* feat(relay): add the per-cell phonePath switch, effective only in reserve mode Step 6 of the relay redesign keys every phone-path change on this switch. The cell reports the effective value in runtime status, and the flag tool refuses phonePath=memory unless the cell is reserve, and a reserve flip that would turn phones over unnamed. * feat(relay-ops): watch a memory phone cell and turn its phone path off on a breach The reserve watch now also judges five phone rules while the switch file says phonePath=memory, from the cell's own runtime metrics against the 10 minutes before flipped-at: 4401s, confirm failures, attach-deadline 4404s and accept database errors over their lines for 3 minutes, and completed accepts under half of background. A phone-rule trip writes phonePath=db only; any other trip still flips the cell back whole. Resume audit drops page after 5 minutes and flip nothing. * fix(relay-ops): store phonePath=db as no key, so old images keep taking writes An explicit phonePath=db left in the switch file would make the flag tool refuse every later write after an image rollback, including a watcher's admitMode=db flip back. * fix(relay-ops): keep phone watch rules off traffic noise, and keep watching after a phone trip Completed accepts are no longer judged. Rate lines use the background mean plus max(margin, share, 4 Poisson deviations), with a margin of 3 for attach deadlines. A phone trip writes phonePath=db mid-watch and the reserve rules go on; both flip backs remove the phonePath key so a cell rolled back to an image without it takes the write. The phone background starts where phonePath went memory, and a background broken by a restart refuses the watch. Audit drops page only while rising; failing renewals page too. * test(relay-ops): replay the phone rules on 26 recorded hours of c7 and c29 Per-minute counts from the cells' runtime metrics (read-only, 10-18/19) replace the synthetic quiet window. c29's bursty auth failures tripped the attach-deadline rule at a margin of 3 in 29% of 300-minute watches, so its margin is now 5 like the others. * fix(relay): judge the phone rules as a share of attempts, retry a failed phonePath write The count rule false-tripped busy c28 (33/121 five-hour watches). The share rule (over half of the minute's attempts, 0.25 over the background, capped at 0.6) trips none of the recorded c7, c28 and c29 watches and catches two refusals per accept within 3 minutes. A failed mid-watch phonePath=db write now keeps watching, retries each sample and pages after 3 failures; break glass also drops phonePath. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(relay): cite the replayed c28 count-rule false trips Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(relay): judge phone confirm failures against completed accepts Each completed accept makes one confirm, so failures/(failures + accepts) could never pass half and a total confirm outage never tripped. Confirm failures are now a share of accepts. Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(relay): note why the confirm replay tests only trips Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Orca Relay
The relay that connects the Orca mobile app to a desktop host. Phones and desktops never talk to each other directly: each opens an outbound WebSocket to a relay cell, the relay pairs the two sessions, and it splices frames between them. A director assigns hosts to cells and coordinates migrations; cells carry the user connections.
This directory is an independent pnpm workspace inside the Orca monorepo. Run
its commands from cloud/, not the repository root. The source is covered by
the repository's root MIT license.
Packages
packages/relay-contract: the wire contract shared by the relay, the desktop app, and the mobile app (frame shapes, close codes, admission budgets, splice state machine).apps/relay: the relay server. The same image runs as a director or a cell depending onORCA_RELAY_ROLE.apps/relay-fence-broker: a private, IAM-only service that owns the durable mutation lease, the Terraform checkout, and the narrow Compute mutation used when a registered target is superseded. The workflow that calls it holds read and invoke rights only, never those mutation permissions.apps/relay-ops: the relay operations console and the incident monitor behindpnpm ops:relay,pnpm incident:relay, andpnpm incident:relay-preflight.apps/pushandpackages/push-contract: the mobile push gateway that holds the APNs key and sends to phones through APNs and FCM, and its wire contract. It is deployed and operated from here but is not part of the relay data path; see docs/push-gateway.md.
Mobile push gateway
apps/push is a separate Cloud Run service from the relay. Phones never hold an
Orca credential for it: the desktop host authenticates with the same X25519
key it uses for the relay, answering an encrypted challenge to mint a 24 hour
session, then registers each paired phone's native push token and asks the
gateway to push. The gateway queues each event as its own notification,
enforces per-host quotas and request limits, and retires a
registration as soon as Apple or Google reports the token unregistered.
Provider push is the only ordinary mobile OS-banner path. The notification
socket is retained only for live dismissal and reconnect tray reconciliation;
it never creates or recovers banners. Desktop notification categories remain
authoritative.
Each delivery is persisted as one notification event. Before deploying an
incompatible queue format, stop all older push gateway revisions and clear only
unpublished push delivery fixtures; no queue preservation or migration is required.
FCM notification messages are inherently collapsible while offline and have a
small concurrent collapse-key budget, so every pending alert is not guaranteed.
Storage follows the relay pattern: PostgreSQL in production, SQLite for tests
and local development. Configure it with ORCA_PUSH_PUBLIC_URL, ORCA_PUSH_FCM_PROJECT_ID,
ORCA_PUSH_DATABASE_URL, the three APNs variables (ORCA_PUSH_APNS_KEY,
ORCA_PUSH_APNS_KEY_ID, ORCA_PUSH_APPLE_TEAM_ID, all three or none), and
optionally ORCA_PUSH_APNS_TOPIC. The FCM credential comes from
the runtime service account, so no key material is configured for Android. See
push gateway operations for deployment and recovery.
Logging is aggregate counters only. Tokens, notification titles, notification bodies, and full host fingerprints never reach a log line.
Infrastructure and operations
infra/terraform: the relay Terraform root. It owns the cells, the director, the shared Cloud SQL instance, DNS, observability, and every GitHub Workload Identity provider the relay workflows authenticate through.backend/holds the per-environment backend configuration andenvironments/the tfvars. Drive it throughpnpm infra:init,pnpm infra:plan, andpnpm infra:apply.dev/scripts: the deploy, capacity, admission, rehome, monitoring, and load scripts the workflows call, plus the contract tests that pin each workflow and Terraform surface. Run them withpnpm test.dev/contractsanddev/fixtures: the checked-in data those contract tests read, including the Terraform root partition.docs/: the relay runbooks, capacity-testing guide, incident-monitor reference, the workflow variable reference indocs/relay-workflows.md, and the push gateway runbook indocs/push-gateway.md.
Workflows
The 25 .github/workflows/cloud-*.yml workflows are the deploy and operate
surface: publish and deploy the director, roll GCE cell capacity, operate Asia
admission and regional rehoming, prove staging capacity, monitor production,
power staging up and down, and deploy the mobile push gateway.
.github/actions/cloud-sql-rollout-lease is the compare-and-swap lease that
serializes rollouts against the shared Cloud SQL instance. Push reuses that
action with its own lease object and deployment concurrency group.
Every one of them is inert. Each top-level job is gated on
vars.ORCA_CLOUD_OPERATIONS_ENABLED == 'true', a repository variable that is
unset here, so the two scheduled triggers and every manual dispatch skip
without running a step. Only the repository owner, holding the GCP identities
these workflows authenticate as, can turn them on.
Cloud Verify is not gated. It builds, typechecks, lints, tests, secret-scans,
and validates the relay Terraform on every change under cloud/, and it runs
on fork pull requests, so it configures no backend and holds no credential.
What is not here
The terraform-foundation and terraform-apps roots and the API and auth
services live in the private stablyai/orca-cloud repository. Scripts and
tests that spanned both trees were narrowed to the relay side rather than
carrying a dangling reference.
Local development
cd cloud
pnpm install
pnpm build
pnpm test
pnpm test runs the SQLite-backed suites. Tests that need PostgreSQL run only
when ORCA_RELAY_TEST_POSTGRES_URL points at a disposable PostgreSQL 16 or 17
database, for example:
docker run --rm -d --name orca-relay-pg -e POSTGRES_HOST_AUTH_METHOD=trust \
-e POSTGRES_DB=orca_relay_test -p 55440:5432 postgres:16-alpine
ORCA_RELAY_TEST_POSTGRES_URL=postgres://postgres@127.0.0.1:55440/orca_relay_test \
pnpm --filter @orca-cloud/relay test
docker rm -f orca-relay-pg
Configuration is read from environment variables validated in
apps/relay/src/config.ts. ORCA_RELAY_ASSIGNMENT_SIGNING_KEY (at least 32
bytes) is the only required value; everything else has a local default.