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* fix(windows): restrict secure files in-process instead of spawning icacls Every secure write on Windows spawned icacls.exe five times on the calling thread (the Electron main thread for most stores): verify, /reset, /inheritance:r /grant:r, verify, verify. Process creation under endpoint security costs ~0.6 s each, so each write froze the UI for seconds (#26027). The /reset + /inheritance:r pair is also what behavioural EDR scores as ransomware tradecraft (#25583). Add native/windows-security (@orca/windows-security): a small N-API addon over advapi32 that reads and writes DACLs in-process. It exposes the token user SID, a DACL read as SDDL, a DACL write (sync and on the thread pool), a create-with-DACL file write, and an additive grant. Policy and verification stay in TypeScript. - writeSecureFile creates each temp file already carrying the protected user/SYSTEM/Administrators DACL (CreateFileW + SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES), reads it back once, and renames it. No ACL is modified on the write path and no process starts. Before: 5-7 spawns, 94-138 ms per write. After: 0 spawns, ~0.5 ms. - A secure directory is verified once per process. It is rewritten only when verification fails, on the thread pool, because the write walks every descendant (~2 s on a 29k-entry userData). - The verifier follows OpenSSH's rule: only the user, SYSTEM and Administrators may be granted anything, and the path must be protected (or, for a file, inherit from a secure parent). DACLs written by the icacls-era hardening pass unchanged, so there is no migration. - If the addon cannot load, the write still happens and reports unrestricted, logged once. There is no icacls or PowerShell fallback. - grantDirAcl, the startup userData grant, and the install-dir probe and package repair use the same addon, so whoami.exe and icacls.exe are no longer spawned anywhere at runtime. - orcad's Windows slots ship the addon beside their bundles (built per arch, PE-machine checked). Its data-root privacy check fails closed, so without the addon a Windows orcad would not start. Fixes #26027 Fixes #25583 * refactor(secure-file): harden existing Windows files through the sync lane The read path called restrictWindowsPathSync directly and recorded success itself; the existing sync lane already does both. One call site fewer. * refactor(windows-security): one load, one rule, no fallthrough (review #28135) - The descriptor parser is anchored, so a conditional ACE (its body holds parentheses) or anything else it cannot read fails closed instead of verifying the ACEs before it. - findSecureDaclViolation is one flat rule: protected, allow rules only for the user, SYSTEM and Administrators (OpenSSH's ACE rule), and full control for the user. The inherits-from-a-secure-parent exception is gone: it accepted exactly what loosening the parent reaches. - The addon and the user SID load once, behind one wrapper that adds the extended-length prefix to every path and runs async DACL writes to one path in order, so a startup grant cannot land after a re-lock and restore the broader DACL. - With the addon loaded, a failed born-restricted create throws with the matching Node error code instead of falling back to a plain write. - A grant leaves a NULL DACL untouched instead of turning 'everyone' into 'only this SID'. WriteFile runs once and fails on a short write. - The artifact create-intent store writes through writeSecureFile and drops its own temp writer, directory LRU and synchronous directory re-lock. - Test seams the global fake makes redundant are gone. * fix(packaging): fail a Windows build whose workspace addon binary is missing or foreign-arch The @orca/windows-* workspace links exist on every host, so their presence proved nothing: a missing or wrong-architecture .node only surfaced at runtime, as unrestricted secure files or an orcad that refuses to start. beforePack now reads each addon's PE machine against the target arch. * refactor(windows-security): prune what the native ACL left dead (review #28135) - Sync-spawn ratchet: hardenSecurePath and the sync-flag exemption it alone used are gone, and the advice and baseline header no longer say secure writers run icacls. - The install-dir probe reads ACEs through parseSddlDacl, so an ACE it cannot parse fails the whole reading closed instead of being skipped; AC is a resolved alias there now. - The packaging check reads the addon binary through node_modules, the copy that ships. - No winCode-to-errno table: nothing reads .code off a failed secure write. - The load memo is not mutated; secure-path keeps its own log-once flag. - grantInstallDirPackageAcl is a plain function, and secure-file restricts a Windows directory and a POSIX path directly instead of through one two-platform helper. * fix(windows-security): resolve LA in real-ACL tests; tear a file whose close fails - The GitHub Windows runner is the built-in Administrator (RID 500), whose SID reads back as LA. Production already resolves it through localDomainSidOf; the win32 test helpers parsed without it. One shared readDaclOf resolves aliases for every real-ACL suite, and the verifier's unit test covers an LA-aliased directory and LA as a stranger. - createFileWithDacl treats a failed CloseHandle like a failed write (lost data on a network volume) and deletes the torn file. - Drop a duplicate test reset and a typo. * fix(windows-security): load only from inside the app; read DACLs as structure (review #28135) - Loader: orcad's staged binary first, then the workspace package only if its real path is inside the app (process.resourcesPath, or this checkout). A bare specifier otherwise walks every parent up to C:\node_modules, which any local user may create, and orcad holds credentials. - The addon reads a DACL as { protected, aces: [{ type, flags, mask, sid }] } via GetAce, with a SID only for plain allow/deny ACEs and null for a NULL DACL. findSecureDaclViolation and the install-dir probe check that structure, so conditional, callback and object ACEs fail closed. The SDDL parser, its alias table, LA/localDomainSid resolution and getDaclSddl are gone; SDDL is only the write format. - Install-dir tree pass: files flagless as before, but a directory only when its own DACL is protected (inheritably). Re-granting inheriting directories re-propagated each subtree (3.2 s for 1,093 directories). The root is no longer granted, or counted, twice. The two passes are plain functions behind a { root, tree } seam. - One namespacing (path.win32.toNamespacedPath) at the addon boundary, also the per-path ordering key; the comment states the real sync-grant invariant. - restrictWindowsDirectory(dir): Promise<boolean> replaces the callback lane; the reporter is guarded once, so the 'settle' stage is gone. - Sync-spawn ratchet: the secure writers no longer spawn or block, so they leave the gate (109 -> 61 uses). - Errors name the Win32 call and code only; a failed GetSecurityDescriptorControl fails the write instead of defaulting to unprotected. * test(secure-file): assert the durable POSIX write's outcome, not the old chmod order writeSecureFile now chmods the temp file to 0o600 before fsyncing it, so the fsync also covers the mode change and the file is owner-writable when opened. Assert what matters under umask 0o200: the write succeeds, the temp file is fsynced read-only, and the published file is exactly 0o600. * fix(windows-security): namespace paths with the host's toNamespacedPath path.win32.toNamespacedPath rewrote POSIX temp paths (/tmp/x -> \tmp\x) in the Linux runs of the Windows-logic unit tests, so the fake addon wrote to the wrong place. The addon only runs on Windows, where the host function is the win32 one; elsewhere it is the identity. The long-path assertion runs on Windows only. * test(windows-security): assert the install-dir long-path prefix on Windows only The prefix comes from the host's toNamespacedPath, which is the identity off Windows; the Linux run of this suite expected the win32 escape. * fix(windows-user-data-acl): grant the root even when its children cannot be listed (review #28135) A readdir failure on userData aborted the whole grant, so the root grant that could repair a DACL refusing the listing was never attempted. The listing failure is now recorded, the root is still granted, and the marker stays withheld so the next launch retries. * test(windows-security): wait for relock propagation, accept Entra ID SIDs (review #28135) - The large-relock test waited only for the parent to turn protected, which happens before propagation reaches the children, then read a child. It now waits on the parent and both ends of the child range. - The token-user test rejected S-1-12-1 (Entra ID) accounts, failing the suite on Entra-joined dev machines. --------- Co-authored-by: Orca Worker <orca-worker@localhost>
407 lines
15 KiB
TypeScript
407 lines
15 KiB
TypeScript
import { mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs'
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import { tmpdir } from 'node:os'
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import { join } from 'node:path'
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import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest'
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import { runProcess, runProcessSync } from '@orca/process-host'
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import {
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__getSecureFileHardeningCacheStateForTests,
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__resetSecureFileHardenedPathsForTests,
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hardenExistingSecureFile,
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writeSecureFile
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} from './secure-file'
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import { mayAttemptHardening } from './secure-path-hardening-retry-budget'
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import {
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setSecurePathHardeningReporter,
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type SecurePathHardeningReport
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} from './secure-path-hardening-report'
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import {
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loadWindowsSecurity,
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resetWindowsSecurityLoadForTests,
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setWindowsSecurityForTests
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} from './windows-security-addon'
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import {
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createFakeWindowsSecurity,
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FAKE_USER_SID,
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type FakeWindowsSecurity
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} from './windows-security-addon.test-fixture'
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vi.mock('@orca/process-host', () => ({
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runProcess: vi.fn(),
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runProcessSync: vi.fn()
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}))
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const FILE_SDDL = `D:P(A;;FA;;;S-1-5-18)(A;;FA;;;S-1-5-32-544)(A;;FA;;;${FAKE_USER_SID})`
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const DIRECTORY_SDDL = `D:P(A;OICI;FA;;;S-1-5-18)(A;OICI;FA;;;S-1-5-32-544)(A;OICI;FA;;;${FAKE_USER_SID})`
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/** What the icacls-era hardening left on disk; it must keep verifying with no rewrite. */
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const ICACLS_ERA_FILE_SDDL = `D:PAI(A;;FA;;;BA)(A;;FA;;;SY)(A;;FA;;;${FAKE_USER_SID})`
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const ICACLS_ERA_DIRECTORY_SDDL = `D:PAI(A;OICI;FA;;;BA)(A;OICI;FA;;;SY)(A;OICI;FA;;;${FAKE_USER_SID})`
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describe('Windows secure files through the native ACL addon', () => {
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const originalPlatform = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(process, 'platform')
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const tempDirs: string[] = []
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let fake: FakeWindowsSecurity
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let reports: SecurePathHardeningReport[]
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beforeEach(() => {
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Object.defineProperty(process, 'platform', { configurable: true, value: 'win32' })
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resetWindowsSecurityLoadForTests()
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__resetSecureFileHardenedPathsForTests()
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fake = createFakeWindowsSecurity()
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setWindowsSecurityForTests(fake)
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reports = []
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setSecurePathHardeningReporter((entry) => reports.push(entry))
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vi.mocked(runProcess).mockReset()
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vi.mocked(runProcessSync).mockReset()
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})
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afterEach(() => {
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// The whole point of #25583 and #26027: no ACL work may start a process.
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expect(runProcess).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
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expect(runProcessSync).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
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setSecurePathHardeningReporter(null)
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setWindowsSecurityForTests(null)
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resetWindowsSecurityLoadForTests()
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__resetSecureFileHardenedPathsForTests()
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if (originalPlatform) {
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Object.defineProperty(process, 'platform', originalPlatform)
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}
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for (const dir of tempDirs.splice(0)) {
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rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true })
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}
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})
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function tempDir(): string {
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const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'orca-secure-file-win-'))
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tempDirs.push(dir)
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return dir
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}
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async function settle(): Promise<void> {
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for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
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await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 0))
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}
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}
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describe('write path', () => {
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it('creates the credential already restricted and publishes it without touching its ACL', () => {
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const dir = tempDir()
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const targetPath = join(dir, 'secret.json')
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expect(writeSecureFile(targetPath, 'contents')).toBe(true)
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const [create] = fake.callsFor('create')
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expect(create?.path).toMatch(/secret\.json\.\d+\.\d+\.[0-9a-f]+\.tmp$/)
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expect(create && 'sddl' in create ? create.sddl : '').toBe(FILE_SDDL)
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expect(readFileSync(targetPath, 'utf-8')).toBe('contents')
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// Born restricted: no ACL is ever set on the temp file or the published one.
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expect(fake.callsFor('set')).toEqual([])
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expect(fake.calls.some((call) => call.path === targetPath)).toBe(false)
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})
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it('reports false but still writes when the addon cannot load, and says so once', () => {
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setWindowsSecurityForTests(null)
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const dir = tempDir()
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for (const name of ['a.json', 'b.json', 'c.json']) {
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expect(writeSecureFile(join(dir, name), name)).toBe(false)
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expect(readFileSync(join(dir, name), 'utf-8')).toBe(name)
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}
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expect(reports.filter((entry) => entry.stage === 'addon')).toHaveLength(1)
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})
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// Never a truncating plain write of the secret: a failed create surfaces like any fs failure.
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it('throws a failed restricted create and leaves no temp file', () => {
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const dir = tempDir()
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const targetPath = join(dir, 'secret.json')
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writeFileSync(targetPath, 'previous')
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fake.createFileWithDacl = () => {
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throw new Error('CreateFileW failed with Win32 error 5')
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}
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expect(() => writeSecureFile(targetPath, 'contents')).toThrow(
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'CreateFileW failed with Win32 error 5'
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)
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expect(readFileSync(targetPath, 'utf-8')).toBe('previous')
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expect(readdirSync(dir).filter((name) => name.endsWith('.tmp'))).toEqual([])
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})
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it('reports false when the filesystem drops the descriptor (FAT32, some shares)', () => {
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const dir = tempDir()
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const targetPath = join(dir, 'secret.json')
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const realCreate = fake.createFileWithDacl
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fake.createFileWithDacl = (path, sddl, data) => {
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realCreate(path, sddl, data)
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const created = fake.callsFor('create').at(-1)?.path ?? path
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fake.dacls.set(created, 'D:NO_ACCESS_CONTROL')
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}
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expect(writeSecureFile(targetPath, 'contents')).toBe(false)
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expect(reports).toContainEqual(
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expect.objectContaining({ stage: 'verify', detail: expect.stringContaining('NULL DACL') })
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)
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})
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it('clears the read-path backoff once a write restricts the same path', () => {
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const dir = tempDir()
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const targetPath = join(dir, 'secret.json')
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writeFileSync(targetPath, '{}')
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fake.failing.add(targetPath)
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let clock = performance.now()
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const now = vi.spyOn(performance, 'now').mockImplementation(() => clock)
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for (const wait of [0, 61_000, 121_000]) {
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clock += wait
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hardenExistingSecureFile(targetPath)
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}
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expect(mayAttemptHardening(targetPath)).toBe(false)
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fake.failing.delete(targetPath)
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expect(writeSecureFile(targetPath, 'contents')).toBe(true)
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expect(mayAttemptHardening(targetPath)).toBe(true)
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expect(reports).toContainEqual(expect.objectContaining({ targetPath, stage: 'recovered' }))
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now.mockRestore()
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})
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})
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describe('directory relock', () => {
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it('relocks the parent once, on the thread pool, across many writes', async () => {
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const dir = tempDir()
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for (let i = 0; i < 5; i++) {
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writeSecureFile(join(dir, `secret-${i}.json`), `contents-${i}`)
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}
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await settle()
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expect(fake.callsFor('setAsync', dir)).toEqual([
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expect.objectContaining({ op: 'setAsync', path: dir, sddl: DIRECTORY_SDDL })
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])
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expect(fake.callsFor('set', dir)).toEqual([])
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})
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it('never rewrites a directory the icacls-era hardening already locked', async () => {
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const dir = tempDir()
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fake.dacls.set(dir, ICACLS_ERA_DIRECTORY_SDDL)
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writeSecureFile(join(dir, 'secret.json'), 'contents')
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await settle()
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expect(fake.callsFor('setAsync')).toEqual([])
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})
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// A relock walks every descendant: ~2 s on a 29k-entry userData. Writes must not wait on it.
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it('neither blocks a write nor starts twice while a slow relock is still running', async () => {
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fake.holdAsync = true
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const dir = tempDir()
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for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
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expect(writeSecureFile(join(dir, `secret-${i}.json`), 'contents')).toBe(true)
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expect(readFileSync(join(dir, `secret-${i}.json`), 'utf-8')).toBe('contents')
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}
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await settle()
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expect(fake.callsFor('setAsync', dir)).toHaveLength(1)
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fake.releaseAsync()
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await settle()
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writeSecureFile(join(dir, 'later.json'), 'contents')
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await settle()
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expect(fake.callsFor('setAsync', dir)).toHaveLength(1)
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expect(fake.dacls.get(dir)).toBe(DIRECTORY_SDDL)
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})
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it('retries a failed relock only after its backoff, not on every write', async () => {
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const dir = tempDir()
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fake.failing.add(dir)
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let clock = performance.now()
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const now = vi.spyOn(performance, 'now').mockImplementation(() => clock)
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writeSecureFile(join(dir, 'a.json'), 'a')
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await settle()
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writeSecureFile(join(dir, 'b.json'), 'b')
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await settle()
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expect(fake.callsFor('setAsync', dir)).toHaveLength(1)
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clock += 61_000
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fake.failing.delete(dir)
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writeSecureFile(join(dir, 'c.json'), 'c')
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await settle()
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expect(fake.callsFor('setAsync', dir)).toHaveLength(2)
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expect(reports).toContainEqual(expect.objectContaining({ targetPath: dir, stage: 'apply' }))
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now.mockRestore()
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})
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})
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describe('read path', () => {
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function existingFile(): { dir: string; targetPath: string } {
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const dir = tempDir()
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const targetPath = join(dir, 'secret.json')
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writeFileSync(targetPath, '{}')
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return { dir, targetPath }
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}
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it('fixes an inherited-ACL file in-process, synchronously, once while it is unchanged', () => {
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const { targetPath } = existingFile()
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for (let i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
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hardenExistingSecureFile(targetPath)
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}
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expect(fake.callsFor('set', targetPath)).toEqual([
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expect.objectContaining({ op: 'set', path: targetPath, sddl: FILE_SDDL })
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])
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expect(fake.callsFor('setAsync', targetPath)).toEqual([])
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})
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it('leaves a file the icacls-era hardening locked exactly as it is', () => {
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const { targetPath } = existingFile()
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fake.dacls.set(targetPath, ICACLS_ERA_FILE_SDDL)
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hardenExistingSecureFile(targetPath)
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expect(fake.callsFor('set', targetPath)).toEqual([])
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expect(fake.dacls.get(targetPath)).toBe(ICACLS_ERA_FILE_SDDL)
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})
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it('rewrites a protected DACL that grants a stranger', () => {
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const { targetPath } = existingFile()
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fake.dacls.set(targetPath, 'D:PAI(A;;FA;;;BA)(A;;FA;;;SY)(A;;FA;;;WD)')
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hardenExistingSecureFile(targetPath)
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expect(fake.dacls.get(targetPath)).toBe(FILE_SDDL)
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})
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it('re-checks a file whose metadata changed after it was cached', async () => {
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const { targetPath } = existingFile()
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hardenExistingSecureFile(targetPath)
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hardenExistingSecureFile(targetPath)
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const checksWhileUnchanged = fake.callsFor('get', targetPath).length
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await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 20))
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writeFileSync(targetPath, '{"changed":true}')
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hardenExistingSecureFile(targetPath)
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expect(fake.callsFor('get', targetPath)).toHaveLength(checksWhileUnchanged + 1)
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})
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it('does not re-verify the parent directory as its mtime churns', async () => {
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const { dir, targetPath } = existingFile()
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hardenExistingSecureFile(targetPath)
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await settle()
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writeFileSync(join(dir, 'other.json'), '{}')
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hardenExistingSecureFile(targetPath)
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hardenExistingSecureFile(targetPath)
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await settle()
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expect(fake.callsFor('get', dir)).toHaveLength(2) // verify, then the post-relock read-back
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expect(fake.callsFor('setAsync', dir)).toHaveLength(1)
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})
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// The read path polls at ~2/s (#4901); a host that can never restrict must not log each time.
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it('collapses a failing read-path poll to a single attempt', () => {
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const { targetPath } = existingFile()
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fake.failing.add(targetPath)
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for (let read = 0; read < 25; read++) {
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hardenExistingSecureFile(targetPath)
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}
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expect(fake.callsFor('set', targetPath)).toHaveLength(1)
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})
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it('re-probes a long-failing path once its backoff has elapsed', () => {
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const { targetPath } = existingFile()
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fake.failing.add(targetPath)
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let clock = performance.now()
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const now = vi.spyOn(performance, 'now').mockImplementation(() => clock)
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for (let step = 0; step < 48; step++) {
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hardenExistingSecureFile(targetPath)
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clock += 31 * 60_000
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}
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expect(fake.callsFor('set', targetPath)).toHaveLength(48)
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now.mockRestore()
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})
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it('LRU-evicts file entries and safely re-checks an evicted path', () => {
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__resetSecureFileHardenedPathsForTests({
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maxEntries: 2,
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maxKeyBytes: 4096,
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maxTotalKeyBytes: 8192
|
|
})
|
|
const dir = tempDir()
|
|
const paths = ['first.json', 'second.json', 'third.json'].map((name) => join(dir, name))
|
|
for (const path of paths) {
|
|
writeFileSync(path, '{}')
|
|
hardenExistingSecureFile(path)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
hardenExistingSecureFile(paths[0]!)
|
|
|
|
const checked = fake
|
|
.callsFor('get')
|
|
.map((call) => call.path)
|
|
.filter((path) => paths.includes(path))
|
|
expect(checked.filter((path) => path === paths[0])).toHaveLength(3) // verify, read-back, re-check
|
|
expect(__getSecureFileHardeningCacheStateForTests().paths).toMatchObject({ entries: 2 })
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
it('LRU-evicts directory entries instead of retaining every path', () => {
|
|
__resetSecureFileHardenedPathsForTests({
|
|
maxEntries: 2,
|
|
maxKeyBytes: 4096,
|
|
maxTotalKeyBytes: 8192
|
|
})
|
|
const root = tempDir()
|
|
const files = ['first', 'second', 'third'].map((name) => {
|
|
mkdirSync(join(root, name))
|
|
const file = join(root, name, 'secret.json')
|
|
writeFileSync(file, '{}')
|
|
return file
|
|
})
|
|
for (const file of files) {
|
|
hardenExistingSecureFile(file)
|
|
}
|
|
expect(__getSecureFileHardeningCacheStateForTests().directories).toMatchObject({
|
|
entries: 2
|
|
})
|
|
})
|
|
})
|
|
|
|
// The prefix comes from the host's toNamespacedPath, which is the identity off Windows.
|
|
it.runIf(process.platform === 'win32')(
|
|
'hands the addon extended-length paths past MAX_PATH',
|
|
() => {
|
|
const longPath = `C:\\Users\\me\\.orca\\${'d'.repeat(300)}\\secret.json`
|
|
const loaded = loadWindowsSecurity()
|
|
|
|
expect('error' in loaded ? null : loaded.addon.getDaclAces(longPath)).toBeTruthy()
|
|
expect(fake.callsFor('get')[0]?.addonPath).toBe(`\\\\?\\${longPath}`)
|
|
}
|
|
)
|
|
|
|
// A grant reads the DACL and writes back a merge; racing a re-lock it could restore the broad one.
|
|
it('runs async DACL writes to the same path one after another', async () => {
|
|
const loaded = loadWindowsSecurity()
|
|
if ('error' in loaded) {
|
|
throw new Error('fake not installed')
|
|
}
|
|
fake.holdAsync = true
|
|
const order: string[] = []
|
|
const relock = loaded.addon
|
|
.setDaclSddlAsync('C:\\Orca', 'D:P(A;OICI;FA;;;SY)')
|
|
.then(() => order.push('relock'))
|
|
const grant = loaded.addon
|
|
.grantAccessAsync('c:\\orca', FAKE_USER_SID, 0x1f01ff, { inheritable: true, replace: true })
|
|
.then(() => order.push('grant'))
|
|
await settle()
|
|
|
|
// The grant waits for the parked re-lock on the same path, whatever its letter case.
|
|
expect(fake.callsFor('grantAsync')).toEqual([])
|
|
fake.releaseAsync()
|
|
await Promise.all([relock, grant])
|
|
expect(order).toEqual(['relock', 'grant'])
|
|
})
|
|
})
|