Files
l0ng-ai fd44c13cb9 fix(ssh): stop a new host-key algorithm from reading as a compromise
A host that grows an ed25519 key beside the ssh-rsa one it has always had
raised the full man-in-the-middle sheet — red border, fingerprint diff, a
"type yes" field — because `check_in_str` folded "known by another
algorithm" into `HostKeyStatus::Changed`. OpenSSH treats a key of an
algorithm the host has no entry for as simply unknown, and saves the alarm
for a key that contradicts one on file.

`ChangedAlgorithm` splits the two apart, with `Changed` keeping precedence
so a same-algorithm mismatch still screams however many other-algorithm
lines sit beside it.

The dialog was only half of it. Negotiation started from russh's default
order, which leads with ed25519, so a host known only by ssh-rsa was
*asked about on every single connection* — and an attacker could pick an
algorithm the user had no entry for to trade the alarm for the mild
confirmation. `build_preferred` now orders the host-key list the way
OpenSSH's `order_hostkeyalgs()` does: what is already on file goes first,
nothing is dropped, and a pinned `HostKeyAlgorithms` is left alone. It
matches on key type, so all three RSA spellings travel together rather
than pinning the host to SHA-1 signatures.

The prompt reuses `AuthPromptKind::HostKeyUnknown` with an added optional
field rather than gaining a variant: the enum is externally tagged and
crosses both the daemon/GUI and the GUI/tty7-server boundaries, where a
new variant is a hard decode failure on an older peer and a new field is
not.

Also fixes a defect the issue did not mention: overriding a genuinely
changed key appended the new line without removing the old one, and since
any same-algorithm match answers `Known`, the superseded — possibly
attacker's — key stayed trusted forever, silently. The superseded line is
now dropped first, and only lines naming this one host are touched, so a
wildcard or `@revoked` entry is never collateral.
2026-08-11 19:58:43 +08:00
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