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A background-colour probe writes `OSC 11 ;? ST` then `CSI 6n` and reads exactly one response, using the CPR as its sentinel: a non-OSC first response means "unsupported" and it stops draining. #13309 routed live cooked-echo-risk replies through the ECHO-probe deferral while CPR kept the immediate path, so the CPR overtook the colour reply, the prober gave up, and the stray `ESC ]` was left in the tty for the next program — `gh auth login` died on it with an escape-sequence error. Queue a reply that needs no echo containment behind ones that do, FIFO, and only while something is actually deferred, so latency-critical replies stay immediate on every other path. Windows is unaffected: only posix-pty defers, so the queue is always empty there. Also: an in-flight echo probe is already the write continuation, so re-arming the timer for a queued reply would fork a second stty and throw away the first verdict; and teardown now hands queued uncontained writes to the pty best-effort instead of dropping bytes the caller was told were sent. Known scope limit, pinned by tests and tracked for follow-up: the guarantee is FIFO among recognised query replies, not over every byte — a reply coalesced with a keystroke, and ordinary typed input, still bypass the queue. Both were unordered before this change too.
174 lines
7.8 KiB
TypeScript
174 lines
7.8 KiB
TypeScript
// Why this module exists: xterm's public onData stream mixes real keystrokes
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// with the parser's synthetic replies to terminal queries a program embedded in
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// its output (CPR/DSR cursor + device-status reports, DA device attributes,
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// DECRPM mode reports, window/cell pixel-size reports, OSC 10/11 color reports,
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// kitty keyboard flag reports, DCS-framed DECRQSS/XTVERSION reports).
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// A querying program (e.g. starship/orb) reads these replies synchronously in
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// raw mode with a short timeout, so on the remote path they must NOT sit behind
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// the input debounce — a late reply lands on the shell prompt in cooked mode,
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// which echoes it literally and splices it into the next typed line (#7329).
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// This classifier lets the transport send replies immediately while keeping
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// ordinary typed input (including bursty arrow-key auto-repeat) coalesced.
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const ESC = String.fromCharCode(0x1b)
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// Built via new RegExp from \u-escaped strings so no literal control
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// characters appear in the source. // Final bytes of xterm's own query-reply grammars:
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// R — CPR / DECXCPR cursor position report (answer to CSI 6n / CSI ? 6n)
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// n — DSR device status report (answer to CSI 5n → CSI 0n)
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// c — DA1/DA2/DA3 device attributes (answer to CSI c / CSI > c / CSI = c)
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// t — window/cell pixel-size + text-area-size reports (CSI 14t/16t/18t)
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// y — DECRPM mode report (answer to CSI ? Ps $ p), body ends "$y"
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// u — kitty keyboard flags report (answer to CSI ? u), carries "?"
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/* oxlint-disable no-control-regex -- grammars match terminal ESC/BEL sequences by definition */
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// Known accepted collision: xterm.js encodes MODIFIED F3 (Shift/Ctrl/Alt+F3) as
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// `CSI 1 ; <mod> R`, which is indistinguishable from a CPR report (a classic
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// VT ambiguity). Such a keystroke skips input-intent/activity bookkeeping, and
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// takeLiveQueryReply will hold it behind a deferred reply like any CPR — so
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// within that window (bounded by the host's echo budget) a keystroke typed
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// after it can reach the pty first. Accepted: it needs the chord and a
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// following keypress inside a live colour-query deferral, and we keep the reply
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// grammar complete rather than special-casing an unresolvable ambiguity.
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const CPR_OR_DSR_RE = new RegExp('^\\u001b\\[\\??[0-9;]*[Rn]$')
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const DEVICE_ATTRIBUTES_RE = new RegExp('^\\u001b\\[[?>=]?[0-9;]*c$')
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// 4/6 = pixel-size reports, 8 = text-area size in characters (answer to CSI 18t).
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const WINDOW_SIZE_REPORT_RE = new RegExp('^\\u001b\\[[468];[0-9]+;[0-9]+t$')
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// `?` optional: private-mode reports carry it (DECRPM), ANSI-mode reports don't.
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const DECRPM_RE = new RegExp('^\\u001b\\[\\??[0-9;]*\\$y$')
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// Kitty keyboard protocol flags report: CSI ? flags u. The `?` distinguishes it
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// from kitty-protocol *keystrokes* (CSI code;mods u), which must stay batched.
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const KITTY_FLAGS_RE = new RegExp('^\\u001b\\[\\?[0-9]+u$')
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// OSC color/title responses: ESC ] Ps ; body ST (ST = BEL or ESC backslash).
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const OSC_RESPONSE_RE = new RegExp('^\\u001b\\][0-9]+;[^\\u0007\\u001b]*(?:\\u0007|\\u001b\\\\)$')
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// DCS-framed reports xterm emits: DECRQSS "ESC P 1 $ r Pt ST" / "ESC P 0 $ r ST"
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// (vim queries cursor style this way) and XTVERSION "ESC P > | text ST".
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const DCS_RESPONSE_RE = new RegExp('^\\u001bP(?:[01]\\$r[^\\u001b]*|>\\|[^\\u001b]*)\\u001b\\\\$')
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// Private-mode DSR (CSI ? … n) — e.g. color-scheme `?997;1n` — often lands cooked.
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// Prefix form peels consecutive replies out of one coalesced payload.
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const COOKED_ECHO_RISK_PRIVATE_DSR_PREFIX_RE = new RegExp('^\\u001b\\[\\?[0-9;]*n')
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const COOKED_ECHO_RISK_OSC_PREFIX_RE = new RegExp(
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'^\\u001b\\][0-9]+;[^\\u0007\\u001b]*(?:\\u0007|\\u001b\\\\)'
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)
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/* oxlint-enable no-control-regex */
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/**
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* True when `data` (from xterm.onData) is a synthetic reply the emulator
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* generated in response to a query — not something the user typed. These are
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* latency-critical and must bypass input coalescing on the remote transport.
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*
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* Conservative by design: matches only complete, well-formed reply grammars so
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* ordinary keystrokes and navigation sequences (arrows CSI A/B/C/D, Home/End,
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* function keys ending in ~, kitty CSI-u keystrokes) are never misclassified
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* as replies — with the single documented modified-F3/CPR collision above.
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*/
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export function isTerminalQueryReply(data: string): boolean {
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if (data.length < 3 || data[0] !== ESC) {
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return false
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}
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return (
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CPR_OR_DSR_RE.test(data) ||
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DEVICE_ATTRIBUTES_RE.test(data) ||
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WINDOW_SIZE_REPORT_RE.test(data) ||
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DECRPM_RE.test(data) ||
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KITTY_FLAGS_RE.test(data) ||
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OSC_RESPONSE_RE.test(data) ||
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DCS_RESPONSE_RE.test(data)
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)
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}
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/** End index (exclusive) of one cooked-echo-risk reply at `start`, else -1. */
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function cookedEchoSafeReplyEnd(data: string, start: number): number {
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if (start >= data.length || data[start] !== ESC) {
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return -1
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}
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const slice = data.slice(start)
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const dsr = COOKED_ECHO_RISK_PRIVATE_DSR_PREFIX_RE.exec(slice)
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if (dsr?.[0]) {
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return start + dsr[0].length
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}
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const osc = COOKED_ECHO_RISK_OSC_PREFIX_RE.exec(slice)
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if (osc?.[0]) {
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return start + osc[0].length
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}
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return -1
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}
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/**
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* If `data` is entirely one or more consecutive cooked-echo-risk replies, return each
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* reply. Repeats still arrive coalesced from a rapid theme flip or an older client that
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* answers 2031 subscribes (this host stopped — #9993), so peel them individually.
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* Mixed payloads (reply + keystroke) return null so hosts fall through to raw write.
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*/
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export function extractOnlyCookedEchoSafeQueryReplies(data: string): string[] | null {
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if (data.length < 4 || data[0] !== ESC) {
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return null
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}
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const replies: string[] = []
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let offset = 0
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while (offset < data.length) {
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const end = cookedEchoSafeReplyEnd(data, offset)
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if (end === -1) {
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return null
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}
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replies.push(data.slice(offset, end))
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offset = end
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}
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return replies.length > 0 ? replies : null
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}
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/**
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* Query replies that must use the ECHO-safe write path on POSIX PTYs so cooked
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* prompts do not paint reply bytes (e.g. `997;1n` on `npx` confirm, #13137).
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* Latency-critical CPR/DSR without `?` stay on the immediate write path.
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*
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* Whole-string only: a single complete reply. For repeated / write-queue
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* coalesced payloads use {@link extractOnlyCookedEchoSafeQueryReplies}.
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*/
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export function needsCookedEchoSafeQueryReply(data: string): boolean {
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const replies = extractOnlyCookedEchoSafeQueryReplies(data)
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return replies !== null && replies.length === 1
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}
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/** True if at least one extracted cooked-echo-risk reply is accepted by `answer`. */
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export function answerEachCookedEchoSafeQueryReply(
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data: string,
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answer: (reply: string) => boolean
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): boolean {
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const replies = extractOnlyCookedEchoSafeQueryReplies(data)
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if (!replies) {
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return false
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}
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let accepted = false
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for (const part of replies) {
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if (answer(part)) {
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accepted = true
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}
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}
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return accepted
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}
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/** Host-side ingress surface for replies the PTY owner may take ownership of. */
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export type LiveQueryReplyIngress = {
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answerLiveQueryReply: (reply: string) => boolean
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writeQueryReplyInOrder: (reply: string) => boolean
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}
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/**
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* True when `ingress` owns this write. A reply a cooked prompt would paint is deferred
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* behind an ECHO probe (#13137); a latency-critical reply (CPR/DA) is taken only while
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* one of those is still deferred, because termenv stops reading at the CPR it sends
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* after its color query — an early CPR strands the color reply in the tty for whatever
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* runs next (`gh auth login` -> "unexpected escape sequence from terminal").
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*/
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export function takeLiveQueryReply(
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ingress: LiveQueryReplyIngress | undefined,
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data: string
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): boolean {
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if (!ingress) {
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return false
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}
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return extractOnlyCookedEchoSafeQueryReplies(data)
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? ingress.answerLiveQueryReply(data)
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: isTerminalQueryReply(data) && ingress.writeQueryReplyInOrder(data)
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}
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