Files
tty7/.github/scripts/check-host-boundary.sh
T
l0ng-ai 43d59b7317 ci(host-boundary): .exists() asks this machine too
The guard forbids the GUI four ways of reaching the filesystem directly,
because a path held by `ui::` or `terminal::` may name a file on a remote
workspace's machine. `.canonicalize()` is one of them. `.exists()` was
not, and it is the same question asked a shorter way: it answers about
the client's disk whatever machine the path belongs to.

`search::local_probe` is what the answer is supposed to look like — a
local prober and a remote one behind one `Probe`, with an `Unknown` that
means "nobody has asked yet". A bare `.exists()` is that split skipped.

Nothing was violating it. All four call sites are local by construction —
a destination the user picked in this app's own copy flow, a name it is
choosing for a download, and the themes directory — so they join the
allowlist with the reason, which is what the allowlist is for.

`.is_file()` and `.is_dir()` are the same hazard and are deliberately not
added. Between them they occur eleven more times, all on paths that are
local by construction, and the script's own header makes the argument
against: an allowlist that grows faster than the net it casts is one
people stop reading. `.exists()` earns its four lines by being the direct
analogue of a pattern already there.

Checked by injecting a `.exists()` on a pane-supplied path: the guard
names the file and line and exits 1.
2026-08-23 01:54:53 +08:00

197 lines
8.2 KiB
Bash
Executable File

#!/usr/bin/env bash
#
# The GUI must not touch the filesystem or git directly.
#
# Once a workspace can live on a remote machine, a path held by `ui::` or
# `terminal::` is not necessarily a path on *this* box, and `std::path`'s
# fs-backed APIs quietly answer for the wrong machine:
# `canonicalize` walks the local filesystem, `is_absolute` says `false` for
# `/home/me` on Windows, `read_dir` lists the client's disk. Everything that may
# be looking at a workspace path has to go through `ui::host_ops` / the `Host`
# trait, which routes to the local disk or the far side as appropriate.
#
# This script enforces that. It is deliberately *not* the raw grep from the
# contract: run bare, that grep reports 42 hits on a clean tree — not one of them
# git, all of them modules whose paths are local by construction — and a guard
# that always fails is a guard everyone learns to ignore. Two things fix it:
#
# 1. Test bodies are cut off properly. The contract's `grep -v '#\[cfg(test)\]'`
# only removes the attribute line itself, leaving the whole test module
# behind it in scope; here the scan stops at the `#[cfg(test)] mod …` that
# opens the trailing test region.
# 2. An explicit allowlist, keyed on (file, pattern) rather than whole files, so
# a module exempted for its `.is_absolute()` still trips on a new
# `std::fs::`. Every entry carries the reason its paths cannot be remote.
#
# Adding an entry is a deliberate act: if the path could ever be a workspace
# path, the answer is `Host`, not an allowlist line.
#
# Usage: bash .github/scripts/check-host-boundary.sh
# Exit 0 = clean, 1 = violations (printed to stderr).
set -euo pipefail
cd "$(dirname "$0")/../.."
ROOTS=(src/ui src/terminal)
# The forbidden constructs, as extended-regex alternatives.
#
# `.exists()` is here for the same reason `.canonicalize()` is: it asks *this*
# machine whether a path is there, and a workspace path may name a file on the
# far side. `search::local_probe` is the shape the answer should take — a local
# prober and a remote one behind one `Probe`, rather than a bare `.exists()`
# that silently answers for the client. `.is_file()` and `.is_dir()` are the
# same hazard and are deliberately *not* here yet: between them they occur
# eleven more times on paths that are local by construction, and eleven more
# allowlist lines would cost more than the net gains.
PATTERN='std::fs::|Command::new\("git"\)|\.canonicalize\(\)|\.is_absolute\(\)|\.exists\(\)'
# Allowlist entries are `<path>|<literal pattern>`, one per line. `<path>|*`
# exempts a file wholesale (used only for the boundary module itself). The
# pattern side is matched as a plain substring of the offending line.
ALLOW=$(
cat <<'EOF'
# The host boundary itself: every routed filesystem call lands here by design.
src/ui/host_ops.rs|*
# A destination the user picked in this app's own save/copy flow, or a name it
# is choosing for a download — both on this machine by construction. The remote
# half of a transfer goes over SFTP, never through these.
src/ui/file_copy.rs|.exists()
src/ui/sftp.rs|.exists()
# Themes and presets are app-owned files under the local config dir
# (`themes_dir()`), never a workspace path — a remote workspace does not carry
# the user's color schemes with it.
src/ui/presets.rs|std::fs::
src/ui/presets.rs|.exists()
src/ui/presets.rs|.is_absolute()
src/ui/app.rs|std::fs::create_dir_all
# Reading a private key off *this* machine to hash it into a keychain account
# (`core::keychain`). The key is the client's credential; the far side never
# sees the file, only the resulting auth.
src/ui/ssh_prompt.rs|std::fs::read
src/ui/ssh_connect.rs|std::fs::read
src/ui/settings.rs|std::fs::read
# Shell history lives in the local user's home (`~/.zsh_history` &co.) and backs
# this app's own history search. A remote pane's history is the remote shell's
# business, read over the wire, not through here.
src/terminal/history.rs|std::fs::
# Completion is already remote-aware: a remote pane is signalled by `cwd: None`,
# which disables exactly these local-filesystem candidate sources in favour of
# `remote_path_request` / `remote_path_candidates`. The `$PATH` scan is likewise
# this machine's `$PATH`, deliberately withheld from remote panes.
src/terminal/completion.rs|std::fs::read_dir
src/terminal/completion.rs|.is_absolute()
# Bundled completion specs shipped in `assets/completions`, resolved from the
# app bundle / dev manifest dir. Program data, not user or workspace data.
src/terminal/signature.rs|std::fs::read_to_string
# Opening a path scraped out of terminal output resolves it against the local
# cwd — a local-pane affordance; `resolve_existing_path` declines when there is
# no local cwd.
src/terminal/search.rs|.is_absolute()
# Clipboard-image paste stages the bytes into the OS temp dir so an agent TUI
# can be handed a path. Always `std::env::temp_dir()` on this machine.
src/terminal/view.rs|std::fs::create_dir_all
src/terminal/view.rs|std::fs::write
# The source side of a file drop. What the desktop hands over is by
# construction a path on the desktop's own machine, so reading it is a local
# read even when the tree being dropped on is remote — the destination side of
# that copy goes through `Host`, and the one `std::fs::copy` that touches a
# destination sits inside a branch already gated on `host.id().is_local()`.
src/ui/file_copy.rs|std::fs::
EOF
)
# Where the trailing `#[cfg(test)] mod …` starts, if any. Line numbers are
# preserved because only the tail is dropped.
body_of() {
local file=$1 cut
# `attr` starts unset, which awk reads as 0 — so a file whose *first* line
# is `mod something` used to match `attr == NR - 1` and cut the body at
# line 0, leaving `head -n -1` to error out and the file to be scanned as
# empty. Two files opened that way, and the guard was blind to both.
cut=$(awk '
BEGIN { attr = -1 }
/^#\[cfg\(test\)\]$/ { attr = NR }
/^mod [A-Za-z_]/ { if (attr == NR - 1) { print NR - 1; exit } }
' "$file")
if [ -n "$cut" ]; then
head -n "$((cut - 1))" "$file"
else
cat "$file"
fi
}
allowed() {
local file=$1 line=$2 entry path pat
while IFS= read -r entry; do
case "$entry" in '' | '#'*) continue ;; esac
path=${entry%%|*}
pat=${entry#*|}
[ "$path" = "$file" ] || continue
if [ "$pat" = '*' ] || [ "${line#*"$pat"}" != "$line" ]; then
return 0
fi
done <<<"$ALLOW"
return 1
}
# A guard that scans nothing reports success, which is the one failure mode worse
# than a noisy guard. Fail loudly if a root has moved out from under us.
for root in "${ROOTS[@]}"; do
if [ ! -d "$root" ]; then
echo "check-host-boundary: scan root '$root' does not exist (moved? renamed?)" >&2
exit 2
fi
done
violations=0
scanned=0
while IFS= read -r file; do
scanned=$((scanned + 1))
while IFS= read -r hit; do
lineno=${hit%%:*}
text=${hit#*:}
# Prose, not code.
case "$(printf '%s' "$text" | sed 's/^[[:space:]]*//')" in '//'*) continue ;; esac
if allowed "$file" "$text"; then
continue
fi
printf '%s:%s:%s\n' "$file" "$lineno" "$text" >&2
violations=$((violations + 1))
done < <(body_of "$file" | grep -nE "$PATTERN" || true)
done < <(find "${ROOTS[@]}" -name '*.rs' | sort)
if [ "$scanned" -lt 10 ]; then
echo "check-host-boundary: only $scanned files scanned — the roots look wrong" >&2
exit 2
fi
if [ "$violations" -ne 0 ]; then
cat >&2 <<'EOF'
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The GUI reached the filesystem/git directly.
A path in `ui::` or `terminal::` may belong to a remote workspace, where these
calls answer for the wrong machine. Route it through `ui::host_ops` / `Host`
instead (`Host::read_dir`, `join`, `is_absolute`, `canonicalize`, …).
If the path genuinely cannot be remote — app config, bundled assets, the local
temp dir — add it to the allowlist in this script with the reason why.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EOF
exit 1
fi
echo "host boundary clean: $scanned files in ${ROOTS[*]}, no direct fs/git calls"