobile app to a desktop host. Phones and desktops never talk to each other directly: each opens an outbound WebSocket to a relay cell, the relay pairs the two sessions, and it splices frames between them. A director assigns hosts to cells and coordinates migrations; cells carry the user connections.
This directory is an independent pnpm workspace inside the Orca monorepo. Run
its commands from cloud/, not the repository root. The source is covered by
the repository's root MIT license.
Packages
packages/relay-contract: the wire contract shared by the relay, the desktop app, and the mobile app (frame shapes, close codes, admission budgets, splice state machine).apps/relay: the relay server. The same image runs as a director or a cell depending onORCA_RELAY_ROLE.apps/relay-fence-broker: a private, IAM-only service that owns the durable mutation lease, the Terraform checkout, and the narrow Compute mutation used when a registered target is superseded. The workflow that calls it holds read and invoke rights only, never those mutation permissions.apps/relay-ops: the relay operations console and the incident monitor behindpnpm ops:relay,pnpm incident:relay, andpnpm incident:relay-preflight.apps/pushandpackages/push-contract: the mobile push gateway that holds the APNs key and sends to phones through APNs and FCM, and its wire contract. It is deployed and operated from here but is not part of the relay data path; see docs/push-gateway.md.
Mobile push gateway
apps/push is a separate Cloud Run service from the relay. Phones never hold an
Orca credential for it: the desktop host authenticates with the same X25519
key it uses for the relay, answering an encrypted challenge to mint a 24 hour
session, then registers each paired phone's native push token and asks the
gateway to push. The gateway queues each event as its own notification,
enforces per-host quotas and request limits, and retires a
registration as soon as Apple or Google reports the token unregistered.
Provider push is the only ordinary mobile OS-banner path. The notification
socket is retained only for live dismissal and reconnect tray reconciliation;
it never creates or recovers banners. Desktop notification categories remain
authoritative.
Each delivery is persisted as one notification event. Before deploying an
incompatible queue format, stop all older push gateway revisions and clear only
unpublished push delivery fixtures; no queue preservation or migration is required.
FCM notification messages are inherently collapsible while offline and have a
small concurrent collapse-key budget, so every pending alert is not guaranteed.
Storage follows the relay pattern: PostgreSQL in production, SQLite for tests
and local development. Configure it with ORCA_PUSH_PUBLIC_URL, ORCA_PUSH_FCM_PROJECT_ID,
ORCA_PUSH_DATABASE_URL, the three APNs variables (ORCA_PUSH_APNS_KEY,
ORCA_PUSH_APNS_KEY_ID, ORCA_PUSH_APPLE_TEAM_ID, all three or none), and
optionally ORCA_PUSH_APNS_TOPIC. The FCM credential comes from
the runtime service account, so no key material is configured for Android. See
push gateway operations for deployment and recovery.
Logging is aggregate counters only. Tokens, notification titles, notification bodies, and full host fingerprints never reach a log line.
Infrastructure and operations
infra/terraform: the relay Terraform root. It owns the cells, the director, the shared Cloud SQL instance, DNS, observability, and every GitHub Workload Identity provider the relay workflows authenticate through.backend/holds the per-environment backend configuration andenvironments/the tfvars. Drive it throughpnpm infra:init,pnpm infra:plan, andpnpm infra:apply.dev/scripts: the deploy, capacity, admission, rehome, monitoring, and load scripts the workflows call, plus the contract tests that pin each workflow and Terraform surface. Run them withpnpm test.dev/contractsanddev/fixtures: the checked-in data those contract tests read, including the Terraform root partition.docs/: the relay runbooks, capacity-testing guide, incident-monitor reference, the workflow variable reference indocs/relay-workflows.md, and the push gateway runbook indocs/push-gateway.md.
Workflows
The 25 .github/workflows/cloud-*.yml workflows are the deploy and operate
surface: publish and deploy the director, roll GCE cell capacity, operate Asia
admission and regional rehoming, prove staging capacity, monitor production,
power staging up and down, and deploy the mobile push gateway.
.github/actions/cloud-sql-rollout-lease is the compare-and-swap lease that
serializes rollouts against the shared Cloud SQL instance. Push reuses that
action with its own lease object and deployment concurrency group.
Every one of them is inert. Each top-level job is gated on
vars.ORCA_CLOUD_OPERATIONS_ENABLED == 'true', a repository variable that is
unset here, so the two scheduled triggers and every manual dispatch skip
without running a step. Only the repository owner, holding the GCP identities
these workflows authenticate as, can turn them on.
Cloud Verify is not gated. It builds, typechecks, lints, tests, secret-scans,
and validates the relay Terraform on every change under cloud/, and it runs
on fork pull requests, so it configures no backend and holds no credential.
What is not here
The terraform-foundation and terraform-apps roots and the API and auth
services live in the private stablyai/orca-cloud repository. Scripts and
tests that spanned both trees were narrowed to the relay side rather than
carrying a dangling reference.
Local development
cd cloud
pnpm install
pnpm build
pnpm test
pnpm test runs the SQLite-backed suites. Tests that need PostgreSQL run only
when ORCA_RELAY_TEST_POSTGRES_URL points at a disposable PostgreSQL 16 or 17
database, for example:
docker run --rm -d --name orca-relay-pg -e POSTGRES_HOST_AUTH_METHOD=trust \
-e POSTGRES_DB=orca_relay_test -p 55440:5432 postgres:16-alpine
ORCA_RELAY_TEST_POSTGRES_URL=postgres://postgres@127.0.0.1:55440/orca_relay_test \
pnpm --filter @orca-cloud/relay test
docker rm -f orca-relay-pg
Configuration is read from environment variables validated in
apps/relay/src/config.ts. ORCA_RELAY_ASSIGNMENT_SIGNING_KEY (at least 32
bytes) is the only required value; everything else has a local default.