* feat: give an organization one fused abuse posture, because every existing control watches a single subject and an actor slightly wrong on several axes sits under all of them: organizations gains risk_state, risk_score, risk_reason and an append-only risk_signals evidence blob, modelled on the warmup participant health machine that already works rather than a second vocabulary for the same idea; restricted cuts per-mailbox cold volume to a quarter and forces the free warmup pool so a risky tenant cannot spend the paid pool's shared reputation, suspended stops sending at the send gate, and watch deliberately changes nothing a customer can feel so evidence accumulates before anything is taken away; an operator's suspension outranks the derived band so a detector clearing cannot release a workspace a human suspended, transitions ride the audit spine to every teammate's dashboard, a banner says which limit is active and why rather than letting volume drop silently, and the posture never travels in a workspace archive since it is one platform's verdict reached from evidence the destination never saw
* feat: make the suspension actually stop sending, and emit the audit transitions the PR claimed: emailsend.SendEmail is only the manual and API path, so campaign and warmup sends went nowhere near the gate and a suspended workspace kept sending on its schedule, while the restricted multiplier floored every mailbox at one a day which quietly turned suspension into a trickle rather than a stop; the campaign scheduler now defers the whole campaign with a reason and the warmup task skips as org-suspended, since warmup is outbound mail from the same domains; separately the band change emitted no audit entry at all despite the entity type and the frontend spine entry both existing, so no banner moved for a teammate and there was no trail of who was restricted when, and only a real transition is logged so a detector re-recording the same finding cannot fill the feed; one of my own live tests also asserted how far out a slot lands, which depends on the hour the suite runs, and now asserts the property it was about
* feat: capture and score a signup's origin instead of discarding it
* feat: document what a signup records, and prove the origin write is on the account path with a seam test rather than only testing the scorer
* chore: drop the em dashes and trim the comments the review flagged
Add request and mail-delivery timeouts around auth flows so login requests cannot hang indefinitely when notification delivery stalls.
Allow the local admin dev origin through default CORS and update context-aware lint fixes so the repository lint gate passes.
The bitmask landed in 000045 with schema + UI; this commit wires the
three gates the bits describe.
- BanScopeLogin → authService.LoginConfirm checks the scope after
password verification and refuses the session
with "this account has been suspended"
- BanScopeOrgCreate → organizationService.Create checks the scope
before any other validation and refuses with
"this account cannot create new workspaces"
- BanScopeSend → emailSendService.SendEmail checks the scope
before validating the email account and refuses
with "this account cannot send email"
Adds UserRepository.GetBanState(ctx, userID) → uint32 — a single-column
read so the hot paths don't have to fetch the full user row just to
check a flag. Returns 0 when no ban (the column defaults to 0); the
caller treats 0 as "allow."
Threads userRepo into emailSendService — the only constructor change
in this commit. cmd/backend/main.go updated accordingly.
The Tries counter on login and registration sessions was checked but
never incremented, making the brute-force protection dead code. An
attacker could retry verification codes indefinitely within the session
TTL. Now each failed attempt increments and persists the counter.
- Return actual captcha verification errors instead of generic
internal errors in login, registration, and reset password flows
- Fix Sentry capturing wrong variable (err -> xerr) in
RegistrationConfirm
- Pass AuthSecret as []byte to JWT SignedString/keyfunc
- Send form data in request body instead of PostForm for Turnstile
- Improve Turnstile non-200 error handling with response body logging
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Matthew Meszaros
Matt
