feat: retain negotiated origin cipher outcomes through bounded process deadlines and verify open-peer behavior

This commit is contained in:
Matthew Meszaros
2026-11-04 21:24:41 +01:00
parent 4515c15627
commit a64a9e3bbf
3 changed files with 44 additions and 9 deletions
+5 -2
View File
@@ -118,16 +118,19 @@ function peerRefusal(stdout, stderr, cipher) {
}
function classify(result, version, cipher, negative = false) {
if (result.error || result.signal) return "inconclusive";
const output = result.stdout + result.stderr;
const negotiated = /New, (TLSv1\.[23]), Cipher is ([^\s]+)/.exec(output);
if (negative) {
if (/certificate verify failed|Verification error|verify error|no cipher match|unexpected eof|reset by peer|connect:errno/i.test(output)) return "inconclusive";
if (negotiated && negotiated[2] !== "(NONE)" && negotiated[2] !== "0000") return "accepted";
const deadline = result.error === "ETIMEDOUT" && result.status === null && (!result.signal || result.signal === "SIGKILL");
if (negotiated && negotiated[2] !== "(NONE)" && negotiated[2] !== "0000" &&
((!result.error && !result.signal) || deadline)) return "accepted";
if (result.error || result.signal) return "inconclusive";
return result.status === 1 && peerRefusal(result.stdout || "", result.stderr || "", cipher) &&
!/-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----/.test(output) && /no peer certificate available/.test(output) &&
/New, \(NONE\), Cipher is \(NONE\)/.test(output) ? "refused" : "inconclusive";
}
if (result.error || result.signal) return "inconclusive";
return result.status === 0 && negotiated?.[1] === version && negotiated[2] === cipher &&
/Verify return code: 0 \(ok\)/.test(output) && /-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----/.test(output) ? "trusted" : "inconclusive";
}
+36 -6
View File
@@ -48,6 +48,27 @@ function fixture(change = () => {}) {
return { rows, run };
}
test("completed negative negotiations retain their outcome at the process deadline", () => {
for (const cipher of CBC) {
const negotiated = { ...trusted(cipher), status: null, error: "ETIMEDOUT", signal: "SIGKILL" };
assert.equal(classify(negotiated, "TLSv1.2", cipher, true), "accepted");
assert.equal(classify({ ...negotiated, signal: null }, "TLSv1.2", cipher, true), "accepted");
for (const altered of [
{ ...negotiated, error: "ENOBUFS" }, { ...negotiated, error: "EIO" },
{ ...negotiated, error: null }, { ...negotiated, signal: "SIGTERM" }, { ...negotiated, status: 0 },
{ ...negotiated, stderr: "certificate verify failed" },
{ ...negotiated, stdout: refused(cipher).stdout },
]) assert.equal(classify(altered, "TLSv1.2", cipher, true), "inconclusive");
assert.equal(classify(negotiated, "TLSv1.2", cipher), "inconclusive");
}
const f = fixture((row, index) => {
if (index === 4) Object.assign(row, trusted(CBC[0]), { status: null, error: "ETIMEDOUT", signal: "SIGKILL" });
});
assert.equal(probe(["10.42.0.85", "10.42.1.12"], f.run, (row) => f.rows.push(row)), false);
assert.equal(f.rows.find((row) => row.kind === "handshake" && row.negative).outcome, "accepted");
assert.equal(f.rows.at(-1).success, false);
});
test("every private target has fresh trusted positives around both explicit CBC offers", () => {
const f = fixture();
assert.equal(probe(["10.42.0.85", "10.42.1.12"], f.run, (row) => f.rows.push(row)), true);
@@ -206,14 +227,17 @@ test("loopback TLS and alert peers preserve strict refusal and trusted positive
assert.equal(generated.status, 0, generated.stderr);
const f = fixture();
probe(["10.42.0.85", "10.42.1.12"], f.run, (row) => f.rows.push(row));
for (const mode of ["tls", "fatal", "close_notify", "eof", "reset", "silent"]) {
for (const mode of ["tls", "tls_held", "fatal", "close_notify", "eof", "reset", "silent"]) {
await t.test(mode, async () => {
const worker = new Worker(`
const { parentPort, workerData: d } = require("node:worker_threads");
const net = require("node:net");
const tls = require("node:tls");
const server = d.mode === "tls" ? tls.createServer({ key: d.key, cert: d.cert,
minVersion: "TLSv1.2", maxVersion: "TLSv1.2", ciphers: d.cipher }, (s) => s.end()) : net.createServer((s) => {
const server = d.mode.startsWith("tls") ? tls.createServer({ key: d.key, cert: d.cert,
minVersion: "TLSv1.2", maxVersion: "TLSv1.2", ciphers: d.cipher }, (s) => {
s.on("error", () => {});
if (d.mode === "tls") s.end();
}) : net.createServer((s) => {
let input = Buffer.alloc(0);
s.on("error", () => {});
s.on("data", (b) => {
@@ -227,7 +251,7 @@ test("loopback TLS and alert peers preserve strict refusal and trusted positive
});
server.on("tlsClientError", () => {});
server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", () => parentPort.postMessage(server.address().port));
`, { eval: true, workerData: { mode, key: readFileSync(key), cert: readFileSync(cert), cipher: GCM[0] } });
`, { eval: true, workerData: { mode, key: readFileSync(key), cert: readFileSync(cert), cipher: mode === "tls_held" ? CBC.join(":") : GCM[0] } });
try {
const port = await new Promise((resolve, reject) => { worker.once("message", resolve); worker.once("error", reject); });
const localArgs = (cipher) => {
@@ -238,9 +262,15 @@ test("loopback TLS and alert peers preserve strict refusal and trusted positive
};
for (const cipher of CBC) {
const result = invoke(localArgs(cipher), (command, args, options) => spawnSync(command, args,
{ ...options, timeout: mode === "silent" ? 300 : options.timeout }));
assert.equal(classify(result, "TLSv1.2", cipher, true), ["tls", "fatal"].includes(mode) ? "refused" : "inconclusive",
{ ...options, timeout: mode === "tls_held" ? 500 : mode === "silent" ? 300 : options.timeout }));
assert.equal(classify(result, "TLSv1.2", cipher, true), mode === "tls_held" ? "accepted" : ["tls", "fatal"].includes(mode) ? "refused" : "inconclusive",
JSON.stringify(result));
if (mode === "tls_held") {
assert.equal(result.error, "ETIMEDOUT");
assert.equal(result.signal, "SIGKILL");
assert.ok(result.stdout.includes(`New, TLSv1.2, Cipher is ${cipher}`));
assert.match(result.stdout, /Verify return code: 0 \(ok\)/);
}
if (mode === "close_notify") {
assert.match(result.stdout, /<<< TLS 1.2, Alert \[length 0002\], warning close_notify\n\s+01 00/);
const summaryOnly = invoke(localArgs(cipher).filter((arg) => !["-ign_eof", "-state", "-msg"].includes(arg)));