 Matthew Meszaros
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0f60fd9b84
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feat: attach a Google, Apple or OIDC identity to an existing password account only after that account's password is presented: resolveFederatedUser parks the sign-in as link_required with a single-use sso_link pending token, POST /auth/sso/link checks the password against the provider-asserted address on the sign-in failure budget and links then issues the session through finishLoginAs, the dashboard collects it on a new login step, and the API reference, endpoints list, security guide and OpenAPI spec describe the third login result
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2026-09-21 03:25:29 -07:00 |
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Matthew Meszaros
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e668a2a36b
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feat: complete the ADA CASA v2.1.1 AL1 control set across authentication, sessions, access control, cryptography, input validation and configuration, adding a breached-password denylist and per-account login throttling, enforced multi-factor authentication on the admin panel, step-up confirmation before an action that mints a lasting credential, purpose-scoped session tokens, single-use TOTP steps, tenant verification on every cross-referenced identifier, security headers on every surface, encrypted webhook signing secrets, per-organization idempotency, PKCE and a minimal two-scope Gmail consent on the mailbox OAuth flow, bounded spreadsheet and archive decoding, a patched Go toolchain with govulncheck in CI, and the evidence pack under compliance/casa
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2026-09-19 08:18:35 +02:00 |
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Matthew Meszaros
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49acd51b64
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feat: stop one recurring fault burying error tracking by reporting it once per five minutes with the count it stands for, keep a cache outage from answering every signed-in request with a 500 and from taking realtime down by treating an unreachable Redis as a miss and the websocket handshake nonce nothing reads as best-effort, answer a 5xx with a sentence the reader can act on while the call site's own words go to the log against the same request id, prefer the API's own message over the HTTP class in the admin and dashboard clients, and name the fix on a schema registry refusal, an SES sandbox rejection and a mailbox check that could not be run
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2026-09-19 07:39:40 +02:00 |
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Matthew Meszaros
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029bc27bfd
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feat: bind a browser sign-in to the browser that started it, so a handoff link cannot be forwarded: one-time state proves the callback answers a request this server made, not one THIS browser made, so anyone could run the flow against their own Google or OIDC account and send the resulting URL to someone else, whose browser would then hold the sender's session (RFC 9700 4.7.1); begin now mints a binding secret that never reaches the provider and never appears in a URL, the callback carries it into the handoff, and the exchange refuses a collection that cannot present it with sso_wrong_browser, while the comments this PR added are condensed to the constraint they exist to state
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2026-08-28 01:44:39 -07:00 |
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Matthew Meszaros
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9ab42cfd65
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feat: build the browser half of social sign-in, which was never wired: GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID was read at boot and made the login screen render a Google button, but the button opened a popup at /auth/google/login which no route served, and authService.GoogleAuth/AppleAuth had no caller anywhere in the codebase; internal/app/socialauth now runs Google and Apple through the flow generic OIDC already used (one-time state, PKCE, nonce, id_token verified against the provider JWKS, identity keyed on issuer and subject, JIT provisioning, the ban and 2FA gates), the redirect URI defaults to API_PUBLIC_URL/v1/auth/<provider>/callback and is logged at boot because registering the dashboard origin instead is the mistake that produces a valid OAuth client and a dead button, /auth/config advertises only providers the backend can actually complete, the SSO landing page no longer swallows a two_fa_required response, and OIDC_PROVIDER_NAME finally reaches the button it documents
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2026-08-28 01:33:08 -07:00 |
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