+ The single biggest threat to a shared warmup pool is a sender pretending to receive its own warmup. A signed HMAC token embedded in the body, validated on classification, makes that impossible. +
+# Token format · plain text, base64url
+wbly:01HQX9F7P3A8KY2NJM4R6BWT0S:1746820392:3f9c2a8b5e1d740a
+ └ pool id └ ulid msg id
+ └ expires └ hmac-sha256
+
+# Embedded as a normal-looking footer line:
+Hey, just wanted to follow up on the project we discussed.
+Let me know when you have a chance.
+
+— Ben
+ref: wbly:01HQX9F7P3A8KY2NJM4R6BWT0S:1746820392:3f9c2a8b
+
+# Receiver classification → verify (HMAC + expiry + msg-id)
+if token.valid() && !seen(token.id) then credit_signal
+else increment_invalid_count(sender)
+ {r.why}
+{s.b}
+{s.b}