shoes/CONFIG.md

Configuration Reference

shoes uses YAML configuration files. Multiple configuration types can be combined in a single file or split across multiple files.

Table of Contents

• Configuration Structure
• Server Config
• Server Protocols
• TUN Config
• WireGuard
• Client Config
• Client Protocols
• Fake DNS
• Rules System
• Named Groups
• Named PEMs
• Advanced Features
• Command Line

WireGuard

WireGuard uses protocol: {type: wireguard} in ordinary client and server configs. It carries TCP/UDP flows over a userspace GotaTun device and smoltcp stack, not a TCP stream wrapper. Unix builds support WireGuard; Windows rejects it.

See server and client examples. Their demonstration keys must be replaced before deployment. Generate a private key with wg genkey and derive its public key with wg pubkey. Never share the private key.

Field	Meaning
private_key	Base64-encoded 32-byte private key
addresses	Nonempty local tunnel CIDRs; at most one address per family
peer_client_chain	Optional client chain carrying encrypted UDP packets to peers; accepts normal group, inline, and pool syntax
mtu	Inner IP MTU, default 1408; supported range 1280-1420
resource_limits	Same fields as TUN, with bounded WireGuard defaults

These fields live inside protocol. WireGuard implies UDP; transport: udp is optional. TCP/QUIC transports and their socket settings are rejected.

A client has one remote peer. Its ordinary address identifies that peer; public_key, optional pre_shared_key, allowed_ips, and persistent_keepalive belong directly in protocol, not a peers list:

- client_group: vpn
  client_proxies:
    - address: "vpn.example:51820"
      protocol:
        type: wireguard
        private_key: "<client-private-key>"
        public_key: "<server-public-key>"
        addresses: ["10.77.0.2/32"]
        allowed_ips: ["0.0.0.0/0"]
        persistent_keepalive: 25

Omitted client allowed_ips defaults to ["0.0.0.0/0", "::/0"]; an explicit empty list rejects. addresses remains required. Routes for an address family without a local tunnel address fail closed. These settings do not install host routes. For multiple upstreams, configure separate clients or a group pool.

A server has a nonempty protocol.peers list. Each peer requires public_key and explicit nonempty allowed_ips. Optional fields are pre_shared_key, endpoint: "host:port", and persistent_keepalive in seconds (zero disables it). Omit endpoint for a peer that initiates toward a directly listening server:

- address: "0.0.0.0:51820"
  protocol:
    type: wireguard
    wireguard_name: gateway
    private_key: "<server-private-key>"
    addresses: ["10.77.0.1/32"]
    peers:
      - public_key: "<client-public-key>"
        allowed_ips: ["10.77.0.2/32"]
  rules:
    - masks: ["192.168.10.0/24"]
      action: allow

Peer hostnames are resolved through native bootstrap DNS during preparation and refreshed on reload. Direct mode selects the first resolved address compatible with the bound socket at startup. Authenticated WireGuard roaming can update the active peer address without a reload in direct mode. Overlapping allowed prefixes between different peers, duplicate keys, and self-peering are rejected. Assign each client distinct tunnel addresses.

The server address must be one literal UDP socket address with a nonzero port, not a hostname, port range, or Unix socket path. 0.0.0.0:51820 listens only on IPv4; [::]:51820 uses a dual-stack socket where supported. Direct clients bind an ephemeral dual-stack wildcard, with IPv4 fallback when IPv6 is unavailable. Outer sockets retain mobile socket protection and interface binding. Optional bind_interface belongs at the client-config level for clients and inside protocol for servers; Linux/Android/Fuchsia support it. No OS interface, route, firewall rule, or NAT rule is created.

Servers require explicit nonempty top-level rules and may specify top-level dns and sniff. Missing, null, or empty rules reject; rules: block-all is valid. protocol.wireguard_name gives a server a stable, case-sensitive identity. When omitted, null, or empty, the server's public key supplies its identity instead. Duplicate names or duplicate unnamed public-key identities reject configuration, even with different listen addresses. Name-based and key-based identities are separate. Client deduplication is unchanged. Reordering servers or adding clients does not change server identity or private Fake DNS ownership. Use an explicit name to preserve that ownership across key rotation; changing the effective identity creates a different context and existing state files reject the new owner. Rules use the normal destination masks, overrides, and client chains. Clients accept replies to their outgoing flows, not unsolicited inbound flows. Per-peer authorization beyond cryptokey source validation is not supplied by destination rules. Authenticated peers can reach the gateway's local services unless rules block them. The server example blocks loopback and link-local destinations; restrict private networks too when peers should not access the gateway's LAN.

Use the client group from the first hop, or put the full client config inline:

client_chain:
  - vpn
  - address: "10.77.0.10:1080"
    protocol: {type: socks}

The second hop is optional. WireGuard cannot appear inside TLS/WebSocket or at later hops. A missing route, address family, failed endpoint, or unavailable peer never causes direct fallback.

To put proxies before WireGuard, configure peer_client_chain inside its protocol:

peer_client_chain:
  - address: "relay.example:443"
    protocol:
      type: tls
      protocol:
        type: vless
        user_id: "b85798ef-e9dc-46a4-9a87-8da4499d36d0"
        udp_enabled: true

The effective path is Shoes -> peer client chain -> WireGuard peer -> optional inner proxy chain -> destination. The routing rule still selects WireGuard at hop zero. See the complete detour example.

Peer chains use the normal inline, named-group and pool syntax. Their final hop must support UDP; earlier hops may be TCP-only. VLESS, VMess and compatible Shadowsocks/AnyTLS UDP-over-TCP configurations work. Shoes' SOCKS outbound only implements CONNECT, and Trojan outbound UDP is not implemented, so neither can be the final UDP hop. Pools select UDP-capable final members. Selection remains fixed for the life of an association; reconnection may select another member.

One persistent association is shared by all inner flows to each resolved peer destination; peers with the same resolved destination share an association. No native WireGuard UDP listener is opened. Configure physical interface binding on the first carrier client, not the WireGuard socket. A proxied server must omit its top-level listen address and specify endpoint and nonzero persistent_keepalive on every peer. It initiates handshakes to establish return mappings, then its ordinary rules handle incoming tunnel flows. It cannot accept arbitrary public peers through the proxy. See the proxied server example. peer_client_chain conflicts with a server listen address or WireGuard socket interface binding. Clients without keepalive initiate a handshake when an outbound inner flow needs one.

Detoured destinations are fixed for the configuration generation. Their message streams do not expose source addresses, so arbitrary peer address roaming is not supported. Peer hostname changes require reload. Peer and outer-proxy bootstrap use native DNS independently of routed DNS and the server's dns. Ensure host DNS and host routes do not themselves require the tunnel being established.

Outer connect and blocked-write attempts time out after 10 seconds. Failed streams retry with backoff from 250 ms to 10 seconds, never falling back to direct UDP. Offline/overflow packets are dropped rather than indefinitely buffered; WireGuard and inner TCP perform their normal retries. Use persistent_keepalive to maintain idle proxy UDP mappings. Silent blackholes without stream errors remain UDP loss. Queues hold at most 64 packets per destination and 64 aggregate received packets, with a 2048-byte outer datagram limit, above the supported inner MTU plus WireGuard overhead. Shutdown waits for workers to release their associations.

The peer chain can itself start with another WireGuard client. Dependencies start first, regardless of declaration order; self-dependencies and indirect cycles (including pool alternatives) are rejected. A direct WireGuard-in-WireGuard carrier requires round_up(inner_mtu, 16) + 80 <= carrier_mtu, conservatively accounting for IPv6, UDP and WireGuard overhead. For example, inner MTU 1280 fits carrier MTU 1408. A TCP proxy after the carrier segments packets instead. External path MTU still needs operator tuning; UDP-over-TCP can introduce head-of-line blocking.

Identical clients share one device per configuration generation, even when copied between different groups or inline locations. Identity is the configured peer address, derived client public key, and server public key, not a resolved or roaming address. WireGuard defaults and equivalent key/address/route encodings, plus carrier interface and TCP socket defaults, are normalized before comparison. Local address prefixes are canonicalized to host prefixes; routing prefixes retain their meaning. Other carrier protocol settings are compared as configured. Conflicting addresses, routes, PSKs, MTUs, limits, interfaces, or peer chains for the same identity reject rather than silently merging. Different identities and servers remain separate. Unused client groups open no sockets. Unreferenced WireGuard-routed DNS groups are validated but not prepared; selecting the group through a server or TUN dns field activates its devices.

DNS remains independently configured. Merely defining a WireGuard client does not tunnel the application's default native DNS. Explicit TCP DNS, DoT, and DoH client chains may use WireGuard with a literal upstream IP. Use server_name for TLS authentication where needed. UDP DNS, HTTP/3 DNS, hostname upstreams on WireGuard chains, and bootstrap dependencies on WireGuard-routed DNS groups are rejected. Endpoint bootstrap itself is native DNS, not DNS through the not-yet-active tunnel.

This is TCP/UDP proxying, not arbitrary IP routing. Remote destinations see the gateway's outgoing proxy connection, not the original client's source address. A non-Shoes gateway must provide the required routes and forwarding or NAT for destinations behind it. ICMP forwarding, IP fragment reassembly, peer-to-peer IP forwarding, WARP reserved bytes, and wg-quick import are not implemented.

Fragmented input and unsupported IPv6 extension chains are dropped before transport parsing. TCP advertises an MSS derived from the MTU. Outbound UDP writes larger than MTU minus 28 bytes (IPv4) or 48 bytes (IPv6) are dropped and counted without closing the flow; they are never truncated. UDP queue-budget exhaustion also drops individual writes. At MTU 1408 the payload limits are 1380 and 1360 bytes. Oversized UDP responses on inbound forwarding are dropped. Large DNS replies should use TCP-based transports. Reduce MTU for constrained underlays; automatic path-MTU discovery is not provided. Packets received from a peer above the local MTU are also dropped. Configure matching MTUs on both sides, including peers whose default is 1420 rather than Shoes' 1408; TCP MSS negotiation does not protect UDP traffic.

Default admission limits are 256 TCP connections, 32 KiB TCP buffers, a 32 MiB TCP buffer budget, 1024 UDP sessions, 4096 UDP destinations, 64 destinations per inbound UDP session, and 8 MiB queued UDP payloads. UDP forwarding and outbound associations have separate bounded pools. Missing or null limit fields use WireGuard defaults rather than the unlimited TUN defaults. Packet and command queues are bounded at 64. These budgets cover modeled Shoes-owned state, not total process RSS or all GotaTun state.

The TCP buffers bound the advertised receive window and in-flight data across the tunnel. A 32 KiB window limits a single flow to roughly 5 Mbit/s at 50 ms RTT or 2.6 Mbit/s at 100 ms RTT, before other bottlenecks. For higher-bandwidth, higher-latency links, set resource_limits.tcp_buffer_size to, for example, 262144 (256 KiB). Four buffers are budgeted per flow, so retaining 256 connections at that size also requires tcp_memory_bytes: 268435456 (256 MiB); the default 32 MiB budget would admit only 32 connections. Tune against measured RTT, throughput, and available memory rather than increasing buffers unconditionally.

Periodic logs report endpoint flow/drop counts and each peer's public key, handshake age, and byte counters. Private keys and PSKs are redacted.

Preparation failures retain the old configuration. Successful reloads disconnect existing tunnel flows and rebuild endpoints; sessions are not migrated. Bind failures during activation can still terminate the process after the old generation has stopped. Shutdown waits for buffered UDP tasks to release their sockets before rebind. No host route cleanup is necessary.

Configuration Structure

A configuration file is a YAML array containing one or more configuration entries. Each entry can be:

• Server Config - Defines a proxy server instance
• TUN Config - Defines a TUN/VPN device for transparent proxying
• Client Config Group - Defines reusable upstream proxy configurations
• Rule Config Group - Defines reusable routing rules
• Named PEM - Defines reusable certificate/key data

# Server configs have 'address' or 'path', except proxied WireGuard servers
- address: "0.0.0.0:8080"
  protocol: ...

# TUN configs have 'device_name' or 'device_fd'
- device_name: "tun0"
  address: "10.0.0.1"
  ...

# Client config groups have 'client_group'
- client_group: my-upstream
  client_proxy: ...

# Rule config groups have 'rule_group'
- rule_group: my-rules
  rules: ...

# Named PEMs have 'pem'
- pem: my-cert
  path: /path/to/cert.pem

Server Config

WireGuard servers require one literal UDP address with a nonzero port, or omit the bind location when peer_client_chain is configured. They do not support port ranges, multiple bind addresses, or Unix socket paths. See WireGuard.

# Bind to IP address and port
address: "0.0.0.0:8080"        # IPv4
address: "[::]:8080"           # IPv6
address: "0.0.0.0:443-445"     # Port range

# OR bind to multiple addresses and port ranges (`address` is also accepted)
addresses:
  - "127.0.0.1:22223"
  - "172.17.0.1:22223-22225"

# OR bind to Unix socket (TCP only)
path: "/tmp/shoes.sock"

# Protocol configuration (required)
protocol: ServerProxyConfig

# Transport layer (default: tcp)
transport: tcp | quic          # WireGuard only: udp (default, required)

# TCP settings (only when transport: tcp)
tcp_settings:
  no_delay: true               # Default: true

# QUIC settings (required when transport: quic)
quic_settings:
  cert: string                 # TLS certificate (path or named PEM)
  key: string                  # TLS private key (path or named PEM)
  alpn_protocols: [string]     # Optional ALPN protocols
  client_ca_certs: [string]    # Optional client CA certificates
  client_fingerprints: [string] # Optional client certificate fingerprints
  num_endpoints: int           # Optional, 0 = auto (based on thread count)
  key_exchange_groups: [X25519MLKEM768] # Optional; see TLS Key Exchange below

# Routing rules (default: allow-all-direct; WireGuard requires explicit nonempty rules)
rules: string | [RuleConfig]

Server Protocols

HTTP

protocol:
  type: http
  username: string?            # Optional authentication
  password: string?

Accepts HTTP/1.0 and HTTP/1.1 CONNECT and absolute-form forwarding, plus multiplexed TCP CONNECT over HTTP/2. H2 is detected from its connection preface; cleartext H2 requires prior knowledge, not HTTP Upgrade. Authentication applies independently to every H2 stream. A successful CONNECT response is sent only after the destination connects.

H2 connections with no active tunnels close after 60 seconds; PINGs and rejected authentication attempts do not extend that interval. Missing credentials receive a 407 challenge. Incorrect credentials also begin connection shutdown, preventing repeated password guesses on one carrier.

For HTTPS proxying, wrap HTTP in a TLS server and explicitly configure alpn_protocols: [h2, http/1.1] on its TLS target. HTTP does not change the parent layer's ALPN defaults. H2 GET/POST forwarding, extended CONNECT, CONNECT-UDP, and HTTP/3 are not supported. This is standard HTTP proxying, not NaiveProxy or XHTTP.

SOCKS5

protocol:
  type: socks                  # Aliases: socks5
  username: string?
  password: string?
  udp_enabled: true            # Default: true (enables UDP ASSOCIATE)

Mixed (HTTP + SOCKS5)

protocol:
  type: mixed                  # Aliases: http+socks, socks+http
  username: string?
  password: string?
  udp_enabled: true            # Default: true (enables UDP ASSOCIATE for SOCKS5)

Auto-detects HTTP (including H2 CONNECT) or SOCKS5.

Shadowsocks

protocol:
  type: shadowsocks            # Aliases: ss
  cipher: string               # See supported ciphers below
  password: string

# Supported ciphers:
# - aes-128-gcm
# - aes-256-gcm
# - chacha20-ietf-poly1305
# - 2022-blake3-aes-128-gcm
# - 2022-blake3-aes-256-gcm
# - 2022-blake3-chacha20-ietf-poly1305

VMess

protocol:
  type: vmess
  cipher: string               # aes-128-gcm, chacha20-poly1305, none
  user_id: string              # UUID
  udp_enabled: true            # Default: true (enables XUDP)

Note: VMess AEAD mode is always enabled. The legacy force_aead field is deprecated and non-AEAD mode is no longer supported.

Replay protection uses a process-wide cache of at most 65,536 Auth-IDs, shared across credentials, listeners, and reloads. Entries remain protected through their timestamp's 120-second validity window; future-dated IDs can occupy a slot for about four minutes. A full cache rejects new authentication rather than evicting live entries. Heavy traffic from one credential can therefore exhaust capacity for other VMess users in the same process. A backward system-clock step also pauses authentication until the clock catches up.

VLESS

protocol:
  type: vless
  user_id: string              # UUID
  udp_enabled: true            # Default: true (enables XUDP)
  fallback: string?            # Optional fallback destination for failed auth (e.g., "127.0.0.1:80")

Trojan

protocol:
  type: trojan
  password: string
  shadowsocks:                 # Optional encryption layer
    cipher: string
    password: string

Snell v3

protocol:
  type: snell
  cipher: string               # aes-128-gcm, aes-256-gcm, chacha20-ietf-poly1305
  password: string
  udp_enabled: true            # Default: true
  udp_num_sockets: 1           # Default: 1, sockets per UDP session

TLS Server

protocol:
  type: tls

  # Standard TLS targets (by SNI)
  tls_targets:                 # Aliases: sni_targets, targets
    "example.com":
      cert: string             # Certificate (path or named PEM)
      key: string              # Private key (path or named PEM)
      alpn_protocols: [string] # Optional ALPN
      client_ca_certs: [string] # Optional client CA certs
      client_fingerprints: [string] # Optional client cert fingerprints
      vision: false            # Enable Vision (requires VLESS inner protocol)
      key_exchange_groups: [X25519MLKEM768] # Optional; see TLS Key Exchange below
      protocol: ServerProxyConfig
      override_rules: [RuleConfig] # Optional rule override

  # Default TLS target (for unmatched/no SNI)
  default_tls_target:          # Aliases: default_target
    cert: string
    key: string
    # ... same fields as tls_targets

  # Reality targets (by SNI)
  reality_targets:
    "www.cloudflare.com":
      private_key: string      # X25519 private key (base64url)
      mldsa65_seed: string?     # Optional 32-byte ML-DSA-65 seed (unpadded base64url)
      short_ids: [string]      # Valid client IDs (hex, 0-16 chars)
      dest: string             # Fallback destination (e.g., "example.com:443")
      dest_client_chain: ClientChain?  # Optional proxy chain for reaching dest
      max_time_diff: 60000     # Max timestamp diff in ms (default: 60000)
      min_client_version: [1, 8, 0]  # Optional [major, minor, patch]
      max_client_version: [2, 0, 0]  # Optional [major, minor, patch]
      cipher_suites: [string]  # Optional TLS 1.3 cipher suites (see below)
      vision: false            # Enable Vision (requires VLESS inner protocol)
      protocol: ServerProxyConfig
      override_rules: [RuleConfig]

  # ShadowTLS v3 targets (by SNI)
  shadowtls_targets:
    "example.com":
      password: string
      handshake:
        # Local handshake (with own certificate):
        cert: string
        key: string
        alpn_protocols: [string]
        client_ca_certs: [string]
        client_fingerprints: [string]
        # OR Remote handshake (proxy to real server):
        address: string        # e.g., "google.com:443"
        client_proxies: [ClientConfig] # Optional proxies for handshake
      protocol: ServerProxyConfig
      override_rules: [RuleConfig]

  # Buffer size for TLS (optional, min 16384)
  tls_buffer_size: int

WebSocket

protocol:
  type: websocket              # Aliases: ws
  targets:
    - matching_path: string?   # Optional path filter (e.g., "/ws")
      matching_headers:        # Optional header filters
        X-Custom-Header: "value"
      protocol: ServerProxyConfig
      ping_type: ping-frame    # disabled | ping-frame | empty-frame
      override_rules: [RuleConfig]

Port Forward

protocol:
  type: forward                # Aliases: port_forward, portforward
  targets: string | [string]   # Target address(es)

Hysteria2

protocol:
  type: hysteria2
  password: string
  udp_enabled: true            # Default: true

TUIC v5

protocol:
  type: tuic                   # Aliases: tuicv5
  uuid: string                 # UUID
  password: string
  zero_rtt_handshake: false    # Default: false (enables 0-RTT for lower latency)

AnyTLS

protocol:
  type: anytls
  users:                       # One or more users
    - name: string?            # Optional display name
      password: string         # User password
  udp_enabled: true            # Default: true (enables UDP over TCP)
  padding_scheme: [string]?    # Optional custom padding (e.g., ["stop=8", "0=30-30"])
  fallback: string?            # Optional fallback destination for failed auth

AnyTLS is a TLS-based multiplexing proxy protocol with traffic obfuscation. Should be used within TLS or Reality.

NaiveProxy

protocol:
  type: naiveproxy             # Aliases: naive
  users:                       # One or more users
    - name: string?            # Optional display name
      username: string         # Basic Auth username
      password: string         # Basic Auth password
  padding: true                # Default: true (enables padding protocol)
  udp_enabled: true            # Default: true (enables UDP over TCP)
  fallback: string?            # Optional path to serve static files for probe resistance

NaiveProxy implements HTTP/2 CONNECT with padding for censorship resistance. Should be used within TLS with alpn_protocols: ["h2"].

TUN Config

TUN (network TUNnel) devices operate at the IP layer (Layer 3), allowing shoes to act as a transparent VPN.

# Linux: Create TUN device by name
device_name: string            # Device name (e.g., "tun0")
address: string                # Device IP address (e.g., "10.0.0.1")
netmask: string?               # Netmask (e.g., "255.255.255.0")
destination: string?           # Gateway/destination (Linux only)

# iOS/Android: Use existing file descriptor
device_fd: int                 # FD from VpnService (Android) or NEPacketTunnelProvider (iOS)

# Common settings
mtu: 1500                      # Default: 1500 (Linux), 9000 (Android), 4064 (iOS)
tcp_enabled: true              # Default: true
udp_enabled: true              # Default: true
icmp_enabled: true             # Default: true

# Routing rules
rules: [RuleConfig]

Platform notes:

• Linux: Requires root or CAP_NET_ADMIN. Creates device with specified name/address.
• Android: Use device_fd from VpnService.Builder.establish(). Routes configured via VpnService.
• iOS: Use device_fd from NEPacketTunnelProvider.packetFlow.

Example (Linux):

- device_name: "tun0"
  address: "10.0.0.1"
  netmask: "255.255.255.0"
  mtu: 1500
  tcp_enabled: true
  udp_enabled: true
  rules:
    - masks: "0.0.0.0/0"
      action: allow
      client_chain:
        address: "proxy.example.com:443"
        protocol:
          type: tls
          protocol:
            type: vless
            user_id: "uuid"

Client Config

Used in rules to specify upstream proxies.

address: string                # Proxy server address (e.g., "proxy.example.com:1080")
protocol: ClientProxyConfig
transport: tcp | quic          # Default: tcp; WireGuard only: udp (default, required)
bind_interface: string         # Optional, Linux/Android/Fuchsia only

tcp_settings:
  no_delay: true

quic_settings:
  verify: true                 # Default: true
  server_fingerprints: [string]
  sni_hostname: string
  alpn_protocols: [string]
  cert: string                 # Client certificate for mTLS
  key: string                  # Client key for mTLS
  key_exchange_groups: [X25519MLKEM768] # Optional; see TLS Key Exchange below

WireGuard clients use address for their peer endpoint and reject TCP/QUIC socket settings. See WireGuard for their protocol fields.

Client Protocols

Direct

protocol:
  type: direct

HTTP

protocol:
  type: http
  username: string?
  password: string?
  http_version: h1             # h1 (default) or h2
  resolve_hostname: false      # Resolve destinations locally before CONNECT

Both versions establish TCP CONNECT tunnels. When the H2 proxy is the first and only hop, eligible routes reuse a connection for multiple concurrent tunnels. Chained H2 hops use the carrier established through the selected prefix rather than sharing tunnels across routes. H1 retains its existing one-tunnel-per-connection behavior. There is no automatic version fallback or replay after a failed CONNECT.

For H2 over TLS, set http_version: h2 here and alpn_protocols: [h2] on the enclosing TLS client. The handshake must negotiate h2. Omitted or explicit http_version: h1 preserves legacy behavior: it sends HTTP/1.1 without checking the negotiated ALPN. Set alpn_protocols: [http/1.1] on the enclosing TLS client when the peer requires ALPN to match the HTTP version. Cleartext H2 uses prior knowledge. See examples/http2-proxy.yaml.

SOCKS5

protocol:
  type: socks
  username: string?
  password: string?

Shadowsocks

protocol:
  type: shadowsocks
  cipher: string
  password: string

Snell

protocol:
  type: snell
  cipher: string
  password: string

VMess

protocol:
  type: vmess
  cipher: string
  user_id: string
  h2mux:                         # Optional h2mux multiplexing (see below)
    max_connections: 4
    min_streams: 4
    max_streams: 0
    padding: false

Note: VMess AEAD mode is always enabled. The legacy aead field is deprecated.

VLESS

protocol:
  type: vless
  user_id: string
  h2mux:                         # Optional h2mux multiplexing (see below)
    max_connections: 4
    min_streams: 4
    max_streams: 0
    padding: false

Trojan

protocol:
  type: trojan
  password: string
  shadowsocks:                 # Optional
    cipher: string
    password: string
  h2mux:                         # Optional h2mux multiplexing (see below)
    max_connections: 4
    min_streams: 4
    max_streams: 0
    padding: false

H2MUX Multiplexing

H2MUX multiplexes multiple proxy streams over a single HTTP/2 connection, reducing connection overhead. Compatible with sing-box. Available for VMess, VLESS, and Trojan client protocols.

h2mux:
  max_connections: 4           # Maximum connections to maintain (default: 4)
  min_streams: 4               # Min streams before opening new connection (default: 4)
  max_streams: 0               # Max streams per connection, 0 = unlimited (default: 0)
  padding: false               # Enable padding for traffic obfuscation (default: false)

Server support: H2MUX is auto-detected on servers. No configuration needed.

TLS Client

protocol:
  type: tls
  verify: true                 # Default: true
  server_fingerprints: [string]
  sni_hostname: string
  alpn_protocols: [string]
  tls_buffer_size: int
  cert: string                 # Client certificate for mTLS
  key: string                  # Client key for mTLS
  vision: false                # Enable Vision (requires VLESS inner protocol)
  key_exchange_groups: [X25519MLKEM768] # Optional; see TLS Key Exchange below
  protocol: ClientProxyConfig

TLS Key Exchange

key_exchange_groups is an optional, ordered allowlist for ordinary TLS clients, TLS server targets (including default_tls_target), and client/server quic_settings. It applies to that TLS layer, regardless of the inner proxy protocol. Supported names are case-sensitive:

• X25519MLKEM768: native rustls X25519 + ML-KEM-768 hybrid.
• SecP256r1MLKEM768: native rustls P-256 + ML-KEM-768 hybrid.
• X25519, SecP256r1, SecP384r1: classical groups.

Omitting the field preserves rustls defaults: currently X25519+ML-KEM-768 is preferred, with classical fallback. An explicit list replaces those defaults; the first client group normally supplies the initial key share. Empty lists, duplicates, null, unknown names, standalone ML-KEM, and SecP384r1MLKEM1024 are rejected. No custom cryptographic implementations are used.

Client QUIC allowlists require a non-direct client at the first chain hop (hop 0), where Shoes creates the QUIC transport. Explicit allowlists on direct clients or later hops are rejected, including entries resolved from groups or pools. Use ordinary TLS in a later hop's protocol when that hop needs its own hybrid-protected tunnel.

To require hybrid exchange without classical fallback:

key_exchange_groups: [X25519MLKEM768, SecP256r1MLKEM768]

Hybrid-only lists force TLS 1.3 and disable early application data. TLS 1.3 resumption remains enabled and still performs a fresh exchange using an allowed hybrid group. Peers offering only classical groups or TLS 1.2 cannot connect. For opportunistic hybrid exchange with explicit classical fallback, use a mixed list such as [X25519MLKEM768, X25519, SecP256r1].

Hybrid-only lists cannot be combined with vision: true on the same TLS layer: Vision direct copy bypasses that layer's encryption. They also cannot be combined with TUIC zero_rtt_handshake: true. Ordinary outer TLS or QUIC can still protect a separate inner Vision connection. The setting does not apply to REALITY, VLESS encryption, or ShadowTLS camouflage handshakes; it is rejected on ShadowTLS configurations and with deprecated shadowtls_password.

Hybrid key exchange protects session-key establishment, not certificate signatures. Certificate verification, fingerprints, and mTLS work as before. verify: false without a trusted fingerprint still permits active impersonation.

Reality Client

protocol:
  type: reality
  public_key: string           # Server's X25519 public key (base64url)
  mldsa65_verify: string?      # Optional pinned 1952-byte ML-DSA-65 key (unpadded base64url)
  short_id: string             # Your client ID (hex, 0-16 chars)
  sni_hostname: string         # SNI to send (must match server's reality_targets key)
  cipher_suites: [string]      # Optional TLS 1.3 cipher suites (see below)
  vision: false                # Enable Vision (requires VLESS inner protocol)
  protocol: ClientProxyConfig  # Inner protocol (typically VLESS)

Reality cipher suites: Valid values are TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256. If not specified, all three are offered/supported.

Reality offers X25519MLKEM768 first, with X25519 fallback. Servers follow the camouflage target's selected group; choose a PQ-preferring TLS 1.3 target to negotiate hybrid key exchange. Legacy X25519 clients remain supported. Debug logs report the authenticated connection's negotiated_group.

For Xray servers, use v25.5.16 or newer. Xray v25.4.30 and earlier cannot synthesize a hybrid-selected target handshake: when a PQ-capable target selects X25519MLKEM768, those servers forward to the real target and Shoes rejects its certificate. X25519 fallback does not prevent this failure because the target has already selected the hybrid group.

mldsa65_seed enables optional server signing. Clients with mldsa65_verify require a matching signature and reject unsigned or incorrectly signed connections. These fields correspond to Xray's mldsa65Seed and mldsa65Verify; neither replaces the existing X25519 key. Omit the fields to disable this extra authentication; empty or incorrectly sized values are invalid.

Enable server signing before distributing verification keys. The camouflage certificate flight must have room for the extra 3309-byte signature and DER overhead; insufficient capacity falls back to the real target instead of silently removing the signature. Removing signing later requires coordinating clients that already pin its key. Vision's direct mode relies on the inner TLS connection for payload encryption, not the outer Reality hybrid exchange.

ShadowTLS Client

protocol:
  type: shadowtls
  password: string
  sni_hostname: string?        # Optional SNI override
  protocol: ClientProxyConfig

WebSocket Client

protocol:
  type: websocket
  matching_path: string?
  matching_headers:
    header_name: string
  ping_type: ping-frame        # disabled | ping-frame | empty-frame
  protocol: ClientProxyConfig

Port Forward (No-op)

protocol:
  type: portforward            # Aliases: noop

Passes through the raw connection without protocol wrapping. Useful for testing or transparent proxying.

AnyTLS Client

protocol:
  type: anytls
  password: string             # User password
  udp_enabled: true            # Default: true (enables UDP over TCP)
  padding_scheme: [string]?    # Optional custom padding scheme

NaiveProxy Client

protocol:
  type: naiveproxy             # Aliases: naive
  username: string             # Basic Auth username
  password: string             # Basic Auth password
  padding: true                # Default: true (enables padding protocol)

NaiveProxy retains its own HTTP/2 client transport policies, independent of http_version: h2 on standard HTTP proxies: 256 KiB stream and connection receive windows, the H2 library's 16 MiB response-header decoding limit, and no periodic HTTP/2 PING watchdog. Peer stream limits and timeouts still apply. In particular, Caddy v2.11.7 defaults to a one-minute request-body idle timeout, which can end a quiet CONNECT tunnel; connection-level PINGs do not reset that timeout.

Fake DNS

Fake DNS is opt-in on a server (including WireGuard) or TUN configuration:

dns:
  servers: "tls://1.1.1.1"
  fake_ip: true

It intercepts logical TCP and UDP destinations on port 53 after inbound authentication/admission, before destination rules. It does not open a DNS listener or intercept encrypted DNS. Intercepted DNS is answered locally or forwarded through dns.servers, never to the application's requested resolver. An explicit rule override to port 53 is ordinary forwarding, not interception.

A/AAAA synthesis creates scoped mappings. Later connections to those addresses restore the hostname before routing or hostname sniffing. A restored hostname is resolved normally when a rule or direct connection needs a real IP; a proxy can receive the hostname instead. With sniff: true, visible TLS SNI or HTTP Host takes precedence for hostname rules only; the restored name remains the connection target and is what IP rules resolve. Both hints are client-controlled, so a different sniffed name can bypass a hostname deny rule on the restored name. Unmapped addresses inside the receiving context's ranges fail closed. Addresses from another context's non-overlapping range are not recognized and are routed as ordinary IPs. Overlapping ranges may map to an unrelated hostname in the receiving context. Use one shared named DNS group for inbounds serving the same clients. Established flows keep their chosen target.

false disables the feature. An options object enables it with these defaults:

fake_ip:
  ipv4_range: "198.18.0.0/15"
  ipv6_range: null
  max_entries: 65536
  bypass_domains: []
  missing_family: forward
  https_records: forward
  state_file: null

• Pools must be CIDRs with usable addresses; reserve non-conflicting ranges and route them through the same ingress. The base and base+1 addresses are reserved, as is IPv4 broadcast. Real upstream, bootstrap, proxy, configured forwarding/fallback targets, and literal rule-override addresses cannot be inside any active or retained fake range. These checks apply even to inbounds without Fake DNS or with it explicitly disabled.
• TUN interface and gateway addresses cannot overlap any active or retained pool, except its reserved base+1 address. An address inside overlapping pools must be reserved in every one of them, regardless of the TUN's DNS context.
• max_entries bounds retained domain mappings, not the allocation range. Least-recently-used domains are evicted; sequential allocation traverses the entire range before reuse. Synthetic answers have a 60-second TTL. This is not a guarantee that a mapping remains valid for 60 seconds under pressure.
• bypass_domains uses the normal hostname-mask suffix matching, including subdomains. Excluded names and IP-shaped questions are forwarded.
• missing_family: forward forwards queries for a disabled family; nodata returns an empty successful answer instead.
• https_records: forward preserves HTTPS/SVCB answers; suppress returns empty successful answers for both types. Forwarded address hints and ECH can bypass hostname-based routing; suppression trades away those capabilities.
• Other record types use real upstream exchange. Valid negative/error answers are retained. Multi-question queries receive FORMERR; TSIG/SIG(0), zone transfers, and non-query operations are refused. Synthesized answers are unsigned and do not claim DNSSEC authentication.

Named DNS groups share one pool across every referencing inbound:

- dns_group: shared-fake
  dns_servers: ["tls://1.1.1.1"]
  fake_ip: true
- address: "0.0.0.0:1080"
  protocol: {type: socks}
  dns: {servers: shared-fake}

Inline fake_ip creates a private context, even when servers references a named group. Omit the inline override to share the group's mappings. Combining fake-enabled groups requires an explicit policy on the composed group.

Private context identity uses the server transport and configured listen addresses (including their order), or the Unix socket path. TUN contexts use device_name (default when omitted); WireGuard contexts use the name/public-key identity described above. Changing these inputs changes private pool and snapshot ownership. Use a named dns_group when ownership must survive listener changes or address reordering. An existing state file with a different owner is rejected.

Compatible reloads retain mappings, including explicit disable/re-enable under the same group/inline identity. Pool ranges, capacity, or state-file ownership changes require restart. Without state_file, restart loses the mappings. Previously active synthetic ranges and endpoints remain excluded from real DNS, carrier resolution, and configured forwarding/override targets until restart, including after a context is removed. With a state file, snapshots are private, atomically replaced, locked against multiple writers, and checked for pool and context identity compatibility. Create its parent directory before startup; protect it because the file records queried domains. State filenames must not end in .lock (case-insensitive); that suffix is reserved for ownership locks. Cursor reservations are persisted before issuance; a crash can lose recent mappings, which then fail closed rather than restoring an obsolete owner. Back up or explicitly remove incompatible state before changing its pool configuration. Persistent families need at least two allocatable addresses, and persistent pools are limited to 383,473 entries to fit the snapshot read limit; unusually long context names reduce the available snapshot capacity. Reservations may skip unused addresses after restart; Windows power-loss durability and state-file ACLs require platform-specific verification.

Omitted servers uses system DNS. Desktop discovery is a periodically refreshed endpoint snapshot, not the OS's complete split/scoped DNS policy. Keep discovered resolvers and any loopback stub's own upstream traffic outside TUN capture to avoid recursive interception. Android/iOS hosts must supply underlying real dns.servers explicitly; automatic VPN system discovery is not supported. Host-local TUN deployments should configure explicit real upstreams: native hostname lookups can otherwise re-enter the host's intercepted resolver. Fake-enabled system configurations fail startup if no usable endpoints can be discovered. Later upstream failures produce DNS failure, not a public-provider fallback. UDP and HTTP/3 upstreams remain direct-only; TCP/TLS/HTTPS can use client chains. UDP truncation retries TCP only when that transport is explicitly configured. Groups with mixed upstream settings try their remaining configured resolvers for a complete successful or negative reply before returning a truncated answer. The retained truncated reply is returned if fallback fails or reaches the forwarding deadline; it still passes the real-address guards. Local UDP DNS peers process one query at a time with bounded backpressure; a forwarded query can delay subsequent synthetic answers until its deadline.

SOCKS, UoT, H2MUX, XUDP, Hysteria2, and TUIC preserve the original logical reply address. Snell's reply format supports only IP addresses: hostname-addressed DNS requires a real lookup for its reply identity and fails if that lookup fails. Literal-address DNS interception remains fully local on Snell.

See the shared-pool example.

Rules System

Rules determine how incoming connections are routed.

TCP Hostname Sniffing

Set sniff: true on a server (including WireGuard) or TUN configuration to use visible TLS ClientHello SNI or cleartext HTTP/1.0 and HTTP/1.1 Host for hostname rules. The default is false. The option applies to logical TCP streams, including multiplexed and QUIC-carried TCP, not UDP/QUIC Initial packets, HTTP/2 or HTTP/3 application headers, or the outer TLS carrier handshake. Nested override_rules inherit the setting.

Sniffing applies to literal IP targets, including restored Fake DNS mappings, when hostname rules exist. Explicitly supplied hostnames are not sniffed. The sniffed hostname takes precedence over the restored DNS name for hostname rules only. IP/CIDR masks and the outbound destination still use the original real IP or restored DNS hostname, including through proxy chains. IP rules resolve the restored hostname when needed, never the sniffed name. An explicit rule override_address can still change the destination.

Capture is best-effort, limited to 300 ms and 64 KiB of wire data. Unknown, malformed, oversized, or incomplete TLS or HTTP falls back to ordinary routing using the original IP or restored DNS hostname; captured bytes are replayed unchanged. Transport errors still terminate the connection. Server-first applications can incur the full delay. When more client bytes are needed, response-gated protocols send success before routing/dialing; a later failure closes or resets the stream rather than sending another status.

HTTP inspection accepts origin-form requests (GET /path HTTP/1.1) and OPTIONS *, on any destination port. It requires a complete CRLF-delimited header section with exactly one valid Host and at most 128 fields. Host names are matched case-insensitively with an optional terminal DNS dot; a numeric port is validated but never changes the destination or rule-matching port. IP-literal Host values, duplicate Host fields, absolute-form requests, and CONNECT requests produce no hint. Request bodies are not parsed or awaited.

The probe sees application bytes after proxy setup: the outer CONNECT headers are not sniffed. A plaintext request inside a tunnel exposes Host; an inner HTTPS connection still exposes only visible TLS SNI. Normal HTTP forward-proxy requests are rewritten to origin-form before reaching the probe.

Routing happens once per logical TCP stream. Later keep-alive or pipelined requests with different Host values, and traffic after an HTTP Upgrade, remain on the first route without another hostname check. Existing sniff: true configurations now also use HTTP Host; omitted or false settings are unchanged. See the HTTP Host example.

SNI and Host are client-controlled, not authenticated identity or a domain firewall. Put mandatory IP deny rules before hostname allows. With ECH, only the visible outer name is available, not the encrypted inner hostname. For Fake DNS flows, that outer name takes precedence over the restored hostname for hostname rules. Disable sniff when routing must follow the restored name, or configure rules for the ECH public names.

Rule Config

rules:
  - masks: Mask | [Mask]      # Strings, typed predicates, file sources, or group references
    no_resolve: boolean?      # Default false; known IPs still participate
    action: allow | block     # Default allow
    # For action: allow
    override_address: string?  # Optional address override
    client_chain: ClientChain | [ClientChain]  # Proxy chain(s) for routing

Client Chains

Client chains define how traffic is routed through upstream proxies. Each chain is a sequence of "hops" - proxies that traffic passes through in order.

# Single proxy (simplest form)
client_chain: my-proxy-group           # Reference a named group
client_chain:                          # Or inline config
  address: "proxy.example.com:1080"
  protocol:
    type: socks

# Multi-hop chain (traffic goes: client -> hop1 -> hop2 -> target)
client_chain:
  chain:
    - first-proxy-group
    - second-proxy-group

# Multiple chains (round-robin selection)
client_chains:
  - us-proxy-group                     # Chain 1: single hop
  - chain: [proxy1, proxy2]            # Chain 2: multi-hop

# Load balancing at a hop (pool)
client_chain:
  chain:
    - pool: [us-proxies, eu-proxies]   # Round-robin between pool members
    - final-proxy

Migration note: The client_proxy / client_proxies fields still work but are deprecated. Please migrate to client_chain / client_chains.

Mask Syntax

# IP/CIDR masks
masks: "0.0.0.0/0"             # Any destination, including hostnames and IPv6
masks: "::/0"                  # Same legacy universal predicate
masks: "192.168.0.0/16"        # Subnet
masks: "10.0.0.1:80"           # Specific IP and port

# Hostname masks
masks: { subdomains: [google.com] } # Descendants, excluding the apex
masks: "example.com"           # Name and all descendants

# Multiple masks
masks:
  - "192.168.0.0/16"
  - "10.0.0.0/8"
  - "internal.com"

Built-in Rule Groups

• allow-all-direct - Allow all connections, direct routing
• block-all - Block all connections

Typed Destination Predicates

masks accepts legacy strings, typed predicates, file sources, and action-free group references. A list combines its entries with OR. Predicate objects contain one operator: all, any, not, or a leaf. The same forms work recursively inside all/any/not; strings always remain legacy masks, never group names or paths. Lists inside a typed leaf are alternatives.

Keep mixed legacy masks and imported groups in one OR list: splitting them into separate policies can change ordered DNS evaluation.

rules:
  - masks:
      all:
        - domain_suffix: [example.com]
        - destination_port: [443]
    action: allow
  - masks: { any_destination: true }
    action: block

Leaves: domain (exact), domain_suffix (apex and descendants), subdomains (descendants only), domain_pattern (* matches one label), domain_keyword, domain_regex, ip_cidr, destination_port, destination_port_range (inclusive "8000:9000"), and any_destination: true. Native domain literals and keywords are case-insensitive. Regexes are unanchored and case-sensitive unless they enable case folding; backreferences, lookaround and non-ASCII patterns are unsupported. Typed ports are 1-65535. Empty sets match nothing; empty all/any nodes are rejected.

Policies still use first-match order. Inside one policy, a known OR match or AND miss can avoid DNS, regardless of predicate order. An earlier unresolved policy cannot be bypassed by a later domain rule. IP predicates use the selected local DNS answer, pinning it for direct dialing; lookup failure aborts routing. Direct multi-address fallback is disabled after this pinning. Hostname-forwarding proxy protocols may still resolve independently at the exit.

no_resolve: true on a rule prohibits initiating DNS, but consumes an address already supplied/resolved. Without an address, IP predicates remain unknown, including under not; an undecidable policy falls through even when its action is block. Domain predicates without a hostname are false, including for literal-IP connections without a sniff hint. No reverse DNS is performed.

Migration: legacy *.x and .x masks are rejected at startup and reload; replace them explicitly with subdomains or domain_pattern. Bare masks still include the apex and descendants. Legacy /0 masks remain universal without DNS, but typed ip_cidr: ["::/0"] is IPv6-only and requires an IP. Other legacy IPv6 masks no longer match IPv4 through numeric overlap; mapped-only legacy masks normalize to IPv4 with a warning. Explicit typed mapped IPv6 predicates must use IPv4 spelling. Invalid supplied hostnames (including non-ASCII, whitespace, empty labels and excessive length) are now rejected even with catch-all-only rules; use A-label/punycode names. Invalid sniff hints are ignored. Matching strips one root dot and lowercases ASCII without changing the dial target.

Local Rule Sources

Declare an action-free rule_group containing file paths, or load a file inline under masks. Sources are read and compiled during validation, including --dry-run, before a reload stops existing listeners. Invalid sources reject the candidate. Automatic reload watches imported files as well as configs. A parseable rejected candidate keeps its source paths watched, so creating or repairing a missing file can recover without another config edit. Active sources remain watched until a replacement activates. --no-reload disables file watches; SIGHUP still reloads. Established connections retain their original rules until they drain. New routing caches belong to the new configuration; Fake DNS pools are preserved separately.

- rule_group: blocked
  rules:
    - lists/domains.srs
    - path: lists/addresses.json
      format: singbox_json

- address: "0.0.0.0:1080"
  protocol: {type: socks}
  rules:
    - masks: {rule_group: blocked}
      action: block
    - masks: {path: lists/extra.srs}
      action: block
    - masks:
        - "192.168.0.0/16"
        - "internal.example"
        - path: lists/direct.txt
          behavior: domain
      action: allow

Sources and groups also compose with typed predicates:

rules:
  - masks:
      all:
        - rule_group: blocked
        - destination_port: [443]
        - not: {path: lists/exceptions.srs}
    action: block

File groups OR their sources together. A source is a path string inside a group's rules, or an object with path and optional format, behavior, code, and attributes. Inline sources under masks require the object form; a mask string is always an IP/CIDR/hostname. For example, masks: blocked matches that hostname, not the group above. No filesystem or name-existence heuristic changes this.

Actions and routing options belong to the referencing policy, not the sources. Omitting action still means allow; an action-free group does not imply block. Source objects reject action fields and cannot be mixed with predicate operators. Sources with the same canonical path and decoding options share one compiled set, including across named groups and inline uses. DAT codes and attribute names are case-insensitive; attribute order and duplicates do not affect sharing. For MRS, omitted and explicitly supplied behavior values use separate cache entries. Each generation accepts at most 1,024 distinct sources.

Explicit format overrides detection. Otherwise SRS and Zstd signatures select the SRS and MRS decoders, followed by case-insensitive .srs, .mrs, .json, .yaml/.yml, and .txt suffixes. Zstd data must still contain a valid MRS payload. Unknown formats require an explicit format; DAT always requires geosite_dat or geoip_dat. YAML/text still require behavior.

Source paths are relative to the declaring config file, including inline sources inside nested predicates and protocol overrides, even when multiple configs are combined. FFI string configs require absolute source paths. Existing PEM cert/key paths remain relative to the working directory; absolute paths avoid mixing these conventions.

SRS versions 1-5 and sing-box source versions 1-5 support destination domain, suffix, keyword, regex, IP, port, inversion and nested logical rules. Unsupported fields, tags and versions fail validation, including inside inverted expressions. Source address alternatives form an OR; destination ports constrain that OR. An empty top-level set matches nothing. Empty individual rules are invalid. sing-box literal spelling is preserved: uppercase domain/suffix/keyword entries cannot match normalized lowercase queries and produce a warning. Regex patterns retain their own case flags; only the bounded ASCII Rust regex subset is accepted.

Files are limited to 64 MiB, inflated payloads to 256 MiB, and compilation has a 512 MiB conservative allocation budget. Each source is limited to 2 million entries. Temporary decode/build charges are released between sources; retained indexes count toward the generation budget. These are safety ceilings, not a mobile memory guarantee. Runtime regex caches are separate per worker and generation; capture tracking is disabled and each lazy-DFA cache is capped at 256 KiB. Regex groups accept at most 512 KiB of pattern text, with syntax-proportional compilation reserves. Remote URLs and GeoIP .db (MMDB) files are not supported; use country SRS files from sing-geoip instead.

Mihomo providers use format: mihomo_yaml (a payload string list), format: mihomo_text (one entry per line, blank lines and #/// comments ignored; one leading UTF-8 BOM is accepted), or format: mrs. YAML/text require behavior: domain, ipcidr, or classical. MRS supports domain/IP only; an optional configured behavior must match its header. MRS accepts one zstd frame with at most an 8 MiB window. YAML supports block and flow sequences in one mapping containing only payload; tags, anchors, aliases and multiple documents are rejected. Parser read-ahead between events is limited to 128 KiB, including comments and whitespace.

Domain providers distinguish bare exact names, +.example.com (apex and all descendants), .example.com (descendants only), and * as one whole nonempty label. Literal labels are case-insensitive. Classical providers accept DOMAIN, DOMAIN-SUFFIX, DOMAIN-KEYWORD, DOMAIN-REGEX, IP-CIDR, IP-CIDR6, and DST-PORT. Entries are alternatives, not paired independent lists. IP entries may end with ,no-resolve; destination ports accept 80/443/8000-9000. Other operators/options fail validation. Classical keywords and regexes are case-insensitive, with inline regex case overrides preserved. Unlike some Mihomo classical paths, Shoes normalizes incoming query names to lowercase.

Xray geodata uses explicit format: geosite_dat or format: geoip_dat, with a required case-insensitive code: CN category selector. GeoSite optionally accepts attributes: [ads]: every listed attribute must have a true boolean value on the domain. Unlike Xray's key-presence filters, false, integer and key-only attributes do not satisfy this filter. Inline @ selectors and other selection syntax are rejected. GeoIP supports reverse_match and separate IPv4/IPv6 membership. The loader scans protobuf framing without decoding unselected category bodies; selected entries reject unknown fields/enums and unsupported regex syntax. DAT has no relation to the MMDB .db files in sing-geoip releases.

Example Rules

rules:
  # Direct connection for local networks
  - masks: ["192.168.0.0/16", "10.0.0.0/8", "172.16.0.0/12"]
    action: allow
    client_chain:
      protocol:
        type: direct

  # Block specific domains
  - masks:
      any:
        - subdomains: [ads.example.com]
        - domain_suffix: [tracking.example.com]
    action: block

  # Route through upstream proxy
  - masks: "0.0.0.0/0"
    action: allow
    client_chain:
      address: "proxy.example.com:1080"
      protocol:
        type: socks

Named Groups

Client Proxy Group

- client_group: my-upstream
  client_proxies:              # Define proxies in this group
    - address: "proxy1.example.com:1080"
      protocol:
        type: socks
    - address: "proxy2.example.com:1080"
      protocol:
        type: socks

# Reference in rules
- address: "0.0.0.0:8080"
  protocol:
    type: http
  rules:
    - masks: "0.0.0.0/0"
      action: allow
      client_chain: my-upstream  # Reference by name

Rule Group

A group contains either ordered policies or action-free file sources. Member shape determines its kind: objects with masks are policies, even when action is omitted; paths and {path: ...} objects are sources. Empty groups and mixed kinds are rejected. Both kinds share one namespace, including built-in names. rule is an alias for rules; either accepts one item directly or a nonempty list.

Policy groups are referenced from rules or override_rules, preserving order, actions, and routing options. Source groups are referenced only with masks: {rule_group: name}, with the caller's action. Cross-kind references are errors: actions are never discarded or invented. Group nesting is not supported.

- rule_group: standard-rules
  rules:
    - masks: ["192.168.0.0/16"]
      action: allow
      client_chain:
        protocol:
          type: direct
    - masks: "0.0.0.0/0"
      action: allow
      client_chain: my-upstream

# Reference in server config
- address: "0.0.0.0:8080"
  protocol:
    type: http
  rules: standard-rules        # Reference by name

Named PEMs

Define certificates once and reference throughout configuration.

# From file
- pem: my-cert
  path: /path/to/certificate.pem

# Inline data
- pem: my-key
  data: |
    -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
    ...
    -----END PRIVATE KEY-----

# Reference in config
- address: "0.0.0.0:443"
  protocol:
    type: tls
    tls_targets:
      "example.com":
        cert: my-cert          # Reference by name
        key: my-key
        protocol:
          type: http

Advanced Features

Vision (XTLS-Vision)

Vision optimizes TLS-in-TLS scenarios by detecting inner TLS traffic and switching to direct mode for zero-copy performance.

Requirements:

• Inner protocol MUST be VLESS
• Works with both TLS and Reality

# TLS + Vision
protocol:
  type: tls
  tls_targets:
    "example.com":
      cert: cert.pem
      key: key.pem
      vision: true
      alpn_protocols: ["http/1.1"]
      protocol:
        type: vless
        user_id: "uuid"

# Reality + Vision
protocol:
  type: tls
  reality_targets:
    "www.google.com":
      private_key: "..."
      short_ids: ["..."]
      dest: "www.google.com:443"
      vision: true
      protocol:
        type: vless
        user_id: "uuid"

XUDP Multiplexing

Automatically enabled for VMess and VLESS when udp_enabled: true. Multiplexes UDP traffic over a single connection.

Proxy Chaining

Protocol nesting (wrap one protocol in another):

client_chain:
  address: "proxy.example.com:443"
  protocol:
    type: tls
    protocol:
      type: vmess
      cipher: aes-128-gcm
      user_id: "uuid"

Multi-hop chains (route through multiple proxies sequentially):

client_chain:
  chain:
    - address: "proxy1.example.com:1080"
      protocol:
        type: socks
    - address: "proxy2.example.com:443"
      protocol:
        type: tls
        protocol:
          type: vless
          user_id: "uuid"

Hot Reloading

Configuration changes are automatically detected. --no-reload disables file watching; on Unix, SIGHUP still requests a reload.

On Linux, if directory permissions prevent watching a readable configuration's parent, startup falls back to direct file watches and logs a warning. In-place edits remain detectable, but atomic replacements may be missed; use SIGHUP or grant directory read permission when replacing files.

Replacement configurations, certificates, and DNS resolvers are prepared while the current listeners continue serving. A preparation failure leaves the current configuration running. Once preparation succeeds, listeners are replaced. A failure to activate replacements exits with status 1; there is no rollback after listeners are retired. Existing TCP connections may drain for global_limits.reload_grace_secs during successful reloads; QUIC connections are closed.

QUIC listener sockets must finish closing before replacements bind. Closing endpoints get up to one second for best-effort close delivery, then their drivers are stopped locally so peer-controlled timers cannot delay reloads. A five-second socket-release guard remains; exceeding it indicates a local cleanup failure and exits with an error rather than announcing a partially ready generation.

Candidate QUIC buffer sizes are used during DNS preparation, but global_limits admission caps change only at activation. DNS bootstrap over HTTP/3 or QUIC proxy chains therefore needs headroom under the live cap. A cap-increasing reload may require a restart if preparation cannot fit. Lowering a cap does not revoke existing reservations, including those made during preparation; new admissions are blocked until usage falls sufficiently. At cold startup, preparation uses the initial unlimited admission caps.

On macOS, edit the configured file path or use SIGHUP when writing through a hard-link alias in another directory. Automatic detection of such alias writes is backend-dependent. System-volume directory symlinks are resolved without watching their immutable links.

SIGINT/SIGTERM (or Ctrl-C on Windows) stop listeners and exit with status 0. Process shutdown does not wait for the TCP reload grace period.

mTLS (Mutual TLS)

Require client certificates for authentication:

# Server side
protocol:
  type: tls
  tls_targets:
    "example.com":
      cert: server.crt
      key: server.key
      client_ca_certs: [ca.crt]  # Required CA
      client_fingerprints: ["sha256:..."]  # Optional specific certs
      protocol: ...

# Client side
client_chain:
  address: "example.com:443"
  protocol:
    type: tls
    cert: client.crt
    key: client.key
    protocol: ...

Command Line

shoes [OPTIONS] <config.yaml> [config.yaml...]

OPTIONS:
  -t, --threads NUM    Worker threads (default: CPU count)
  -d, --dry-run        Validate config and certificates without starting listeners
  --no-reload          Disable automatic reloads on file changes

COMMANDS:
  check <config.yaml>                           Alias for --dry-run
  version                                      Alias for --version
  generate-reality-keypair                       Generate Reality X25519 keypair
  generate-reality-mldsa65-keypair                Generate optional Reality ML-DSA-65 keys
  generate-shadowsocks-2022-password <cipher>    Generate Shadowsocks 2022 password

check and --dry-run exit with status 0 for valid configuration and 1 for errors. They do not open listeners, create a file watcher, or perform DNS bootstrap networking. Runtime failures such as unavailable bind addresses remain possible after a successful check.

Tips

Generate Keys

Reality keypair:

shoes generate-reality-keypair

Optional Reality post-quantum authentication keys:

shoes generate-reality-mldsa65-keypair

Keep mldsa65_seed on the server; distribute only mldsa65_verify to clients.

Shadowsocks 2022 password:

shoes generate-shadowsocks-2022-password 2022-blake3-aes-256-gcm

UUID:

uuidgen

TLS certificate fingerprint:

openssl x509 -in cert.pem -noout -fingerprint -sha256

Security Best Practices

• Use strong, random passwords
• Keep private keys secure
• Use 127.0.0.1 instead of 0.0.0.0 for local-only access
• Use firewall rules to restrict access
• Enable client certificate authentication for sensitive services
• Use Vision with Reality for maximum privacy

Performance Tips

• Enable vision: true for TLS-in-TLS scenarios
• Use tcp_settings.no_delay: true for low latency
• Set quic_settings.num_endpoints to match worker threads
• Use QUIC transport for high-latency or lossy networks

Common Issues

• "Address already in use": Change port or stop conflicting service
• "Permission denied": Ports < 1024 require root/admin
• Reality connection fails: Verify keys match, UUID matches, SNI matches server's reality_targets key
• Vision not working: Ensure inner protocol is VLESS
• Config validation fails: Run with --dry-run for detailed errors